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ABSTRACT 
by 
Anita Levinson 
The Report of the Robens Committee (1972), the Health and 
Safety at Work Act (1974) and the Safety Representatives and 
Safety Committees Regulations (1977) provide the framework 
within which this study of certain aspects of health and safety 
is carried out. The philosophy of self-regulation is considered 
and its development is set within an historical and an industrial 
relations perspective. 
The research uses a case study approach to examine the effec-
tiveness of self-regulation in health and safety in a public 
sector organisation. Within this approach, methodological 
triangulation employs the techniques of interviews, questionnaires, 
observation and documentary analysis. 
The work is based in four departments of a Scottish Local 
Authority and particular attention is given to three of the main 
'agents' of self-regulation - safety representatives, supervisors 
and safety committees and their interactions, strategies and 
effectiveness. A behavioural approach is taken in considering 
the attitudes, values, motives and interactions of safety 
representatives and management. 
Major internal and external factors, which interact and 
which influence the effectiveness of joint self-regulation of health 
and safety, are identified. It is emphasised that an organisation 
cannot be studied without consideration of the context within which 
it operates both locally and in the wider environment. One of 
these factors, organisational structure, is described as bureau-
cratic and the model of a Representative Bureaucracy described by 
Gouldner (1954) is compared with findings from the present study. 
An attempt is made to ascertain how closely the Local Authority fits 
Gouldner's model. 
This research contributes both to knowledge and to theory in 
the subject area by providing an in-depth study of self-regulation 
in a public sector organisation, which when compared with such 
studies as those of Beaumont (1980, 1981, 1982) highlights some of 
the differences between the public and private sectors. Both 
empirical data and hypothetical models are used to provide 
description and explanation of the operation of the health and 
safety system in the Local Authority. 
As data were collected during a dynamic period in economic, 
political and social terms, the research discusses some of the 
effects of the current economic recession upon safety organisation. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
3 
I~TRODUCTION 
1.1 Origin of the research project 
This study of health and safety provision in one part of the 
public sector in the United Kingdom was prompted partly by a 
general increase in interest in health and safety both as a result 
of legislation and in increasing expectations of the quality of 
working life, and partly because, at the time of initiating the 
research, there was a lack of published work in the area. 
Researchers in the United States have produced some important 
seminal work, for example on the workings of safety committees; 
however, caution has to be used when relating these findings to 
the British context because of certain important differences such 
as the industrial relations systems of the two countries. 
For example, there is a higher degree of unionisation in 
the U.K. (approximately 50% as opposed to 20% in the U.S.A.). 
Trade union safety representatives have a statutory right to 
consultation with management on health and safety matters in the 
U.K. which does not exist in the U.S. legislation. In the U.S.A., 
unlike the U.K., unionisation is particularly weak among white 
collar and public employees which is important because a higher 
proportion of the workforce are in these occupations than in the 
U.K. 
In the U.S.A., the trade unions are not directly connected 
to a major political party as are their British counterparts. 
This may mean that they have less potential influence on the 
introduction of employment legislation. 
It is therefore important to build up a foundation of research 
based in the United Kingdom 'to use as a basis for future studies 
leading to the further development of health and safety as a 
recognised academic subject area. The research work that has 
been carried out in this country has nearly all been based in the 
private sector, and it is therefore apposite to examine how certain 
aspects of health and safety legislation are being implemented in 
a Local Authority. 
Local government has certain characteristics which make it 
interesting to study. For example, it is bureaucratic in nature, 
it is under more direct governmental control than private industry, 
and it has a longer history in the use of joint consultation 
between management and trade unions. 
1.2 Scope of the project 
It was decided to examine one aspect of the Health and Safety 
at Work etc. Act (1974) which was an innovation on previous safety 
legislation - that is self-regulation, and to try to define this 
concept and the ways in which it can be operationalised. 
The implication of the Robens Report (1972) that health and 
safety is an area where a unitary perspective is appropriate also 
leads to a potentially interesting research topic. Is a purely 
co-operative, consultative relationship between management and 
trade union safety representatives to be found? Or, is the 
Robens view too simplistic and does an element of negotiation, 
indicative of the pluralistic perspective of industrial relations 
exist? 
The scope of the research project and the breadth and depth 
of the work carried out is governed by obvious constraints of 
time and labour. In this case the entire project was carried 
out by one researcher, and there was limited time available to 
carry out the work. Because of these constraints a realistic 
area of work had to be identified. Breadth of coverage was 
sacrificed in favour of depth, by using a case study approach 
using a Scottish local authority as the organisation to be 
studied. 
The aim was to obtain rich, abundant data which although 
initially descriptive should generate hypotheses either to be 
followed up in the present work or by future researchers. The 
fact that generalisations cannot be made from the data collected 
in this study was considered to outweigh the superficiality of 
data described in some of the studies reviewed in Chapter Five 
where larger samples were used. 
Four departments (described in Appendix Two) were studied 
in detail within the Local Authority, each with its own health 
and safety problems, and the researcher had to be selective 
about what information to use in the final study as co-operation 
from those concerned was so forthcoming. 
Very little research in the area of health and safety has 
been carried out in the public sector and as a Local Authority 
;s an example of a bureaucratic organisation, the scope of the 
E 
project also includes a chapter based on the description by 
. 
Gouldner (1954) of three types of bureaucracy. Gouldner 
described Representative Bureaucracy in terms of safety 
organisation which means that it was possible to try to fit 
the organisation under study to Gouldner's model. 
In addition, a chapter which is theory-based rather than 
being restricted to the empirical data generated in the present 
study, was written on the philosophy of self-regulation and an 
attempt was made to describe its historical development within 
a framework of increasing participation and responsibility of 
workers in certain aspects of their work. 
1.3 Objectives of the research 
The aims and objectives of the research are outlined below: 
1 . 
2. 
To carry out a case study-based project in order 
to examine the implementation of the self-
regulatory aspects of the Health and Safety at 
Work etc. Act (1974) in one part of the public 
sector. 
To define self-regulation and to try to examine 
the effectiveness of, and roles played by some 
of its 'agents', for example trade union safety 
representatives, safety committees, senior 
management and supervisors; these agents being 
those who mainly impinge upon the shop floor. 
3. To test certain hypotheses with regard to the 
functioning of t~e above agents of self-
regulation using relevant research methods 
which can allow an element of cross-checking 
or validation of data. 
4. To carry out a full literature review of the 
limited available research and to use this as 
a basis for the present study. 
5. To examine Gouldner's concept of Representative 
Bureaucracy to determine whether the Local 
Authority can be described as an example of 
this type of organisation in relation to health 
and safety. 
6. To comment upon the philosophy of se1f-
regulation and its development. 
7. To draw conclusions from the completed study 
and to make recommendations for further 
research as appropriate. 
1.4 The layout of the project 
Chapter Two provides a short summary of the background and 
legislation necessary to provide a context within which the 
concept of self-regulation, which is described in Chapter Three 
can be appreciated. 
Chapter Four deals with the various types of methodology 
used in this study and explains the value of methodological 
triangulation in validating data. The use of various techniques 
to collect data is in itself a useful learning experience for the 
researcher, as is coping with the problems generated when trying 
to gain access to an organisation, which are also described in 
this chapter. 
The literature review which was carried out is described in 
Chapter Five. Chapter Six contains a brief appreciation of the 
differing perspectives of the management/trade union relationship 
in a health and safety context which interact with the industrial 
relations frame of reference within which the relationships occur. 
A separate chapter is given to each of the three agents 
studied - safety representatives, supervisors, and safety committees. 
There is considerable overlap here; that is, some data are relevant 
to more than one chapter. The result of this is very occasional 
repetition of data in order to interpret them in a different 
context. The other result is that compared with the chapters on 
safety representatives and safety committees, the chapter on 
supervisors is shorter. The reason for this is that much of the 
data on supervisors has been incorporated into the safety 
representatives chapter in order that comparisons between these 
two groups may be made. Several questions on the two questionnaires 
were deliberately made common to both and are mainly discussed in the 
safety representatives chapter. It should be noted that not all 
aspects of self-regulation have been considered. The role of the 
safety officer, the safety policy and organisational arrangements 
for example, if studied would have broadened the scope of the thesis 
beyond the resources available. 
Chapter Ten is based on the study of Representative Bureau-
cracy by Gouldner and an attempt is made to show in diagrammatic 
form similarities and differences between his model and the 
research findings from the local authority stuqy. 
Chapter Eleven consists of an examination of the philosophy 
of self-regulation and its development. Chapter Twelve puts 
forward some conclusions as to the effectiveness of self-
regulation in the organisation. 
Appendices One and Two describe the structure of the local 
authority and the four departments under study. Appendices 
Three and Four contain copies of the two questionnaires which 
were sent out to groups of safety representatives and supervisors. 
CHAPTER TWO 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATION 
, , 
I ' , , 
RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND LEGISLATIO~ 
2.1 The Robens Report (1972) 
The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act (1974) was the outcome 
of the Robens Report of 1972 which was produced by a committee set 
up in 1970 under the chairmanship of Lord Robens. Their terms of 
reference were: liTo review the provision made for the safety and 
health af persons in the course of their employment ... and to 
consider whether any changes are needed in: 
1. The scope or nature of the major relevant 
enactments, 
2. The nature and extent of voluntary action 
concerned wi th these rna tters . II 
They also had to consider whether any further steps were 
required to safeguard members of the public from hazards other 
than general environmental pollution arising in connection with 
activities in industrial and commercial premises and construction 
sites, and to make recommendations. 
The Committee talked to inspectors, administrators, industr-
ialists, trade unions and received written submissions from 
organisations and individuals. They made visits at home and 
overseas to discuss health and safety issues with managers, work 
people and government officials. 
There are five main reasons why the Robens Committee was 
, r 
'L. 
looking at the system ln 1970: 
1. There had never before been a comprehensive review 
of the subject. 
2. There was a high national rate of accidents and 
disease at work with the related costs which was 
considered to be unacceptable at that particular 
time by the Labour Government, trade unions and 
management. 
3. The wide publicity given to cases of compensation 
for diseases such as asbestosis had raised concern 
about the insidious and potentially deadly nature 
of the long-term risks to which certain groups of 
workers might be exposed. 
4. There was a rapid increase in the number of new 
chemical substances and mixtures being brought 
into use in industrial and commercial processes. 
5. Attitudes or expectations about authority and 
decision-making had changed. Increasingly, both 
employers and workers expected to take an active 
part in the making and application of legislation 
of this kind. 
The traditional approach to health and safety at work was 
based upon an extensive system of detailed statutory provisions 
administered and enforced by government departments and local 
authorities and the legislation on industrial safety had emergec 
in a piecemeal fashion decade after decade. This traditional 
empirical approach could not keep pace in an age of rapid change 
in industrial structure and technology as well as in social 
attitudes and expectations. 
The Robens Committee considered that there were three main 
defects in the existing statutory system: the first defect 
was that there was too much law. There were nine main groups 
of statutes supported by nearly 500 subordinate statutory instru-
ments. The sheer mass of the law had become counter-productive. 
The COl1l11ittee maintained that lithe primary responsibility 
for doing something about the present levels of occupational 
accidents and disease lies with those who create the risks and 
those who work wi th than. II The system encouraged too much 
reliance on state regulations and too little on personal respon-
sibility and voluntary, self-generating effort. It was 
necessary to influence attitudes and create a framework for 
better health and safety organisation and action by industry 
itself. Robens suggested that what was needed w~s a balance 
between the regulatory and voluntary elements of the overall 
system. 
The second defect was that the existing law was intrin-
sically unsatisfactory to the extent of being badly structured, 
and badly written, too detailed and littered with obsolete or 
obsolescent provisions. The bulk of the existing provisions 
were concerned with physical circumstances, for example, the 
safeguarding of machines or the provision of adequate lighting 
and ventilation. But equally important, according to the Robens 
Committee were the attitudes, capacities and performance of 
1 ~ 
people and the efficiency of tte organisational systems within 
which they work. Such factors as the roles of training, joint 
consultation, the arrangements for monitoring safety performance, 
or the influence or work-systems and organisation upon attitudes 
and behaviour must be included. 
The third defect was the fragmentation of administrative 
jurisdictions. There were five government departments (Employment, 
Trade & Industry, Agriculture, Environment and the Home Office) and 
seven separate inspectorates (factories, mines, agriculture, 
explosives, nuclear installations, radio-chemical and alkali). 
These covered nothing like the whole of the working population and 
overlap could create uncertainty and confusion. Fragmentation 
of the legislation and its administration made the task of harmon-
ising, servicing and up-dating the various statutory provisions 
extremely difficult. 
This fragmentation had effects at various levels. One 
establishment may have been subject to a multiplicity of safety 
and health provisions under a number of acts and sets of regulations. 
Some workplaces, between them employing eight million people, fell 
entirely outside the scope of the existing provisions, for example 
road haulage depots, airports, schools, hospitals. I nspectori a 1 
and administrative time was being wasted on demarcation matters, 
depending on the definitions of premises, processes and activities. 
At the national level of policy formulation and law making it 
may be difficult to make progress on a subject where administration 
responsibilities are heavily fragmented and where close and 
extensive consultation between several departments is needed before 
a major initiative can be taken. 
The Committee proposed that there was a need for a more self-
regulating system of provision for safety and health at work. 
The traditional approach based on ever-increasing detailed 
statutory regulation was outdated, over-complex and inadequate. 
Reform shoul d be aimed at cr'eati ng the condi ti ons for more 
effective self-regulation by employers and work people jointly. 
The efforts of industry and commerce to tackle their own 
safety and health problems should be encouraged, supported and 
supplemented by up-to-date provisions unified within a single, 
comprehensive framework of legislation. Much greater use should 
be made of agreed voluntary standards and codes of practice to 
promote progressively better conditions. 
The Robens Committee recommended that a National Authority 
for Safety and Health at Work should be set up and that the 
existing legislation should be revised, unified and administered 
by the new authority. This authority should have a comprehensive 
range of executive powers and functions, and statutory provisions 
formulated should be laid before Parliament by the appropriate 
~1inister. The scope of the new legislation should extend to all 
employers and employees and should cover the self-employed where 
their acts or omissions could endanger other workers or the 
general public. 
As regards sanctions and their enforcement, inspectors would 
be able to issue improvement notices where changes were to be 
made within a stated time, or prohibition notices where a process 
If 
could be stopped completely if the hazard was great. Higher 
fines should be provided fo~ and these and the notices should 
be subject to appeal before industrial tribunals. 
It was recommended that the new authority should playa 
promotional and co-ordinating role in safety training and it 
should actively participate in some neglected areas such as 
safety training in management courses. 
It was felt that the costs of accidents had been relatively 
neglected and a more cost-effective approach to the deployment 
of public resources for accident prevention should be encouraged, 
and similar work assisted by industry-level organisations and 
individual firms. 
To sum up, the objectives of future policy were to create a 
more unified and integrated system to increase the effectiveness 
of the state's contribution to health and safety at work, and to 
develop more efficient self-regulating systems instead of negative 
regulation by external agencies. 
There must be acceptance and exercise of appropriate 
responsibilities at all levels within industry and commerce. 
There should be more management initiative and greater involvement 
of work people. 
2.2 The Health and Safety at Work etc. Act (1974) 
The Health and Safety at Work Act (HASAWA) was brought into 
, -
!/ 
force in three stages, commencing respectively on 1st October 1974, 
. 
1st January 1975 and 1st April 1975. It is an enabling Act in 
addition to and only partially replacing existing health and 
safety at work legislation such as the Factories Act (196l) and 
the Offices, Shops and Railway Premises Act (l964). The greater 
part of the existing acts and subsidiary regulations remain 
current, but repeal, amendment, revision and updating will continue 
as necessary over a number of years. 
The HASAWA also extends the scope of health and safety 
legislation because it applies to all persons at work, employers, 
self-employed and employees, with the exception of domestic 
servants in private households. About eight million people such 
as those employed in education, research, leisure industries, 
medicine and in some parts of the transport industry, have 
legislative protection for the first time. The legislation is 
designed to protect not only people at work, but also the health 
and safety of the general public who may be affected by work 
activities. 
The Act also aims at controlling the storage and use of 
dangerous substances and the control of pollution emitted into 
the air from certain premises. 
A Health and Safety Commission and a Health and Safety 
Executive were set up to administer the legislation. The Commission 
has major research, educational and advisory responsibilities. 
It also undertakes the continuing job of preparing proposals for 
revising, updating and extending the statutory provisions on 
health and safety at work and for issuing approved codes of 
lE 
practice which lay down minimum guidelines. 
The Health and Safety Executive has the power to enforce the 
statutory requirements on health and safety. In particular, 
inspectors now have powers to issue improvement and prohibition 
notices, which would enable them to require practical improvements 
to be made within a specified time or require preventive measures 
immediately without first having to obtain a court order. 
Employers can appeal to an industrial tribunal about, for 
example, notices served on them, but in the first year following 
the introduction of HASAWA in 1974, there were only 35 appeals 
arising out of 6,000 notices served. 
To sum up the ways in which the situation following the 
1974 Act differs from that under the previous legislation: it 
covers aZZ people at work, which means that over eight million 
workers receive protection for the first time. It contains very 
little detail, concentrating more on the statement of broad 
principles which call for positive action on the part of both 
employers and employees, self-regulation being encouraged. 
Regulations and codes of practice were to follow with a demand for 
commitment to health and safety at the highest level in every 
organisation. Written safety policies must be published, together 
with methods for implementing them. Full information about risks 
must be given to employee representatives and they must be 
consulted about the solution to problems, usually done in a 
regular and structured way through the mechanisms of safety 
committees and safety representatives. Joint safety committees 
were formed with both worker and management representatives where 
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a two-way flow of information could make both workers and manage-
ment aware of hazards and ways to overcome them. 
The inspectorate must give information about hazards and 
thei r preventi on, and mus t therefore ha ve di rect contact wi th 
employees. Additional powers were given to inspectors to 
issue improvement and prohibition notices backed up by the 
sanctions of much stiffer financial penalties than those that 
existed before. Fines are unlimited and criminal proceedings 
can be taken for breach of general or specific duties. 
The laws that existed about such things as the guarding of 
machines were tightened up and responsibility for this placed 
on the designer, importer and manufacturer of machines as well 
as the owners and operators. 
2.3 The Safety Representative and Safety Committees Regulations 
(1977) 
Under the Hea 1 th and Sa fety at Work Act (1974), Regul ati ons \\ere 
made on safety representatives and safety committees which became 
operative from 1st October 1978 (SRSC Regulations). 
Among other things these Regulations brought safety committees, 
which had existed for some time in many organisations, into a legal 
framework for the first time, although it should be noted that the 
committees had to be established under the SRSC provisions for 
this to be the case. 
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The Health and Safety Commission published the Regulations 
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and in addition, the approved Code of Practice which gives the 
minimum standards considered acceptable. Guidance Notes also 
offer practical advice to employers on the Regulations. 
Within the same flexible framework as the HASAWA, the 
Regulations and Code of Prcctice leav2 employers and trade unions 
free to make arrangements suitable to the circumstances of each 
undertaking. They set out in detail how trade unions can appoint 
safety representatives and also the functions of these represent-
atives and the duty of employers to permit them time off with 
pay to perform their functions. 
This statutory support of workers' representatives in the 
regulation of conditions governing their health and safety 
heralded a major change in the system of accident prevention in 
this country. Also mentioned are the obligations of the employers 
to provide relevant information, instruction and training. 
Regulation nine deals with the establishing of safety 
committees. An employer must set up a safety committee if 
requested in writing to do so by at least two safety representa-
tives. On receipt of this request, he must consult with the 
safety representatives who made it and with the representatives 
of recognised trade unions whose members work in any workplace 
in which the committee would function. The employer must post 
a notice for the workforce to read stating the composition of 
the committee and the workplace to be covered by it. The final 
statutory requirement on the subject of safety committees states 
that the committee must be established by the employer not later 
than three months after receipt of the request fer it. 
The objectives, functions, possible composition and organ-
isation of the safety committee are suggested in the Guidance 
Notes. There is particular emphasis on the promotion of co-oper-
ation between employers and employees in investigating, developing 
and carrying out measures to ensure the health and safety at work 
of all employees. 
The Guidance Notes also suggest that agreed objectives or 
terms of reference should be drawn up for the committee and 
examples of these are described in detail with regard to the four 
departments under study in this project. 
The above three sections comprise the frame of reference 
within which the effectiveness of the self-regulatory aspects of 
the HASAWA (1974) are to be assessed. 
For the purpose of setting out the context for this thesis, 
the relevant background and legislation which has been discussed 
here has been treated in a descriptive rather than an analytical 
way. Other texts deal with various legal aspects of health and 
safety at work from a variety of standpoints. These include: 
general guides (e.g. Jackson, 1979; Dewis, 1982; Selwyn, 1982), 
reference manuals for safety officers (e.g. Dewis, 1978), guides 
for managers (e.g. Howells and Barrett, 197:; Broadhurst, 1978), 
Health and Safety Commission publications (e.g. HSC, 1977), 
handbooks directed at workers and trade unionists (e.g. Kinnersly, 
1973; Eva and Oswald, 1981), as well as numerous guides produced 
by trade unions and other organisations. 
CHAPTER THREE 
SELF-REGULATION 
SELF-REGULATIOt\ 
It is important here to clarify exactly what is meant by 
this concept of self-regulation. 
The Robens Report (1972) stated that a rigorous enforcement 
policy from health and safety inspectors was "misconceived" and 
II undes i rab 1 e" and that they sho u1 d offer advi ce to employers 
rather than enforce legal sanctions. This belief was based on 
the idea that self-regulation on the part of those involved in 
the workplace is the best method of achieving a safe and healthy 
environment. 
'~ principle theme of this report is the need for greater 
acceptance of shared responsibility and more reliance on 
self-ir~pection and self-regulation and less on state 
regulation. This calls for a greater degree of real 
participation in the process of decision-making at all 
levels." 
In other words, the Committee was advocating a minimum of state 
intervention, a more co-operative approach being more appropriate. 
What this means at plant level is voluntary management -
labour interaction and a general duty of the employer to consult 
with employees - that is, cooperation is essential for self-
regulation to be effective. But is this unitary viewpoint on 
health and safety a valid one? The extent to which management 
and trade union views on safety coincide or diverge will be 
investigated in the course of this thesis. 
But the concept of self-regulation was not without its 
critics, for example Ashford (1976), who made such comments as 
'naive', 'too hopeful " 'puts too much faith in human nature'. 
It was also suggested that the responsibility for safety would be 
divided among all so that it would become no-one's business. 
It is hoped that this research will indicate whether self-
regulation is effective in maintaining safety standards or whether 
the reservations mentioned above have foundation. I t wi 11 
concentrate on that part of the legislation which stresses the 
importance of self-regulation as opposed to enforcement by outside 
agencies. 
By self-regulation is meant the setting of self-imposed 
standards of health and safety performance which should be 
continuously monitored internally to ensure that targets are 
being met and standards upheld. Employers must accept the 
responsibility for managing their organisation in a way which 
ensures the systematic care of the health and safety of employees. 
The important function of monitoring can be carried out at 
various levels in the organisation from senior management to the 
worker on the shopfloor. Training is particularly important 
for those who are specifically responsible for monitoring so that 
they are able to make a genuine assessment of safety performance 
in the organisation. For example, trade union-appointed safety 
representatives may monitor safety standards and then on the 
basis of these make representations via the consultative ~achinery 
set up under the Safety Representatives and Safety COrTlTlittee 
Regulations. 
Training courses for safety representatives generally t",ave a 
module devoted to inspection and monitoring of the workplace 
indicating that this is seen to be an important function of the 
safety representative. 
The internal monitoring carried out by an organisation may 
vary depending on the circumstances prevailing and some of the 
main areas which are useful in providing information regarding 
safety performance are: 
1. Safety policy 
Employers must prepare a written statement related 
to the health and safety of employees which includes a 
statement of the organisation and arrangements for 
carrying out the policy. The policy should be 
displayed for all employees to see and often individual 
copies are provided for workers. 
Monitoring should indicate whether the organisation 
and arrangements for the implementation of the policy are 
effective. The degree of effectiveness of the policy 
in the organisation can indirectly indicate the degree 
of commitment to health and safety of the employer or 
senior management. 
2. Accident records 
It is important that direct comparisons should not 
be made betwee~ different organisations or, in the case of 
a local authority, between different departments. 
Differences in size, numbers at risk and the number and 
severity of inherent hazards makes it invalid to make 
direct comparisons, and it is more useful to use 
statistics to indicate a trend within a department 
by comparing present figures with past ones. 
Analysis of accidents can facilitate the prevention 
of their recurrence. 
3. Compliance with legal requirements and Codes of Practice 
This may indicate the extent to which many 
hazards have been controlled or eliminated. 
Various methods can be used to ensure that the health 
and safety laws are being upheld, for example, formal 
inspections, safety sampling or audits. Staff must be 
trained in these methods so that information can be 
collected, recorded, analysed and evaluated in a system-
atic way. This information can also indicate the 
standards of training, supervision and instruction in 
the organisation. 
4. Achievement of objectives 
An important part of self-regulation is the set-
ting from within the organisation of targets related to 
a time scale. Examples may be the elimination of 
hazards, the provision and use of protective equipment 
or the training of certain groups of staff. 
This is one area which is more clear-cut for 
monitoring purposes because it is easier to measure 
progress against a pre-set target. Also from the 
point of view of providing feedback to the ~orkforce 
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this is one area which, in conjunction with trends 
in accident statistics, may be used as positive 
reinforcement for motivating employees to work 
safely. 
Having indicated what is meant in operational terms by 
self-regulation in an organisation, we can now look at some of 
the primary 'agents' of this procedure in an organisation. 
Each has an important part to play in the monitoring of safety 
standards and in this study separate chapters are devoted to each 
of three 'agents' and their roles, that is safety representatives, 
safety committees and supervisors. 
Although these three agents represent only some of the 
influences on self-regulation, they closely affect the shopfloor 
procedures for safe working. Within the scope of this project, 
there had to be an element of selection of subject areas to be 
studied because of constraints on time and workload, and the 
three areas considered to be most useful from the point of view 
of directly influencing health and safety on the shopfloor, were 
safety representatives, safety committees and supervisors. 
These three areas are in turn affected by overall management 
. 
policy on health and safety. However, by confining the study to 
what was essentially a single organisation, management influence 
may be regarded as 'a constant', that is this study is not a 
comparative study on, for example, safety officers or safety 
policies. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
METHODOLOGY 
4.1 The Case Study 
According to Yin (1981), the main feature of the case study 
as a research strategy is that unlike experiments, it attempts to 
examine a contemporary phenomenon in its real life context. 
The case study can use either qualitative or quantitative data or 
as in this project, a mixture of both. There is a place for both 
types of data, which can be used in conjunction to provide evidence 
around specific topics. Yin (1981) notes that with care, a case 
study can be conducted systematically, although he agrees with 
Miles (1979) that the available methodological textbooks emphasise 
fieldwork and not case study design or analysis. 
Doby (1967) describes the case study as lIa way of ordering 
social data with the view toward preserving the unitary character 
of whatever is being studied. II He says the function of the case 
study is lito describe the case in terms of the particularities 
that are observable. 1I This means the intensive examination of 
the specific factors implicated in the case. 
In this project the case study technique was used in the form 
of exploratory research. The main purpose of this design is to 
generate and perhaps to test hypotheses. 
Within the case study framework several techniques of data 
collection will be used. Each of these techniques has advantages 
for the collectiorl of certain types of data and by using several 
methods it may be possible to cross-check the data which, 
hopefully, will lend validity to results. This methodological 
triangulation and the various methods used will be discussed in 
more detail later. 
As with all methods of research, the case study has its 
strengths and weaknesses. Among its disadvantages are that it 
is low on control - that is, variables cannot be rigorously 
controlled as in experimental methods, and low in representative-
ness - that is, in this case one cannot generalise about health 
and safety in other regional councils or other types of organ-
isation on the basis of information collected in one specific 
organisation. It is also difficult to differentiate cause 
from effect in such a study and it can be risky to infer from 
the intensive study of one case. 
The case study has as its main advantage the richness that 
evolves from descriptive and concentrated study of one unit and 
the results may suggest hypotheses which can then, or at some 
later stage, be tested by other methods such as experiments or 
surveys. The case study is particuarly useful for exploratory 
research into subject areas such as health and safety, where 
little previous research has been completed and where the 
generation of hypotheses may be more important than the testing 
of them. 
Glaser and Strauss (1965) make the point that qualitative 
research should not be seen merely as a preliminary to quanti-
tative research, but as a theory generator in its own right: 
creating new theory as well as testing current theory. 
Galtung (1967) sets out an interesting table which is 
reproduced belo~. 

4.2 Methodological Triangulation 
Methodological triangulation can be described as the utility 
of different data-gathering techniques applied concurrently to the 
same problem. Denzin (1970) explains that triangulation can apply 
to data and to method. 
Some years ago, Trow (1957) suggested that sociologists 
should refrain from defending one research method over another and 
realise that no single method is always superior. He said that 
social scientists should move on to a position which permits them 
to approach their problems with all relevant and appropriate 
methods - that is to the use of the strategy of methodological 
triangulation. The main reason for using this~rategy ;s an 
attempt to eliminate as many sources of error as possible and to 
this end Bruyn (1966) states that the only satisfactory way to 
verify research is to check th~ough different sources of knowledge. 
It may not be possible, as in this project, to have more than 
one field researcher and so it may be more useful to use several 
methods of studying so gaining perspectives on a particular 
phenomenon in order to maximise research information. 
It is suggested that no method of research is without bias, 
and research without the use of methodological triangulation may 
be restricted, for it is possible that interpretative errors will 
not be eliminated by virtue of checking alternative data sources. 
That is, without multiple methods assessed against common data 
bodies, the researcher has no way of judging the reactive and 
biasing effects of the methods he has used. 
So a~ two or more methods of collecting data can reinforce 
each other and lend validity to data collected. 
Fitzgerald & Cox (1975) give these reasons for the use of 
triangulation: 
1. To minimise error resulting from the use of any single 
method for collecting data. 
2. To maximise the possibility of discovering discrepancies. 
3. To make full use of the principles characterising the 
scientific perspective. 
4.3 Problems of Field Studies 
Before going to look at some methods of data collection in 
more detail, it is important to be aware of one of the main 
methodological problems of field studies. 
One such problem is concern for 'hardness' versus 'depth 
and reality' of data. Zelditch (1962) explains that quantit2tive 
data is described as 'real and deep' but asks Zelditch what do you 
do if you prefer data that are real, deep ar~ hard? 
In this project a mixture of qU2litative and quantitative 
data were collected in an attempt to 'solve' this proble~. 
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Zelditch classifies field methods into: 
1. Participant observation where the field worker directly 
observes and participates by having social relationships 
within the social system he is studying. He mayor may 
not play an active part in events. 
2. Informal interviewing during the event itself is consid-
ered part of participant observation, or the information 
may be about others or events which occurred in their 
absence. 
3. Enumeration and samples are used in both surveys and 
direct, repeated, countable observations. 
4.4 Observation 
Vidich and Shapiro (1955) note that survey data can be used 
to test hypotheses from participant observation. The manner in 
which different research methods may be best combined to provide 
the greatest possible overlap of subject areas is important. For 
example questionnaire responses may confirm participant observation 
findings in quantitative terms. 
Observation can supply the impressionistic, organised, total 
picture necessary for the development of hypotheses and the inte-
gration of structured data. It can also provide a detailed descrip-
tion of social events as they can be observed at first hand. 
Observation can be unstructured or structured, both methods 
having advantages and disadvantages. 
One advantage of unstructured observation is that the 
researcher can be purely inductive, there are no artificial 
constraints or pre-meditated structures imposed on her. In 
view of this, however, the researcher must have the ability to 
interpret accurately the events or interactions she observes. 
Another advantage is that she can probe deeply into what she 
observes by being flexible and able to concentrate on certain 
areas. 
The disadvantages of unstructured observations are mainly 
ones which make the task more difficult for the researcher. It 
makes it more difficult for others to replicate her research and 
this opens up the question of whether it is in fact essential, 
or even possible, to replicate interactions or social events 
which, unlike chemical reactions, are complex, unpredictable, not 
governed by any logical rules and take place within a situation 
which is dynamic not static. Another point regarding the 
difficulty of replicating observations is the fact that being 
studied may have an effect on a group (the Hawthorne Effect 
described by Roeth1isberger and Dixon, 1939) and so might alter 
their subsequent behaviour. According to Schwartz & Schwartz 
(1955) the presence of an observer affects the situation under 
study even if one does not go so far as to suggest that his 
presence 'distorts reality' (Mensh & Henry, 1953). 
Schwartz & Schwartz (1955) alsc state that recreation of 
events in their settings for recording and interpreting 1S not 
possible i~ participart observatio~. Wher observation lS use~ 
as an exploratory technique for example, the researcher may use 
events she sees to raise questions and suggest explanations 
which may then be further investigated by other means such as 
interviews and questionnaires. 
It is suggested that the theory produced by means of 
unstructured observation cannot be validated scientifically, 
but a fuller discussion of reliability and validity of data 
collected by various methods is given below. 
Another disadvantage of unstructured observation is that a 
degree of selectivity is involved. It is possible for the 
observation to be comprehensive, and for the researcher to 
capture all that occurs or does she note only what interests 
her or catches her attention? It is inevitable in complex 
social situations that some degree of selective perception is 
used in order to make meaningful what is happening. If only 
one observer is carrying out the field work it would be physically 
impossible to observe everything. For these reasons, even if 
observation is unstructured, that is rigid categorisation schemes 
are not used, the researcher can still usefully select material 
to record. 
Structured observation entails the development of categor-
isation schemes both during and after observation. For example, 
there could be a schedule drawn up for recording categories of 
verbal or non-verbal behaviour. However, it is difficult for the 
observer to keep attention in order not to ~iss a piece of 
behaviour and at the same time to be aware of what is generally 
going on. 
It is important for researchers to try to reduce to a m;numum 
the effects of their presence on events taking place. This is 
perhaps best done by being as unobtrusive as possible and in the 
case of meetings, attending a few meetings after the initial one 
where introductions were made in order to get over the 'novelty' 
of having an outsider (especially a female one) at a safety 
committee meeting for example. 
It is said that all acts of observation produce reactive 
effects both on the observed and the observer. Group behaviour 
will vary according to who is present and it is important for a 
researcher to learn how group members define him or her and in 
particular whether or not they believe that certain kinds of 
information and events should be kept hidden from her. She can 
interpret evidence more accurately when the answers to these 
questions are known. For the above reasons, it is particularly 
important for the researcher to be introduced to those being 
observed and that the nature of the study is described. The use 
to which any information obtained will be put should also be 
clearly explained in order to allay any suspicion and distrust 
which can arise as a result of lack of information. 
The participant observer role has been described in various 
ways. Schwartz & Schwartz (1955) describe it as being passive 
or active, where an active participant observer maximises 
interaction with respondents. In this study when observing 
safety committee meetings, or observing work on various sites, 
the observer was as passive as possible in an attempt to intrude 
as little as possible. 
To sum up, it can be said that most researcR into social 
relationships involves participant observation even if this is 
by unconscious intent, and in the research context as a whole, 
participant observation should still be regarded as complementary 
to, rather than in competition with, or in opposition to, other 
research methods. 
Observation was used in this study to get 'a feel I for the 
general climate of safety committee meetings - the atmosphere, 
the interactions between management and safety representatives, 
the control of the chairman and his authority, the inputs, the 
types of items raised, even the seating arrangements. This was 
to give the observer the chance to savour some of the highly 
individual problems related to each department and to suggest 
ideas which could later be enlarged upon by using interviewing 
techniques and questionnaires. 
This type of observation is fairly unsystematic and 
personal because rigid categories are not counted and reported 
as this might mean a loss of some of the richness of the data. 
As this part of the study was exploratory, a somewhat interpre-
tative analysis was justifiable as an instrument which might 
generate hypotheses which could later be tested by more 
quantitative methods. 
Observation of work being carried out at some sites in the 
four departments gave the researcher some insight into the 
potential hazards the workers encountered in their working 
environment. She also observed training courses in health anc 
safety taking place at the training section of the Personnel 
Department ct Regional Headquarters. 
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Observer bias 
The two main forms of observer bias are:firstly that those under 
investigation act differently because they are being investigated. 
It has to be realised that this behaviour may not be representative 
of that usually found in a similar situation, for example, the 
researcher was told on one occasion that the language was 'toned 
down a bit' when she was present at safety committee meetings. 
Secondly, there may be some subjectivity on the part of the 
observer who must interpret what is happening around her in order 
to make sense of it all. The frame of reference within which she 
structures this information will to some extent affect her inter-
preta ti on. It is important for observers to be aware of these 
potential biases so that they may eliminate or at least minimise 
them. 
4.5 The Interview 
Observation does not allow the researcher to study events 
that have already occurred or to gain insight into the attitudes, 
opinions or emotions of subjects. In order to obtain such 
information, interviews can be effectively used, where key people 
are asked open-ended questions. The researcher can probe for 
information, that is the situation can be formal ,but, when 
exploring the objective, fairly unstructured. 
Carnell & Kahn (1968) distinguish three broad, important 
concepts for a successful interview. The first is the accessib-
ility of the required informatior, to the respondent - this means 
, r-
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that the researcher must find out in advance who the key people 
are in the organisation and'must ensure that she interviews 
people who can accurately answer her questions. 
The second important point is that the respondent must be 
able to understand what is required of him, that is he must be 
asked clear, unambiguous and meaningful questions, and also that 
the researcher would be well advised, at the time of making an 
appointment to interview a respondent, to make quite clear what 
the interview will involve, and what subject areas will be 
covered. This gives the respondent a chance to look out any 
material he may need and at least to be prepared to answer 
questions on a particular subject. This in no way invalidates 
his replies as he should not be told in advance what questions 
he will be asked, only informed of the general area to be 
covered. 
The third point made bycannell & Kahn is that the respondent 
should be motivated to answer the questions accurately. Perhaps 
the researcher should fully explain the importance of her research 
and where the interview fits in with the rest of the study. 
Another important way to encourage people to give truthful, 
accurate answers is to assure them of the confidentiality of the 
final report. In many situations, such as in the area of health 
and safety involved in the present study, respondents may fear 
that statements they make may 'rebound' on them should they get 
into the hands of others, for example their superiors or trade 
union officials. 
There are various types of interview techniques and the 
choice of which one to use will depend upor the prevailing 
circumstances and the information to be obtained. 
Fiske et ale (1956) and Gordon (1969) maintain that the 
focussed or guided interview allows respondents more freedom while 
still covering a given area in a systematic way. It has the 
flexibility to allow respondents to develop their views in detail. 
The focussed interview was used in the present study 
consisting of a small number of open-ended questions around several 
major topics relevant to the enquiry. This gives flexibility as 
well as ensuring that the information collected is relevant. If 
informants stray from the point the skilled interviewer can gently 
lead them back to the relevant subject area. This is made easier 
by not being forced to go through a list of structured questions 
which for reasons of standardisation must be answered by subjects 
in the Icorrectl order. 
Structured~ standardised~ formal interviews are described by 
Fitzgerald and Cox (1975) as having a fixed question content and 
structure with a set of standardised responses - that is, fixed 
a 1 te rna ti ves . This technique can be used when the researcher 
already knows something about her research problem and has a number 
of specific questions she wants answered. 
Mann (1968) refers to the standardisation that is possible 
in formal interviews which allows some quantification of response. 
The richness of the data resulting from uncontrolled interviews is 
lost but uniformity is gained. 
Unstructured~ informaZ interviews are said by Fitzgerald and 
Cox to be useful in exploratory studies where the researcher war:ts 
to explore general question areas and then follow up on particular 
topics suggested by the respondent. The structure and order may 
not be pre-determined which allows more flexibility although it 
means that direct comparability between interviews is not possible 
because informants are not treated uniformly. 
Smith (1972) describes unstructured interviewing as non-
directive where the interviewer formulates her own questions and 
the respondent formulates his own replies. He says it should be 
an individual interview where attitudes, opinions and information 
about underlying motives are elicited by means of the interpersonal 
reaction between the interviewer and interviewee. 
Mann (1968) considers informal interviews to be very natural 
and good conversation flow is easy to maintain. The informant 
can develop his views and may introduce points the interviewer had 
not thought of. The interviewer can prompt and form real depth 
and insight into complex social situations. The main disadvantages 
as seen by Mann are that the interviews are not replicable and also 
there will be some selection on the part of the interviewer as to 
what he uses and what he discards. However, it is a good explora-
tory technique to be used before detailed hypotheses are put 
forward and elaborate questionnaires or interview schedules made up. 
Dean et al. (1967) discuss some of the limitations and compen-
sations of unstructured methods used in field work. These methods 
may suggest hypotheses but seldom provide the data for testing them. 
There is also the danger that relationships established in the field 
may increase the likelihood of bias if the researcher uses these 
relationships in this way. 
On the other hand, the field worker is not bound by prejudge-
ment, the problem can be reformulated as the interview proceeds. 
Because of her closer contact with the field situation, the 
researcher is better able to avoid misleading or meaningless 
questions. The field worker may absorb information which at the 
time may seem to be irrelevant but much later, when her perspective 
on the situation has changed, this information may turn out to be 
extremely valuable. 
The conduct of the interview 
It is important for the interviewer to establish a relationship 
between herself and the respondent at an early stage of the interview. 
Philip et all (1975) state that the interviewee must be put at ease 
and at the same time it is important that the authority of the 
interviewer is established. Smith (1972) says the respondent must 
be completely relaxed and sympathetic rapport established between 
him and the interviewer. He suggests that a general first question 
is useful to arouse interest and to motivate the respondent to 
communicate and discuss his feelings fully and freely. Smith also 
expresses the view that the interviewer, having established the 
necessary rapport should then become a 'passive' listener with no 
interruptions, indeed he says that a sympathetic silence may lead 
to the expressing of unconscious motives or attitudes. 
The question of probing and prompting is discussed by Philip 
et ale who point out that matters of opinion are very ser.sitive to 
suggestion, and the interviewer must not paraphrase questions. 
However, open-ended questions may require probing to various 
extents in informal interviews where there is more freedom to 
probe and challenge which can lead to errors. 
Smith gives four reasons for intervention by the interviewer: 
1. To keep the respondent talking to elaborate on 
what he has said; to go into greater detail and 
more deeply into the subject. 
2. To obtain the reasons for what has been said. 
3. To introduce a new subject that has not yet been 
covered. 
4. To return to a point made earlier by the respondent. 
Philip et ale state that replies must be recorded with scrupu-
lous accuracy at the time they are given. This point leads on to 
a discussion of some of the sources of error and interviewer bias 
put forward by Smith who says that response errors can be either 
systematic or non-systematic. Systematic bias may stem from the 
interviewer holding strong opinions, prejudices or expectations 
regarding respondents' views. 
Non-systematic bias can arise from carelessness in recording 
or misreading instructions on the part of the interviewer. These 
effects of bias may cancel each other out in the survey as a whole, 
but it is important to have clear interviewer instructions, mean-
ingful questions and well trained interviewers where the research 
project uses several different interviewers. 
The main sources of interviewer error and bias are according 
to Smith: 
1. The interviewer-respondent interaction 
2. Deviations in asking the questions 
3. Inadequate probing 
4. Faulty recording of the answers 
Dean et al. describe interviewing as the best way to get at 
information, impressions and feelings that can be verbally reported. 
However, they stress three sources of possible distortion: 
1. Informants may give socially acceptable answers which 
may modify expressed attitudes or feelings and fail 
to reflect the information which the interviewer is 
attempting to elicit. 
2. Selective perception is a psychological concept used 
to describe the fact that we do not perceive or 
process all the information around us but select 
information which reinforces our expectations about 
an individual or a situation. For this reason an 
interviewer may select comments which back up the 
responses he may have expected from the informant, 
for example a senior manager or a trade union repre-
sentative. On the other hand he may select out, that 
is, ignore information which appears to conflict with 
his pre-conceived ideas of what he will hear. As a 
result the interviewer reduces any cognitive dissonance 
he may experience as a result of such conflict. 
3. The interviewer may forget details when writing up an 
interview later. It is difficult tc take notes and 
maintain some eye contact at the same time. However,in 
spite of the difficulties, taking notes may still be 
better than using a tape recorder for reasons described 
below. 
Smith (1972) states that the interview can be reliable but 
not valid, but it cannot be highly valid without also being reliable. 
Reliability is difficult to achieve when several different inter-
viewers are used, but is more attainable when one interviewer is 
carrying out all the interviews. However the more informal, 
unstructured and open-ended the interview is, the lower will be 
its reliability. Validity may be more difficult to establish 
as there may be little previous data against which to validate 
the interview in question. 
Smith sums up by saying that the interview is a rich source 
of data, and interviewer error can be minimised if the potential 
sources of error described above are dealt with. 
In the present study, a single interviewer carried out all 
the interviews - informal, unstructured interviews being carried 
out initially followed later by more formal, structured interviews. 
Only key respondents were interviewed such as safety officers and 
senior managers, and there was no attempt to analyse answers 
statistically because only a small number of interviews were 
carried out. These provided some interesting attitudes and views 
on safety and gave rise to questions asked in the two questionnaires 
described later. 
Note-taking can be a problem with ar. unstructured interview, 
but it was found that most people expect the interviewer to take 
notes and, with practice, it becomes fairly satisfactory to take 
brief notes which are written up immediately after each interview. 
A tape recorder was not used on the grounds that it can make 
people feel ill-at-ease and also because it can be very time-
consuming to transcribe the recording. 
4.6 The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire is another means of collecting information 
about opinions, attitudes and knowledge of a group of respondents. 
However compared with interviews there is an increase in the 
possibility of misunderstanding and deception because it increases 
the distance, both physical and symbolic, between the researcher 
and his respondents, making it difficult to probe or follow up 
seemingly contradictory responses. 
Fitzgerald and Cox (1975) state that although using question-
naires ;s less expensive than interviewing, the completion rate is 
seldom better than 60%. They make a useful distinction between the 
two main types of questionnaire making the point that there is a 
range in between. The first type is highly structured with fixed 
alternative responses. This type of questionnaire is easily 
precoded, simple to administer and relatively inexpensive to analyse. 
However respondents may feel compelled to select one of the 
alternatives when none really fits the respondent's position. 
The second type of questionnaire is open-ended where the 
respondent is not required to choose among fixed responses set by 
the researcher. ~ This gives a degree of freedom of choice and the 
opportunity of giving detailed responses. However this type is 
more difficult and costly to analyse. In spite of these disadvan-
tages, an open-ended questionnaire should be used if the researcher 
does not know all the alternative answers or when the number of 
possible alternative answers is very large. 
Fitzgerald & Cox suggest that the researcher can benefit from 
both types of questionnaire by using a mixture of questions. This 
may be advantageous but Fitzgerald & Cox add a word of caution 
saying that this procedure does not eliminate the weaknesses of 
either type of question. The big disadvantage is that the 
combination of questions complicates the analysis. 
Berdie and Anderson (1974) say that the questionnaire must be 
easy to complete with brief but clear instructions for completion. 
They also suggest beginning with a few interesting, non-threatening 
questions. They emphasise the importance of question construction. 
Questions can be dichotomous, open-ended or ranking and much 
attention has to be paid to the actual wording in order to ensure 
that the respondent understands exactly what is meant by the 
question and what his response options are. 
Mann (1968) says that it is important to avoid ambiguous or 
leading questions, and what he calls double response to a question 
which because of its construction seems to indicate that two 
answers are needed. Also to be avoidec are questions containing 
jargon and technical terms or those couched in emotional terms. 
Philip et al. (1975) say a questionnaire can consist of 
open-ended questions or those with a limited list of alternative 
replies. The questionnaire should be well laid out, simple and 
not too long. The questions should initiate responses that are 
acceptable indications of those variables that are to be studied. 
The presence of each question needs to be justified - it must 
gather information on a specific aspect of the study or test the 
accuracy of responses to other questions. 
Respondents need a certain standard of education to be able 
to fill in a questionnaire adequately according to Krausz and 
Miller (1974) who also suggest the avoidance of loaded words such 
as 'bosses' and 'strike breakers'. 
Oppenheim (1966) stresses the importance of a covering letter 
to respondents in a postal survey to stress the confidentiality of 
information collected by the researcher. This may help to 
increase the response rate which is notoriously 10vi in postal 
surveys. With regard to the response rate, Moser & Kalton 
(1971) say that it is possible that only recipients having a 
particular viewpoint will respond to the survey - a point to be 
kept in mind by the researcher. 
Galtung (1967) says that the standardisation offered by 
questionnaires is a strong advantage over, for example, interviews 
when the sample is a homogeneous one. When it comes to follow-up 
however, the interview provides opportunities for clarification 
and recording more subtle, non-verbal cues, that are not possible 
with questionnaires. The only type of follow-up here is the use 
of filter questions but these apply at all respondents in G certain 
category so provide follow-up of a different kind. 
Galtung makes reference to control with regard to the filling 
in of questionnaires which is difficult unless there is some sort 
of supervision - respondents may get friends to assist them to 
answer the questions. However at least the use of questionnaires 
is free of the interviewer effect which can affect replies in a 
face-to-face situation. Questionnaires are inexpensive, a 
characteristic which makes them attractive to researchers, and can 
generate a considerable amount of information in a fai.rly short 
time period as all respondents can receive a questionnaire in the 
one pos ti ng. 
The importance of carrying out a pilot study is mentioned by 
severa 1 resea rche rs . Krausz and Miller (1974) describe a 
pilot study as a small scale replica of the main survey which 
tests the suitability of the data collection technique and the 
adequacy of the questionnaire. For example, do the questions 
provide the necessary indications to identify and measure the 
variables under scrutiny and whether this is done in an unambiguous 
and meaningful way. The researcher has the opportunity to confirm 
or modify the design proposed or suggest alternatives to it before 
being committed to the existing questionnaire layout. 
Fitzgerald & Cox (1975) say a pilot study must be conducted 
on a small number of respondents who are similar in background 
characteristics to the target sample. This pre-test often high-
lights ambiguous questions and may indicate a need to change the 
wording, order and content of a questionnaire. Oppenheirr, (1966) 
notes that a pilot study may show up a question to be too wide or 
narrow in scope, too colloquial or too technical in wording or too 
intimate or abstract. Some free answer questions may be turned 
into multiple choice ones on the basis of the results of a piloted 
In the present study, a questionnaire was constructed to be 
sent to all safety representatives in the four departments under 
study. This consisted of a mixture of closed and open-ended 
questions and was a lengthy questionnaire, as it was important 
to see if individuals would be willing to complete a long 
questionnaire and to answer several open-ended questions requiring 
some thought. It was thought by the researcher that the 
population being trade union-appointed representatives who 
presumably had considerable interest in the subject of health and 
safety and their contribution to safe working, would mean that 
they would be motivated and interested enough to complete the 
questionnaire. This hypothesis was later borne out by the 77% 
response rate. 
The population on whom the questionnairewas piloted were 
attending a local college of education on a TUC safety represent-
ative training course. These safety representatives were 
divided for teaching purposes into two groups, one from the 
private sector and one from the public sector. Each was handed 
a copy of the questionnaire by the researcher with an explanation 
of what a pilot study is and how valuable their co-operation 
would be. There was a reasonable number of questionnaires 
returned and it was noticed that nearly all of these were from 
the safety representatives who worked in the public sector. 
As a result of this pilot study, some alterations and 
improvements were made and when the questionnaire for supervisors 
was constructed, it was decidec that it was so similar (although 
shorter) to the safety representative one, that it would not be 
necessary to carry out another pre-test. However in the light 
of experience a few small changes were made in questions common to 
both questionnaires, for example the addition of another category 
to a graded response type of question, where it was felt that this 
would be an improvement. 
We can sum up some of the possible errors in the use of 
questionnaires. Instructions should be clear so that all respon-
dents answer the questionnaire in a standardised way. Questions 
should not be culture- or class-ridden or worded in emotive 
language. An important problem with questionnaires is the 
possibility that respondents are not answering truthfully but are 
giving socially desirable answers. They may provide the answers 
they think the researcher wants or they may suppress the truth 
because they fear repercussions, perhaps from employers, if they 
tell the truth as they see it. One way of encouraging truthful 
answers is to strongly emphasise confidentiality and anonimity as 
in the case of the present study when names were not asked for on 
the questionnaire. Interpretation is another important variable 
as different respondents may understand different meanings from 
the same words in a questionnaire, so emphasising the need for 
clarity and lack of ambiguity. 
One other important potential fault occurs if the researcher, 
in an attempt to reduce the amount of data from completed question-
naires and to facilitate qualification of data classifies the 
responses. The categories used to classify the respondents' 
answers may be too gross and so may overlook the subtilties of 
meaning that the respondents may wish to convey. This point 1S 
made in the chapter on safety representatives when it is 
explained that a decision was made not to combine certain categories 
(safety representative roles), even if the numbers in each category 
were small, because of the 10ss of interesting information. 
However, categories may also be combined for the purpose of 
statistical testin~providing a balance between a descriptive and 
a statistical approach to the data. 
These are only a few of the potential sources of error assoc-
iated with the use of questionnaires but it is vitally important 
for researchers to be aware of them and to try to eliminate them 
or reduce them to a minimum in order to be able to use the 
information they generate in a meaningful way, 
The questionnaires in this study were used to supply quant-
itative data some of which was suitable for statistical analysis. 
These data provided both factual information regarding for 
example, age, trade union membership and also data regarding 
cognitive variables such as attitudes and opinions in relation 
to various aspects of health and safety held by safety represen-
tatives and supervisors in the sample populations. 
4.7 Analysis of Documents 
Fitzgerald & Cox (1975) describe three potential sources 
of error in the analysis of documents. 
1. Error may be built in by the recording agency 
or individual, for example selective retention 
of recorded data. 
2. Error resulting from clerical mistakes. 
3. Error resulting from misinterpretations by 
either researcher or respondent. 
The advantages of using analysis of document is that the 
technique is relatively inexpensive and is also non-reactive, 
that is the presence of the researcher has no effect on the content. 
The documents can provide information about events which happened 
in the past and which might otherwise be forgotten. 
Content analysis can be used to provide validity. For 
example, the researcher attended a sample of safety committee 
meetings and later compared notes taken at the time, with official 
minutes to make sure that they cross-checked. The minutes were 
found, in this way and in the opinion of the researcher, to be an 
accurate representation of the main issues discussed at meetings. 
Other documents which could be analysed were departmental safety 
policies, the terms of reference and constitutions of safety 
commi ttees and acci den t s ta ti s ti cs . 
Dean et ale (1967) say that content analysis can also be 
used to edit field notes, to develop categories for the classifi-
cation of data, to decide upon the units to be tallied, to count 
or cross-tabulate or in some other way establish relations among 
variables. The analysis of documents was used in this study to 
provide an additional method of cross-checking data rather than 
as a resea rch method standi ng on its own. For example, mi nutes 
of safety committee meetings were analysed and the types of 
issues discussed were classified in an attempt to validate the 
responses given by safety representatives in their questionnaire 
respo~ses. 
-... 
4.8 Reliability and Validity and Statistical Analysis 
The reliability and validity of the various methods used to 
collect data in this study will not be discussed in detail. 
However the reliability of this type of social research can be 
examined. 
The degree of consistency of dependability of a measure, 
that is, its reliability, had traditionally centred on some 
measurement of repeated use. But repetition is an almost 
impossible criterion of social situations. Suchman (1967) 
suggests that it may be better to talk about internal consistency 
of operational indices, that is to repeat the question or obser-
vation from another point of view which does not destroy the 
conceptual meaning of the datum. The inter-relationships of 
different indices of the same concept can then be examined. 
Bruyn (1966) says that a study should be capable of replication 
and interpretation using the same method by another independent 
investigator. Perhaps there could be two observations carried 
out simultaneously by two observers. However this idea is not 
without problems due to the unavoidable element of subjectivity 
present even in a structured observation. This is discussed in 
more detail below. 
Validity is a notoriously difficult concept to define but 
it is an evaluative criterion as to whether a procedure 'measures' 
what it purports to measure. Smith (1972) says that validity 
can be difficult because there may not be previous data to vali-
date the new data against. Bruyn (1966) suggests the verification 
of data by checking through different sources of knowledge - that 
is through what has been described above as methodoloo;cal 
;;J 
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triangulation. However Bruyn admits that there are no 
absolute methods for checking the validity of findings from 
participant observation because the researcher studies the 
reality directly. A situation or social interactions may 
occur once only never to be repeated or perhaps even remembered 
by the individual concerned. Because of the differences in 
interpretation due to perception, no two individuals will put 
exactly the same interpretation upon what occurred. We select-
ively perceive what happens around us for a variety of reasons 
one of which is motivated perception which makes us put more 
emphasis on certain aspects of, for example, an interaction. 
We also, for defensive reasons, may filter out certain aspects 
which do not fit in with our attitudes or preconceptions. 
This demonstrates how difficult is this concept of validity 
with regard to certain types of methodology. This researcher 
effect is minimal when using questionnaires as opposed to 
observation and interviews. 
Construct validity is very important in research, for 
example it is important for the researcher to define a concept 
such as self-regulation and to suggest some potential criteria 
for its 'measurement'. 
Kaplan (l964) argues that "the work of the behaviourial 
scientist might well become methodologically sounder if only he 
did not try to be so scientific ll • The social sciences' pre-
occupation with emulating the natural sciences has resulted in a 
tendency to test for statistical significance rather than looking 
for meaningful relationships. Rich qualitative data may be lost 
at the expense of scientific rigour involving quantitative pro-
cedures. 
Suchman (1967) says that sometimes conclusions are made that 
a relationship is not significant, when what is meant is that the 
population difference is not large enough for a small sample to 
determine, although a larger sample may well shO\-'J a significant 
r e 1 at ions hip. 
Research can be described in terms of failure or success 
(which are in themselves subjective terms) and successful research, 
which may prove or confirm what is already known, gains ready 
acceptance. However research which is considered to some extent 
to have 'failed' can still be valuable. 
The purpose of research is, in my opinion, not only to try 
to produce new knowledge in a particular subject area, but also 
to provide a learning experience for the researcher. Research 
degrees can be conferred on the basis of the scholarship and 
learning displayed by the researcher and not only in the situation 
where a major 'breakthrough' occurs. 
Hypothesis generation 
The researcher starts off with a theory or general idea which 
has to be brought down to a researchable level. ReseGrc~ questions 
are broad and ceneral whereas research hypotheses go further and 
are narrow, focussed and testable. Hypotheses turn problems and 
questions into testable propositions subject to empirical refutation 
(or confirmation). 
Hypotheses are generated as the result of the identification 
of a problem to be solved. We state, either explicitly or implic-
tly. that two or more variables relate to each other in some 
determinate way. Hypotheses enable social scientists to formalise 
their ideas in as open and rigorous a manner as possible where 
personal bias is open to scrutiny. These propositions about the 
relationships between variables can be tested empirically in a 
way that isolated facts about a single variable cannot. 
Becker (1958) states that a well-formulated hypothesis makes 
possible a deliberate search for negative cases, particularly when 
other knowledge suggests likely areas in which to look for such 
evidence. This kind of search requires advanced conceptualisa-
tion of the problem, and evidence gathered in this way might carry 
greater weight for certain kinds of conclusions. 
In the present study, hypotheses were generated as a result 
of reading, both of the background legislation and of previous 
research which has been carried out in the area of health and 
safety. Interviews with senior management, safety officers and 
inspectors from the Health and Safety Executive also gave rise to 
various hypotheses related to the part played by safety represen-
tatives, supervisors and safety committees in the self-regulation 
of health and safety st~ndards in the Local Authority. 
The hypotheses which were identified and tested in the present 
study are described in each of the relevant chapters. 
Hypothesis testing 
Baldamus (1972) descrires the hypothesis as fulfill ins the 
need to "sort out one's ideas, to formulate a tentative pro-
position in such a manner that the possibility of an empirical 
test might be contemplated, if a convenient opportunity to do so 
presented itself." 
Social enquiry is of a para-scientific nature and its 
associated terminology comes directly from lithe scientific 
method". For example tests, variables, prediction, replication 
may not be appropriate when social research is so often a process 
of discovery and is essentially descriptive rather than experi-
mentally based. 
Baldamus says that statistical testing may be an empty 
gesture, a way of pretending to be scientific unless data that 
is found to be not significant is described as well as statistically 
significant data. Hypotheses have to be stated before examining 
the data or else there is a danger of 'data dredging' where 
researchers carry out wholesale statistical tests on their data 
in an indiscriminate way in the hope of discovering something 
s i g ni fi ca nt. 
There is an opinion, in my view unfounded, that only if a 
proposition can be tested by experimental or statistical methods, 
is it possible for the results to be regarded as potentially 
useful for administrative, political or economic decision makers. 
The main statistical test that can be carried out on data of 
nominal type collected in this study is the Chi-squared test. 
Whe re th; sis used the s i gni fi cance 1 eve 1 whi ch wi 11 be accepted 
as indicating an association between two variables is the 0.05 
level and the probability value for the relevant degrees of freedom 
will be given. Only association can be inferred, this test cannot 
indicate cause and effect. 
The present research project is considered to be qualitative 
and descriptive rather than analytical and quantitative and the 
study is seen not so much as hypothesis testing as hypothesis 
generating and will be carried out in this spirit. 
Kish (1959) describes statistical tests as designed for 
distinguishing results at a pre-determined level of improbability, 
for example p = 0.05, under a specified null hypothesis of random 
events. After finding a result improbable under the null 
hypothesis the researcher must not accept blindly the hypothesis 
of 'significance' due to a presumed cause. 
Child and Partridge (1982) state that statistical tests must 
be interpreted conservatively and researchers must always be 
aware that their results in no way indicate the substantive and 
analytical significance of relationships. 
In this project, the traditional convention will be used 
whereby a significant level of probability, p = 0.05 (the 5% 
significance level) ;s referred to as 'significant' and the 
significant level of probability, p = 0.01 (the 1% significance 
level) is referred to as 'highly significant'. 
4.9 Problems of Access 
Mann (1968) when discussing human relations skills in 
social research, talks of the role expectations of people in an 
organisation with regard to the researcher. He stresses that 
it is the researcher's responsibility to develop in those who are 
co-operating with him on an understanding of the meaning of 
objectivity in research role, that he is an impartial outsider. 
The researcher has to gain trust and to get rid of suspicion and 
if he gives pledges of anonymity and confidentiality, these must 
never be violated. These are all valid points which have been 
taken into account in the present study. 
The subject area of health and safety at work can be an 
emotive one in industry and because of its obvious industrial 
relations associations can be devisive. The legislation, 
although clearly stressing the use of the trade union channels 
for worker representatives, also stresses the need for co-opera-
tion and consultation rather than negotiation over health and 
safety matters. However a researcher going into an organisation 
to see how a piece of legislation is being implemented, not only 
by examining what management is doing, but also what trade union 
safety representatives are contributing, is bound initially to 
arouse some apprehension at all levels. Management may wonder 
if areas found needing improvement will be reported to the 
unions or to the Health and Safety Executive. Trade unions may 
suspect that the researcher is doing a bit of 'spying' for manage-
ment, and members of safety committees may wonder what the 
researcher is doing listening to whet is going on and how to treat 
her. 
The answer to all these potential problems is undoubtedly 
information - plenty of it given well in advance and in a pleasant 
unthreatening way. I feel that tackling some of these problems 
in a subject area such as health and safety has provided me with 
one of the most valuable learning experiences available to 
researchers. 
The Chief Executive was written to explaining the research 
project and asking if it could be based in the local authority. 
The four departments, each with a safety officer or co-ordinator, 
were picked to study. Safety officers were contacted and then 
appointments made with Directors and senior managers in each 
department. During interviews, at this level, co-operation 
was excellent when it was explained that the research project 
was an academic one for a higher degree and was not to be 
published in newspapers and that the local authority was to be 
anonymous (although this was not demanded). 
However in one department, the Director insisted that the 
safety officer was to be present during the interview and indeed 
he answered one or two of the questions. This seemed to indicate 
some insecurity on the part of the Director and was uncomfortable 
for the researcher who had already asked the safety officer some 
of the same questions. 
In another department, the Assistant Director apologised for 
the safety officer not being present but then he relaxed and gave 
some interesting comnents. Indeed when he thought the official 
interview was over, he lit a cigarette and proceeded to give some 
off-the-cuff but very relevant views on health and safety. The 
suspicions of management were definitely reduced when they 
discovered that the research was for a serious purpose and when 
they perceived that the researcher was not likely to be a 
'trouble-maker ' . 
When I was interviewed for the research post, I was asked 
if I thought that being a woman would be a disadvantage when 
dealing with people at all levels when I had little industrial 
experience. I replied that I thought it would be a positive 
advantage as a non-threatening, friendly, unaggressive approach 
could gain the researcher the co-operation and acceptance of 
others. I feel strongly that this indeed did prove to be the 
case. 
Having got management approval, I thought carefully about 
the best way to approach the trade unions so that I could best 
approach their safety representatives whose co-operation with 
returning the questionnaire to be sent to them was vital. 
Either I could ask permission from full-time officials of the 
main trade unions first, or I could go to the safety representatives 
direct and possibly upset the full-time officials. I decided 
that formal letters to the trade unions may blow up out of 
proportion this aspect of the project and may delay getting the 
questionnaire sent out to the safety representatives. So on 
journeys with safety officers around different areas, I was 
introduced to safety representatives and they were told what I 
was working on. I also sat in on a few safety committee 
meetings initially to be introduced and explain to safety 
representatives that in the future a questionnaire would be 
sent to them. I emphasised that this would be anonymous and how 
grateful I would be if they returned these questionnaires. 
An important event took place at one of these early safety 
committee meetings I observed. When I was introduced to a 
member of one of the major trade unions who had a responsibility 
for health and safety as well as being a safety representative, he 
objected to my presence and insisted that I should contact the 
full-time officials before going further. I explained the 
purpose of the project and the meeting continued. I 1 ater had 
a meeting with this person where I more fully described the 
research project and the atmosphere was friendly and co-operative 
(he later fully completed the questionnaire as a safety represen-
tative). 
I then wrote to the two full-time trade union officials of 
the major trade unions stating that I would be sending out a 
questionnaire to safety representatives and would be happy to 
make an appointment to come and see either of them to explain 
the project more fully. One official did see me in his office 
and was interested and co-operative; the other official, in spite 
of being written to twice, did not respond and so the research 
work progressed satisfactorily with excellent co-operation from 
a 11 concerned. 
This highlights the problem of whether it is best to approach 
certain bodies with the attendent risk of delay or even a decision 
to withhold co-operation, or to try through informal ways, for 
example, social interaction, to get oneself and one's work known 
about and then officially inform these bodies when foundations 
have been laid. 
Access to an organisation needs to be handled carefully, 
often in planned stages, in order to gain the vital co-operation 
of people at all levels;-· The essence of the procedure is to 
adopt a pleasant, non-threatening approach to keep people 
informed well in advance of what is to take place, emphasising 
confidentiality and the value of their contribution to a useful 
piece of academic work. 
During the writing of Chapter Eleven on the philosophy of 
self-regulation, approximately ten sources were consulted, 
mainly academics and health and safety experts, who were inter-
viewed by the researcher using a flexible approach which allowed 
the conversation to cover a wide range of topics. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
5.1 Relevant Previous Work 
As explained above, there is a lack of published empirical 
work in this area of health and safety in organisational terms, 
although since the field work was initiated in the present study, 
other work has been published. 
In the United States, Kochan et ale (1977) carried out a 
study on safety committee effectiveness and in the United Kingdom, 
Beaumont has been the most prolific writer on, among other things, 
safety committees and safety representatives and their relationship 
both with management and with the workers they represent. The 
work of both Kochan and Beaumont is discussed below in relation to 
the present project. 
In the 1950s, Gouldner studied the effect of a change in 
management on the organisational structure in a gypsum mine in the 
United States. As part of this study, he looked at the safety 
rules and procedures in the organisation and developed the model 
of bureaucracy he described as representative bureaucracy. The 
local authority to be studied is an example of a bureaucratic 
organisation, and an important part of this study is to test the 
relevance of Gouldner's model to the safety procedures in a 1980s 
bureaucracy in the United Kingdom. 
These then are the three main authors of empirical research 
into organisational aspects of health and safety which form the 
basis of the theoretical background to this study. 
5.2 Gouldner's Study 
Perrow (1979) in "Complex Organisations: a critical essay", 
describes local authorities as having elaborate bureaucratic 
hierarchies where the bulk of the people in the lower and middle 
levels are prevented from giving their all for goal achievement 
because the hierarchical structure promotes rigidity and timidity. 
The top of the pyramid is where the power is located. Subordin-
ates are not encouraged to express ideas for change which might 
imply that their superior should have thought of the change but 
did not. For this reason, Perrow suggests that people prefer 
familiar to new situations. 
This lack of opportunity for individuals to use their 
initiative and make decisions promotes delays and sluggishness 
whi ch Perrow says res ul ts from "everythi ng bei ng ki cked ups tai rs 
for a decision". This could be because the superior insists on 
this or because people do not want to risk making a poor decision. 
Eventually, it is suggested, closely watched subordinates may 
give up using their initiative or imagination, and may suppress 
or distort information. 
In the course of this study of a local authority, a watch 
was kept for these manifestations of bureaucratic organisation 
particularly with regard to health and safety issues. 
Having described local authorities as bureaucracies, it is 
now important to examine an important study carried out by Alvin 
Gouldner in the United States in 1954 and described in his book 
'Patterns of industrial bureaucracy'. 
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Before describing Gouldner's work in more detail, it may be 
useful to briefly summarise the main points of the study. 
Gouldner revised and extended Weber's conception of bureau-
cracy and considered that Weber described three types of bureau-
cracy. One of these is the 'representative I form of bureaucracy 
based on rules established by agreement and which are justified 
technically and administered by specially qualified personnel. 
These rules are consented to voluntarily. The second pattern 
described by Gouldner is the 'punishment-centredI bureaucracy 
and is based on the imposition of rules and on obedience that is 
externally imposed. The third type is 'mock bureaucracy I 
where bureaucratic rules exist but are ignored - that is they are 
not enforced by management and are not obeyed by the workforce. 
The research project was carried out by Gouldner in order 
to clarify some of the social processes leading to different 
degrees of bureaucratisation, to identify some of the crucial 
variables, and to formulate tentative hypotheses concerning their 
interconnections. Details of Gouldner's study are given in 
Chapter Ten. 
The model of representative bureaucracy which will be featured 
in the present study was, according to Gouldner, characterised by 
numerous, complex safety rules to which workers willingly conformed 
as there was little resistance to the safety programme. The 
reason for this lack of resistance was considered to be that the 
safety programme was in conformity with the workers I values of 
personal well-being, cleanliness and neatness, as well as their 
knowledge that injury meant loss of earnings. Any deviations are 
explained by well-intentioned carelessness or ignorance. The 
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rules are made and enforced by experts with acceptable authority. 
Another typical aspect of developed bureaucracy was the 
complex ~stem of paper work and reports centred on the safety 
programme and the regular meetings to discuss accidents. Accidents 
were associated with a careful system of statistics and reports, 
rules, special meetings, posters and inspections. A specialist 
safety manager was employed which is also typical of a bureaucratic 
organisation. The safety work in the organisation could then be 
described as being highly bureaucratised. So it was not safety 
as such that Gouldner was studying, only the social characteristics 
which happened to be associated with safety in the plant. 
Gouldner states that safety work was unique because management 
believed that adherence to the safety programme could be secured by 
way of 'education' through meetings, posters and discussions rather 
than via discipline and punishment. When accidents were discussed 
prevention was what was important, not fixing the blame. When one 
party defines the other's failure to perform, in an expected way as 
being due to the latter's 'carelessness' or ignorance - the 
'utilitarian conception of deviance' - the response will take the 
form of developing a I representative bureaucracy I • 
In opposition to this idea, where one party defines the others 
failure to perform ln an expected way as being deliberate and 
intentional - the 'voluntaristic' conception of deviance - the 
response will take the form of developing a 'punishment-centred 
bureaucracy' . 
Gouldner sees a convergence between Weber's conception of 
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bureaucracy based on expertise and his own conception of the 
'representative' pattern. For example, the safety engineer is 
expected to use his technical knowledge to prevent accidents. 
However, Gouldner states that the expert's authority is validated 
only when used to further the workers' ends and when workers have 
a say in the enactment and administration of the experts' pro-
gramme. 
Some of the specific aspects studied by Gouldner and 
followed up in the present study will be discussed later in more 
detail, but included are: workers' attitudes towards safety, 
the education as opposed to punishment effect, the role of the 
supervisor, the interdependence of safety and production, the 
opinions of senior management with regard to health and safety 
and the effects of safety meetings. 
In the course of this study of a Scottish Local Authority 
the question of whether the organisation can be described as an 
example of representative bureaucracy will be examined. Some 
aspects of Gouldner's model will be operationalised and a number 
of hypotheses generated concerning the existence of these pheno-
mena in the organisation under study. 
Examples of hypotheses derived from Gouldner's model include: 
1. Safety rules are given by experts - is there a 
Safety Officer in the department and if so what 
is his input to the system of safety rules? 
2. Both groups, trade unions and management, 
initiate the rules and view them as their own. 
3. The safety rules are felt by workers to be 
imposed upon them: 
4. There are shared norms on health and safety 
(a unitary perspective). For example, 
what are the views of both management and 
trade unions on disregard of safety rules? 
5. Both workers and management can legitimate 
the rules in terms of their own values 
is neither group's values violated under 
most conditions? 
6. The standard explanations of deviance from 
the rules are ignorance or well-intentioned 
carelessness. 
7. The rules have an effect on the status of 
the participants. 
8. The safety programme generates few tensions, 
little overt conflict, diminishes conflict, 
and increases solidarity between workers and 
management. 
It is suggested that the Local Authority to be studied can 
be classified as a representative bureaucracy for the reasons 
given below, and that when its safety programme is studied, its 
organisation and administration will reveal some of the 
characteristics listed above. 
With regard to the Local Authority being classified as a 
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bureaucracy, Weber (1947) described the 'ideal type' of bureaucracy 
as being the most rational method of work for administration on a 
large scale. A Local Authority is an example of a large scale 
administrative organisation which displays other characteristics 
of bureaucracy identified by Weber. There is a hierarchy of 
several levels with the higher levels being the locus of power. 
Relationships are impersonal with loyalty to the office held by 
an individual's superior not to him personally. There is a 
large number of rules which clearly define procedures and commun-
ication is generally written necessitating the need for complex 
filing systems for storage purposes. Officials are trained and 
qualified for the job (for example by the Civil Service examination 
system) and there are experts in certain fields such as safety. 
Information to test the above hypotheses will be gathered 
using the techniques of interviews, questionnaires, observation 
and analysis of documents such as safety policies and minutes of 
safety committees. 
5.3 The Work of Kochan, Dyer and Lipsky 
Because employees and employers in organisations have 
different and often opposing interests, collective bargaining has 
emerged as a process to accommodate the needs of both parties. 
Conflict and mistrust is often characteristic of this bargaining 
relationship- Therefore,the overall trade union-management relation-
ship which exists in an organisation will influence the degree of 
success of a joint attempt to tackle such issues as improved safety 
performance. 
Kochan et al. (1977) suggest that safety in the United States 
is an example of an 'integrative' issue within the bargaining 
relationship over which the parties share more common goals. This 
has been discussed by Walton and McKersie (1965) who suggest that 
co-operative problem-solving strategies within the context of the 
overall bargaining relationship have to be developed to deal with 
safety issues. 
It is important that safety is differentiated from the issues 
that characterise the formal bargaining process and which polarise 
the two parties' views. Kochan et ale suggest that where this is 
done successfully, an improvement in safety and health may follow, 
whereas failure to use problem-solving techniques will constrain 
the ability of the parties to achieve safety improvements. 
Kochan et al. carried out a study of safety committees on 
the assumption that they would be highly suited for problem-
solving as safety issues tended to be ones where the union and 
the employer held basically common goals. They interviewed 
managers and trade union representatives and sent out question-
naires in order to collect information concerning their views on 
safety committees and their functioning. 
Kochan et ale found that management viewed safety committees 
as advising bodies with the power to make recommendations, and not 
as decision-making bodies with the power to establish or implement 
policies. They suggest that advisory status is crucial to 
obtaining management's acceptance of and commitment to these 
committees. Management feel less threatened as they are not 
locked into a decision and as an advisory committee is not an 
extension of the collective bargaining process it encourages 
co-operative problem-solving behaviour rather than bargaining 
strategies. The two parties share information and ideas, the 
scope of issues is less circumscribed and it is possible to 
discuss alternative solutions without commitment to a position. 
The safety committee being an advisory body can be advantag-
eous to the trade unions because this reduces the threat of 
being co-opted into decisions that are unpopular with the rank 
and file members. The trade union can still reserve the right 
to take new safety issues or issues that continue to be rejected 
by management in the committee process, to the bargaining table 
in future rounds of negotiations. 
Respondents were asked by Kochan et al. to rate the extent 
to which they perceived the goals of the union and the management 
in their plant to be in conflict. Twelve different industrial 
relations issues were rated and it was expected that the degree of 
goal conflict would be lower on health and safety issues than on 
others such as wages, grievance procedures and fringe benefits. 
The results showed that management officials saw a greater 
potential for union-management co-operation on safety and health 
issues than did union officials. Kochan et ale hypothesised 
that if these perceptions carried over into behaviour then the 
union representatives would mix negotiating strategies with the 
more co-operative approach of problem-solving in their interactions 
with management on health and safety issues. 
The data suggested that union officials appeared to rely 
more heavily on problem-solving than on negotiating strategies 
but neither the union nor the management officials abandoned 
negotiating behaviour on safety issues. So the position ;s 
rather more complex than the original hypothesis suggested, with 
union-management interactions appearing to be mixed-motive 
relationships characterised partly by problem-solving and partly 
by negotiating behaviour. The predominant mode of relationship 
appeared to be one of problem-solving, but in addition there were 
variations in the amount of pressure the parties exert on each 
other by using negotiating strategies. 
Kochan et al. found that employers tend to choose either 
problem-solving or negotiating behaviour in dealing with the 
union on safety but that unions tend to employ a mixed strategy, 
combining both problem-solving and negotiating strategies in 
dealing with management. 
Kochan et ale went on to study the determinants of the 
degree of problem-solving or negotiating found in the interactions. 
They stated the following conclusions from their analysis. 
Management behaviour when interacting with unions was largely a 
response to external pressures from legislation and from the union. 
This pressure has had a strong effect in deterring the use of 
negotiating-type responses to union influence attempts and in 
inducing active problem-solving behaviour by management. Union 
problem-solving is more directly a function of the pressure and 
involvement of rank-and-file members. Management commitment 
and policies have an important impact on deterring the union 
from using pressure or negotiating strategies in health and safety 
committees. This demonstrates how strategies are developed as a 
result of a two-way process of interaction between the parties 
involved. 
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Kochan et a1. found that unions only become involved or 
active at plant level on health and safety issues when they 
perceive the need to induce management to improve existing 
conditions. When they see pressure from legislation making 
union pressure unnecessary they do not tend to actively pursue 
either problem-solving or negotiating strategies. 
Kochan et al.'s methodology of using interviews and 
questionnaires was broadly similar to that used in the present 
study. However, their sample of organisations was larger and 
therefore the present study of one organisation has more descrip-
tion and depth. Another point of difference is that the 
industrial relations system in the United States differs from 
that found in this country which means that the frame of 
reference within which employers and trade unions interact can 
affect each side's perception of the situation. Some examples 
of these industrial relations differences given in Chapter 
One are the higher degree of unionisation in Britain and the 
statutory right to consult with management on health and safety 
issues enjoyed by trade union representatives. Ashford (1976) 
states that the Occupational Safety and Health Act 1970 in the 
U.S.A. puts no obligation on employers to c,losely interact with 
workers. 
5.4 The Work of Beaumont et al. 
One of the most prolific and important writers on the subject 
of health and safety in the United Kingdom is Phil Beaumont of 
Glasgow University. Some of the most relevant pieces of research 
he has carried out are reviewed here and it must be remembered 
that these have been published since the present research study 
was initiated. 
In 1978, shortly before the official introduction of the 
Regulations regarding safety representatives and safety committees, 
Beaumont wrote a paper entitled 'Management perception of the 
institution of collective bargaining'. In this he commented on a 
statement made by Allan Flanders (1967) to the effect that in 
Britain there is a poverty of subject matter and a limited range 
of substantive issues regulated by written and formally signed 
agreements - the principal subjects are wages and working hours. 
Beaumont suggested that the situation described by Flanders 
would change with a broader range of subject matter being settled 
by collective bargaining. One example of a new subject area is 
a wide range of health and safety at work matters. It is a 11 eged 
that workers' interests have shifted away from wages and hours to 
the quality of their working environment and that there has been 
a shift in worker values or priorities, resulting in an interest 
in job enrichment or employee participation. Although there has 
been a shift in emphasis with regard to the subject matter settled 
by collective bargaining, the inclusion of health and safety is 
not at the expense of other areas. That is, there has been an 
enlargement of the range of subjects bargained over rather than an 
actual substitution of some new subjects for ones previously included. 
Beaumont (1978) elicited the views of a group of managers about 
the value of the collective bargaining process as a means of dealing 
with a variety of job-related issues for manual workers. The 
group were asked to indicate on a questionnaire, their opinion of 
the importance of twelve issues to manual workers. 'Safety' appeared 
third on the list after 'earnings' and 'job security'. 
Walton and McKersie (1965) describe the traditional subjects 
of collective bargaining as 'distributive issues', that is they 
are job-related matters in which there is a clear cut distinction 
between the goals of the unions and of management. It is suggested 
that where there are conflicts of interest between workers and 
management, negotiation is necessary as management cannot be 
expected to act in the best interests of their workers. 
In contrast, consultation takes place over matters where there 
is alleged to be a fundamental similarity of trade union/management 
interests, that is over 'integrative' issues. There is a problem-
solving orientation where there is the possibility of joint gains 
to unions and management. 
To investigate this suggestion, Beaumont asked the group to 
rate the extent to which they felt trade unions and management 
were attempting to accomplish the same or conflicting goals on each 
of the iss ues . Thi s time I sa fety I was placed second out of the 
list of twelve issues with a high rating in terms of basic similarity 
of ai ms. 
Respondents were next asked which issues they felt collective 
bargaining was most helpful in dealing with. 'Safety' was third 
out of the twelve job-related issues, and Beaumont sees this high 
ranking as encouraging in view of the legislate measures which 
have been designed to bring about negotiations over these matters. 
When the managers were asked what they considered to be the 
'ideal' means of dealing with the various job-related issues, the 
result with regard to safety showed that 75% of the group thought 
that joint consultation was'the 'ideal I means. The results 
found over the whole study suggest little management support for 
extending the subject matter of collective bargaining except for 
the area of job security. 
An interesting point noted by Beaumont is that all the 
respondents were highly doubtful of the ability of management to 
maintain a distinction in practice between consultation and 
negotiation on matters of prime concern to workers and unions 
such as safety matters. 
Beaumont's sample of personnel and industrial relations 
managers on courses gives a very specific perception of collective 
bargaining and it is hoped that the present study, which is based 
in the public rather than the private sector, can shed more light 
on the perceptions of both supervisory staff and trade union safety 
representatives as to the nature of their relationship. That is, 
do they see negotiation, joint consultation or a mixture of both 
as the most prevalent process used in interactions over health and 
safety matters, 
Beaumont (1980) carried out a study which throws some light on 
the function of the safety representative with regard to his 
relationship with management. Beaumont hypothesised that 
consultation and negotiation will be the main strategies u5ed in 
this relationship and defines consultation as being used where the 
basic aims of unions and management are held to be essentially 
similar. Negotiation is used where there is held to be a 
fundamental divergence of interests between the two parties. 
Beaumont asks if a basic similarity of union-management aims 
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over a subject favours joint consultation to negotiation over that 
subject. He suggests that the subject area of workplace health 
and safety is considered to be particularly suitable for joint 
consultation because of the consensus view, that is, the unitary 
perspective. 
The Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) provides for safety 
representatives and management to consult jointly on setting up 
and monitoring measures to ensure the health and safety at work of 
employees. However, this formal obligation to consult may not 
work this way in practice as described in an extract from a Labour 
Research Department document of 1978 " ... the union representative 
who consults and is consulted by the employer is also a negotiator". 
Beaumont states that a number of union and labour movement 
guidance notes have argued that unions should emphasise the role 
of the safety representative rather than the joint health and 
safety committee because the safety representative is more likely 
to use a negotiating strategy. 
In Beaumont's study, questionnaires were given to 162 safety 
representatives on a training course. Just over half of the 
subjects held the dual role of shop steward and safety representative, 
the others being only safety representatives, this division being 
mainly affected by which trade unions were involved as their 
policies on the matter differ. This issue will be discussed more 
full y 1 ate r . 
Beaumont wanted to know how similar safety representatives 
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perceived management/trade union aims and objectives in relation 
to health and safety matters to be. Two thirds of the sample 
stated that they felt that unions and management were trying to 
accomplish essentially similar things in relation to health and 
safety matters - this supports the Robens view of a unitary 
perspective. 
Variables related to this viewpoint were identified as: 
1. Size - nearly half of the number of safety 
representatives v/ho perceived a similarity 
of aims came from the smaller plants. 
2. The accident rate of the industry - safety 
representatives from the high accident rate 
shipbuilding industry tended to see a basic 
similarity of union and management aims on 
health and safety issues. 
3. The general quality of the union/management 
relationship - where this was seen as 
essentially co-operative as opposed to hostile 
a large percentage (78%) perceived there to be 
an essential similarity in union/management 
aims over health and safety matters. 
The results showed that the more likely a representative was 
to see an essential similarity of union/management aims over health 
and safety matters, the more likely he was to describe his basic 
representative function as one of consultation. 73% of the 
respondents described this function as consultation and 27% 
described it as negotiation. 
So, the two main factors related to the consultative function 
were found to be: 
1. The degree of similarity of union/management aims. 
2. The safety representative's view of the extent of 
management's concern to minimise the involvement 
of unions in workplace decision-making. Those 
who felt that management were not trying to 
minimise union involvement in plant decision-
making saw their basic function as consultation. 
Beaumont draws the conclusion that the terms 'consulting' 
or 'negotiating' are situation-specific, that is, they are defined 
in terms of the general attitude of management towards the question 
of management rights and the extent to which they will allow trade 
unions to be involved in decision-making. There may be 
different operating styles used by safety representatives who 
see their function as either consultation or negotiation, but 
Beaumont writes that those consulting with management are no less 
active or 'successful I than those safety representatives who 
negotiate with management. 
Some points emerge from this study by Beaumont which will be 
followed up in the present study. Beaumont's sample of safety 
representatives was drawn exclusively from the private sector, 
whereas in the present study the sample of safety representatives 
sent questionnaires is from one local authority. It will be 
interesting to see whether the findings are similar from these 
public and private sector studies. Beaumont used only the 
survey method to collect data. In the present study additional 
methods were used such as interviews with senior managers to 
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determine their views of issues such as co-operation. A 
questionnaire for supervisors contained questions concerning 
negotiation and consultation thus illustrating the viewpoint of 
junior management. 
Other areas to be examined are: the relationship between 
the consultation and negotiation processes and the perceived 
qegree of management commitment to health and safety. This 
subject of commitment will be assessed by questions in the 
questionnaires to safety representatives and supervisory staff, 
and indirectly by looking at such issues as what level of 
management chairs ~fety committee meetings. 
This public sector study will add to the information from 
the study carried out by Beaumont with regard to the negotiation 
and consultation processes used by trade unions and management 
in the area of health and safety. 
Beaumont (1981) used the same sample to examine the nature 
of the relationship between safety representatives and their 
workforce constituencies. He wanted to find out how the safety 
representatives saw their function in relation to their workforce 
constituencies, and in addition, how they saw their workforce 
constituencies as a resource in carrying out their representative 
function. 
The provision of such information concerning the attitudes 
and behaviour of these trade union-appointed representatives is 
seen by Beaumont to be important because of the high cost of 
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industrial accidents in Britain, and also because of the special 
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position of safety representatives in the workplace, with legal 
backing given to their representative functions by the Health 
and Safety at Work Act. This is in direct contrast with the 
position of shop stewards who receive little support from 
either official union constitutions or legislation although they 
do get support from management. 
71% of the sample reported that health and safety matters 
were of some degree of concern to employees at their workplace 
and three-quarters of the sample described the trade union/ 
management relationships as reasonably co-operative with 68% 
reporting at least one instance of industrial action at their 
workplace during the preceding year. 
Through a questionnaire, the sample were asked what they 
considered to be their single most important function as safety 
representatives. Over half of the sample answered "taking up 
individual worker's health and safety complaints with management", 
that is they saw themselves as a channel of communication. In 
contrast, two further groups answered that "routine inspection of 
the workplace to i dent; fy potenti a 1 hea 1 th and safety ha zards II , 
and "investigation of actual accidents" were their most important 
functions. Beaumont describes these as more technical functions 
requiring technical training and making safety representatives 
different from other trade union representatives. 
When looking for factors to explain these findings, Beaumont 
found that safety representatives from larger plants see their 
role as taking up workers' complaints because these are likely to 
be forthcoming. On average, there were found to be more worker 
complaints in larger plants because of the greater potential for 
health and safety hazards due to the greater alertness to such 
hazards in the workforce. Beaumont suggests that this could be 
due to more complex technology or to the more 'regimented ' work-
ing environment sometimes found in larger organisations. There 
may be more complaints in larger plants because greater trade 
union consciousness may make the workforce more willing to convey 
information to safety representatives to help them in their role. 
There may also be more highly developed collective bargaining 
arrangements than is the case in typical smaller workplaces. 
Beaumont describes the roles of inspector and investigator as 
adaptive and which emerged when safety representatives were not 
confident of worker complaints being forthcoming. It was found 
that those who emphasised the representative role, said that 
employees and management at their workplace were relatively 
concerned about health and safety matters and management were 
relatively receptive to the presentation of workers' grievances. 
Conversely, where management was felt to be relatively unconcerned 
about health and safety matters, safety representatives acted on 
the assumption that only the representation of 'hard evidence' of 
work hazards in their capacity as well-trained, well-informed 
individuals stood any real chance of convincing management of the 
need to make changes in workplace organisation and practice in 
the interests of health and safety. 
Beaumont also wanted to determine the extent to which safety 
representatives value and rely on their workforce constituencies 
as an important resource in their work and the group were asked 
what was the single most important factor necessary for them to 
function effectively as safety representatives. Half of the 
sample replied that a safety representative must be well-informed 
about the relevant safety regulations. Beaumont interprets 
this by stating that there is a need for an effective safety 
representative to be a well-informed, well-trained individual 
capable of carrying out a specialist technical function rather 
than simply being a negotiator who relies basically on the 
strength of workforce commitment and backing. An alternative 
reply to the above question stated that the safety representative 
must have the full backing of the workforce in his activities 
implying that there must be a concerned workforce. 
Beaumont claims a relationship between those likely to stress 
the importance of workforce backing and the perception of manage-
ment as being relatively unconcerned about health and safety 
matters. There is likely to be a need for 'hard negotiation ' 
with the implicit potential conflict which accompanies it. 
Safety representatives who answered in this way may perceive 
some difficulty in convincing management of the need to change 
workplace organisation and practice in the interests of health 
and safety. Other replies stated that the safety representative 
must have the ability to convince management of necessary changes 
and also that the safety representative must be well-informed 
about the potential causes of accidents. 
The safety representatives were asked if the health and 
safety matters which they had taken up with management were 
identified by the safety representatives themselves or by members 
of their workforce 'constituency'. 42% answered 'themselves' 
suggesting that they see the onus of a contribution to improved 
health and safety at the workplace to fallon safety representatives. 
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30% answered that the workforce identified matters to be 
raised with management - particularly those from the larger 
plants - and 27% answered that both safety representatives and 
the workers they represent identified these matters. 
Beaumont states that safety representatives attached 
considerable importance to the function of communicating workers' 
complaints to management. Less importance was attached to the 
role of the workforce as a back-up resource, although they had 
identified and passed on information regarding potential health 
and safety hazards to safety representatives. If the workforce 
are not interested in the safety representative function, they 
do not pass on information "about hazards and the result of this, 
according to Beaumont, is that the safety representatives adopt 
an adaptive role in the form of a more active personal search for 
potential hazards. That is, the safety representatives adapted 
their attitudes and behaviour to the favourableness or not of 
certain environmental circumstances in which they found themselves, 
for example, their perception of workforce interest and attitudss 
to themselves as safety representatives, and to health and 
safety matters in general. However, Beaumont makes the 
point that there is a two-way relationship here as a safety 
representative who personally did the minimum and as a result 
relied on his workforce constituency to convey information to 
him - that is he assumed their interest in his activities - could 
perhaps find their interest waning because of his own lack of 
activity. 
In the present study the perceived roles of the sample of 
local authority safety representatives to emerge from open-ended 
questions will be classified. Safety representatives who have 
attended training courses will be asked which aspects of the 
course they had found most useful, and it is suggested that the 
aspects identified will relate to the perceived role and 
functions of the safety representatives. A further issue to 
be addressed is whether safety representatives receive support 
from various groups in carrying out their role. 
A similar analysis of data obtained from a questionnaire to 
supervisors in the local authority will be used to describe 
supervisors' perceptions of the role they play in maintaining a 
safe working environment. 
Beaumont (1981) examined the enterprise response to indus-
trial relations legislation by looking at the position with 
regard to the rights of unionised employees in an organisation 
prior to the passage of the industrial relations legislation in 
question. He suggests that there are three sub-groups of 
firms: 
1. Those firms where the rights and arrangements 
embodied in the legislation have been 
established on a voluntary basis well before 
the passage of the legislation. 
2. Those firms that move quickly to comply with 
the provisions of legislation which is either 
imminent or has just been passed. 
3. Those firms who only get round to establish-
ing the arrangements called for in the 
legislation after some time has passed. 
Thus, in looking at the variation in the impact of industrial 
relations legislation at the level of the individual employment 
establishment, Beaumont used as an indicator the speed or time 
profile with which the provisions became operative. 
The Health and Safety Executive conducted a survey in 
October 1979 which was designed to assess the extent to which 
safety representatives had been appointed under the Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations during their 
first year of operation. The basic results of this survey were 
analysed by Beaumont (1981). For the purpose of the present 
study, the most interesting part of the analysis concerns the 
public sector. 
Beaumont hypothesised that there was a significantly greater 
likelihood of the Regulations having been invoked during the year 
in question in industries predominantly or solely in the public 
sector. This hypothesis is based on the government's acceptance 
of an obligation to act as "good employer" if labour in the public 
sector. (See Beaumont (1981) "Government as an emp loyer: setti ng 
an examp 1 e?" ) . 
Beaumont states that this good employer obligation has 
frequently placed the public sector to the forefront of the process 
of introducing new institutional arrangements and structures in the 
industrial relations field in Britain, and he suggests that this 
effect may h~ encouraged a rel ati ve ly rapi d i ntroducti on of the 
safety representative Regulations. 
The use of joint consultative procedures within the public 
sector before the Health and Safety at Work Act may also have 
meant that procedures such as those for safety committees were 
not as new in concept as in some areas of the private sector. 
As a result of this study, Beaumont found that the safety 
representative Regulations were most likely to have been invoked 
during their first year of operation in industries characterised 
by high accident rates, high collective agreement coverage, 
single employer bargaining, large sized establishments and 
establishments where there was a member of senior management 
specifically responsible for industrial relations and personnel 
matters. Statistical tests showed that there was a greater 
likelihood of the safety representatives Regulations having been 
invoked in public sector industries. It will be interesting to 
see if this concept of the Government as a 'good employer' has 
resulted in the operationalisation of the Regulations concerning 
safety representatives and safety committees within a short 
period of time following their introduction. 
Over the period 1980 to 1982 a study was carried out by the 
Centre for Research in Industrial Democracy and Participation at 
the University of Glasgow to look at safety committees. High, 
medium and low accident rate sectors were represented in the sample 
of 51 manufacturing plants that were studied. The study was 
carried out by a group headed by Phil Beaumont, and the main 
objective was to assess the effectiveness of health and safety 
committees in the sample using certain external and internal 
criteria. The main part of the study concentrated upon the 
internal determinants of effectiveness as they are more control-
lable by the organisation. These are described more fully in 
Chapter 8 and data from other sources, such as the work of Kochan 
. 
et al. and from the present local authority study, are also examined. 
After collecting background information, the methodology used 
by Beaumont et al. was interviews, carried out with members of 
safety committees at all levels in the organisations, to collect 
information regarding the objectives of the committee and the 
factors which the interviewees felt made their committees either 
effective or ineffective. 
The methodology used meant that only a fairly superficial 
study could be made of the 51 firms concenred, and no attempt 
was made to cross-check views given at interviews using other 
methods. The firms were all in the manufacturing division of 
the private sector and so the findings cannot be generalised to 
all organisations, for example to those in the public sector. 
The determinants of effectiveness described by Beaumont et al. 
do not produce many surprises and many of them seem to be almost 
obvious, for example the committee must meet regularly and should 
not be too large! The study will not be further described 
here as the details are given fully in Chapter 8. However, it is 
hoped to use the study as a framework within which to present some 
of the data collected in the present Local Authority study. 
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CONSENSUS OR CONFLICT? 
6.1 Introduction 
As some of the empirical studies in the area of health and 
safety are concerned with the relationship between management and 
trade unions, it is necessary to set out some of the perspectives 
which provide a frame of reference within which health and safety 
issues and procedures are dealt with by the parties. 
Fox (1974) describes three perspectives which are used here 
as frames of reference to aid interpretation of HASAWA. The 
first of these - the industrial enterprise as a unitary system, 
has one source of authority and one form of loyalty. It can 
be likened to a team unified by a common purpose - the football 
team analogy. This system is characterised by voluntary self-
regulation and the virtues of joint consultation, exemplified 
by safety committees, are emphasised. Mangement is willing 
to share its authority in order to create a unified working 
environment built on harmony and mutual trust. 
The effects on industrial relations within this unitary 
frame of reference are many. The trade union presence is seen 
as an intrusion into what should be a private, unified structure 
and there may be resentment by management against trade union or 
work group claims. There may also be a refusal by management 
to negotiate, and the trade unions are left ignorant of management 
policy affecting them. 
So the unitary frame or reference described by Fox denies 
the validity of conflict in industry. Any conflict which is 
admitted by this model is unnatural and is due to incompatible 
personalities, faulty communication, the result of stupidity 
(failure to grasp the communality of interest) or the work of 
agitators inciting others who would otherwise be content. 
This use of stupidity or ignorance to explain conflict is 
also used by Gouldner in his model of representative bureaucracy 
as an explanation put forward by management as to why the work-
force break ~afety rules. 
described later. 
This 'careless worker ' approach is 
So to sum up, the unitary frame of reference emphasises 
managerial prerogatives and management's disposition to play 
down the realities of divergent workgroup attitudes and values 
in the interests of a strong unified team. 
The second perspective described by Fox is the industrial 
enterprise as a pluralist system. Here the organisation is 
considered to be a coalition of divergent interests and sectional 
groups. These many groups, related by separate interests and 
objectives, must be maintained in some kind of equilibrium. 
From the industrial relations viewpoint~ the individual 
worker is seen to be so much weaker than the employer that he 
is allowed to combine with his fellows in collective bargaining. 
Acceptance of trade unionism came through its being recognised 
as a necessary protection for the worker and therefore management 
must share its decision-making with other sources of authority. 
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It follows that, according to the pluralist frame of 
reference, conflict is endemic to industrial organisations 
with the inevitable conflict of interest between management 
and workforce being resolved by negotiation and compromise. 
However, it does not follow that trade unions introduce 
conflict into the industrial scene, rather they provide a 
highly organised and continuous form of expression for section-
al interests which would exist anyway. A high degree of 
organised conflict does not necessarily mean low morale as 
there is a belief in the inherent fairness of collective bar-
gaining. The pluralist approach assumes that compromise 
solutions to health and safety problems would be acceptable 
to the workforce enduring the risk. 
The third of Fox's perspectives is the radical approach 
which suggests that management use their power to achieve 
their aims by exploiting the workforce, that is the parties 
to conflict are not equal. Fox argues that given a low 
trust and low discretion relationship, labour will respond 
in a low trust manner and have a purely instrumental attachment 
to work. 
For the purpose of this research project, attention will 
be concentrated on the unitary and the pluralist frames of 
reference as according to Ramsay (1975) the radical perspective 
is little used by either side in industry. 
In the course of collecting information as part of this 
project it is intended to shed some light on the pluralist/ 
unitary approach tn organisations in relation to health and 
safety issues. 
c-
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6.2 The consensus approach 
The unitary perspective can be illustrated by a strongly 
held belief in a basic similarity of union-management aims in 
the area of health and safety in the workplace as stated by 
the Robens Committee. 
"There is a greater national identity of interest 
between 'the two sides' in relation to safety and 
health problems than in most other matters. There 
is no legitimate scope for bargaining on safety 
and health issues but much scope for constructive 
discussions~ joint inspection and participation 
in working out solutions. " 
Consultation and participation are the concepts which are 
stressed in the Robens Report (1972). The Robens Committee 
envisaged joint safety committees where representatives of 
management and workers would work together to apply themselves 
to the health and safety problems of the organisation. That 
is, that there would be a united attack on hazards and the 
reduction of accidents. It is suggested that safety represen-
tatives on joint safety committees would be 'consulted' by 
management on various safety issues, but that their prime 
function would be to assist management to get 'apathetic' 
workers to comply with regulations. 
Lewis (1977) claims that the consensus view is based on 
the concept of the industrial enterprise as a team unified by 
a common purpose. He states that this approach is consistent 
with the view that consultation is the means of promoting action 
SE 
where there are no obvious conflicts. This consensus approach 
entails workers' and managements' representatives acting together 
in the formal safety system of the organisation to improve 
working conditions and practices, and to introduce safety equipment, 
safer machines and work procedures. The joint safety committee 
would be influenced by technological and economic constraints, 
making trade union representatives more aware of management 
1 i mi ta ti ons . Lewis's consensus approach is illustrated in 
Fi gure 6. 1 . 
6.3 The Conflict Approach 
However, Lewis notes that there will inevitably be conflict 
because of the differing biases of management (for maximising 
production or profitability) and of workers (for protection). 
This conflict approach sees management as being primarily respon-
sible for unsafe working conditions and at the same time being 
subject to economic constraints. Workers must organise them-
selves to force a re-ordering of priorities in favour of safety. 
This would be done by bargaining as suggested by Grayson and 
Goddard (1975), who consider that bargaining on safety matters 
must be kept separate from that on other subjects such as canteens. 
The conflict approach is illustrated in Figure 6.2 in diagrammatic 
form. 
When comparing the two models of control of work hazards, 
the consensus view and the conflict view, several important 
differences can be seen. In the consensus model, research, 
advice and information concerning economic constraints are avail-
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able to both safety representatives and management through the 
safety committee. This seems to be a more realistic context 
in which joint action can be taken, than the conflict view 
where research and advice is given separately to safety repre-
sentatives and management. This information may differ, 
complicating the situation by providing each group with a 
different frame of reference within which to interpret the 
existing safety situation in the organisation. I f the trade 
union representatives are not aware of the economic constraints, 
their demands (for example for improvements in the workplace) 
may be unrealistic. They may not appreciate the necessity for 
the setting of priorities often emphasised by management. 
Ashford (1976) notes the problem of inequality of access to 
information, for example between management and labour. He 
suggests that this inequality of access creates incentives to 
withhold or distort information which may be either damaging or 
beneficial. Differential access converts information into a 
bargaining advantage for the more knowledgeable party. 
Examples may be information about newly introduced substances 
and processes. 
Information is only one of the variables which has been 
examined in experimental studies of the negotiating relationship 
carried out by, among others, Morley and Stephenson (1977). 
Other variables include, the medium of communication, the size 
of the group and the seating arrangements. 
The consensus model shows some allocation of responsibil-
ity for hazards from both groups. Unsafe working conditions 
(management) and apathy (workforce). The conflict view acknow-
ledges only management's contribution through providing unsafe 
, 0 -
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working conditions. This view may question the neutrality or 
credibility of the source of research and advice information 
in the consensus model and may justify the use of two separate 
sources of information, or emphasise the importance of safety 
representatives being aware of the source of information they 
receive. The Lewis model will be adapted to the situation 
found to exist in the Local Authority on the basis of the data 
collected. This will be described in Chapter Nine. 
The unitary approach to health and safety has been challen-
ged by, among others, Nichols and Armstrong (1973). They 
suggest that Robens' contention that accidents must be due to 
apathy because everyone is anxious to reduce accidents and to 
gain from safe working, is theoretically suspect and lacking 
in evidence to back it up. They describe his view of accident 
causation as being derived from 'purely homespun psychology'. 
With regard to safety committees for example, the Robens 
Report suggested that there was a necessity for common goals 
to be agreed between the trade unions and management. This 
idea has been received by trade unions with some scepticism 
and A.S.T.M.S. has said that 'a successful safety committee 
may not be the same thing as a co-operative and harmonious one'. 
Grayson and Goddard (1975) consider that there is over-
whelming evidence against the consensus view of safety. They 
contend that the law recognises the essential conflict between 
cash and safety in the use of the flexible term 'reasonably 
practicable'. This takes into account the fact that management 
will at all times have to allocate resources according to a 
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system of priorities, and the Health and Safety Executive claim 
to be realistic in their acknowledgement that often safety 
cannot be 'brought up to standard I all in one procedure when 
there are other competing claims for money in the organisation -
cost and trouble is weighted against the severity or extent of 
the hazard. 
Grayson and Goddard suggest that in an economy dominated 
by the pursuit of private profit, conflict between the aims of 
workers and employers is inbuilt and inevitable. In addition, 
they put forward the view than an end to trade union bargaining 
over safety would mean an immediate deterioration in the 
conditions of workers in industry. 
It is suggested that it is too simplistic to assume there 
will always be an identify of approach between management and 
trade unions in the area of health and safety. Among the many 
matters which could be legitimately discussed by managers, 
safety representatives and inspectors are: the severity or 
extent of a potential hazard, the cost/benefit equation with 
respect to various alternative preventive measures and the 
allocation of priorities where resources are limited. 
Ashford (1976) states that in the United States, organised 
labour has not emphasised health and safety in collective 
bargaining for several reasons. Worker concern with inflation, 
economic problems, and the fear of losing jobs have meant that 
health and safety issues have not always had the attention they 
would otherwise have merited. 
discussed in Chapter Eleven). 
(These issues will be further 
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PAGE NUMBERING AS IN THE 
ORIGINAL THESIS 
It was not until 1966 that the National Labor Relations 
Board in the U.S.A. established the principle that health and 
safety issues are mandatory subjects for bargaining. Ashford 
states that there is now a trend towards contract bargaining 
as a major union mechanism for achieving improved health and 
safety conditions. Ashford suggests that collective bargaining 
has the potential to go beyond the mandate of the Occupational 
Safety and Health Act 1970 (OSHA) by obligating employers to 
interact closely with workers rather than merely complying with 
loosely enforced and inadequate government standards. Collective 
bargaining may also move the responsibility for occupational 
health and safety out of the sole hands of management and 
encourage the participation of workers in controlling technology 
in the workplace. It can be seen that Ashford, in examining 
the situation in the United States, postulates that a bargaining 
relationship between employers and the workforce could bring 
about changes which would improve health and safety standards. 
-
An interesting point to follow up in this study is that 
the report of the Robens Committee (1972) is essentially worded 
in terms of the unitary frame of reference, whereas the SRSC 
Regulations (1977) are implicitly pluralist in perspective. 
The most radical aspect of the Regulations ~s the concept 
of the trade union-appointed safety representative. For the 
first time there was a statutory basis given to a trade union 
lay official which differed from the voluntaristic industrial 
relations tradition. So trade union safety representatives 
are acknowledged to represent the interests of an specific 
group in the organisation. However, the SRSC Regulations may 
be viewed as only one instance of a general move away from the 
voluntaristic tradition evident in much legislation passed 
lOt 
during the 1970s. 
It is expected that in the present study of a Local 
Authority there may be found to be a mixture of the pluralist 
and unitary perspectives used by safety representatives 
operationalised in the use of both consultative and negotiating 
tactics with management. 
If we ask, lis safety a devisive or an integrating issue?' 
we must examine the situation to find out if there is any 
struggle for power involved. The struggle which may be found 
is one for scarce resources because of the other competing 
demands on management such as the need for production or 
profit. Safety representatives unlike management can 
concentrate on safety alone. 
This chapter has described the unitary, pluralist and 
radical perspectives identified by Fox which can be used as 
frames of reference within which it is possible to view health 
and safety. The unitary viewpoint taken by Robens suggested 
that bargaining would not be necessary over health and safety 
issues - a position that was challenged by Nichols and Armstrong, 
who find no evidence for the 'apathy' explanation for poor 
safety performance, and Goddard and Grayson and Ashford among 
others. The main point made by these writers is that making 
safety a subject for collective bargaining can improve 
s tanda rds. 
Lewis's consensus and conflict views on health and safety 
were described and will be adapted later in this study to 
illustrate the actual situation in the organisation being 
'0"" I ~ / 
examined. 
The industrial relations aspects of health and safety and 
the strategies used in interactions between management and 
safety representatives will be discussed later in relation to 
the work carried out by researchers such as Kochan et al. in 
the United States and Beaumont in Britain. 
lOt 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE SAFETY REPRESENTATIVES 
THE SAFETY REPRESENTATIVE 
A postal questionnaire with covering letter was sent to all 
the safety representatives in the four departments under study 
in the Local Authority. 
Contact was made by letter with the full-time officials 
of NUPE and NALGO who also represent the craft unions. An 
appointment was arranged with the NUPE official to explain the 
research project, but no acknowledgement was received from 
NALGO, even when a second letter was sent, therefore no personal 
contact was made. Problems of access are discussed in 
Chapter Four. 
A pilot study was carried out to test the clarity of the 
wording of the questionnaire and to ensure that it was not 
overlong. The safety representatives used in the pilot study 
were taking the TUC training course for safety representatives 
at a local college. They worked in both the public and private 
sectors. After making a few alterations, the questionnaire was 
considered to be ready to be sent out to the study population. 
The main objective of the questionnaire was to examine the 
part played by safety representatives in the implementation of 
the HASAW (1974) in the Local Authority. It was intended to 
collect information on safety representatives' perceptions of 
their role and to compare these with the functions of safety 
representatives as stated in the Safety Representatives Safety 
Committee Regulations (SRSC Regulations). A large amount of 
information was collected on the safety representative role and 
some of the findings are described below. 
1 1 C: 
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7.1 The Sample 
Eighty-six representatives from the four departments under 
study were sent questionnaires by post. Sixty-six replies were 
received - a response rate of 77%. 
The SRSC Regulations recommend that safety representatives 
should have at least two years' service with the employer or at 
least two years' experience in similar employment, and it was 
found that the safety representatives in the sample had worked 
in their departments for several years a; seen in Table 7.1. 
TABLE 7.1 Length of service of safety representatives 
"For how long have you worked in this department?" 
(%) 
Under 2 years 11 
3 - 7 years 39 
8 - 12 years 15 
13 - 17 years 14 
18 - 22 years 11 
23 years and over 11 
When the age bands were aggregated into two ranges, it was 
found that 29% of the safety representatives were between 20 
and 40 years old and 62% were over 41 years old. 
75~~ of the respondents had been safety representati ves for 
between one and four years which might be expected as the SRSC 
Regulations officially came into force in October 1978 although 
some workplaces had safety representatives in operation before 
that date. 
7.2 Appointment of Safety Representatives 
When asked to describe exactly how they became safety 
representatives the respondents replied as in Table 7.2. 
TABLE 7.2 Method of appointment of safety representatives 
( %) 
Already a shop steward 41 
Appointed by the trade union 20 
E1 ected 18 
Requested (by shop steward, colleague 
or management) 14 
Vol unteered 8 
One of the most interesting aspects of the appointment of 
safety representatives is the question of whether the role is 
best carried out combined with that of shop steward, or as a 
specialist without these dual responsibilities. 
Trade union policy differs on this matter with some unions 
(such as NUPE, NALGO, AUEW and TGWU which are all represented 
among the respondents) suggesting that the functions of safety 
representatives should be carried out by shop stewards. Other 
unions, such as the print unions and COHSE, favour separation 
of the roles and functions. For a full discussion of these 
differing trade union policies see Stevens (1979). 
The GMWU in thei r safety representati ves I handbook state 
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that "in most cases some of the existing shop stewaY'ds or staff 
representatives shou~d a~so'be designated safety representatives 
and shou~d combine hea~th and safety responsibi~ities with their 
other tasks." It shoul d be noted that a 1 though the GMWU have 
now amalgamated with the Boilermakers Unions (to form GMBATU) 
reference will continue to be made to the GMWU as this was the 
name of the union at the time of the study. 
The National Union of Sheetmetal Workers suggest that shop 
stewards' committees should liaise with the safety representa-
ti ves ei ther by putting a safety representa ti ve on the stewards' 
committee or by arranging that a leading steward is a safety 
representa ti ve. An alternative suggestion is that a shop 
stewards' committee may set up a health and safety sub-committee 
with safety representatives on it. 
Before going on to look at the arguments for and against 
the dual role described above, the results of the questionnaire 
can be seen to show a flexible approach where the most appropriate 
arrangements can be made in the individual workplace. 
TABLE 7.3 Dual/sin le role and trade union membershi of 
sa ety representatlves 
Trade Union Dual Role Sinfle Role (Sa fety Rep/ (Sa ety Rep. 
Shop Steward) only) 
NALGO 12 8 
NUPE 12 6 
TGWU 13 6 
AUEW 6 
EEPTU 1 3 
GMWU 2 
Sheetmeta 1 Workers 2 
UCATT 1 
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It is felt by some trade unions that safety representatives 
who are also shop stewards will be more committed to ensuring that 
the workforce they represent will have a safe and healthyenviron-
ment in which to work. Also only the experience and power of 
the shop steward will give sufficient strength to the safety 
representative role which will avoid the danger of health and 
safety being isolated from collective bargaining procecures. 
Shop stewards already have experience in representing members' 
interests in negotiations with management and so are "not as 
likely to be fobbed off with delays and excuses". (Caldwell et ale 
1980). The combination of the strength of the trade union 
backing for shop stewards and the legal backing of the safety 
representatives provides a powerful joint role. The dual role 
may he 1 p to avoi d cl ashes betv/een the shop steward, who has no 
health and safety responsibilities, and the safety representative 
who can be single-minded about health and safety issues. These 
clashes might be exploited by management as might the problems 
of having two channels of communication between trade union 
members and management. 
The Assistant Divisional Officer of NUPE when interviewed by 
the researcher stated that one individual should hold both roles 
or management will 'buck pass'. He also said that one would 
need two people who can work well together if the roles are 
separate and it may be easier to combine the two roles in one 
person. 
Peter Jacques, Secretary of the TUe's Social Insurance and 
Industrial Welfare Committee, says of the dual safety representa-
tive/shop steward role: 
"1 1 L 
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" .. . it is the easiest U}ay to get the system going ... 
and the shop stewards are familiar with the 
industrial relations systems which is needed in 
big corrpanies where it can be pretty complex." 
There may also be a reduction in the amount of paperwork 
and communication necessary if one individual carries out the 
dual role. 
On the other hand, one argument for Single role safety 
representatives is that the dual role may cause work overload 
resulting in an individual carrying out both roles at less than 
full efficiency. 
Nicholson (1976) states that reported role overload among 
shop stewards has been found to be due to the breadth of activities 
demanded of them, not only to the volume of work. This would 
suggest that the additional responsibilities and work load 
imposed upon shop stewards who take on the joint role of shop 
steward and safety representative may cause stress due to over-
load as well as stress resulting from potential conflict 
between the two roles. Particularly hazardous working 
environments may be better served by expert safety representatives 
who have the time and total commitment to devote themselves to 
the promotion of health and safety. 
Another point, briefly mentioned above, which is to be 
investigated in the project is that role conflict may be exper-
ienced by those with dual responsibilities. Safety may be 
sacrificed in the cause of other aims - a shop steward may 
support the bonus scheme and back up his constituents' wish to 
maximise their earnings, but in his role of safety representative 
he may feel the bonus schem~ encourages workers to cut corners to 
save time and may result in unsafe practices. 
Shop stewards may be up for re-election annually which is 
not the position with safety representatives. A need for 
consistency and continuity was emphasised by members of senior 
management who were interviewed. They stated that safety 
representatives who have developed expertise in the area of 
health and safety in their workplace should not be changed at 
too frequent intervals. 
On the introduction of the SRSC Regulations, some managers 
may have anticipated shop steward safety representatives as 
likely to be more militant and so likely to 'make an issue' out 
of health and safety. At present there does not appear to be 
any evidence to support this view. 
It was hypothesised that certain differences might emerge 
between shop steward safety representatives and safety represen-
tatives with the single role, and 'information was collected to 
show if the differing trade union policies are justified. 91% 
of the safety representatives who were also shop stewards 
reported that they did not find that the two roles conflicted. 
One of the few examples given of role conflict was the problem 
of fitting certain matters into which role, that is whether to 
take up the matter as a safety representative or as a shop 
steward. 
It was hypothesised that there would be certain important 
possible differences between the two groups of safety representatives 
and some of these are described below. 
1. Safety representatives with the dual role may be more 
likely to experience conflict with the supervisor 
because they are used to engaging in conflict with 
management. 
2. Those with the dual role may see their relationship 
with management as negotiating or a mixture of 
negotiation and consultation rather than purely consul-
tative. 
3. Safety representatives who are also shop stewards may 
say that the bonus scheme does not work against safe 
working because they want to help their constituents 
to maximise their earnings. 
4. Those with the dual role may see management as only 
slightly committed to safety because of the polar-
isation of trade union/management attitudes sometimes 
demonstrated in shop stewards. 
Using Chi-squared tests, there were no statistically significant 
differences between the two types of safety representatives on the 
above issues. 
The fact that these hypotheses were statistically unsupported 
suggests that in manY aspects there are no detectable differences 
in this study between the two groups. 
This leads to the consideration of whether there are any 
advantages or disadvantages, from the trade union point of view, 
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in having safety representatives who are also shop stewards. 
This evaluation would require a longitudinal study of a sample 
of the two groups looking, from a trade union perspective, at 
various aspects of their effectiveness and carrying out a 
compa ri son. 
Perhaps, as is the case with the majority of trade unions, 
a flexible approach, where the appointment of safety represen-
tatives is carried out in the workplace by whichever means are 
considered to be most appropriate, may be more effective. For 
example it may be appropriate to make all existing shop stewards 
become safety representatives in one organisation. The trade 
unions in another organisation may have a different method 
entirely. 
7.3 The Safety Representative/Supervisor Relationship 
The self-regulatory aspects of the HASAWA have meant that 
the relationship between the safety representative and the 
supervisor is very important. Stevenson (1980) says 11 ••• health 
and safety has to be identified as an area for co-operation 
demanding the development of a constructive partnership. II He 
refers to the fact that both supervisors and safety representa-
tives want certain things, such as to encourage workers to wear 
protective clothing, although perhaps for different reasons. 
This is representative of the unitary viewpoint described 
earlier. 
If this supervisor-safety representative partnership is to 
be effective, it is important that each of the parties receives 
support from senior management and the workforce respectively. 
Both safety representatives and supervisors were asked about 
the support they felt they got when health and safety issues were 
raised. The two sets of results can be seen below. 
TABLE 7.4 Support for Safety Representatives 
IIWhen health and safety issues are raised to you feel 
you get the support of: 
Yes (%) No ( %) 
a) the people you represent? 78 22 
b) management? 70 30 
c) your trade union?1I 84 16 
N=64 
TABLE 7.5 Support for Supervisors 
"When trying to maintain a safe workplace do you feel 
you get the support of: 
Yes (%) No (%) 
a) the workers you supervise? 67 33 N=82 
b) safety representatives? 95 5 N=83 
c) senior management? 91 9 N=80 
d) the safety offi cer?" 91 9 N=77 
It can be seen that nearly a quarter of the safety representa-
tives feel that they do not get the support from their own 
members and 33% of supervisors report a lack of support from the 
workers they supervi se. However only 9), of supervisors report 
a perceived lack of support from senior management compared with 
30% of safety representatives. 
It should be noted here that the safety representatives were 
asked if they got the support of management - which could include 
supervisory level, whereas the supervisors were asked about senior 
management - that is, levels of management higher than their own. 
The lack of support for supervisors which applies to only 9% 
of the respondents may stem from the fact that top management 
are usually physically removed from the hazards which may closely 
affect the working environment of supervisors and those they work 
with. For this reason, top management may find it difficult to 
appreciate the necessity of giving thei:r full backing to super-
visors if they want them to implement the organisation's safety 
po 1 i cy. 
Lack of support for safety representatives may result from 
the apathy in the workforce described by Robens. They may feel 
suspicious about any changes made by management especially if 
there is a poor industrial relations climate. The safety 
representative may be perceived as doing management's work in 
'enforcing'safety rules and not given support by the people he 
is trying to represent. They may not report hazards to him 
when they should, and may knowingly ignore safety rules. 
In an open-ended question to safety representatives asking 
for further comments on health and safety at work, the apathy 
of the workforce was mentioned by a few respondents. 
In a similar question in the questionnaire to supervisors, 
the main criticism of senior management was that they had not 
invested supervisors with tne necessary authority to enforce 
safety rules which would enable them to cope more effectively 
with their legal responsibilities. This issue will be discussed 
more fully in Chapter Eight. 
It was hypothesised that there would be a difference between 
the degree of management support received respectively by safety 
representatives and by supervisors. 
TABLE 7.6 Dearee of Management Support Received by Supervisors 
an by Safety Representatives 
"When health and safety items are raised do you feel you 
get the support of management/senior management? 
Safety representatives 
Supervi sors II 
Yes No 
45 
73 
19 N=64 
7 N=80 
x2 = 1'.93 df = 1 p < 0.001 
The Chi-squared value under the nul' hypothesis of no 
association between the perceived degree of management support 
of the groups - that is safety representatives and supervisors -
is 11.93 on 1 df which gives a p-value of < 0.001. On th is 
evidence, it is possible to conclude that there is a relationship 
between the role of safety representative or supervisor, and 
perceptions of support given by management/senior management. 
Supervisors are acting on behalf of management to implement 
their safety policy, whereas safety representatives represent 
another interest group in the organisation. Thi s may account 
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for the fact that the supervisors' perceptions of the support 
they get from management is 'greater than the perceptions of the 
safety representatives. 
91% of supervisors considered that they receive the support 
of safety representatives which indicates that the co-operation 
considered to be necessary by the Robens Committee seems to exist 
in reality in this Local Authority. However, this finding cannot be 
compared with the 75% of safety representatives who feel that they 
receive the support of management, because the level of management 
was not specified in the answer which could refer to senior 
management levels in addition to the supervising level. 
Perceptions of conflict 
Stevenson (1980) suggests that it is inevitable that the 
safety representative and the supervisor will have differences of 
opinion on many issues because although their aims are similar, 
that is the provision and maintenance of a safety and healthy 
workplace, their responsibilities are different. 
The supervisor must take into account his legal responsibility 
both for himself and for his subordinates, whereas the safety 
representative's concern is to avoid the prosecution of his 
fellow workers as well as avoiding accidents and injuries which 
may occur. In his capacity of safety representative he has no 
legal liability. 
In the questionnaires sent out to safety representatives 
and supervisors, each group (66 safety representatives and 88 
supervisory staff) was asked if they ever experienced conflict 
with each other. It was hypothesised that there would be a 
difference between the two groups' experience of conflict on 
the grounds that disagreements over health and safety would be 
more salient to safety representatives than to supervisors who 
have many other competing responsibilities. 
as in Table 7.7. 
The resul ts were 
TABLE 7.7 Ex§erience of Conflict between Safety Representatives 
an Supervi sors 
"Have you ever experienced conflict with a safety 
representative/supervisor over a health and safety 
iss ue?" 
Yes No 
Safety representatives 15 51 
Supervi sors 4 82 
x2 = 11.22 df = 1 p < 0.001 
The Chi-squared value under the null hypothesis of no 
association between the reported incidence of conflict between 
the two groups - safety representatives and supervisors - is 
11.22 on 1 df which gives a p-value of < 0.001. 
Safety representatives are reporting a significantly 
different amount of conflict than supervisors - 23% compared to 
on ly 5% of s upervi sors . As these two groups are interacting 
with one another in the four departments it is necessary to 
examine why this difference of views has been demonstrated. 
One possible explanation ;s the interpretation of the word 
"confl i ct II whi ch is an emo ti ve word. The pe rcepti on of confl i ct 
may vary between the two groups - what is considered to be 
conflict by a safety representative may not be classified as 
conflict by a supervisor. This may be because safety represen-
tatives can be single-minded over health and safety, and to them 
any difference of opinion with the supervisor over a health and 
safety issue will be regarded as an example of conflict. On the 
other hand, supervisors have many diverse tasks and responsibilities, 
of which health and safety is only one, and may be subject in their 
everyday work to conflict and pressure from both sides, that is, 
management and workforce. They may have to enforce rules and to 
discipline the men whom they supervise, and so compared with these 
areas of potential conflict, an altercation with a safety represen-
tative may be viewed as a minor aggravation rather than an example 
of conflict. 
Most of the 59% of the sample of safety representatives who 
had been trained had attended the TUe course for safety represen-
tatives. When presented with a list of possible skills learned 
on courses (which can be seen in Table 7.12) 39% mentioned 
negotiating skills whereas this aspect was not mentioned by super-
visors in a similar but open-ended question on training skills. 
As negotiating skills is a part of the Tue training course for 
safety representatives, it may therefore be that the safety 
representatives are made more aware of potential trade union-
management conflict than are the supervisors whose training is 
more orientated towards their legal responsibilities and education 
of their subordinates. 
This suggestion that elements in the training courses for 
safety representatives, for exa~ple negotiating skills, may have an 
affect on their perception of conflict with supervisors, is supported 
by data collected from the questionnaire. A cross-tabulation showed 
the relationship between the two groups of safety representatives -
those who had been on a training course and those who had not - and 
whether they had or had not experienced conflict with a supervisor over 
a health and safety issue. lt was hypothesised that there would be an 
association between having attended a safety training course for safety 
representatives and reported experience of conflict with the 
supervisor. This is because the TUC have always stated their 
preference for a bargaining role for safety representatives in the 
interactions with management, and as the majority of safety representa-
tives have attended the training course developed by the TUC, its 
pluralistic perspective, which will inevitably entail some degree of 
conflict with management, may make them conscious of conflict, actual 
or potential. 
TABLE 7.8 Reported Conflict with Supervisors related to Trained/ 
Untrained Safety Representatives 
Conflict with supervisor 
No conflict 
2 
x = 4. 72 df = 1 p < 0.05 
Trained 
13 (33%) 
26 (66%) 
Untrained 
2 ( 7%) 
25 (YJ%) 
The Chi-squared value under the null hypothesis of no association 
between those who had been trained and those who had experienced 
conflict with a supervisor is 4.72 on 1 df which gives a p-value of 
< U.Ob. Possible explanations for this statistically significant 
difference were discussed above. 
It is possible to look at the occasions which are described by 
both safety representatives and supervisors concerning such conflict 
over health and safety issues. Of the lj responses from safety 
representatives, four concerned safety items such as an argument over 
men travelling on a tractor trailer, three examples concerned personal 
protection such as men not wearing safety boots and overalls on site, 
three examples concerned a lack of information, and one related an 
incident when he was told by a supervisor to get back to work when he 
was investigating an accident. There were an additional two items 
concerning overmanning and administration problems 
Only four respondents from the larger supervisor group reported 
examples of conflict with safety representatives. Of those, three 
concerned safety in general such as trying to get the squad to move 
signs with them as they move when patching roads. The remaining item 
concerned the failure of management to provide adequate noise 
protection. 
So it can be seen that some items such as lack of information for 
example, are not perceived as conflict issues by supervisors, but may 
be seen as such by safety representatives. 
One other possible explanation for the lack of perceived conflict 
reported could be that supervisors are reluctant to admit conflict as 
they consider that it could reflect adversely on their ability to run 
their section effectively. This could indicate that supervisors are 
selectively perceiving situations - that is, they are not acknowledging 
the existence of conflict, or they may be giving socially acceptable 
answers to the question. 
7.4 The Safety Representative Role and Function 
In order to collect information regarding the functions and 
role of the safety representative in the self-regulatory aspects 
of the health and safety legislation, it was decided to use a 
combination of closed, (i.e. forced choice) questions and open-
ended questions. The ease of coding closed questions may not 
compensate for the limitations - open-ended questions can yield 
more richly descriptive material which may, however, be difficult 
to classify. 
It was decided to try to use the information collected in 
the questionnaire sent to safety representatives in order to 
classify the perceived role of safety representatives in the 
workplace. This technique of classifying information to identify 
roles has been used in research by among others Batstone et ale 
(1977) who looked at the shop stewards' role and Beaumont (1981) 
and Cook (1980) who were concerned with safety representatives. 
These studies are described below. 
Chinoy (1950) in the United States divided local trade 
union officials into three categories of leaders: 
"accidental" who are reluctant, acquiescent nominees 
"ideological" who strive to actualise beliefs and values 
"ambitious" leaders whose aspirations are geared to the 
furtherance of their own personal needs for 
status and recognition 
One criticism of Chinoy's work is that there is a tenuous or 
unspecified relationship between his taxonomies on the one hand 
and empirical observations o~ the other. 
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Batstone et al. (1977) looked at the way in which shop 
stewards and their members act within the workplace as trade 
unionists. Their main research method was observation and they 
identified ideal types of shop stewards based on two cross-
cutting dimensions: 
1. the extent to which emphasis is placed on a 
delegate or representative role, 
2. the pursuit of union principles. 
Their categorisation of stewards derives largely from the 
ideas of stewards themselves and in particular from the expect-
ations of the convenors and more experienced stewards. The four 
roles identified were: 
1. 'the leader ' - plays a representative role in 
relation to his members as he attempts to implement 
trade union principles which he is generally able 
to achieve; 
2. 'the nascent leader ' - often sponsored by a leader. 
He is committed to trade union principles but 
without the support of other stewards is unable 
to maintain the necessary representative role; 
3. 'the cowboy I - in the short term can maintain the 
representative role but is not committed to trade 
union principles. Is concerned with maximising 
the earnings of his own groups of members in the 
short run; 
4. 'the populist ' - acts as a delegate whose activities 
are determined by expressed wishes of his members. 
Lack of commitment to trade union principles and 
ability or desire to be a representative. 
The problem with using ideal types 1S that an attempt is 
12[ 
made to collapse a wide range of complex psychological and 
. 
situational factors into a classification of people. The 
question also arises as to whether such categories are mutually 
exclusive or is there a contingency effect whereby the situational 
factors prevalent in the workplace will affect the role taken on 
by the stewards? That is, perhaps the roles are not mutually 
exclusive but can be interchanged depending on the circumstances 
prevailing and the issues being dealt with. In th e s arne way, 
the safety representative role may be dynamic, constantly 
changing, as opposed to static. 
Cook (1980) carried out a series of interviews on a small 
sample of safety representatives in an attempt to gather infor-
mation on their perception of their role. He found evidence of 
three categories of safety representatives: 
1. Hazard reporter; 
2. Secondary Educator, i.e. educator of constituents; 
3. Enforcement Officer - policing the company's safety 
policy and keeping members in line, for example 
with regard to wearing protective clothing. 
No evidence emerged to reinforce Cook's anticipated categories 
of: 
1. Information Processor, i.e. keeping up-to-date 
with relevant literature; 
2. Monitor of established standards, e.g. checking 
protective clothing, noise, etc.; 
3. Researcher - into accidents, near misses and 
complaints; 
4. Liaison with the Health and Safety Executive. 
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In the present study, instead of having pre-conceived roles 
before collecting data, open-ended questions asked safety 
representatives to state what aspects of a safety representative's 
work they considered to be most important, and also what issues 
took up most of their time. Analysis and categorisation of the 
responses to these questions provided interesting material regard-
ing the perceived role of safety representatives. 
of this analysis are discussed below. 
The resul ts 
Another example of the use of the technique of role classi-
fication is the study carried out by Beaumont (1981) which was 
described in Chapter Five. 
The three main safety representative functions described as 
most important by the sample of safety representatives themselves 
were: 
1. Representative - a channel of communication, 
2. Inspector/Monitor, 
3. Accident Investigator. 
Beaumont (1981) describes the first function as an industrial 
relations-based role as is the shop steward. He describes the 
other two main functions as technical, for example, inspecting, 
monitoring and investigation skills requiring specialist training 
which differentiates them from the 'traditional I shop steward 
functions. 
In the present study, 55 replies were given to the question 
"What aspects of a safety representati ve IS work do you see as 
being most important?" These were initially categorised into 
13C 
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eight roles as follows: 
TABLE 7.9 Safety Representati ve Roles 
N % 
1 ) Concerned with general health, safety & welfare 15 27 
2) Inspector/Monitor 12 22 
3) Educator (of themselves and others) 10 18 
4) Management Press uri ser 6 
" 5) Consulter 4 7 
6) Enforcer 3 5 
7) Representa ti ve 2 4 
8) Others 2 5 
N=55 
In order to illustrate what is meant by the various categories 
made by the researcher from the open-ended replies, some examples 
are given below. 
1) Concerned with general health, safety and welfare in the 
workp 1 ace. "Improvement of workplace conditions, materials 
and methods II. 
2) Inspector /Moni tor. "Hazard s potti ng and ins pecti ng II • 
3) Educator (both of others and of themsel ves) . "Havi ng 
the knowledge of legislation and being able to put it 
to use". 
4) Management Press uri ser. "putti ng pressure on management 
to enforce health and safety in the workplace l' • 
5) Consulter. "Consultation and co-operation with employers 
to promote heal th and safety issues II. 
6) Enforcer. "Getting the men to obey safety regulationsll. 
7) Representative. IIFollowing up enquiries II. 
8) Others (e.g. prevention, rectification). 
tive measures ll • 
, ~, 
I .: ' 
IITaking preven-
If the categories of 'Representative' and 'Consulter' (which 
are in fact very similar when judged by the illustrations given 
by the safety representatives) are amalgamated, then a comparison 
can be done with the three main categories described by Beaumont. 
TABLE 7.10 com~arison of Results using the Three Main Categories 
of afety Representative Role described by Beaumont 
Beaumont (1981) Levinson (1984) 
Representative 51% Representative (inc. consulter) 
Inspector/Monitor 32% Inspector/Monitor 
Accident Investigator 10% Accident Investigator 
O~e~ 7% Others (described above) 
It can be seen that the figures are very different especially 
the percentage who see their role as a representative. This may 
be the result of different statistical procedures being used or 
different samples being used, that is from the public and private 
sectors. 
11% 
22% 
77% 
Beaumont used cluster analysis to reduce a larger number of 
categories to three main ones. This was considered by the researcher 
in the present study, but in spite of the fact that some of the 
categories consist of small numbers, it was decided that some 
interesting and descriptive material would be lost by this 
reduction of data. So the 77% falling into the 'others' category 
can be divided up as described above. 
Another point to be noted is that the 'accident investigator' 
role mentioned by 10% of Beaumont's sample was not given as the 
most important function by any local authority safety representative 
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in spite of the fact that 56% said that they investigated accidents 
and dangerous occurrences in the workplace, so this does not seem 
to be perceived by these safety representatives as a major function. 
This was also found in a questionnaire to supervisors regarding 
their perception of the most useful contribution to safe working 
which can be made by supervisory staff. The six categories, 
which will be described later, did not include accident investi-
gation although 72% of supervisors said that they do investigate 
acci dents . 
It may be that both groups - safety representatives and 
supervisors, see accident investigation as a reactive function 
rather than a proactive, preventive function, and for that reason 
do not see it as a major contribution to, or aspect o~maintaining 
a safe working environment. 
Another possible explanation for safety representatives and 
supervisors not mentioning 'accident investigation ' as an important 
aspect of their work, is that accidents and dangerous occurrences 
only happen infrequently in the workplace, and so investigation 
cannot be described as an ongoing function like monitoring of 
conditions or ensuring the proper use of equipment. 
Beaumont describes the 'representative! role as a channel of 
communication linking workforce and management. It is an 
industrial relations-orientated role where safety representatives 
communicate their constituents I needs and views to management. 
On the other hand, Beaumont sees the roles of 'inspector/ 
monitor' and 'accident investigator' as adaptive and as technical 
roles requiring specialist training. So in Beaumont's study, the 
roles are split almost equally between industrial relations and 
technical: 
Industrial relations role 51% 
Technical role 49% 
In the present study, when the eight categories were classified 
as being either industrial relations or technically orientated, the 
percentages were: 
Industrial relations role 22% 
Technical role 77% 
NOTE: Percentages have been rounded 
to the nearest whole number so 
do not total 100% 
The industrial relations/technical classification was assigned 
to the ei gh t ca tego ri es as fo 11 ows : 
TABLE 7.11 Industrial Relations/Technical Roles of Safety 
Representa tives 
Industrial Re1 ati ons % Technical 
Consulter 7 Inspector/Monitor 
Representati ve 4 Educator (other and self) 
Management Pressuriser 11 General (H, S, & W) 
Enforcer 
Other 
Total % 22 Total % 
N = '2 N = 43 
% 
22 
18 
27 
5 
5 
77 
The low proportion of responses related to industrial relations 
indicates that safety representatives in this organisation do not 
see thi s functi on as bei ng one of the mos t important aspects of a 
safety representative's work. This could be due to several 
factors, but it may be that there is little conflict over health 
and safety issues in this local authority, so safety representatives 
use more of their time in areas such as inspection, monitoring and 
concerning themselves with general health, safety and welfare 
matters, as opposed to negotiating with management for time off, 
protective clothing, etc. This lack of conflict or absence of 
strongly opposing perspectives on health and safety of trade union 
representatives and management will be discussed later. 
Before proceeding to discuss further Beaumont's interpretation 
of the 'representative' role, one possible explanation for the 
differences in emphasis given to the various roles by the safety 
representatives in Beaumont's sample and those in the present study 
needs to be considered. An important difference is that Beaumont's 
sample was drawn from the private sector, and the group in the 
present study from the public sector, and certain differences 
resulting from this might account for the disparity in the results. 
Some of the important aspects relating to the public sector are 
described by Clegg (1979) and Thomson & Beaumont (1978) and these 
are applied below to the situation being analysed. Clegg (1979) 
gives the trade union density in the public sector in 1974 as a 
high 85.6% and talks of the Government's readiness to recognise 
trade unions, encouraging employees to join trade unions sometimes 
resulting in closed shop arrangements. 
Trade union membership extends high up the organisational 
hierarchy resulting in senior officers who are relatively well-
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disposed towards unionism. Clegg states that the trade unions 
can exert influence on a wider range of employment-related matters 
when compared with the private sector where wages and hours are 
the main areas discussed. Good fringe benefits exist because of 
the Government's 'good employer' obligations, and in addition there 
is safe employment due to the relative insulation from adverse 
market forces and the fact that management are less willing and less 
able to dismiss labour. 
Thomson & Beaumont (1978) also talk of the large white collar 
labour force in the public sector and the high unionisation of both 
white and blue collar workers. They, like Clegg, state that the 
public sector is sheltered from competition and also by the bureau-
cratic system with its rules and regulations which tend to cushion 
overt conflict. They also mention the traditional high level of 
job security compared to the low job security in the private sector 
(a point even more relevant in the recession of the 19805). 
Thomson & Beaumont describe the bargaining relationship in the 
private sector as adversary and that in the public sector as 
traditionally co-operative. There is limited consultation in the 
private sector, whereas consultation is central to the industrial 
relations system in the private sector. Conflict resolution is 
through informal settlement at plant level in the private sector 
and through formalised, centralised procedures in the public sector. 
All the points described above highlight factors relating to 
the public sector which may help to explain why the role of 
'representative' ;s not found as often in the present study as in 
Beaumont's study. It may not be necessary to have a channel of 
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communication through which the workforce can express their needs 
and views to management because of the degree of consultation and 
co-operation already existing in the public sector, for example 
through joint consultative committees. Management are well-
disposed towards the unions, and there is little overt conflict 
which may account for the fact that only a small proportion of 
the safety representative roles fall under the heading of 
industrial relations roles. The large proportion of technical 
roles may indicate that the freedom from having to act as a commun-
icator, allows the safety representatives to develop their roles 
in other directions, for example an educator role. 
It is interesting here to note the interpretation and possible 
explanation given by Beaumont of the Industrial Relations/Technical 
division of the safety representative role. Beaumont states that 
the safety representatives who emphasised the 'representative' role 
said that employees and management at their workplace were relatively 
concerned about health and safety matters and management were 
relatively receptive to the presentation of workers' grievances. 
On the other hand, Beaumont suggests that where management were 
relatively unconcerned about health and safety matters, safety 
representatives had to present hard evidence of work hazards to 
convince management of the need for changes in workplace organ-
isation and practice in the interests of health and safety - that 
is they used the adaptive roles of inspector/monitor and accident 
investigator. It may be that a different explanation would, 
intUitively at least, be more probable - that is where management 
were relatively unconcerned about health and safety in the workplace, 
safety representatives would have to use pressurising tactics and 
use hard negotiating in order to get management to carry out 
improvements and make changes in practices. 
I would suggest that where safety representatives feel that 
management are strongly committed to health and safety, and where 
safety representatives feel that they get the support of management 
when health and safety issues are raised, they are less likely to 
perceive their role (that is the most important aspect of their 
work) as industrial relations-orientated. 
Chi-squared tests were carried out on data collected in the 
present study to test the relationship between the groups of roles -
that is Industrial Relations and Technical - and the degree of 
commitment of senior management to health and safety, and also 
whether or not the safety representatives felt that they get 
management support. It was hypothesised that those who emphasised 
the industrial relations aspects of their role would perceive 
senior management to be only slightly committed and would not feel 
that they got the support of management. However, no statistically 
significant relationships were found between Industrial Re1ations/ 
Technical safety representative roles and 1) the degree of perceived 
senior management commitment to health and safety or, 2) the 
perception of safety representatives regarding the support they 
get from management. Whether safety representatives take an 
industrial relations or a technical approach to their work is not 
associated with these perceptions or attitudes. 
Other aspects such as lack of overt conflict or the technology 
used in the work environment, may favour the technical aspects of 
the role being used in this Local Authority. For example, in the 
Drainage Department, special equipment has to be used in sewers and 
the safety representative may spend time in inspecting this, and in 
educating both himself and others with regard to the potential 
hazards and safety procedures to be observed. 
When the safety representatives were asked what health and 
. 
safety issues took up most of their time, the most common answers 
were: carrying out inspections, checking equipment, reading and 
writing of reports, following up reports and attending safety 
committee meetings. Another category named 'general conditions of 
work' included such items as heating in workshops and excessive 
exhaust fumes in garages. 
These replies reinforce the answers given to the question 
regarding their perception of the most important aspect of a safety 
representative's work, for example the role of inspector/monitor, 
by showing that a large proportion of time is spent on activities 
related to the main roles identified. 
Another point concerning the perceived role of safety 
representatives was the relationship between their perceived roles 
and the skills which are taught to safety representatives on TUC 
and other training courses. 59% of the safety representatives 
had attended a training course, that is, 39 individuals. Of 
these, 37 answered a question asking which courses(s) they had 
attended. Multiple answers were possible and four safety 
representatives gave more than one course. The majority (89%) 
had attended the TUC lO-day course for safety representatives. 
Other courses attended were a course run by the Regional Council 
or by their specific department, external courses such as that run 
by the National Water Council, and a NALGO course which had been 
attended by one respondent. 
The safety representatives were given a list of the maln 
skills taught on the TUC training course for safety representatives -
obtained from the teaching material, and were asked to tick which 
aspects of the training course they had found most useful in their 
workplace. Again, mUltiple answers were possible and from the 36 
respondents who answered this question, the results were as below: 
TABLE 7.12 Training Course Skills Considered to be most useful 
by Safety Representatives 
"Which aspects of the above course(s) have you found most 
useful in your workplace?: 
Hazard spotting skills 94% 
Lega 1 knowl edge 89% 
Negotiating skills 39% 
Technical skills (e.g. sampling or monitoring) 36% 
Accident investigation skills 33% 
Committee procedures 25% 
N :: 36 
It was hypothesised that there would be an association between 
the roles most commonly identified by safety representatives and 
the skills taught on training courses which are considered by them 
to be most useful. When cross-tabulations were performed between 
the skills listed above and the safety representative perceived 
roles, the cell sizes were too small to carry out a Chi-squared 
test and a Fisher Exact Test showed no statistically significant 
relationship. However, as discussed in the chapter on methodology, 
Baldamus (1972) among many others states that in social science 
research it is not valid to discount data simply because it is not 
statistically significant. 
From the role classifications it can be seen that hazard 
spotting skills mentioned by 94% of the respondents who had 
attended a training course, would be particularly relevant in the 
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'inspector/monitor' and 'general health and safety' roles although 
only some (that is 27) safety representatives cited these two roles 
as being the most important aspects of a safety representative's 
role. 
Of the 64 respondents who were asked if they personally made 
safety inspections, 77% (that is 49 individuals) replied that they 
did so. It therefore seems that hazard spotting skills are also 
useful to those who described other aspects of a safety representative's 
work such as educator and management pressuriser, as being more 
important. 
Legal knowledge was considered useful by 89% of respondents 
who had attended any safety training courses, which again is a 
necessary pre-requisite for almost all the roles mentioned, particu-
larly educator, management pressuriser, enforcer and representative. 
Negotiating skills cited by 39% of this group of safety 
representatives would be particularly useful in the management 
pressuriser and representative roles. 
Technical skills such as sampling or monitoring were ticked by 
only 36% of the respondents although this figure might have been 
expected to be higher in view of the large number who previously 
mentioned the inspector/monitor role. However, sampling or 
monitoring, for example of noise or gases, is a specialist skill 
which is not always relevant or necessary in work situations. 
Committee procedures would be useful to those who see 
themselves as a consulter and/or a representative. 
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The one result which did not 'fit in' with the perceived 
roles of safety representatives was 'accident investigation skills ' 
which was ticked by 33% of the respondents, and yet as stated 
before, the investigator role was not mentioned in this study. 
This may be because accidents are infrequent events which does 
not mean that accident investigation skills are not useful to the 
safety representative only that these skills are not used as 
frequently as others such as inspecting. This may indeed be an 
area where safety representatives feel that training is particularly 
important as their evidence may be crucial in any enquiry carried 
out as a result of an accident. 
and Safet Committee Re ulations 
It is instructive to look at the workplace functions of safety 
representatives which are set out in the SRSC Regulations and which 
are not considered in any way to be legal duties. These are 
summarised below, and in looking at the functions visualised by the 
legislators to be part of the safety representative's role, each 
can be related to the findings in this project. These functions 
are set out and given to all safety representatives in the local 
authority and although all these functions may be carried out by 
all safety representatives this project is examining what safety 
representatives see as the most important aspect(s) of their work. 
That is, there is an objective assessment of the perceived primary 
function(s) of a safety representative. 
SRSC Regulations - Safety Representative Functions 
The bracketed roles are those identified by analysis of the 
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safety representative questionnaire data in this project and 
, 
considered by the researcher to be equivalent to the listed 
functions. On occasions more than one role is associated 
with one function. 
1. To represent employees in consultation with the employer 
(Representative, Consulter) 
2. To investigate potential hazards and dangerous occurrences 
in the workplace (not mentioned as a primary function - ? 
Reactive) 
3. To examine causes of accidents in the workplace (as No.2) 
4. To investigate complaints by any represented employee 
related to their health, safety and welfare at work 
(Representative) 
5. To make representations to the employer on matters arising 
out of causes of accidents in the workplace (Representative, 
Consulter, Management Pressuriser) 
6. To make representations to the employeron general matters 
affecting health, safety and welfare at work of employees 
(Representative, Consulter, Management Pressuriser) 
7. To inspect the workplace by agreement with the employer 
at least once every three months, or when there has been a 
notifiable accident or dangerous occurrence, or when a 
notifiable disease has been contracted in that workplace 
(Inspector/Monitor) 
8. To represent the employees he was appointed to represent 
in consultations with HSE inspectors or other enforcing 
agency (Representative, Consulter) 
9. To receive from inspectors, factual information relating 
to the workplace, or with respect to action taken or 
proposed in connection with the workplace (Representative, 
Self-educator) 
10. To attend meetings of safety committees as a safety 
representative in connection with any of the above 
functions (Representative, Consulter, Management Pressuriser). 
,~~ 
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Thus, it can be seen that the main roles classified in this 
project which can be defined by the functions laid out in the 
SRSC Regulations are those of representative, consulter, and 
management pressuriser. The role of inspector/monitor is also 
common to both, however the investigatory role was not emphasised 
in the present study for the reason already suggested. The role 
of educator identified by safety representatives in this project 
is not described in the SRSC Regulations but is implied in the 
associated Code of Practice which states that safety representatives 
should be allowed time off for training. 
7.5 Relationship with HSE Inspectorate 
One interesting area with regard to the functions described 
above is the relationship between safety representatives and HSE 
inspectors. It is suggested in the SRSC Regul ati ons that safety 
representatives will receive information from inspectors relating 
to the workplace and keeping them informed about any proposed 
action or steps already taken in connection with the workplace. 
In the present research project the relationship with HSE 
inspectors was not at any stage mentioned as an important aspect of 
the safety representative role. However in a WEA publication, 
Schmoller & Grayson (1980) state that safety representatives' 
rights of representation, inspection and information open up new 
possibilities for trade union influence in the workplace. 
These authors suggest that safety representatives are in a position 
to control the activities of the inspectorate and, at times, to 
harness their powers for trade union use. Schmoller & Grayson do 
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admit, however, that inspectors are extremely reluctant to get 
. 
involved in anything which may be an industrial relations matter. 
The questionnaire sent to safety representatives in the Local 
Authority contained a series of questions regarding the safety 
representatives contact with the HSE inspectors. Firstly, the 
safety representatives were asked if any inspector had ever 
visited their department. The results can be seen in Table 7.13. 
TABLE 7.13 Safety Representatives' Awareness of HSE Inspector's 
vi si ts 
"Has a Health and Safety Executive Inspector ever visited 
your department?" 
Yes 48% 
No 17% 
Don't know 34% 
N = 64 
Those who answered 'Yes' were asked another four questions and 
their responses are shown below. 
TABLE 7.14 Details of HSE Inspector's Visits Recalled by Safety 
Representatives 
Yes (%) No (%) N 
1. Have you ever accompanied an inspector 
on an inspection? 
2. Has an inspector come to speak to you 
during his/her visit? 
3. Have you received a copy of an inspector's 
report after a visit? 
4. Have you received a copy of any Improvement 
or Prohibition Notices served in your 
depa rtrre n t? 
* 4Cc: diG not knov if any rae beer servEc 
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24 76 34 
33 67 33 
25 75 35 
20 40* 35 
So it can be seen from these results that the majority of 
these safety representatives have had no contact with inspectors 
during their visits, nor have most safety representative respon-
dents received information concerning these visits, either in 
the form of reports of copies of notices served on their depart-
ments, indeed 40% did not even know if any improvement or prohib-
ition notices had been served. So the two functions in the SRSC 
Regulations concerning the HSE inspectorate do not appear to be 
being carried out among the safety representatives who returned 
the questionnaire. 
Morri s (1981), ina study of the role and effecti veness of 
government inspection in health and safety found that attitudes 
towards the inspectorate were very similar from employers and 
employees - that is, on the whole favourable attitudes. However, 
the response rates to his questionnaire were 27% from employers 
and only 16% from employees. Morris suggests that this was 
because the questionnaire was lon~ However, the low response rate 
may be due to the fact, suggested by the present study, that employees 
have little contact with inspectors. 
Schmoller & Grayson (1980) advise safety representatives in a 
workplace to negotiate the right for the appropriate safety 
representative to accompany the inspector on his/her visit. This 
point is also illustrated in the GMWU model safety agreement: 
"Safety representatives will be immediately notified 
when a Health and Safety Inspector is on the premises 
and each representative will be entitled to tour his/ 
her' constituency with the inspector and communicate 
with him/her privately." 
However, Schmo11er & Grayson (1980) admit that inspectors 
. 
can use their own discretion who they involve in a workplace visit. 
A Labour Research Department survey of safety agreements 
(Bargaining Report Jan/Feb 1980) states that in well over half of 
the organisations covered, safety representatives were informed by 
management when an inspector was visiting the workplace. It seems 
that, in this Local Authority, the majority of safety representatives 
do not have direct contact with inspectors when they visit the 
workplace. 
Complaints to the Inspectorate 
Schmoller & Grayson (1980) suggest that making a complaint to 
the inspectorate is one way of putting pressure on management to 
improve conditions. They say that this type of trade union pressure 
can be "a positive force for change in the attitudes end enforce-
ment procedures of the inspectorate". 
Inthis Local Authority study, safety representatives were 
asked if they had ever reported to the Health and Safety Executive 
something which was unsafe. Of the 63 replies, 21% said they had 
reported something and 79% had not. Those who had reported 
something were asked to give examples and these ranged from fire 
appliances to cleaning fluid (which was finally withdrawn). 
The lack of reporting is borne out by an HSE survey published 
in the February 1981 issue of the Employment Gazette which reports 
that the widespread appointment of safety representatives has not 
been accompanied by any significant use in the number of complaints 
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to HSE inspectors. This report suggests that the reason for 
this is that, as had been expected, mutually agreed solutions 
are generally being found to health and safety problems through 
joint discussion at the place of work. Certainly, Cook (1980) 
found no evidence of a liaison role with the HSE for safety 
representatives. 
Schmol1er & Grayson (1980) stress that complaints from 
safety representatives can remain anonymous and it is possible 
that safety representatives who replied to the questionnaire did 
not want to admit to having complained to the inspectorate 
although the complete confidentiality of the information was 
stressed. 
7.6 The Safety Representative/Management Relationship 
The relationship between safety representatives and management 
is one which has been studied by researchers such as Beaumont (1980) 
and Kochan (1977). One aspect of this which is considered partic-
ularly important is the degree of senior management commitment to 
health and safety which can be assessed by various means including 
data collected in the safety representative questionnaire. The 
degree of management commitment perceived by the safety represen-
tatives will in turn affect the strategy they use in interactions 
with management, so the importance of this commitment can be 
emphasised. 
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7.6.1 The degree of management commitment 
In 1977 Bill Simpson, then Chairman of the Health and 
Safety Commission told an audience of managers that a fundamental 
factor in improving a firm's health and safety performance was 
the degree to which senior management was committed. 
"It is senior management's task to estab lish a 
defined company safety organisation~ which will 
show a clear line of responsibility from the 
shop floor supervisor through line management 
and senior management to the managing director." 
Before looking at the results of a direct question regarding the 
perception of the degree of senior management commitment to health 
and safety, it may be useful to look at some indirect measures of 
that comnitment. 
Indirect Measures of Senior Management Commitment 
1. The Chairmanship of Safety Committees 
In the Local Authority studied, the upper tier committees 
are chaired either by the Director of the department 
himself or by his depute. It ;s suggested that the 
; nc 1 us i on of seni 0 r managers ; n the sa fety cOl11T1i ttee is a 
demonstration to the workforce of the commitment of top 
management to improving health and safety ;n the workplace 
and to the operationalisation of the safety policy. 
There are various competing demands on the time of, for 
example, the Director of a department of a local authority, 
and so the fact that a senior manager allocates time to 
chair a safety committee meeting indicates that he considers 
it to be important. 
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2. Problems Experienced by Safety Representatives 
In the present study a series of questions was put to the 
safety representatives to see if they had experienced any 
problems in certain areas to do with their various functions. 
It is suggested that if a large majority were experiencing 
such problems this may be indicative of a certain lack of 
commitment to health and safety from those who are respon-
sible for making policy decisions, that is, senior 
management. 
The resources spent on health and safety for example on 
providing safety clothing and equipment and also a 
willingness to send people on training courses and to give 
safety representatives time off with pay when necessary 
may indicate the degree of senior management commitment 
to health and safety. These questions and the responses 
are seen below: 
TABLE 7.15 Problems Experienced by Safety Representatives 
"Have you ever experienced any probl ems about: 
Yes(%) No(%) 
a) getting time off to perform safety 
95 representative duties 5 
b) getting information on health and 
safety 13 87 
c) getting on a training course 6 94 
d) getting protective clothing or 
equipment for employees 18 82 
e) any other aspects of safety 
representative functions II 8 92 
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N 
63 
63 
63 
62 
60 
Discussion of the above results 
a) Time off to perfonn duties 
The SRSC Regul ations state: 
"4(2) An employer shall peT'177it a safety representative 
to take such time off with pay during the employee's 
working hours as shall be necessary for the purposes of: 
(a) performing his functions under section 2(4) of the 
1974 Act. 11 
Caldwell et al. (1980) state that from their studies 
written agreements specific to the organisation on time 
off for safety representatives seem unusual as most 
safety representatives felt these agreements were 
unnecessary. Of course this may be because this safety 
representative right is written into the Regulations above. 
The results from the present study seem to confirm this lack 
of need of a specific agreement in that only 5% had 
experienced any such problems. It is possible that as 
the present recession deepens and redundancy and short-
time threaten, getting time off may become more of a 
problem. 
The respondents who had experienced problems were asked 
to give details and these included: difficulty because 
of a shortage of workforce, a general lack of time to 
deal with safety representative business and a safety 
representative being told by a superior that he needed 
permission from the Directorate to go to trade union 
he a 1 til and safe ty m ee tin g s . 
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b) Getting Information on Health and Safety 
The SRSC Regulations set out the various types of information 
to be provided by employers. Caldwell et al. (1980) states 
that "although expeT'ience has varied it seems that most 
safety T'epT'esentatives have had difficulty in getting as much 
infoT'fTlation as they would like." However, only 13% 
answered that they had experienced difficulty getting 
information. Two respondents mentioned TLVs and other 
information with regard to chemicals and noise levels, one 
mentioned a lack of information from the safety officer about 
inspectors' visits, one said that the information provided by 
their trade union was not up to date. The remaining examples 
concerned a lack of literature on various aspects of a safety 
representative's functions. 
c) Getting on a Training Course 
Regulation 4(2) provides for paid time off for: 
"(b) undergoing such tT'aining in aspects of those functions 
as may be reasonable in all the circumstances having regard 
to any relevant provisions of a code of practice relating 
to time off foT' training .•. fl. 
As described in a previous section, only 59% of the 66 
safety representatives who answered the questions, replied 
that they had been on a training course for safety 
representatives, and 80% of those had been on the TUC ten-
day course. 
Only 6% of the 63 safety representatives who answered a 
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question asking if they had experienced problems getting 
on a training course, answered that they had experienced 
problems. This may indicate a general lack of interest 
or motivation to attend a training course on the part of 
safety representatives who had not yet attended a train-
ing course, had applied and had been told that they must 
wait until it was possible for them to attend. They 
might not have perceived this to be a problem. 
The three replies concerning problems were interesting. 
One safety representative said that he had to wait two 
years before being sent on a course; one said that the 
safety representative follow-up course, if attended, is 
not with full pay and a particularly interesting point 
was made by the third respondent who stated that he is 
a shop steward also and so cannot be spared to go on 
all courses necessary to carry out his duties as fully 
as he would wish. This is one aspect of the joint role 
which may cause some problems. 
The same point was made by some members of senior manage-
ment who, when interviewed, stressed that it is often 
not possible because of manpower shortages to send 
people on courses when they (the potential trainees) 
would like. 
During the time that the research was being carried out, 
the safety officer in the Water Supply Services held a 
one-day course for all safety representatives in that 
department. So it is possible for management to arrange 
for safety representatives to receive some training and 
to get time off from their duties. On the whole, however, 
the basic safety representatives training is carried out 
by the trade unions and may then be supplemented by 
training of a more situation-specific nature at their 
place of work. 
d) Getting Protective Clothing/Equipment for Employees 
Respondents were asked if they had experienced any problems 
getting protective clothing/equipment for employees and 
this question gave rise to the largest number of affirmative 
answers (18% of 62 respondents) which initially seems 
surprising, as in interviews the safety officers and 
members of senior management of the four departments, all 
said that they had little trouble with regard to the 
budget which each Director presents to the chairman of 
the relevant committee of the local authority. 
Three out of four of the departments studied had a 
separate health and safety budget which is estimated by 
a group of people which varies between departments. 
Usually it consists of a group of Sub-Regional Engineers 
and the safety officer. In the Transport Department, 
where there is no full-time safety officer, the Chief 
Engineer plays a part in deciding how the budget should 
be allocated . The budgets for health and safety have 
• been agreed by the Regional Council without dispute -
only growth being debated by the relevant committee. 
Protective clothing and equipment is provided free in the 
departments to those who require it, although in one 
department after an initial provision, an allowance is 
then made for replacement. 
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Of the ten examples given of problems concerning protec-
tive clothing or equipment, the majority mention diffi-
culty either in getting the required sizes of quality 
of clothing or delays in receiving it. This point is 
one which was raised at some of the safety committee 
meetings observed by the researcher, especially in the 
Highways and Drainage Departments. Initially the 
tendency in a local authority, where large quantities of, 
for example, gloves are being ordered, would be to order 
fairly cheap all-purpose clothing. Later, these were 
often found to be unsuitable for the job in question. 
For example, men going down into sewers must have special 
anti-static boots as a spark generated when there could 
be dangerous since gases could cause an explosion. 
Often at meetings gloves were discussed. If these were 
unsuitable they would wear out quickly or could cause 
dermatitis. One solution to this problem in some 
departments was, after discussion with safety representa-
tives at safety committee meetings, to get groups of 
workers to test out various types of protective clothing 
and report back on how suitable they were. This was 
found to be very useful to the people ordering the 
equipment but also psychologicall~ as if the workforce 
can be made to feel involved in health and safety in 
their place of work they may be more committed to it. 
Having tested, then chosen, the type of gloves to be 
worn they are more likely to continue wearing them. 
The 8% who cited problems with other aspects of health 
and safety mentioned such things as finding time and 
getting employees to act safely and pay attention to the 
Health and Safety at Work Act. 
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3. The Number of Safety Committee Recommendations Followed Up 
This area will be discussed more fully in the chapter 
on safety committees but the results of a question to safety 
representatives can be seen in Table 7.16. 
TABLE 7.16 Follow-Up of Safety Committee Recommendations 
liDo you feel that recommendations and points discussed 
by the safety committee are followed up - always, often, 
fai rly often, never?1I 
a) Always 28% 
b) Often 36% 
c) Fai rly often 36% 
d) Never 
N = 44 
NOTE: This question was asked only of the 44 safety 
representatives who belonged to safety committees 
Only 28% of these safety representatives felt that points 
were always followed up. This to some degree can be cross-
checked with the minutes of safety committees (see Chapter Nine). 
Whether valid or not however, it is of interest because 
it is still an impression or opinion of safety representatives. 
This could indicate a lack of confidence in safety committees 
or a feeling that the safety committees are effective in 
highlighting faults and areas to be improved, only to be 
'let down' by a lack of senior management commitment to 
health and safety, resulting in an unwillingness to progress 
items and see that recommendations are actually carried out. 
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4. Issues Di scussed wi th Management 
The safety representatives were asked about the last 
occasion they were approached by management on a health 
and safety issue, that is what did the issue involve? 
The replies were then classified as follows: 
TABLE 7.17 Ty~e of Issue Discussed with Management by 
Sa ety Representative 
N Examples 
Safety 15 New departmental sa f e ty po 1 i cy 
Persona 1 Protecti on 11 Sa fety boots 
Trai ni ng 2 A one-day course 
Health 4 Asbestos removal 
Wel fare 4 Heating, 1 i ghti ng 
N = 36 
The safety representatives were also asked what was the 
outcome to find out if management are following up and 
dealing with issues discussed with safety representatives. 
TABLE 7 .18 Outcome of Discussions between Management and 
Safety Representatives 
Items: N % 
Dealt with sati s factori ly 25 69 
Being deal t wi th 5 13 
Sti 11 awaiting action 6 17 
N = 36 
69% of issues had been dealt with satisfactorily and only 
17% of issues were still awaiting action. This indicates 
that, in the majority of cases, management are willing to 
allocate the resources necessary for dealinQ with issues 
raised by safety representatives. This could be one 
criterion of management commitment used by safety 
representa ti ves . 
We can now turn to a consideration of more direct 
measures of senior management commitment to health and 
safety. 
percehtion of the Degree of Senior Management Committment to 
Healt and Safety 
Kochan et ale (1977) asked a population of safety representa-
tives and a population of plant managers the following question: 
liTo what extent to you feel that top management of this plant is 
committed to creating safe working conditions in the plant?" 
Respondents were given fi ve categori es rang; ng from "not commi tted" 
to livery strongly commi tted" and the resul ts were as follows: 
TABLE 7.19 Senior Management Commitment to Health and Safety 
(Kochan et ale (1977)) 
Safety Plant 
ReEresentatives (N=51) Mana~ement ( =42) 
% % 
Not committed 2 0 
Weakly commi tted 24 0 
Generally committed 33 12 
Strongly committed 31 21 
Very strongly committed 10 64 
The different views of trade union representatives and 
representatives of management were very marked. The categories 
covering "not commi tted" and "weakly commi tted" accounted for 26~ 
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of the safety representative sample, whereas these two categories 
were unfilled by the plant management sample. 
A striking difference can also be seen when the categories 
of 'strongly committed' and 'very strongly committed' are 
combined. In the case of the safety representatives, 41% of 
them put senior management into these categories, while 85% of 
plant management thought these categories described top management. 
This disparity of viewpoints concerning the perceived degree of 
commitment of top management to health and safety is indicative 
of the conflict viewpoint of the Pluralist Frame of Reference as 
described by Fox (1974). This suggests that the conflict which 
is inevitable in organisations, manifests itself in differing 
attitudes and perceptions on the part of the two main groups 
involved - that is the workforce and management. 
A Department of Employment survey of 1981 conducted in 
private sector firms in Scotland highlighted differing attitudes 
and perceptions of management and workforce with regard to certain 
aspects of work including health and safety. When asked to state 
the form of involvement of management and workforce in health and 
safety issues the results showed some disparity. 81% of 
management respondents mentioned consultation as opposed to only 
56% of workforce representatives. Negotiation was mentioned by 
24% of workforce representatives but by no management respondents. 
This indicates a difference in perception by the parties who 
represent different interest groups. The issue of which strategy 
is used by workforce and management in interactions over health and 
safety is discussed in detail later in this chapter and it may be 
possible to see if supervisors' and safety representatives' 
perceptions of the strategies used differ as much in an organ-
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isation in the public sector as they do in the private sector 
as described in the above survey. It should be noted here 
that management were represented in the survey by the Managing 
Director, Personnel Executive and Chief Engineer. That 
is, they are senior management rather than the supervisory level 
of management as ;n the present study - direct comparisons 
cannot therefore be made. 
It was hypothesised that a similar disparity of viewpoint 
about the degree of senior management commitment would be found 
in the present study and to that end a similar question was 
asked. 
Respondents were given four categories of reply in the 
questionnaire for safety representatives and these were later 
reduced to three categories in the questionnaire for supervisors 
as it was felt that these would give a more balanced scale. 
When analysing the data, combining the 'strongly committed I and 
Ivery strongly committed' categories gave more acceptable cell 
sizes for the purpose of carrying out Chi-squared tests. The 
results of the two questionnaires are seen below with the separate 
and combined data for the safety representatives shown. 
Management Commitment in the Local Authority Study 
TABLE 7.20 Perceptions of Senior Management Commitment 
(Levinson, 1984) 
liTo wha t exte nt do you feel tha t seni or management is 
committed to creating and maintaining safety working 
condi ti ons in the departments?" 
(Table 7.20 continued) 
Not commi tted 
Slightly committed 
Strongly committed 
Very strongly committed 
Safety Representatives 
N = 62 
% 
o 
27 
47) 
26) 73 ) 
Supervisors 
N = 78 
% 
o 
26 
74 
The pattern of responses from the two groups were remarkably 
similar. In both cases there were no returns in the Inot committed
' 
category. 27% of the safety representatives and 26% of the 
supervisors saw senior management as 's1ight1y committed ' . In 
the questionnaire to safety representatives, the combined categories 
gave a figure of 73% compared with 74% in the supervisor question-
naire. 
Before going on to try to account for the differences in 
results between Kochan et a1. 's study and the present one, it may 
be useful to see the two sets of results set out in one table. 
TABLE 7.21 Comparison of Results (Management Commitment) 
Kochan et a1. (1977) Levinson {1984) 
Safety Supervi sors Safety Supervi sors 
Reps(%) ( %) Reps(%) ( %) 
Not committed 2 0 0 0 
Weakly cormli tted 
(Slightly) 24 0 27 26 
Generally committed 33 12 
Strongly committed 31) 21 ) 47) 74) 
Very strongly )41 )85 )73 )74 
10) 64) 26) - ) cOllJl1i tted ) ) ) ) 
N=51 N=42 N=62 N=87 
It is important to note that a direct comparison of Kochan 
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et al.'s findings and those from the present study is not possible 
due to his additional category of 'generally committed' which was 
not included here as it seemed a rather vague concept and a 
potential option for those who did not want to come down on the 
side of either slight or strong commitment. The more interesting 
comparisons are those already described between trade union 
representatives and managers at plant level (the level of manage-
ment referred to by Kochan et al. is not clear - in the project 
set in Scotland, the level of management was first line supervisors). 
It appears then, that in the present study, there are 
virtually no differences between safety representatives' and 
supervisors' perceptions of the degree of senior management 
commitment to health and safety, whereas there are considerable 
differences in the US study. This disparity is difficult to 
explain, but may be due to one or more of the following: 
a) differences in the industrial relations systems of the 
UK and USA such as those already described; 
b) the fact that a different level of management was 
questioned in the two studies; 
c) in the UK supervisors usually have been promoted from 
the shopfloor, in the USA junior management may enter 
directly to this position in the organisation often 
after gaining certain academic qualifications; 
d) Kochan et al. 's study was carried out in a number of 
plants in the private sector of industry, whereas the 
present study is set in the public sector where there 
may be less overt conflict, less diversity of perspective 
and where management may have less trouble in getting 
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resources to spend on health and safety than in the more 
competitive private sector. 
In the present study, it was hypothesised that the safety 
representatives who considered senior management to be only 
slightly committed to health and safety might be the ones who had 
experienced the problems described in Section 7.6. 
Of the 17 individuals who see management as only slightly 
committed, nine had experienced problems of some kind which may 
have coloured their attitudes with regard to how committed senior 
management were. These nine individuals account for 53% of the 
'slightly committed' category, the remaining 47% presumably basing 
their opinion upon evidence other than having experienced the 
problems described in Section 7.6. 
One variable which could have an effect on the perception of 
senior management commitment by both groups (safety representatives 
and supervisors) is whether they feel that they get the support of 
management or of senior management in the case of supervisors. 
The data concerning management support were described and 
statistically tested in Table 7.6. Of the 30% of safety 
representatives who answered that they did not get the support of 
management, several stated that senior management back the 
regional and departmental safety policy, but that local manage-
ment do not enforce safe working enough, and also that they 
(local management) resent the time spent on health and safety 
issues when they have so much to do. A lack of urgency with 
regard to getting work progressed was also mentioned. However 
it may be that safety representatives are expressing their 
perceptions of supervisors in general and attributing to their 
attitudes that may, or may not, accurately reflect the actual 
attitudes held by individual supervisors. 
91% of supervisors as opposed to 70% of safety representatives 
felt that they get the support of management. This may be 
because supervisors are themselves a part of management and as 
such have a legal responsibility under the HASAWA for the men 
with whom they work. If a supervisor should fail in his 
responsibilities, a prosecution may be brought against him as 
well as against senior management whose ultimate responsibility 
is the maintenance of a safe and healthy working environment. 
Apart from the legal responsibility, senior management should 
be aware of the important part the supervisor can play in setting 
an example to the workforce and in helping to motivate and encourage 
workers to, for example, use protective clothing and equipment. 
To this end, it is essential for senior management to give support 
to the supervisor in his work with regard to health and safety. 
Indeed Kochan et ale (1980) see a committed management as able to 
activate the desired behaviour in lower level management. 
Another aspect with regard to support, is that although 
management were felt to be supportive by 70% of the safety 
representatives they were also getting support from their trade 
unions (according to 84% of respondents) and, for those who had 
attended, comprehensive health and safety training on the TUe 
safety representative course. 
Thus, in order for supervisors, who are the members of 
management most often in contact with safety representatives, 
to be able to interact and co-operate with safety representatives, 
it is important for the supervisors to get support through access 
to information, attendance at training courses and general back-up 
which necessitates the support of senior management. 
Crosstabulations were made for each of the two groups to 
examine the relationship between the two variables (1) support of 
management and (2) perception of the degree of senior management 
commitment to health and safety (this was reduced to two categories 
in each case as there was a nil return in the 'not committed' 
category) . 
A Chi-squared test was carried out to see if there were 
significant differences between those in each group who felt 
respectively that they did and did not receive management support. 
It was hypothesised that these safety representatives who felt 
that they received the support of management will tend to see 
management as strongly committed to health and safety. 
TABLE 7.22 
lanage-
lent 
Yes 
upport No 
Commi tment b 
resentatlves 
Safety Representatives' view of: 
Management Commitment 
Slight Committed Strongly Committed 
9 34 
9 9 
x2 = 3.82 df = 1 n.s. 
The Chi-squared value under the null hypothesis of no 
association between the perception of the degree of commitment 
of senior management and receiving support from management in 
the case of safety representatives is 3.82 with 1 df. The 
Chi-squared value of 3.82 is close to 3.84 the statistically 
significant value for 1 df at the 5% level, showing a considerable 
difference between safety representatives who do/do not get 
support from management and the perceptions of each group of the 
degree of commitment to health and safety of management. 
It was hypothesised that those supervisors who felt that 
they got the support of management in their role would tend to 
see management as being strongly committed to health and safety. 
TABLE 7.23 
Manage-
ment 
Support 
Yes 
No 
Supervisors' view of: 
Management Commitment 
Slightly Committed Strongly Committed 
12 60 
6 2 
x2 = 10.9 df = 1 p < 0.001 
The Chi-squared value under the null hypothesis of no association 
between the perception of the degree of commitment of senior 
management and receiving support from management in the case of 
supervisors ;s 10.9 with 1 df which gives a p-value of < 0.001. 
There is a significant difference between those supervisors 
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who feel that they do/do not receive management support and their 
perception of the degree of commitment to health and safety of 
senior management. Only 17% of those who felt that they get 
support see senior management as only slightly committed as 
opposed to 83% who see them as strongly committed. Of those 
who felt that they do not get the support of management, 75% felt 
that senior management are only slightly committed although 
admittedly this group only comprised six individuals. The two 
tables were then combined using Cochran's Method and the p-value 
was .0012. So the combined populations of safety representatives 
and supervisors showed a relationship between the feeling of being 
supported/not supported by management and the perception of the 
degree of commitment to health and safety of senior management. 
Although receiving management support was associated with the 
perception of a strongly committed senior management, the Chi-
squared test does not show a cause and effect relationship. 
7.6.2 Strategies used by safety representatives and management 
The Robens Committee, having adopted a unitary perspective 
on the involvement of workers in health and safety emphasised the 
use of joint consultation through safety committees in the workplace. 
That is, they recommended that there was a need for real partici-
pation in decision-making at all levels. However, there is 
survey evidence fram 1968, 1974 and 1975 that health and safety 
has been the subject of workplace negotiation in Britain for some 
time. (Workplace Industrial Relations 1968; Parker 1974 and 1973). 
It can be seen that there is some difficulty in the theoretical 
as opposed to the practical aspects of joint consultation and 
negotiation. In theory these can be defined as two distinct 
entities which differ in the degree of similarity of aims of the 
two parties involved, that is management and unions. However, in 
practice this distinction may be less than relevant in particular 
in the area of health and safety where the two forms of joint 
decision-making could be combined. It may in any case be difficult 
to categorise certain interactions, such as those between safety 
representatives and supervisors, as being specifically either 
consultation or negotiation. 
Clegg (1960) subscribes to the view that the purposes of 
negotiation and consultation are different. Collective bargaining 
was seen to be appropri ate in the narrow area where the interests 
of management and workers conflict, whereas joint consultation was 
to be used in the wide area in which these interests coincided. 
So it became generally accepted that joint consultation should be 
kept separate from collective bargaining machinery. The Indus tri a 1 
Relations Code of Practice of 1972 regarded consultation and negot-
iation as closely related but distinct processes, although there 
is now a view that these distinctions are inadequate and unnecessary. 
Lewis (1977) states that negotiations take place both in 
conjunction with and separate from consultation and an investigation 
into the range of bargaining of shop stewards revealed that 54% of 
them discussed and settled safety questions as standard practice. 
In some companies safety rules are included in formal agreements and 
it was found to be quite common for joint safety committees to 
combine the functions of consultation and negotiation. The 
implications for the functioning of safety committees and the use 
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of these alternative strategies will be discussed more fully in 
the chapter on safety commi ttees . 
Lewis sums up by saying that the distinction between 
negotiation and consultation which is theoretically based on 
the ultimate location of authority (that is consultation leaves 
the final decision with management) is now obsolete. There 
should be a merger of negotiation and consultation machinery. 
While the initiative must come from management, it is the trade 
unions' function to jog management. This endorses the safety 
representative role of 'management pressuriser'. Lewis 
considers that the trade unions have started to insist that 
safety is a fit subject for negotiating through collective 
bargaining. 
Ramsay (1975) describes a study carried out in a shipyard 
where workers were asked if they agreed or disagreed with a 
statement suggesting that "a finn is like a football team in 
which management and workers are on the same si de because good 
tealTlNo rk is to everyone's adva ntage . " 79% were in agreement 
with the statement. However, when they were then asked if that 
was the way things worked in their own firm, the responses 
shifted significantly with only 54% agreeing that their own 
organisation was like a football team. This suggests that it is 
important when collecting information, particularly by question-
naire, to distinguish between responses in relation to a theoret-
ical concept such as co-operation or consultation, and responses 
in relation to the practice of the respondent's own working 
envi ronment. 
In this study, it was emphasised when asking a questio~ 
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regarding consultation and negotiation, that it was specific 
relationships within the organisation in question that were being 
described. Definitions of 'consultation' and 'negotiation' were 
also given alongside the question so that there would be no 
misunderstanding or alternative interpretations of the terms 
be; ng used. 
Beaumont (1978) carried out a study which has already been 
described in some detail, where he elicited the views of managers 
about the operation of collective bargaining for manual workers 
in relation to a range of job-related matters of which safety was 
one. 
Respondents were asked to rate the extent to which the 
managers felt trade unions and management were attempting to 
accomplish the same or conflicting goals. 92% answered that 
they wished to accomplish rather similar things. 86% felt that 
collective bargaining was helpful although when asked what they 
considered to be the 'ideal' means of dealing with various job-
related issues, 75% of the managers said that joint consultation 
was best for safety issues. 
One point added by Beaumont is that all the respondents were 
highly doubtful of the ability of management to maintain a 
distinction in practice between consultation and negotiation on 
matters of prime concern to workers and unions such as safety 
matters. This point reinforces the idea of an artificial 
dichotomy between the two concepts described above. 
A study carried out by Beaumont in 1980 with a sample of 
safety representatives was described in detail in Chapter Five. 
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The results showed that the more likely a safety representative 
was to see an essential similarity of management-trade union 
aims over health and safety matters, the more likely he was to 
describe his basic representative function as one of consultation. 
73% of the respondents described this function as consultation 
and 27% described it as negotiation. Beaumont draws the 
conclusion that the terms 'consultation' and 'negotiation' are 
defined in terms of the attitude of management towards management 
rights and the extent to which they will allow trade unions to be 
involved in decision-making. 
In the present study it is hypothesised that factors such as 
the safety representatives' perception of the degree of senior 
management commitment will determine which strategy is used by 
safety representatives and managements. (For details see Table 
7.25). 
Kochan et al. (1977), in the course of their study on the 
effectiveness of safety committees suggest that safety is a 
particularly suitable subject for the use of co-operative problem-
solving strategies on the part of management and trade unions. 
The rationale behind this is that safety issues tend to be ones 
where unions and employers hold basically similar goals - echoes 
of Robens. 
As previously described, the results of part of Kochan et al.'s 
study showed that management officials saw a greater potential for 
trade union-management co-operation on safety and health issues 
than did union officials. Kochan et al. looked at the operation-
alisation of those theoretical positions and hypothesised that 
trade union officials would mix negotiating strategies with the 
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more co-operative approach of problem-solving in their interactions 
with management on health and safety issues. 
It is appropriate at this stage to clarify the issue of the 
definition used by Kochan et ale of the strategies of 'problem-
solving' and 'negotiating'. Kochan et ale base these concepts 
on the definitions given by Walton and McKersie (1965, 1966). 
The problem-solving phase they describe as an attempt by the 
parties concerned to identify alternatives for the issues under 
discussion and to define the various joint gains or losses assoc-
iated with these alternatives. The negotiating phase is where 
the parties attempt to select one of the alternatives and to 
determine the precise distribution of the gains. 
The behaviour engaged in by the parties can also be described. 
In problem-solving, the parties openly identify the problems of 
mutual concern, seek out all information relevant to the issues, 
maximise the amount of information exchanged and avoid coercive 
and threatening tactics. In negotiating, the parties limit the 
amount of information and communication, engage in bluffing, 
attempt to establish their commitment to given positions and use 
various forms of coercive behaviour, such as warnings, promises 
and threats. 
I would suggest that the description of problem-solving 
behaviour above is similar enough to the co-operative, information-
sharing, consultative behaviour described as 'consultation' in the 
present study, to be considered to be an equivalent when making 
comparisons between the findings of Kochan et al. (1977) and the 
wcal Authority study. 
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One of the variables identified by Kochan et al. as affecting 
the strategy used is the degree of management commitment which, if 
strong, may mean that the unions do not need to use pressure or 
negotiating strategies in order to induce management to make the 
necessary changes. It \'/as decided to follow up this area in the 
present study and the results are described below. 
It should be noticed that in testing for the variable describ-
ing the degree of senior management commitment to health and safety, 
when it is the questionnaire to safety representatives that is the 
source of the data, the original three categories are used, that is 
'slightly committed, strongly committed, very strongly committed'. 
It is only when these results are used in conjunction with data 
from the supervisor questionnaire that the second and third 
. 
categories are combined. 
The two groups, safety representatives and supervisors were 
asked the question: 
"00 you see your relationship with management mainly as: 
a) consultative? b) negotiating? c) a mixture of both?" 
The following definitions were given alongside the question 
to ensure that different interpretations were not made of the 
concepts 'negotiation' and 'consultation'. These were: 
'Consultation is used where the basic aims of trade unions 
and management are held to be essentially similar'. 
'Negotiation is used where there is held to be a fundamental 
divergence of interests between the two parties'. 
The results were: 
TABLE 7.24: Perceived Relationship with Management: Safety 
Representatives and Supervisors 
Safety Combined 
Representatives Supervisors samples 
% % % 
Consultative 45 51 49 
Negotiating 5 5 5 
A mixture of both 50 44 46 
N=62 N=8l N=l43 
Once again the results are remarkably similar for the two 
groups with only 5% reporting a purely negotiating strategy. 51% 
of supervisors as opposed to 45% of safety representatives see the 
relationship between management and trade unions as being consulta-
tive (roughly equivalent to Kochan et al.'s problem-solving) but 
in both groups there is a roughly even split between those who see 
the relationship as consultative and those who see it as a mixture 
of consultation and negotiation. 
It seems to be a definite improvement to include the mixed 
strategy category suggested by Kochan et al. as opposed to Beaumont's 
two category split between 73% consultationand 27% negotiation. 
This suggests a more pragmatic approach being taken by both 
groups when interacting - a contingency strategy which is 
situation-specific and dependent upon several variables of which 
each can affect the relationship as perceived by both groups. 
This is indicative of the dilemma mentioned before with regard to 
classifying interactions between safety representatives and 
supervisors as either consultation or negotiation. 
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In the safety representative questionnaire, three individuals 
fall into the 'negotiating' category and a check was done to see 
if they gave their main safety representative role as being a 
Imanagement pressuriser ' however none of the three had mentioned 
thi s rol e. 
It was decided that in order to carry out statistical tests 
on the relationship between trade unions and management, the 
strategies used could be categoriesed into: 
a) a strategy with I no negotiation ' - that is 'consultation; 
b) a strategy with 'a negotiating element ' - that is 
'negotiating' plus 'a mixed strategy'. 
It was felt that the most potentially interesting relationship 
to test is that between the safety representatives' perceived 
degree of senior management commitment to health and safety, and 
the relationship between the trade unions and management. 
TABLE 7.25 Crosstabulation of Senior Management Commitment 
by Relationship with Management as Perceived by 
Safety Representatives 
+J No c 
Degree of Senior Management Commitment 
Slightly 
COll11li tted 
Strongly 
Committed 
Very strongly 
Cormnitted 
V) QJ Negotiating 3 13 12 C...c:: E 
o +J QJ 
-r- .,-
+J~ro A Negoti a-ItS C 
,..... ItS ting Element QJ ~ 
a:: 
15 15 4 
N = 62 (Safety Representatives) 
x2 = 11.69 df = 2 P < 0.005 
The Chi-squared value under the null hypothesis of no association 
between the perceived degree of senior management commitment and 
a negotiating relationship with management is 11.69 with 2 df 
which gives a p-va1ue of < 0.005. 
There is a statistically significant difference in the per-
ceived degree of senior management commitment between those safety 
representatives who see their relationship with management as 
non-negotiating and those who see their relationship as having a 
negotiating element. This difference is significant at the 0.5% 
level. The higher the perceived degree of commitment to health 
and safety, the more likely is there to be a relationship with no 
negotiation, that is a more consultative relationship. 
A Chi-squared test for trend developed by Armitage was carried 
out, the x2 statistic being 11.67 on 1 df giving a p-value of 
< 0.005 so there is a highly significant difference in the 
proportions which is entirely explained by a linear trend across 
the different 'values' of degree of senior management commitment 
to health and safety. 
So the safety representatives who feel that senior management 
are strongly committed to health and safety may be more likely to 
adopt a non-negotiating strategy when interacting with them. 
This may be because they do not feel the need to put pressure upon 
them and to negotiate for their rights with regard to improvements 
in health and safety in the workplace. 
On the other hand, those who feel thct senior management are 
only slightly committed to health and safety may be more likely 
to use pressuris;ng tactics to get management to take an interest 
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in health and safety and to devote resources in the way of time 
and money in order to create and maintain a safe working 
environment. 
It was hypothesised that whether or not a safety represen-
tative was also a shop steward may affect his perception of 
his relationship with management, as may whether the safety 
representative belonged to a safety committee or not. 
Perhaps in general safety representatives who are also shop 
stewards have a more polarised attitude towards management 
and so may adopt a negotiating stance either through the use of 
a pure negotiating strategy or through a mixture of negotiation 
and consultation. Also those safety representatives who were 
members of safety committees which are chaired or attended by 
members of senior management, will have some first hand contact 
with this level of management in addition to their direct 
superior, and it is hypothesised that this may affect the 
strategy that they feel is appropriate for trade union repres-
entatives to use when interacting with management. The 
overall climate at the safety committee meetings, that is 
whether the atmosphere is one of co-operation, or one of 
either overt or potential conflict, may also affect whether 
the safety representatives see consultation, negotiation or a 
mixture of the two as being the most prevalent strategy used by 
the parties concerned. 
The amount of pressure needed to induce management at 
safety committees to make sure that recommendations are 
followed up, will also affect those safety representatives, as 
if they see that items are reappearing on the agenda of 
meetings without being dealt with, this may encourage them to 
have to take up a negotiating stance with management. This 
point will be discussed again in Chapter Nine. 
However, after carrying out Chi-squared tests on each of 
these variables, that is being a shop steward and belonging to 
a safety committee, it was found that neither of them had a 
statistically significant relationship with the type of strategy 
used in interactions between management and safety representatives. 
This suggests that the strategy used is contingent upon the 
situation prevailing at the time of each individual interaction, 
rather than influenced by variables which may ~fect the safety 
representatives outwith these interactions. For example, all 
such interactions are two-way processes, therefore the strategy 
used by one party will affect the corresponding strategy used 
by the other. 
When the safety representatives were asked a set of questions 
regarding the consultation aspects of their relationship with 
management, the results were as below: 
TABLE 7.26 Safet 
~~~~~~~------~--~----------~ 
ti ons of bei n 
consu 
"Have you ever been consulted by management on: 
Yes (%) No (%) 
a) re-writing of the department safety 
73 policy? 27 
b) devising safe systems of work? 43 57 
c) how to motivate the workforce?1I 23 77 
N = 60 
It can be seen that the percentage of safety representatives 
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who had been consulted by management on health and safety issues 
was only about 25% except in the case of devising safe systems 
of work where nearly double this percentage had been consulted, 
possibly because of their knowledge of what actually happens on 
'the shop floor'. 
It was hypothesised that there would be a difference between 
those safety representatives who had been consulted by management 
on a health and safety topic and those who had not been consulted, 
and their relationship with management. However, when a Chi-
squared test was carried out, the difference was not found to be 
signi fi cant. This suggests being consulted by management on 
the issues mentioned in the questionnaire does not affect the 
strategy used by safety representatives in interactions with 
management. There are several possible explanations for this. 
The strategy used may refer to interactions of a formal nature, 
for example at safety committees, whereas the safety represent-
atives may be consulted on a specific issue on a more informal 
basis. Another possible explanation may be that safety 
representatives may feel that being consulted by management 
on certain issues is a 'gesture' rather than an indication of a 
genuine consultative relationship. 
7.7 Summary 
The Shop Steward/Safety Representative Joint Role 
It was found that there were no statistically significant 
differences beb~een those who hold the joint or the single role. 
So the different trade union policies have not been shown by the 
evidence in the case of this local authority to have significantly 
different effects upon the role and function of safety represent-
atives. There seem to be no particular advantages or dis-
advantages in safety representatives having, or not having, the 
dual role - a flexible approach based on workplace circumstances 
may be most effective for the trade unions. 
The Safety Representative/Supervisor Relationship 
A statistically significant difference was found between the 
two groups as to the amount of management support they felt they 
received, the safety representatives feeling that they got less 
support than did the supervisors. 
There was also a statistically significant difference in the 
reported incidence of conflict between the two groups with the 
safety representatives reporting more conflict with supervisors 
than the supervi sors reported. It may be, among other things, 
a problem of interpretation of 'conflict', or a reluctance on 
the part of supervisors to report such incidents. There was 
also found to be an association between safety representatives 
having attended a safety training course and experiencing conflict 
wi th supervisors. It may be that elements in the training empha-
s;se confrontation with management. 
Safety Representative Role and Functions 
An attempt was made to use role classification as a technique 
by analysing the answers to open-ended questions on the subject. 
Eight categories were identified which could be further grouped 
into either industrial relations or technical categories. It 
was found that these categories did not show statistically sig-
nificant differences in relation either to the safety representa-
tives' perception of the degree of senior management commitment 
to health and safety or to the degree of support they received 
from managanent. 
The roles identified were compared with the roles envisaged 
in the SRSC Regulations and also to the skills which were found 
by the respondents to be most useful in safety representative 
training courses. 
Relationship with HSE Inspectorate 
Very little contact was in evidence between safety represen-
tatives and HSE Inspectors. With regard to complaints to the 
Inspectorate there was little evidence to suggest that safety 
representatives are using this channel of communication regarding 
unsafe conditions in their workplace. This may be because they 
feel that complaints are satisfactorily dealt with at work or that 
they would not want management to know of any such complaints to 
the HSE. 
Degree of Management Commitment to Health and Safety 
Direct and indirect measures of management commitment were 
examined, and unlike the results of Kochan et al. (1977), the 
results from the two groups, safety representatives and supervisors, 
were found to be remarkably similar. 
One variable which was found to be closely related to the 
safety representatives' and the supervisors' perceptions of the 
degree of commitment of management was whether they felt that 
they received the support of management. Those in both groups 
who felt they got management support saw management as strongly 
committed as opposed to slightly committed to health and safety. 
Strategies used by Safety Representatives and Management 
Again in this study, there was found to be a remarkable 
similarity in results of safety representatives and supervisors. 
The main strategies used were consultation alone and a mixture 
of consultation and negotiation. Only a very small proportion 
used a purely negotiating strategy. The strategy used by the 
safety representatives was found to be closely related to the 
degree of senior management commitment to health and safety 
which they perceived. No evidence was found however to suggest 
a difference, with regard to the use of negotiation or consultation 
between safety representatives who hold the dual role of safety 
representative/shop steward, and between those who are only safety 
representatives, and between those who sit on safety committees 
and those who do not. Having been consulted by management on 
certain issues was not associated with a preference for either 
a negotiating or a non-negotiating relationship between safety 
representatives and management. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE SUPERVISOR 
1 C..: 
THE SUPERVISOR 
8.1 The Supervisor Role - Problems of Definition 
Before discussing the important part played by supervisory 
staff in maintaining a safe and healthy workplace, it is necessary 
to examine the role of the supervisor in industry. As early as 
1911 F W Taylor stated that supervisors' roles should be made 
specific with clear definitions of responsibilities. He suggested 
that foremen had too much responsibility, too much freedom, were 
subject to too little control and that they wasted their efforts in 
inefficient actions over a broad front. 
An ASTMS document on Health and Safety and the Supervisor 
(1981) suggests that the supervisor role has changed as a result 
of the centralised control over production which has dictated a 
centralised control over people. The irony is that although there 
is less responsibility for supervisors in most areas of their work, 
they have an increased responsibility for health and safety since 
the introduction a the HASAWA and their duties have been expanded 
enormously. However, this increased responsibility has not been 
accompanied by any real change in authority and executive respon-
sibility resulting in some problems in attempting to enforce 
safety rules. 
Wray (1949) describes the double standards which apply to the 
supervisor's role. Being held accountable as managers of 
employees while being excluded from many management decisions, 
supervisors are 'special victims of the disparity between social 
norms and social reality.' 
with regard to the problem of role definition, Petersen (1978) 
asks if supervisors know what management want and what their duties 
are and emphasises the importance of role perception. The percep-
tion of the role by the individual himself should closely relate to 
that of management. Howeve~ in their study of the supervisors' 
role, Child and Partridge (1982) found a disparity between the 
interpretations of management and of supervisors themselves with 
regard to what the job entailed. Bell (1974) found that the 
managers in charge of the foremen he studied showed far less 
variation in their assessment of priorities in their foremen's 
jobs than did the foremen themselves. This could be described 
as a management stereotype of the foreman's job. Fletcher (1969) 
gives an insight into the conflicts inherent in the role in the 
following description: 
"Industrial supeT'Visors~ classically foremen" are men in 
the middle. Wedged between ~orkers and management they 
represent both to each other" and neither to themselves. 
Supervisors are constantly torn by competing demands and 
loyalties. They have come up from the ranks but are not 
part of management. " 
Fletcher goes on to say that supervisors' conflict is contingent 
upon the degree to which their decisions are bureaucratised. 
Impersonal procedures and rules will give the supervisor less 
discretion in decision-making. The concept of the supervisor as 
a marginal man is particularly relevant in a local authority which 
is a typical example of a bureaucratic organisation. Fletcher 
also describes the employment of specialists, for example safety 
officers, who devise and operate certain procedures, such as 
safety procedures leaving supervisors to enforce them. 
An American review of middle managers' jobs reported by Nealey 
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and Fiedler (1968) concluded that the largest gap in culture and 
cOnJT1unication in the industr'ial hierarchy at that time lay between 
the first line industrial supervisor and the manager above him. 
Child and Partridge (1982) also refer to the gap between 
management and supervisors when they question where supervisors' 
social identities lie. They ask if supervisors today retain a 
working class identification with the group from which they were 
made up or does becoming a supervisor still represent a qualit-
ative social advance in their eyes. 
The gap between management and supervisors has widened 
according to Child and Partridge because promotion from worker 
to supervisor now represents a less significant upward move with 
the decline that has taken place in the authority, standing and 
differential rewards and privileges that supervisors enjoy. 
Child and Partridge also postulate an educational barrier between 
management and supervision which is the result of the fact that 
since the last War recruitment into management is no longer from 
supervisory level but from graduates and others with academic 
qualifications. The foreman's role has changed in some aspects 
over recent years and Child (1975) suggests that the increase in 
the establishment of collective bargaining has meant that the 
foreman has been by-passed in labour negotiations. Shop stewards 
have tended to take matters straight to the level of works 
manager or its equivalent where they discern that the real source 
of power to negotiate lies. So the foreman has begun to find 
himself held responsible for maintaining good labour relations in 
his department when he plays no part in the setting of the 
parameters within which they operate. 
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Corfie1d (1981) suggests that somethign similar may be happen-
ing over health and safety a't work. The trade unions, through 
safety representatives are encouraged to use the negotiating 
machinery to handle safety problems and management's reaction has, 
in some cases, been to use professional health and safety advisory 
staff and let higher management cope with the pressure. Corfield 
states that the result has been that the first line manager feels 
himself to be out on a limb. 
Thurley and Wirdenius (1973) state that the traditional fore-
man roles have been eroded by the emergence of specialist manager-
ial functions such as work study. Safety officers might be 
included in this category of specialist. 
Foremen may often be paid less than employees over whom they 
have charge and who are on some kind of bonus scheme, and there 
has been an increase in recent years in the numbers joining 
supervisory unions such as ASTMS. The recent unionisation and 
militancy of foremen may mean that although supervisors are 
considered to be a part of management with regard to the functions 
they perform, in their industrial identification they see their role 
as one which may be strengthened by trade union membership. 
Thurley and Wirdenius (1973) describe the spread of white 
collar unions and the fact that supervisors have become increasingly 
ready to bargain separately with management for pay and conditions 
of servi ce. 
Child and Partridge (1982) state that in 1979, 40% of super-
visors in the United Kingdom were members of a trade union. They 
suggest that while still identifying with management goals, most 
supervisors feel that they cannot rely on management to look after 
their interests and feel tha"t it is necessary for them to belong 
to a trade union on pragmatic grounds. Membership of a trade 
union did not express alienation from management, in the study of 
supervisors of manual workers carried out by Child and Partridge, 
but it did indicate a belief that they had lost the protection of 
management. Supervisors were experiencing a distancing and 
rejection from management. The supervisor was no longer 'the 
companY's man l - there had been a shift in the supervisor's 
perception of where his best interests lay. With the erosion of 
supervisors I differentials and privileges over shopfloor workers 
and the threat of redundancy supervisors have felt they had a need 
to defend their standard of living and job security. 
Weir and Mills (1973) state that where supervisors see their 
interests and commitment to be located can affect their attitude 
to change in the organisation. If they perceive change to 
threaten a further erosion of their position, they may well gener-
ate shopfloor opposition to management's proposals. 
The above situation could be particularly relevant in the 
area of health and safety where supervisors can play the role of 
a catalyst for change when new rules and procedures are introduced, 
and where it is important for the supervisor to set a good example 
for others to emulate. 
Supervisors I attitudes towards improvements could, according 
to Child and Partridge (1982), be either constructive or obstructive 
and their perceptions could be of a common purpose as oppposed to 
an outlook based on antipathy and conflict. 
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Child (1975) states that supervision varies considerably with 
respect to the type of work and technology in question and the 
kind of employees being supervised. Management practice affect-
in9 supervision will also tend to vary according to these situational 
factors and also according to the size of the organisation as a 
whole and to the work culture of the industry or region in question. 
Thurley and Wirdnius (1973) state that: 
"The nature of the supervisor's role~ the importance and 
significance of what de does~ all vary with the type of 
techno logica l si tuation~ the type of workers and managers 
he is dealing with~ the supervisor's perceptions of his 
boss's expectations and his priorities~ the supervisor's 
OWn inclinations which probably mirror his strengths~ 
weaknesses and his frame of reference. It will also vary 
with the structure of the organisation he is working with 
and his position in that structure. " 
Woodward (1965) describes the effect of technology on organis-
ational characteristics such as the span of control of first line 
supervisors. Having studied firms involved in unit production, 
mass production and process production, she found that the span of 
control of first line supervisors reached its peak in mass produc-
tion and then decreased. She found that the attitudes and beha-
viour of both management and supervisory staff and the industrial 
relations climate in finns seems to be closely related to their 
technology. At both ends of the scale of technological complexity, 
pressures on people from technology seemed to be less than they were 
in the middle of the scale and the atmosphere was more relaxed. 
Child (1975) used a system of classification of foremen in 
relation to the degree of identification with management. He 
identified four categories of foreman as follows: 
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1. The 'time-server' 
Hp has been promoted after man'y years on the shop floor and 
does not want further promotion. He identifies strongly 
with other foremen and poses little threat to management's 
position, ideologies and procedures as he does not see 
himself as a professional manager. 
2. The 'supercraftsman' 
He has long service and technical expertise and may have 
aspirations for future promotions. 
3. The 'frustrated achiever' 
He is from a middle class background and was promoted from 
the shop floor at a young age. He identifies with management 
and wants further promotion and responsibility and so is 
frustrated and critical of management policy. 
4. The' cadet' 
He has a university education and identifies with management 
not with other foremen. 
It can be seen that Child found considerable differences in the 
degree to which foremen identify with management and its view of 
industrial relations, as opposed to expressing sympathy with shop 
floor workers. 
Child suggests that many industrial supervisors experience a 
profound alienation in the sense that they find their idealised 
image of the supervisor's role to be unfilfilled in contemporary 
practice. This may be especially evident for production 
supervisors in large bureaucratic organisations. The social 
norms do not match up to the social reality. The supervisor is 
a 'boundary role' lodged ambiguously between the two traditionally 
defined 'sides of industry' at a major watershed in the class 
system. 
The technique of classification used by Child does have some 
disadvantages. There is always some unavoidable degree of subject-
ivity when roles are classified, as the classifier has to decide 
which category is most appropriate in the instances where this is 
not clear cut and a role may overlap more than one category. 
There must therefore be some simplification of a complex concept. 
In the area of health and safety, it has been claimed that 
supervision is of crucial importance. For example, The Central 
Training Council giving evidence to the Robens Committee in 1972 
state: 
" .. . They (foremen and supervisors) have the closest contact 
wi th the m::xn on the job and may be ah le to influence for 
good the conduct and habits of working of young people in 
their charge. They must not only be alive to the need for 
safety, but also understand how to train the employees 
under their supervision and to work safely. Foremen and 
supervisors must understand too the importance of maintaining 
works discipline in safety as in other matters. They must 
never turn a blind eye to malpractices which may one day lead 
to an accident. " 
The Robens Committee Report (1972) stated: 
"It 1,.8 the supervisor who t.s on the spot and is in a 
I G 1 
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position to know whether or not safety arrangements are 
working in practice. ,This inf1uence can be decisive. 
Both here and abroad, wherever we have seen outstanding 
safety and health arrangements it has been clear that a 
key role is played by well-trained supervisors who are 
held accountable for what happens within their sphere of 
control. We are not at all satisfied that this key role 
in safety is sufficiently recognised throughout industry 
generally or that enough is done to equip supervisors for 
. t " ~ . 
It may now be useful to relate the main points from the liter-
ature reviewed above to some of the important health and safety 
aspects of the supervisor's role. 
Time has been spent on the problem of defining the supervisor's 
role and describing its changing nature. There is often a gap 
between the amount of responsibility placed on modern supervisors 
and the amount of authority they have at their disposal to ensure 
that they can carry out their responsibilities to the best effect. 
It is suggested that in health and safety - which is one area 
where the supervisor's responsibility has increased over recent 
years, the respondents to the questionnaire may have identified a 
lack of authority to carry out their function of enforcing 
management's rules and procedures and in disciplining workers for 
breaches of the rules. 
If management expect supervisors to motivate the workforce 
it is important that supervisory staff are aware of the conflicting 
motives which may exist in the workforce that may mean, for example, 
that safety and payment by results systems are incompatible. 
It is important to examine which group supervisors identify 
most closely with - management or workforce. Several points have 
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been highlighted above which suggest that the modern supervisor 
who holds membership of a trade union may hold attitudes that are 
closer to those of the workforce than to those held by management. 
If this is the case, then it is not surprising that there is a 
close similarity in responses to some questions put to supervisors 
and to safety representatives, some of which were described in 
Chapter Seven. 
The main question to be pursued in this chapter is the extent 
to which, and in what ways, the health and safety aspects of the 
supervisor's role have been affected by him being 'the man in the 
middle ' playing a marginal role. 
Because of the importance of the supervisor in health and 
safety it was decided to send a questionnaire to all supervisory 
staff in the four departments. Before going on to describe the 
population to whom these questionnaires were sent, it should be 
noted that the problem of definition of the roles of supervisor 
and foreman is one which has been resolved by those researching in 
this area in various ways. To illustrate this point, four 
definitions are given below: 
1. "A supervisor is a person in constant control of a I 
definite section of a labour force in an undertaking, 
exercising it either directly or through subordinates 
and responsible for this to a higher level of management." 
(Great Britain: Ministry of Labour 1954) 
2. "Throughout the report the word I foreman lis used to mean 
the men and women in industry who are in charge of a 
production or maintenance unit and who are in immed~ate 
daily contact with the operatives whose work they d,rect 
and control.1I 
(Grabe and Silberger 1956) 
3. liThe definition of 'supervisor' used in this study is based 
on the theory that the purpose of management is to control 
the operatives and the operations on the shop floor. II 
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"This control can be exercised in two ways: 
(a) 
(b) 
by administrativ~ methods, that is, at a distance; 
by actual 'overseeing' inspection and direction in 
the area of operations. 1I 
liThe supervisor is someone who exercised control by the 
latter method." 
(Thurley and Hamblin 1963) 
4. "By foreman we mean an employee who has been appointed 
by management to see that its plan for any particular 
organisational unit within a company are carried out by 
directly leading the labour force of the unit in question." 
liThe foreman rarely performs work of the same type as his 
subordinates and only in cases of emergency and for 
instructional purposes." 
(Westerland and Stromberg 1965) 
There is a common thread running through these four definitions. 
This is the element of responsibility for the work of others and 
daily contact with the group the supervisors control. This day to 
day contact is particularly important when deciding who to include 
in the study because safety should be a daily ongoing part of the 
supervisor's job. Daily safety inspections should be an integral 
part of his work and would not be possible if he were more remote 
from the actual work site. 
8.2 The Questionnaire 
A questionnaire was drawn up which was similar to the one sent 
to the safety representatives. Some of the questions asked were 
common to both questionnaires, with some additional questions to 
elicit information about potential problems facing supervisors 
such as conflict between safety and production. It was expected 
that only a small percentage of supervisors would be members of 
safety committees and so some of the section on safety committees 
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from the safety representative questionnaire was omitted. 
In the questionnaire there were some questions which were 
similar to those in the safety representative questionnaire. For 
example, supervisors were asked the converse of the question asked 
to safety representatives about the management/trade union relation-
ship which was described in Chapter Seven. An attempt was made as 
in the safety representative questionnaire, to classify the super-
visor role by means of two open-ended questions. Differences and 
similarities between the findings from the safety representative 
and the superv1sor questionnaires will be discussed later. Most 
of the questions had already been piloted in the safety representa-
tive questionnaire so the second questionnaire was sent without 
piloting to all supervisory staff in the four departments in the 
study. 
The main purposes in using the questionnaire were: 
(1) to examine the vital part played by supervisors in 
the area of health and safety and their perception 
of their role; 
(2) to describe and analyse their interactions with 
safety representatives and their attitudes towards 
trade unions on the one hand, and senior management 
on the other in the context of health and safety. 
8.3 The Sample 
A decision had to be made regarding the sample to be sent the 
questionnaire. The various departments use different designations 
or job titles for supervising staff, for example chargehands, 
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foreman, supervisor or superintendent. Advice was accepted from 
. 
the safety officers in the four departments who recommended that 
chargehands should not be included in the population because in 
the Local Authority it is the foreman or supervisor who has manager-
ial responsibility for his colleagues with regard to health and 
safety. He also receives reports of accidents from workers and 
maintains the accident book - that is he is responsible for the 
paperwork associated with safety as well as for other aspects such 
as training. It was felt that, having discussed the problem, the 
safety officers were in the best position to know which gradings 
were the most relevant for the study. So all (of the population of) 
supervisory staff, excluding chargehands, were sent the questionnaire. 
A total of 124 questionnaires were sent out and 88 replies were 
received - a response rate of 71%. 
TABLE 8.1 The Sample of Supervisors 
N % 
Foreman 25 28 
Supe rvi sor 38 43 
Superi n tendent 18 21 
Other grading (equivalent to 
first line management) 7 8 
N= -gg 
The category 'other grading' included, among others, an assistant 
storekeeper, a chief waste inspector and a technical assistant. For 
the purpose of describing the results of the questionnaire, all the 
respondents will be called 'supervisor'. 
28% of the supervisors were aged between 20 and 40 years old 
and 72~c were aged 41 yea rs or more. 
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When the supervisors were asked how long they had held their 
present job in the department, the results were: 
TABLE 8.2 Length of Service of Supervisors 
N % 
1 - 5 years 31 36 
6 - 10 years 38 44 
11 - 15 years 11 13 
16 - 20 years 7 8 
N=8'i 
8.4 The Supervisor's Role and Function in Health and Safety 
The use of role classification as a technique in research 
has been discussed in Chapter Seven and a similar method was used 
as in the safety representative instance, to collect information to 
illustrate the perceived role of the supervisors with regard to 
health and safety. 
The supervisors were asked an open-ended question: 
"What do you consider to be the most useful contribution 
to safe working that can be made by supervisory staff?" 
The 79 replies to this question were classified into five 
main roles by the researcher in the same way as with the safety 
representative sample, keeping in mind the inevitable degree of 
subjectivity which this involves. The results can be seen in 
Table 8.3, 
:°7 1-
TABLE 8.3 Classification of the Supervi sor IS Ro 1 e in Health and 
"Safety 
N % 
l. Inspector/Monitor 27 34 
2. Educator 23 29 
3. Enforcer 11 14 
4. Good Housekeeper 8 10 
5. Examp 1 e Sette r 7 9 
6. Othe rs, e. g. moti vati ng, 
protecti ng the public 3 4 
N=79' 
In order to illustrate what is meant by the various categories 
some examples are given below: 
1. Inspector/Moni tor: 
2. Educator: 
3. Enforcer: 
4. Good housekeerer: 
5. Example setter: 
6. Others: 
Time spent on issues 
The supervisors were asked: 
"Checki ng safety requi rements, 
too 1 s, eq ui pmen til 
II Instructi ng and i nfonni ng the 
work fo rce II 
IIGetting fi tters to obey safety 
rul es II 
IIEnsuring a clean and tidy 
workshopll 
"Maintaining existing standards 
by means of personal example" 
"Keeping in close contact with 
safety representati ves II 
IIWhat health and safety responsibilities take up most of 
your time?1I 
The results of this question can be seen below, keeping in mind 
th f 1 . hl e act that multip e answers were poss'~ e. 
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TABLE 8.4 Health and Safe~y Issues Identified by Supervisors 
Conditions of work in general 
Inspecting/Monitoring of workplace and 
equipment 
Reading/Writing (of reports, forms, etc.) 
Training /Education of workers 
Investigating Accidents 
None in particular 
No. of times mentioned 
30 
28 
10 
5 
2 
5 
It can be seen that the most time-consuming responsibilities 
concerned general conditions of work, inspecting and monitoring 
and reading and writing (of reports, forms, etc.) 
There is a similarity between the most time-consuming respon-
sibilities described by supervisors and those described by the 
safety representati ves. The first three categories in the above 
list, that is conditions of work, inspecting/monitoring, and reading 
and writing of reports were also on the list given by safety 
representatives. The main differences were that the supervisors 
mentioned training and accident investigation, not mentioned by the 
safety representatives, and some of the safety representatives 
menti oned attendi ng safety commi ttee meeti ngs, not menti oned by the 
supervi sors . 
Table 8.5 shows that there are three perceived health and 
safety roles common to both safety representatives and supervisors -
inspector/monitor, educator and enforce~ 
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TABLE 8.7 Safety Training Carried out by Supervisors 
N % 
(a) Yes, all workers 32 37 
(b) Some of them 15 17 
(c) No, none of them 40 46 
N=87 
Those supervisors who ticked (a) or (b) were then asked to 
give details of the training they gave. A few answers mentioned 
general safety aspects, but all the others described the teaching 
of correct work methods and procedures. This training was very 
specific in nature and was related to the men's own work situation. 
It included the correct use of equipment and the wearing of protective 
clothing. Induction and apprentice training were given as areas 
where supervisors were making a contribution. Some of the special-
ist types of training are listed below: 
Correct road signing, trench timbering, pipe laying, gas 
detection, lifting and slinging, use of harness, use of ladders, 
stacking, power tools, rope slings, working on manholes, use of gas 
masks for chlorine, use of fire fighting appliances, use of propane 
gas, garage safety. These examples show the variety of 
procedures carried out in the four departments in which the super-
visors work. 
However, when the supervisors were asked if they had been 
consulted when training programmes on health and safety were being 
drawn up, of the 87 who replied only 16% had been consulted. So 
although supervisors play an important part in on-the-job training, 
their expertise as the people nearest to the actual work situation 
does not appear to be used by management when formal safety training 
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programmes are being drawn up. This may be an important source of 
information which is not being utilised. 
It is important that safety training should involve not only 
a change in knowledge and skill, but also an element of attitude 
change in order to be effective. For example, workers may wear 
protective clothing when the supervisor is nearby indicating some 
compliance to safety regulations. However, if this behaviour is 
stopped as soon as the supervisor is out of sight, positive 
attitudes to the wearing of protective clothing have not been 
i nterna 1 i sed. It is initially a change in behaviour that is 
required, however if attitudes are also changed, there will not be 
a need for close supervision, or enforcement backed by discipline. 
Too close supervision can have the effect of reducing job satis-
faction (Herzberg, 1959) and inducing resentment against management 
among the workforce, therefore a situation where workers can work 
with more autonomy and less strict supervision could be of benefit 
to a 11 . 
Discussions including the supervisor and a group of employees 
may be more effective than orders from management in achieving a 
change in attitude towards protective clothing. Discussion encourages 
participation and hopefully some commitment to a change in behaviour 
which has been found to be more effective than being lectured at. 
What is required is an active rather than a passive role on the part 
of those whose attitudes are to be changed. 
Good housekeeper - 10% 
One potential cause of accidents is objects falling on workers' 
heads or people falling over objects. If goods are stacked 
carefully, and equipment and materials are neatly stowed within 
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clearly marked areas leaving clear gangways, then the incidence 
of these accidents may be reduced. It is an important everyday 
part of the supervisor's job to oversee good housekeeping practices 
in the workpl ace. 
De Reamer (1980) states that good housekeeping standards in 
an organisation have a beneficial effect on employees as they 
demonstrate management's concern for their employees. Morale 
wi'l be high and the industrial relations climate will be favourable 
for the co-operative effort required in health and safety. 
In the present study, supervisors were asked to describe an 
example of a recent investigation they had made and the results 
were categorised. It was found that a proportion of these accident 
were caused by tripping over items such as cables or slipping on wet 
oro i 1 Y floors. Good housekeeping practices such as stowing cables 
away out of gangways, and wiping up spillages immediately they occur, 
could reduce this type of accident and it is the supervisor on the 
spot who should instill into those he is responsible for the import-
ance of cleanliness and tidiness at all times. 
Inspector/Monitor - 34% 
With regard to the role of inspector/monitor also mentioned by 
the safety representatives, they may see this role in a formalised 
way, carrying out inspections at regular intervals, for example 
three monthly, after informing management in writing of their 
intention. On the other hand, the inspector/monitor role of super-
visors is a more continuous, ongoing, daily inspection which super-
vi sors are expected by the Loca 1 Authori ty to ca rry out. Too 1 s , 
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equipment and protective clothing must continually be inspected 
by the supervisor to ensure that they are in good working order. 
70% of supervisors said they inspect the workplace and it may be 
that the 30% who answered that they did not inspect may have meant 
formal inspections carried out with others such as safety represen-
tatives. 
Although the inspection and monitoring functions of safety 
representatives and supervisors differ in their frequency and 
degree of formality, these functions are considered by both groups 
to play an important part in the self-regulation of health and 
safety standards. When firms are expected to set their own safety 
standards and publicise these through their safety policy, it is an 
important part of the procedure to monitor these standards and to 
take any necessary steps to ensure that they are maintained. 
Inspections of the workplace are one way of carrying out the monitor-
ing of conditions and procedures. 
Enforcer - 14% 
Management support is essential if supervisors are to implement 
senior management's safety policy. Senior management may try to 
delegate responsibility for health and safety down the management 
hierarchy without actually providing any additional means to imple-
ment these responsibilities. 
De Reamer (1980) states that if management place a guard on a 
machine they should insist on its use to show that they care about 
the; r worke rs . The Na ti ona 1 Sa fety Council in the USA in an 
Accident Prevention Manual (1978) points out that if the supervisor 
observes men taking short cuts or otherwise departing from safe 
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methods, he should correct them at once because if he does not the 
unsafe method will become standard practice. This then means that 
there will be few occasions which require 'discipline'. 
A common complaint voiced by some supervisors in the present 
study with regard to the health and safety aspects of their job was 
their lack of authority to enforce workers to follow safe procedures 
and to wear protective clothing. They stated that if, as is the 
case, they carry legal responsibility for the safety of their fellow 
workers, they ought to have the power to back this up. Some quotes 
from questionnaires received from supervisors illustrate this: 
III can only suggest not enforce the use of safety equipmentll. 
IISupervisors are held responsible for accidents but have not 
the means to enforce safety at workll. 
III can only advise a worker who is carrying out a dangerous 
practi cell . 
lilt would help if powers were granted to enforce rules or 
the use of safety equipment was made compulsoryll. 
IIAll safety gear is provided but the workforce cannot be 
compelled to wear it - so it is a waste of time ll . 
However in spite of this perceived lack of authority, 14% of 
the supervisors did mention the enforcement role as being important. 
It is necessary for management to make clear in its safety policy 
the importance of adherance to safety rules and also clearly to 
allocate specific safety duties and responsibilities, with their 
attendant powers, to supervisors in order to make them effective 
in accident prevention. 
The supervisors were asked how often workers were disciplined 
for breaches ; n health and safety practi ces. The responses given 
are shown in Table 8.8 alongside the responses given by the safety 
')()C 
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representatives to the same question. 
TABLE 8.8 The Use of Discipline as Perceived by Supervisors 
"Are members of the workforce ever disciplined for breaches 
of health and safety practices in the workplace?" 
(For example, not wearing protective clothing) 
Supervisors Safety Representatives 
N % N % 
Often 7 8 5 8 
Occas i ona 1 ly 49 57 28 47 
Never 30 35 27 45 
N=86 N=60 
The results are similar over the two groups with supervisors 
seeming to have the impression that there is more disciplining carried 
out than do the safety representatives. 
The main areas highlighted in the ASTMS document (1981) which 
may cause disciplinary problems for supervisors are where workers 
remove machine guards and where they refuse to use or to wear 
protective equipment and clothing. The document suggests that 
jOint management/union agreement on what constitutes disciplinary 
offences should be negotiated and there should be less conflict and 
di fferences of interest in the fi e 1 d of hea 1 th and safety than in 
other areas - a similar opinion to that expressed in the Robens 
Report. 
Pirani and Reynolds (1976) carried out a study in two organisa-
tions to monitor different methods of persuading employees to wear 
safety gear. One of the six methods used was disciplinary action 
action and there was some s~ccess in the short term, but the policy 
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was counter-productive in the long term as it is suggested that in 
the long term the attitudes of the operatives hardened under this 
policy and the use of safety gear declined. 
Gouldner (1954) describes the vicious circle of supervision 
in relation to the level of tension in a work group. He states 
that one consequence of rules is to decrease the visibility of 
power relations which raises the tension level in the work group. 
Pirani and Reynolds also state that a major problem is that 
disciplinary procedures must be applied equitably - supervisors 
must not be selective in enforcing the rules, for example, they 
must not climb down if they feel that a certain individual would 
cause trouble. The use of discipline as a method of persuasion 
was, in Pirani and Reynolds' study, found to be unsuccessful and 
indeed from the supervisor's pOint of view it may itself cause 
problems such as an increase in the number of grievances brought 
before management by workers who feel that disciplinary procedures 
have been applied inequitably. 
Corfield (1981) states that when management decide to tighten 
up standards, it is supervisors who have to see that instructions 
are being enforced. They must take the moral responsibility for 
disciplinary penalties as disciplinary action may be based on their 
evidence and they may have to be witnesses. Management must 
depend on supervisors who can stand up for themselves and must have 
a good grasp of the safety code and of their own and their work 
group's responsibilities for working safely together. 
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It may be that positive reinforcement in the form of supervisors 
showing approval to employees who follow safe procedures is more 
effective in motivating workers to work safely, than negative 
reinforcement in the form of punishment which causes resentment, 
bad feelings, low morale and which, instead of producing a lasting 
change in attitude and behaviour, only means that workers act safely 
when management are at hand, and at other times work on ways to beat 
the system in order to express their resentment. Interviews with 
senior managers and safety officers indicated that they see discipline 
as being used as a last resort, and a change in attitude as a 
preferable strategy to effect a change in behaviour. However, it 
should be noted that change in attitude by no means guarantees a 
concomittant change in behaviour. Nor does a change in overt 
behaviour necessarily mean that there has been a change in attitude. 
For example, a worker may wear eye protection when the supervisor 
is nearby, but will remove it as soon as no members of management 
are around. This is mere compliance with rules, as described by 
Kelman (1961) and Deutscher (1973) with no real accompanying positive 
attitude as to the value of wearing eye protection. The relationship 
between overt behaviour and underlying attitudes is not a straight-
forward one. 
Example setter - 9% 
Gardner (1979) says that supervisors must motivate workers by 
getting them to set safety as one of their goals. This means that 
the supervisor must be aware of potential conflict between motiva-
tions such as working safely and being comfortable at work which is 
discussed below. One way of motivating employees to wear protective 
clothing for example is for the supervisor to ensure that he wears it 
himself. A supervisor cannot expect his subordinates to wear 
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protective clothing or follow safety rules if he himself does not 
do the same. 
Grimaldi and Simonds (1975) maintain than an indifferent 
supervisor is soon surrounded by indifferent workers - it is up to 
him to set an example of how to work safely. 
In studying over two thousand industrial accidents, Powell 
et ale (1971) formed the opinion that supervisors could influence 
accident rates through leadership. They would be able to set a 
better example if they were more knowledgeable and better trained 
than those in some organisations. 
De Reamer (1980) states that the safety effort of supervisors 
can playa constructive part in shaping the emotional attitude of 
employees towards their bosses and their company. In order to 
win acceptance, supervisors must really want to operate a safe 
plant and by the example they set, they must let their people 
know that they are expected to work safely. 
8.5 The Supervisor/Safety Representative Relationship 
The duties of the supervisor with regard to health and safety 
will entail some interaction with safety representatives, therefore 
it is useful to examine this relationship to see if it is mutually 
supportive or is characterised by conflict. The relationship was 
discussed in some detail in Chapter Seven and the difference 
between the perception of conflict in the relationship between the 
two groups was described. In addition, supervisors' perceptions 
as to whether they get the support of management was also mentioned. 
21C 
Five percent of supervisors felt that they did not get the support 
of safety representati ves whi 1 e another 5% sa i d that they had 
experienced conflict with safety representatives. 
It was hypothesised that the four individuals who represent 
5% of the sample and who mentioned lack of support from safety 
representatives would be the same four individuals who reported 
conflict with safety representatives. When this was checked, it 
was found that this was not the case, so it appears that lack of 
support and co-operation do not necessarily lead to conflict 
between the two groups. For example, the more committed and 
motivated safety representatives are likely to be those who 
support supervisors ofer health and safety issues and in order to 
achieve their aims, and this may mean that on occasion there 
may be a clash of interests of opinions between these safety 
representatives and supervisors. 
This point is reinforced by a comment from the safety 
representative questionnaire: 
"1 feeZ from my (J/;.)n experience~ that supervisors think 
that safety representatives are a bZoodY nuisance. 
This may not be a bad thing where getting something 
done is concerned." 
Those safety representatives who do not support supervisors 
may be less consciencious about their role and functions and as a 
result do not experience conflict with supervisors or may have 
minimum contact with them with regard to health and safety in the 
workp 1 ace. There is therefore no clear relationship between mutual 
support and reported conflict between supervisors and safety 
representa ti ves . 
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91% of supervisors felt that they get the support of safety 
representatives as opposed to only 70% of safety representatives 
who felt that they get the support of management. However it may 
not be valid to make a direct comparison here, because the question 
to safety representatives contained the word Imanagementl not 
specifically supervisory level management. 
Two comments from responses given by safety representatives 
who felt thatthey did not get the support of management highlight 
the differences between different levels of management. 
"Local management resent the contents of safety 
inspection forms but head office management are 
very safety conscious." 
'~enior management backs regional policy but local 
junior management could enforce more safety 
practices if they desired." 
One would expect supervisors to receive strong support from 
senior management whose safety policy they must put into operation. 
Although basically safety representatives and management wish to 
attain the same objectives with regard to health and safety, for 
example fewer accidents and a safe working environment, they may go 
about achieving these aims in different ways. This may give rise 
to a potential for conflict which mayor may not become overt. 
8.6 Conflicting Motives 
It is necessary to motivate the workforce to work safely in 
order to develop the desired positive attitudes to safety and to 
ensure that safe work methods will become the norm. It; s 
important that those responsible for motivating others are aware 
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of the possible existence ?f conflicting motives in some individuals 
which may make the procedure of motivating them more complex than it 
seems. 
With regard to the motivation of employees, Petersen (1978) 
states that the supervisor is a funnel directing information to 
employees as well as directing or carrying out the majority of 
training. He sees the motivational role of the supervisor as 
crucial which necessitates the supervisor himself being motivated 
to share the company's goal of safe working. Petersen suggests 
motivating supervisors in three main ways. Firstly, making 
safety performance an integral and important part of the supervisor's 
performance. It should be one of his defined production respon-
sibilities which include such things as quality, cost control and 
methods of improvement. 
Petersen's second suggestion is that management should give 
supervisors a free hand in how they control accidents, retaining 
accountability for results. This approach might help to overcome 
the problem identified by supervisors in the present study where 
they felt that they were accountable for accidents taking place in 
their area of control, but that they did not have the necessary 
authority invested in them by management to enable them to enforce 
safety rules. 
The third suggestion entails assigning to supervisors special 
projects in safety. If supervisors are encouraged to perceive 
their role in safety as important, and if they have some input, 
either through projects as suggested by Petersen, or when rules 
are being drawn up by management, they should feel more committed 
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to safety. The National Safety Council Accident Prevention Manual 
(1978) states that "ru1es that supervisors have had a chance to 
review are likely to be more effective than those they have had no 
part in formul ati ng. II 
Petersen (1978) states that if the supervisor in the area of 
safety performance considers that the value of a reward which 
management will give for achieving the goal is great enough, he 
will expend the necessary effort on safety. The supervisor may 
decide that his personal goals would be better achieved by expend-
ing efforts in other areas and too often he is right. He may 
question whether safety is really important to management or are 
other areas more crucial. 
This illustrates the importance of senior management commit-
ment to safety as without this positive attitude at the top of 
the organisation, the supervisory staff will, in turn, be 
uncommitted and be unlikely to be able to motivate the workforce 
to take safety se ri ous ly. 
Grimaldi and Simonds (1975) state that supervisors must see 
that safety measures will operate to increase the all-round 
efficiency of their departments rather than constitute an increase 
in cost and lower production. They need to have safety continually 
brought to their attention and to have routines set up in such a 
manner that their part in the total safety programme will be a 
normal, regular operation. 
It is particularly important that the supervisor when trying 
to motivate his subordinates to work safely should be aware of the 
fact that each man is a unique individual who is affected by various 
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motives depending on the circumstances prevailing at that time. 
sometimes an individual is motivated by two or more mutually 
exclusive motives which are in conflict, and usually he will 
experience some degree of cognitive dissonance which he will 
strive to reduce. There are various methods to reduce this 
dissonance one of which is that the motive that is most salient 
to the individual at that time will take precedence over the 
other(s). For example, if the need to earn maximum bonus is 
more important than following safe procedures, an individual 
may work too fast and take risks in order to produce more. 
With regard to the issue of conflicting motives in the work-
force, Gardner (1979) gives some interesting examples of these. 
He states that the supervisor must convince workers that they can 
prove they are manly without risking injury, for example, by 
using kinetic lifting techniques instead of brute force. In 
addition, Gardner talks of job competency, that is a basic 
ingredient of expertness may be seen by workers to be getting 
away with hazardous actions by reasons of deftness, timing, 
precision, etc. Supervisors should appeal to a skilled worker's 
confidence in mastering the job or in setting a good example to 
others. 
Another possible conflict mentioned ariefly above is that 
between working safely and maximising earnings although Gardner 
says that if jobs are properly engineered, good earnings should 
be attainable with safe job methods. 
One of the fundamental assumptions underlying the use of 
piecework is that there is a co-incidence of interests between 
employer and worker in keeping production high. If this is the 
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case, the same pressures will cause a co-incidence of interests in 
keeping obstacles to production, such as safety practices, to a 
minimum. 
The British Safety Council in written evidence to the Robens 
Committee stated: 
"In hazardous industries there should be no question 
of payment by result~ that is piece-work. In such 
iruiustries~ as is now universal in coal mining~ the 
workman should be paid a regular weekly wage which 
does not depend directly upon his output. 
In some occupations~ for example mass production lines 
in the motor car industry~ where the work can be seen 
as safe but monotonous~ payment by results is perfect-
ly legitimate as the health and safety of the workers 
is not direct Zy affected." 
In order to further examine the effect of payment by results 
methods of remuneration on safe working, the questions described 
below were asked of supervisors and safety representatives in the 
ques ti onna ires. 
I n the present study, sa fety representa ti ves and s upervi sors 
were asked the question in Table 8.9. 
below: 
TABLE 8.9 
The responses can be seen 
Views u on 
"ls there a bonus scheme in operation in your workplace? II 
Safety Representatives 
S upe rvi so rs 
21E 
Yes(%) No(%) N 
73 
98 
27 64 
2 88 
It is difficult to find a reason for the above discrepancy 
between the responses from the two groups. The percentages of 
those from each group who worked in each of the four departments 
were not dissimilar enough to suggest that this might affect the 
results. There is a bonus scheme in each of the four departments 
in any case so it may be that the two groups have different 
perceptions of the meaning of the question. 
Nearly all the supervisors (98%) answered in the affirmative 
and they may have been referring to the existence of a bonus 
scheme in their department in general rather than in terms of 
whether they personally were paid by this method - no supervisory 
staff were paid in this way. However, the safety representatives, 
some of whom are paid on a piecework basis, may have answered 
according to whether or not they personally were on a bonus payment 
system. The above discrepancy underlines the problem in postal 
questionnaires with regard to the interpretation of seemingly 
straightforward questions. 
Respondents were then given the following statement and asked 
for their reaction. 
TABLE 8.10 The Bonus Scheme and Safe Working Methods 
"Some people feel that a bonus scheme works against safe 
working methods. Do you agree?" 
Safety representatives 
Supervi sors 
,,--
L. I ! 
Yes(%) No(%) N 
49 
55 
51 59 
45 87 
It was hypothesised that there would be a difference in 
responses from supervisors and safety representatives, because 
the latter may stand to benefit personally from a bonus scheme, 
the former are not paid in this way. When a Chi-squared test 
was carried out on these results there was no statistically 
significant difference between the responses of the two groups. 
One possible reason for the similarity between the responses 
of the two groups with regard to the bonus scheme and safe work-
ing, is that some supervisors bend safety rules and collude with 
workers in maximising their output in order to reduce potential 
conflict at work. (This point is discussed more fully below). 
In the same way some safety representatives who are themselves 
paid on a bonus system may take short cuts in order to maximise 
their own earnings. (See for example, Roy 1955). 
As can be seen, approximately half of both groups of respon-
dents feel that the bonus system may have a detrimental effect on 
safe working which lends support to the trade union opposition 
to wage incentives reported by Wrench (1972). This opposition 
has frequently been voiced in terms of arguments which emphasise 
the increase in accidents as a consequence of speeding. 
The Congress of Swedish Labour Unions in 1971 stated that 
the speed of work was raised so much in most industries with piece-
work systems that dangerous situations were being created. 
They voted to work against piecework systems in favour of monthly 
p~. 
Although payment by results is traditionally opposed by the 
~'[ / ' ~I 
unions, it is sometimes preferred by individual workers because 
of the satisfaction of more direct individual control over levels 
of earnings. For the pieceworker the immediate benefits of a 
high rate of output are a direct calculable certainty. On the 
otherhand, an accident is not a certainty, only a possibility and 
probably a remote one. 
Those respondents who stated that the bonus scheme does work 
against safe working methods were asked to describe in what way 
they considered that the bonus system contributed to unsafe 
practices or working conditions in their workplace and some examples 
of these are described below. 
The most frequent comments referred to the tendency to cut 
corners and to rush in order to save some time. Also mentioned 
was the use of bad work methods, for example not blocking up 
jacked-up buses, not setting out road signs adequately for the 
job, not using the proper scaffolding, and the misuse of tools. 
One supervisor said, "If the squad are held back by unforeseen 
circumstances, they skip safe working procedures to catch Up.1I 
Roy (1952) examined the interaction between piecework and 
accidents and revealed extensive co-operation between machine 
operators and other shop floor groups in the submission of formal 
managerial rules of production. Illegal practices were common-
place in the drive to attain a consistent piecework quote often 
with the silent collusion of supervisors. This is an illustra-
tion that conflicting motives concerning safety affect not only 
the workforce but also supervisory staff. 
In the questionnaire to supervisors, the question below was 
':1 0 L _ 
asked, regarding feelings of pressure. 
TABLE 8.11 Production Pressure Perceived by Supervisors 
"00 you feel under press ure to keep up production?" 
(a) often 28 (33%) 
(b) sometimes 37 (44%) 
(c) never 19 (23%) 
N=84 
From this result it can be seen that 77% of supervisors at 
some time feel under pressure of this kind. This may have the 
effect of making it difficult to supervisors to enforce safe 
working procedures to the extent they would feel was appropriate 
in less stressful circumstances. There may, therefore, be some 
incompatibility between expectations of the safety role and other 
work roles of the supervisor. 
Two quotes from the supervisor questionnaire illustrate this 
pressure: 
"Supervisors do not have time to pay crose attention 
to hearth and safety regu rations in the 'Workp race. " 
"The foreman has a rot of 'Work and so may miss out 
on some safety aspects." 
Supervisors may find themselves caught between management 
and workforce. On the one hand they may be put under pressure 
by management to keep up production, and on the other hand they 
may be under pressure from workers through their safety represen-
tatives to ensure that the working environment is safe and that 
management provide the necessary equipment to the work according 
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to laid down safety procedures. 
Child and Partridge (1982) state that supervisors can keep 
latent the conflict, which results from conflicting expectations 
of their role, by 'colluding' with the work group. Contingencies 
which arise within production systems may force supervisors to 
break or to stretch certain rules regarding, for example, work 
schedules, line speeds or maintenance procedures so that output 
will be achieved or employee earnings maintained. Supervisors 
on occasion may have to order rules and expectations into a priority 
list and if necessary sacrifice some of these rules or expectations 
in order to reduce the potential for conflict that exists in their 
work environment. 
Young (1964) commenting upon the conflict between the goals 
of safety and production states: 
"The employer has to choose between a form of payment 
which tacitly encourages workers to break the law but 
which brings greater prosperity to the business in 
higher output~ and the danger of accidents which may 
bring their own financial penalties." 
Evidence from a study of over two thousand accidents carried 
out by Powell et al. (1971) for the National Institute of Industrial 
Psychology supports the view that conflict between the achievement 
of safe working practices and other production objectives is 
endemic. The survey concluded that accidents were structured by 
and arose out of the continuous pressure for production. 
Pressure to keep up production can lead to 'speed accidents' 
which are described by Wrench (1972) as being caused by speed-
induced carelessness on the part of the injured person. Examples 
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given of this type of accident are when a machine guard has been 
. 
ignored, when a machine is left in motion for an operation when it 
should have been stopped, for example for cleaning, or when an 
operator has started a machine cycle before fully withdrawing his 
hand. Wrench suggests that it is feasible that pressure towards 
increased output may, in some circumstances, lead to a neglect of 
safety measures with or without the knowledge of management. 
Nichols and Armstrong (1973) looked at five factory accidents 
and found that each occurred while men were trying to maintain or 
restore production after a process failure. The dangerous 
situations were created to make the resumption of production 
quicker and easier. At least three of the accidents occurred 
as a result of 'illegal practices' which were virtually normal 
and company safety rules were broken. This was partly because 
of pressures from both foremen and management on the workforce 
to keep up production. Workmates also put pressure on each 
other to ensure that their bonus earnings are not jeopardised. 
Even the day of the week can affect the safety of piece-
workers. Wrench and Lee (1982) found that towards the end of 
the week, in the period immediately preceding the point of 
calculation of the week's output, the pieceworkers are more 
likely to speed up, cut corners, make less concession to their 
own fatigue, take more risks and generally be more liable to 
industrial injuries. 
It has to be admitted that it is very difficult to demon-
strate any relationship between incentive payments and industrial 
accidents in a statistically satisfactory way because of method-
ological problems. There are too many other variables involved 
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such as the type of supervision and individual differences of 
~e workers concerned. However, it does not follow that there 
is no relationship or that piecework does not encourage unsafe 
working behaviour. 
The bonus scheme in use in the four departments in the Local 
Authority was carefully developed - there is a maximum bonus 
that can be earned, and it is contended that ample time has been 
allowed for safe working methods to be used. However, there does 
still seem a conflict between working safely and maximising 
earnings which are often incompatible. 
The main point to be made in this section on conflicting 
motives is that safety is often compromised in order to attain 
other goals, and that this conflict of motives affects not only 
the workforce but also supervisors. 
The role of Accident Investigator was not mentioned as a 
useful contribution of supervisory staff to safe working although 
72% of supervisors said that they investigated accidents and 
dangerous occurrences. However, two individuals did mention 
this function when asked what health and safety responsibilities 
took up mos t of thei r ti me. 
The roles for supervisors in health and safety from the 
Industrial Data Sheet described above include 'investigation of all 
lost time accidents that occur in his section' and it must be 
assumed, as with the safety representative data, that accidents 
are fairly infrequent events and so this role is not seen by 
supervisors in the present study as a useful contribution to safe 
working. 
")"-" ,... 
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8.7 Traini ng 
79% of the supervisors had been on a training course involv-
ing health and safety. Of these 70 individuals, 76% had attended 
the hea 1 th and safety courses for s upervi sors run by the 1 oca 1 
authority. These last for two days and in some departments 
attendance on the course is mandatory for supervisors. 18% of 
the group of 70 had attended speica1ist training courses, for 
example National Water Council courses, and 12% of them had attended 
general safety courses, for example ROSPA, TWI, NEBSS. Only 5% 
of those who had received safety training had attended trade union 
safety courses. 
This emphasis on the importance in the Local Authority of 
supervisory safety training may explain the differences found 
between the percentage of safety representatives (59%) and 
supervisors (79%) who had attended safety training courses. 
TABLE 8.12 Numbers of Supervisors and Safety Representatives who 
were Tra; ned 
"Have you attended a safety training course?" 
Safety Representatives 
Supervi sors 
x2 =7.19,df=1, p<O.Ol 
Yes No 
39 
69 
27 
18 
The Chi-squared value under the null hypothesis of no assoc-
iation between having attended a safety training course and being 
a supervisor or a safety representative is 7.19 on 1df which gives 
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a p-value of < 0.01. 
above variables. 
This shows an association between the 
This statistically significant result may appear to be sur-
prising in view of the fact that a comment sometimes seen in 
writings on health and safety at work is that in some aspects of 
safety in the workplace, safety representatives are more knowledge-
able than management because a larger number of them have been 
trained. The content of the courses is equally as important as 
the number of individuals who have attended them if one is evalua-
ting their effectiveness. Therefore, although a smaller percen-
tage of safety representatives had attended a course, most of 
those who have received safety training had been on the ten day 
TUe course which is longer and more comprehensive than the one to 
two day courses attended by supervisors. The effect may be that 
overall trained safety representatives are still more knowledgeable 
than trained supervisors. However, it is still a sign of manage-
ment interest that 79% of supervisors have been trained in health 
and safety. It may be that the comment about fewer supervisors 
than safety representatives being trained relates more to the 
private than to the public sector as it is in the private sector 
that most of the research in health and safety has been carried out. 
The main point here is that it is important that supervisors 
are adequately trained in health and safety when they are inter-
acting with well-informed shopfloor safety representatives so 
that they can talk on equal terms. Supervisors must be able to 
match safety representatives' knowledge and awareness of health 
and safety with their own. 
The supervisor should be observing workers for unsafe acts 
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and taking corrective action at once or else he is seen to give 
taci t approva 1 to the act. Gardner (1979) suggests tha t super-
visors who accept carelessness as a cause of accidents are admit-
ting to helplessness in controlling unsafe behaviour. On the 
otherhand, supervisors must consistently show approval to employees 
who are following safe procedures. The effectiveness of positive 
reinforcement for desired behaviour has been well established by 
psychologists attempting to shape behaviour in animals and humans. 
Safety is one area where this could be a valuable strategy. 
In the present study, in the questionnaire to safety represen-
tatives, an open-ended question was asked about which aspects of 
the courses attended had been found to be most useful in the 
supervisors' work. This question was open-ended because these 
aspects could vary greatly from course to course and so it was 
not as appropriate to set out a list for respondents to tick in 
the way of the safety representative questionnaire. The Tue 
course for safety representatives which most had attended lends 
itself to this format as the areas are neatly divided up for 
teaching purposes. 
The results of the supervisors' open-ended question can be 
seen below. 
Trai ni ng Aspects 
The most important aspects were clustered into five main 
categories as below: 
TABLE 8.13 Training Aspects Mentioned by Supervisors 
Legal aspects 
All aspects 
Accident Prevention 
Specialist Aspects 
Education/Training 
Mentioned by % of 
the 41 individuals 
32 
27 
20 
17 
5 
Some explanation of these categories is necessary. 'Legal 
aspects I includes comments alluding to the supervisor's legal 
responsibilities. The category described above as 'All aspects I 
was used when supervisor respondents did not consider any particular 
aspect to be the most important. 'Accident prevention ' includes 
anticipation, prevention, prediction, hazard spotting and good 
housekeeping. Items included under 'Specialist aspects I were 
excavations, report writing and the use of power wagons and hydrau-
lic cranes. The category of 'Education/training' included the 
training requirements of the HASAWA. 
All the above aspects of training are considered to be useful 
in supervisor safety training. Supervisors are aware of their 
legal responsibilities which may provide an underlying motive for 
accident prevention by means of anticipating situations, hazard 
spotting and good housekeeping, rather than accident investigation 
which, although potentially a source of useful information, could 
be considered to be reactive. Accident investigation was only 
mentioned by two individuals as a responsibility taking up most of 
their time, although 72% of this sample of supervisors reported 
that they investigate accidents. 
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8.8 Summary 
In this chapter the difficulties of definition of the 
supervisor role in an organisation have been described. In 
different organisations, or even different departments in this 
case, the job title may vary which further complicates the situation. 
Various references were given which describe the supervisor 
as a marginal man caught on the boundary between management and 
workforce. Partly because of an increase in the establishment 
of collective bargaining, the foreman is by-passed in labour 
negotiations, the shop steward going direct to the level of works 
manager where he sees the authority to make decisions lies. 
Many supervisors belong to white-collar trade unions and as 
a result of this increased unionisation and some erosion of their 
authority described above together with a degree of role ambiguity, 
it may be that they identify more closely with the worforce than 
with management of whom they are nominally a part. This may be 
one of a number of possible explanations for the unexpectedly 
similar perspectives held by the populations of safety represent-
atives and supervisors who replied to the questionnaires. 
The areas where this similarity was particularly evident were: 
(a) the perception of safety representatives and supervisors of 
the degree of management commitment to creating and maintaining 
safe working conditions in the departments; 
(b) the perception of the relationship between trade unions and 
management on health and safety issues, that is, the strategies 
used in interactions between them. 
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There was a considerable difference between the reported 
incidence of conflict between the two groups, the safety represen-
tatives reporting more conflict than did the supervisors. 
Another statistically significant difference was found between the 
two groups as to the amount of management support they felt they 
received - the safety representatives feeling that they got less 
support than did the supervisors. 
Supervisor Role in Health and Safety 
An attempt was made, in the same way as with the safety 
representative sample, to classify supervisor roles in health and 
safety. This was done by analysing the answers to open-ended 
questions asking supervisors what they considered to be their most 
useful contribution to safe working and what health and safety 
responsibilities took up most of their time. Five main categories 
were identified and these roles were examined in relation to the 
aspects of safety training courses attended by supervisors that 
were considered by them to be most important. The roles identified 
in this way were then compared with the nine roles and functions of 
the supervisor in health and safety laid out in Industrial Data 
Sheet l7A. 
Conflicting Motives/Pressures 
The importance of the awareness in the supervisor of the 
pressure on the workforce as a result of conflicting motives 
which may be incompatible, was discussed. One such example is 
the desire to work safely versus the desire to maximise earnings. 
If the supervisor is to be effective in persuading those he 
supervises to follow safe procedures and adhere to safety rules, 
he should have an understanding of the fact that some goals are 
mutua lly excl us i ve and he mus t try in some way to overcome th i s 
prob 1 em. 
The effects of the bonus system on safety were described by 
supervisors and safety representatives and roughly half of each 
sample thought that the bonus system was detrimental to safe 
working. 
The effects of pressure on supervisors to keep up 'production' 
was also mentioned with 77% of supervisors feeling this pressure 
at some time and also feeling that they may not be able to keep up 
safety standards. 
Training 
A larger proportion of supervisors than safety representa-
tives had been trained in health and safety and 54% of supervisors 
claimed to train the workers they supervise. 
Conclusions of the survey of supervisors 
1. When supervisors and safety representatives were asked about 
experiencing conflict with one another, a significantly 
greater percentage of safety representatives than supervisors 
reported the existence of conflict - 23% compared with only 5% 
of supervisors. Possible explanations for this were given 
in Chapter Seven. 
2. There was virtually no difference between supervisors' and 
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safety representatives' perceptions of the degree of senior 
. 
management commitment to health and safety. 74% of 
supervisors and 73% of safety representatives see management 
as strongly committed to health and safety. This may 
indicate a similarity of attitudes and perceptions between 
the two groups, and may reinforce the proposition that a gap 
has developed between supervisors and higher levels of 
management. 
3. The degree of management support received by supervisors and 
safety representatives was significantly different. 70% of 
safety representatives compared with 91% of supervisors felt 
that they get support. One would expect supervisors to get 
more support for they are putting into practice the policies 
devised by management. 
4. There was a significant relationship between those supervisors 
who felt that they did/did not receive management support and 
their perception of the degree of commitment of management to 
health and safety. Most of those who felt that they got the 
support of management in their role saw management as strongly 
committed to health and safety. 
5. When questionned about the trade union/management relationship 
the responses of safety representatives and supervisors were 
very similar with only 5% of each group describing the relation-
ship as purely negotiating. The remainder of each group were 
nearly equally divided between consultation alone and a mixture 
of consultation and negotiation. 
6. The two most often cited roles identified by the supervisors 
were inspector/monitor (70% make inspections) and educator 
(54% train workers) which together account for 63~ of the 
responses. Table 8.S·shows comparisons between the 
perceived health and safety roles of supervisors and 
safety representatives. The three roles identified by 
both groups were: inspector/monitor, educator and enforcer. 
The other roles identified by safety representatives mostly 
involved relationships with others such as management pressur-
iser, representative and consulter. The supervisors identi-
fied roles more related to the physical environment such as 
good housekeeper and example setter. 
7. 79% of supervisors who replied to the questionnaire had 
attended a training course involving health and safety. 
If this training is effective, it should result in well 
informed supervisors who are aware of their legal responsib-
ilities towards their subordinates and who can interact with 
well-trained safety representatives on equal terms with respect 
to knowledge. 
8. 78% of supervisors felt that they get the support of the 
workers they supervise when trying to maintain a safe 
workplace. Only 64% of safety representatives stated that 
they received support from the people they represented. 
9. 77% of supervisors felt under pressure to keep up production 
either loftenl (33%) or I sometimes I (44%). This ties in 
with the view of the supervisor as the man caught in the 
middle of workers and management, and under the influence of 
competing demands, for example for keeping up production and 
for maintaining a safe working environment. 
10. Respondents to the supervisor questionnaire seemed to have 
positive attitudes towards safety committees with 99% 
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agreeing that they provide a genuine opportunity for 
management and employees to co-operate over health and 
safety. 93% disagree with the statement that safety 
committees provide an excuse for management to delay 
action on health and safety issues. 
To sum up some of the points which emerged from the survey, 
in this Local Authority a large proportion of the supervisors had 
received some safety training. On the whole, they had positive 
attitudes towards safety committees and to the degree of commit-
ment to health and safety shown by senior management, and they 
report few incidents of conflict with safety representatives. 
When supervisors were asked to add any further comments they 
had on their responsibilities with regard to health and safety in 
the workplace 24 responded. These responses highlighted some of 
the main problems facing supervisors: lack of time, making men 
aware of their responsibilities and lack of authority to enforce 
safety rules and procedures. 
illustrate these points: 
Some quotes are given below to 
"supervisors do not ha:ve time to pay c l,ose attention to 
heal,th and safety regul,ations in the workpl,ace" 
"the foreman has a l,ot of work so may miss out on some 
safety aspects" 
'~e must make men aware of their responsibil,ities to 
themsel,ves and others" 
"no matter how vigil,ant a supervisor is~ the final, 
responsibil,ity remains with the workforce to maintain 
safe working conditions when the supervisor i8 not in 
attendance" 
"supervisors are hel,d responsib'ie for accidents but 
have not the means to enforce safety at work" 
"all the safety gear is provided but the woi"kforce 
cannot be compelled to wear it Be it i8 a waste o( 
n:~""~:eu " 
.. ' 
Self-Regulation and the Supervisor 
Supervisors should be seen as a valuable human resource in 
the organisation whose importance to the maintenance of a safe 
and healthy work environment should be fully recognised by senior 
management. The supervisor is the 'agent' who helps to put into 
practice the self-regulation measures identified by senior manage-
ment in their safety policy. 
The supervisor is the man at the 'sharp end' where the 
accidents actually happen and the hazards exist. He is the 
person who influences the general work environment by his attitude 
to the importance of good housekeeping and setting a personal 
example. The effect that the supervisor can have on the atti-
tudes of those he supervises is perhaps sometimes overlooked. 
Training which is carried out by 54% of supervisors is one 
way in which they can influence their men's attitudes, for 
example with regard to wearing protective clothing or carrying 
out work using the correct safety procedures. 
Constant vigilance, monitoring and daily inspections are also 
key aspects of the supervisor's contribution to health and safety 
although supervisors mentioned a feeling of lack of authority to 
enforce rules and procedures which gave rise to a feeling of frus-
tration in some of them. However, it may be more effective for 
the supervisor to use positive reinforcement in the form of praise 
for 'correct' behaviour, than negative reinforcement in the form 
of discipline. 
The position of the supervisor with regard to health and safety 
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can be summed up in a passage from the HSE Report of 1980: 
"Supewisors are in the front Zine in matters of health and 
safety and are particularly vulnerabZe at a time when some 
of their other powers are being eroded or taken over by 
personnel~ legal and training departments. They have lost 
much of their formal authority~ but still have an essential 
job to do in terms of ensuring the health and safety of the 
workers who operate in their span of control. They need 
management support and training in the control of health and 
safety problems of their own place of work so that they car. 
discuss with confidence the issues raised by safety represen-
tatives. " 
There is no doubt about the importance of the supervisor in 
the setting and maintaining of safety standards in the workplace 
which is the essence of self-regulation. 
CHAPTER NINE 
THE SAFETY COMMITTEE 
Z3f 
THE SAFETY COMMITTEE 
9.1 Introduction 
According to the Robens Report (1972), in 1969 there were 
approximately 10,000 joint safety committees in United Kingdom 
manufacturing indus.try covering 70% of the workforce in factories 
employing more than fifty people. 
In the late 1970s a study of establishments in manufacturing 
industries carried out by the Industrial Relations Research Unit 
at Warwick University (1977-78) revealed that 69% had safety 
committees of which 41% were set up prior to 1974 and 59% were 
set up between 1974 and the time of the study (Brown, 1981). 
The Warwick study showed that the incidence of safety 
committees was greater in larger establishments but they tended 
to be more recent where workforces were smaller. It was found 
that safety committees were least likely to exist where trade 
unions were not recognised, and the conclusion was drawn that, in 
formal terms, the legislation has had a very substantial impact on 
the setting up of health and safety committees. 
Leopold and Coyle (1981) found that 71% of establishments 
comparable to those in the Warwick study, had safety committees 
and that the breakdown was very similar between pre- and post-
1974 figures to the Warwick study. 
In October 1979 an HSE survey of over 6,500 workplaces 
revealed that a majority of all workplaces with safety represen-
tatives also had a safety committee. This survey also confirmed 
that 90% or more of workplaces in parts of the public sector and 
elsewhere has safety committees and it concluded that the SRSC 
Regulations had helped to narrow the gap between industries in the 
provision of safety committees. 
HASAWA makes reference to safety committees: 
"In such cases as may be prescribed it shall be the duty 
of evepY employer if requested by the safety representa-
tives .•. to establish3 in accordance with regulations 
made by the Secretary of State3 a safety committee 
having the function of keeping under review the measures 
taken to ensure the health and safety at work of his 
employees and such other functions as may be prescribed." 
In 1977 the Safety Representative and Safety Committee 
Regulations (SRSC) set out the statutory provisions for safety 
committees. These are described briefly below. 
The request to set up a safety committee must be in writing to 
the employer from two safety representatives. The employer must 
then consult with the safety representatives who made the request 
and with the representatives of recognised trade unions whose 
members work in any workplace to which it is to relate. The 
employer must post a notice stating the composition of the 
committee and the workplace to be covered by it, in a place where 
it can be easily read by the employees. The safety committee 
must be established not later than three months after the request 
for it. 
Guidance Notes were published by the Health and Safety 
Commission which provided background advice but at the same time 
left sufficient flexibility to allow the safety committee to be 
tailored to fit the individual circumstances of each workplace. 
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9.2 The Gui dance Notes 
The Guidance Notes deal with: 
(1) Organisational matters 
Account must be taken of the relevant circumstances 
within which the committee functions. For example, a 
single committee in a large workplace may be IItoo large, 
or if kept sma 11, may become too remote II • 
(2) Safety committee functions 
The SRSC Regulations suggest that the main statutory 
function is to monitor the precautions for health and 
safety at work. The Guidance Notes emphasise the need to 
draw up agreed objectives or terms of reference. The 
functions of safety committees will be fully discussed 
later in this chapter. 
(3) Membership 
The Guidance Notes suggest that membership and structure 
should be settled in consultation between management and the 
trade union representatives. The committees should be as 
compact as possible to aid communication, and the number of 
management representatives should not exceed the number of 
employee representatives. The safety officer should be an 
ex-officio member of the safety committee. 
(4) Relationships 
There should be flexible relationships between safety 
committees and higher management, the safety officer, safety 
representatives and trade unions especially where functions 
may overlap, for example, in the case of safety committees 
and safety representatives. 
(5) Conduct of meetings 
The committee should meet as often as necessary and 
there should be sufficient time for business to be fully 
discussed and for the necessary papers to be circulated at 
least a week before the meeting. 
Leopold & Coyle (1981) found that one effect of HASAWA and the 
SRSC Regulations was that many existing committees were reorganised, 
and also that small firms (with under 200 employees) had been 
particularly stimulated to set up safety committees even in firms 
in low accident rate industries. 
They noted, however, that in high and medium accident rate 
industries the vast majority of firms had safety committees whereas 
in the low accident rate sectors only just over half the plants had 
committees. 
Before going on to discuss the role and functions of safety 
committees it will be useful at this point to describe the system 
of safety committees in the Local Authority under study. 
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9.3 The System of Safety Committees 
The Local Authority ran a pilot study prior to the coming into 
operation of the SRSC Regulations in 1978. The study was based on 
the Drainage Department and information resulting from this study 
was then used to assist other departments to set up their own 
systems of safety commi ttees. 
Meetings were called in the various departments between trade 
union safety representatives and management representatives where 
the proposed safety committee structure was discussed with a view 
to acceptance from both trade unions and management. /This included 
details concerning the membership, office-bearers and the constitu-
tion and objectives and functions of the safety committee. 
There are some similarities with regard to safety committees 
between the four departments studied; however, within this frame-
work there has been the opportunity for departments to use their 
own discretion as to how their safety committees function. 
There is a two-tier system in each department with a depart-
mental or Iparentl safety committee on the higher tier and sub-
regional or location safety committees based in the individual 
workplaces within each department. In these lower tier committees 
there is representation, through the various unions,of all groups 
of workers. 
1. Tbe Hi ghways Depa rtmen t 
The departmental safety committee was first set up in November 
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1978. There were to be eight management representatives including 
~e chairman (the Depute Director) covering the various sections of 
the department. The safety officer was to be an ex-officio member. 
An equal number of safety representatives would represent the work-
force - one from each of the eight sub-regional safety committees 
which were also to be set up. 
In an interview, the Assistant Director of Highway Maintenance 
said that the present situation is that the departmental safety 
committee meets annually but can be called at any time. He stated 
that this is because few items are put on the agenda because they 
are dealt with satisfactory at sub-regional level meetings, that is, 
the system seemed to him to be 'working well '. 
Eight sub - regional safety committees were to be set up, 
representing the manual, craft and APT and clerical staff in the 
Region and a specified and variable number of safety representatives 
and management representatives would sit on these committees. The 
chairman was to be a senior manager. A draft consitution similar 
in content to that of the other departments, was discussed and later 
accepted. 
The lower tier committees meet three-monthly. Copies of 
minutes are sent to all members of safety committees and all safety 
representatives. All members of the committees can place items on 
the agenda in time for a meeting. Although the highest level of 
management does not attend sub-regional meetings, they receive 
copies of the minutes of meetings so they are kept informed of 
problems experienced in the various locations. 
Objectives: The main objectives concern reviewing of measures to 
ensure the health, safety and welfare of employees, promoting co-
operation between management and employees in instigating, develop-
ing and carrying out the above measures, and eliminating or reducing 
the accident rate in the department to an acceptable level. 
Functions: The functions of the safety committees concern: 
(1) The study of accidents and notifiable disease 
statistics and trends so that reports can be made 
to management on unsafe and unhealthy conditions 
and practices and recommendations made for 
corrective actions. 
(2) Reports from inspectors and safety representatives 
are studied and a working brief kept on the effect-
iveness of the safety content of employee training 
and the adequacy of health and safety communication 
and publicity in the workplace. 
(3) Assisting in the development of departmental 
safety rules and safe systems of work. 
FIGURE 9.1 
Departmental Safety Committee 
(8 safety representatives/8 management representatives) 
meets annually 
Sub-Regional Safety Committees 
(Variable size) 
~eet 3- T Jnthly 
UPPER 
TIER 
LOWER 
TIER 
2. The Drainage Department 
There is an upper tier departmental safety committee with ten 
members which originally met twice yearly. Although it can be 
called at any time if necesasary it now meets only once a year as 
so fevJ issues are referred to it. The committee is chaired by 
the Depute Director. 
There are, in addition, four lower tier sub-regional safety 
committees chaired by a member of senior management such as a 
sub-regional engineer. These committees meet 3-monthly and the 
minutes of each committee are sent to all the others as it is felt 
that useful information can be circulated and be beneficial to all. 
These minutes are also posted on notice boards so that employees 
know what has been discussed. 
The objectives and functions of the safety committee are 
very similar to those of the Highway Department described above. 
FIGURE 9.2 
Departmental Safety Committee 
(5 safety representatives/5 management representatives) 
meets a nnua 11 y 
Sub-Regional Safety Committees 
(Variable size) 
meet 3-monthly 
UPPER 
TIER 
LOWER 
TIER 
The five safety representatives on the departmental safety 
committee are: two from NALGO, two from NUPE and one for the 
T&GWU who between them represent manual workers and craftsmen 
and APT and clerical staff. 
3. The Transport Department 
The system is similar to those described above in that there 
are eight location sub-committees on safety, each consisting of 
four trade union representatives and three management representa-
tives. The four trade union represented are AUEW, NALGO, NUPE 
and TGWU. 
Each of these committees is chaired by a safety representative 
who is designated senior safety representative which entitles him 
to sit on the upper-tier departmental safety committee. These 
location committees meet quarterly and, unlike other departments, 
meetings are preceded by a 'walkabout' where hazards are noted and 
brought to the attention of the committee. 
The Chief Engineer receives a written request for permission 
to carry out these walkabouts and then forms are sent to him 
stating any points needing attention. Any items outstanding are 
then discussed at the upper tier meeting. 
The safety co-ordinator, who is also personnel officer in the 
Transport Department, as there is at the time of writing no safety 
officer, is an ex-officio member of location safety committees who 
attends in an advisory capacity and does not form part of the 
management representation. The objectives and functions of 
location safety committees are as described above for the other 
departments. 
The upper-tier committee in the Transport Department is a 
Joint Consultative Committee for Safety (JCC) which meets quarterly 
and has the Director, or sometimes the General Manager as its 
chairman. In addition, there are seven other senior management 
representatives with the Safety Co-ordinator acting as secretary 
to the committee. The JCC discusses accident statistics, 
training and any alterations in the workplace, for example, new 
plant. Plans are shown to safety representatives who are 
involved in any changes taking place. 
FIGURE 9.3 The Trans~ort Deyartment - Safety Committee System (2,500 em loyees 
JCC for Safety 
(8 safety representatives/8 management representatives) 
meets 3-monthly 
I 
UPPER 
TIER 
LOWER 
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Location Safety Committees 
(4 safety representatives/3 management representatives) 
meet 3-monthly 
4. Water Supply Services 
Unlike the other departments, there are no lower-tier safety 
committees as a result of a Directorate decision to avoid having 
too many committees. There are sub-regional joint consultative 
committees which meet two-monthly which were not originally 
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designed for safety, but safety is a major item discussed. If 
~ese items are not satisfactorily dealt with at the sub-regional 
JCCs they are referred to the departmental JCC where all minutes 
of sub-regional committees are discused, resolved and approved. 
There is a departmental safety committee which meets quarterly 
and whose chairman is the Depute Director with the chairman's 
deputy being a safety representative. There are six management 
representatives and six trade union safety representatives who 
represent NALGO, NUPE, EEPTU, TGWU, GMWU, and AUEW. The safety 
officer is an ex-officio member and attends all meetings to 
discuss accident statistics and the annual review of statistics 
as well as giving expert advice if this is needed. Again, the 
objectives and functions of the safety committee are very similar 
to those already des cri bed. 
An interesting development from this departmental safety 
committee has been the setting up of study groups consisting of 
a small number of people (perhaps four) representing both trade 
unionsand management. These have studied the following topics: 
1. the role and effectiveness of the safety committee; 
2. acci dents; 
3. operation of safety representatives' training requirements, 
methods of operating and relationship with other members of 
staff; 
4. lifting and handling. 
Copies of the reports produced by these study groups are distributed 
widely throughout the department. It was felt that as the safety 
committee has no executive power and can only make recofTT11endations, the 
setting up of study groups is one way in which the cOfTT11ittee can playa 
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FIGURE 9.4 
No lower 
tier S Cs 
Services 
Departmental Safety Committee 
meets 3-monthly 
Safety items discussed at sub-
regional JCCs (meets 2-monthly) 
UPPER TIER 
In the present study, data were collected with the intention of 
providing information with regard to the part played by safety 
committees in the self-regulation of health and safety in the 
Loca 1 Authori ty. Some cons i dera ti on was also made of the deter-
minants of effectiveness of safety committees. 
The data sources were: 
(a) questionnaires to safety representatives who were 
members of safety committees 
(b) interviews with senior management and safety officers 
(c) observations made by the researcher during safety 
committee meetings 
(d) documentary data, for example minutes of safety 
committee meetings 
Before going on to describe the present study and some other 
research in the area, six sources of data will be considered as 
well as the functions and duties of safety committees, so that 
these may form a theoretical background against which to examine 
the empi ri ca 1 da ta . The six sources were selected from many 
such publications to give a varied range of types. Other 
existing sources cover much the same ground and a decision had to 
be made to limit the number of interpretations of the functions 
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indicated. The following items were mentioned by three or more of 
the six sources and the number of mentions is shown in brackets 
after each. 
1. The safety committee must have objectives or terms of 
reference (3) 
2. Consideration of safety performance (5) 
3. Consideration of causes of accidents (3) 
4. Study trends and statistics related to accidents and disease (3) 
5. Make recommendations to management on health and safety (4) 
6. Promote co-operation between management and employees (4) 
7. Help to develop safety rules and safe systems of work (3) 
One point made by five out of six sources is that a safety 
committee must operate within a frame of reference and have 
objectives. This may seem rather basic but it is a vital 
point because without these basic functions the workforce could 
not be expected to take seriously any committee purporting to have 
as its members individuals who represent their interests. 
The main point to emerge from the seven functions described 
above is that the safety committee should monitor safety perfor-
mance in the organisation. This can be done in a variety of 
ways. For example, the safety committee can evaluate the safety 
policy by examining: 
1. the level of accidents during the first six months of each 
individual's employment - this would indicate the effectiveness 
of induction procedures among other things; 
2. response to safety campaigns; 
3. the number of accidents or near misses resulting from 
failures to carry out procedures or to observe rules; 
4. the use of protective clothing and equipment. 
Accidenttrends and statistics can be examined and discussed 
in an attempt to determine underlying causes. On the basi s of 
di scuss i on, recorrmenda ti ons -shoul d be made to management us i ng a 
co-operative approach. 
The other function mentioned by three out of the six sources 
suggests that the safety committee can play an active rather than a 
purely reactive role in initiating and helping to develop safety 
rules and safe systems of work. 
It is interesting to look at some of the functions which were 
mentioned less frequently. Two of these functions concerned 
liaison with HSE inspectors (two mentions) and consideration of 
their reports (one mention). It is interesting to note that the 
SRSC Regulations (1977) mention both the above functions related to 
the Inspectorate and Williams (1960) mentions liaison with HSE 
inspectors as a safety committee function. It may be that 
theoretically these were considered to be useful functions for 
safety committees - Williams was writing long before the HASAWA, 
and the SRSC Regulations were issued to introduce the statutory 
provisions related to safety representatives and safety committees 
- that is safety committees had only been operating in a limited 
number of organi sa ti ons before 1977. However, in practice, 
there appears, among the remaining four sources, to be little 
support for this function. The trade union source, GMWU (1978), 
certainly is dated early after the introduction of the Regulations, 
but the other three sources are dated 1980, that is safety committees 
had been in operation for two years even where they had not been in 
existence before the SRSC Regulations. What was thought to be a 
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safety committee function in theory does not seem to be the case 
where the Regulations have oeen put into action. Perhaps liaison 
with the HSE is seen as a management function or perhaps the safety 
committee has problems finding suitable times for its members to 
get together for meetings without organsiing further meetings in 
order to liaise with the HSE inspectorate. The responses to 
questions about contact with the HSE described in Chapter Seven 
indicate that safety representatives have little liaison with the 
Inspectorate and, in similar vein, those who describe safety committee 
functions may see contact with the HSE Inspectorate and consideration 
of their reports as infrequent events. 
Only two of the six sources mentioned carrying out safety 
inspections as a safety committee function. Kochan et al. (1977) 
suggest that safety committees should carry out safety inspections 
- preferably the day before each meeting. This procedure is 
carried out in the Transport Department when the location safety 
committees have walkabouts just before their next meeting. This 
is not done in other departments, possibly because of problems of 
time and of getting the safety committee members together espec-
ially if they are geographically dispersed as in departments such 
as the Water Supply Services. When safety representatives were 
asked why their safety committees do not inspect, they replied 
that this is a safety representative function with the same answer 
being given by senior managers in interviews. This may also be 
the reason why only twc sources see inspections as a safety 
committee function. 
Similarly, the functions of showing conviction and setting an 
example (one mention), arousing interest in health and safety (two 
mentions) and promoting personal responsibility for health and 
safety (two mentions) may be considered by some sources to be 
management functions especially at supervisory level. 
Monitoring the effectiveness of safety training and commun-
ication, which is included in the SRSC.Regulations, was only men-
tioned by the GMWU among the other sources referred to, and although 
this is a standing item on the agenda at higher tier meetings in the 
Local Authority, it was usually only briefly mentioned at the 
meetings attended by the researcher. 
Kochan et ale (1977) suggest that trade unions should encour-
age their members to use safety committees rather than formal 
grievance procedures as the first forum for dealing with health 
and safety problems. This increases the importance and status of 
the committees and also eliminates a source of pressure on the 
formal grievance procedure. 
The Gt~wu gives advice to its stewards to the effect that the 
safety committee should be the final internal stage for dealing 
with complaints on health and safety. This union sees an advantage 
in having a negotiated complaints procedure as an illustration of the 
usefulness of the safety committee. 
In the present study, safety representatives were asked if the 
procedures for raising and pursuing health and safety issues at work 
were the same as for existing grievance procedures and how often 
this procedure was used for those issues. 68% said that the 
procedures were the same and 32% said the procedures differed, with 
most respondents mentioning the involvement of safety representatives, 
the safety officer and/or the safety committee. At the end of this 
chapter it will be useful to see if the most frequently mentioned 
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functions from Table 9.1 are carried out by the safety committees 
in the Local Authority. 
9.5 Previ ous Resea rch on Safety Commi ttees 
There has been very little empirical research carried out on 
the effectiveness of safety committees and the variables which 
determine their effectiveness. However, there are two main pieces 
of work, one based in the United States and one in Britain, which 
are discussed below in relation to some of the information gathered 
in the present study. Kochan, Dyer & Lipsey (1977) described the 
results of a study of safety committees in some districts of a 
large trade union in the United States. They examined factors which 
led to the effectiveness of these union-management safety and health 
committees. 
Between 1980 and 1982 a study was carried out at Glasgow 
University to clarify the nature of an effective health and safety 
committee and to identify the major characteristics that lead to 
such effectiveness. In this study, 51 plants in the manufacturing 
industry sections of the UK economy were visited, representing 
high, medium and low accident rate sectors and members of safety 
committees were interviewed. 
Both these studies described above involved the private sector 
of industry and they were exclusively concerned with the effective-
ness of safety committees. The present study was based in the 
pUblic sector - an area which has received less attention from 
researchers and where, in this instance, the setting up of safety 
committees has been as a result of the legislation, although joint 
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consultative committees in ,other subject areas were well established 
in the public sector before 1978. 
Beaumont et al. (1982) divided the factors which determine 
effectiveness of safety committees into external and internal ones. 
External factors are grouped into: 
(a) industry accident rate 
(b) plant size 
(c) overall industrial relations environment 
These are all considered to be beyond the immediate control of 
the committee members and yet playa part in shaping the committee's 
acti ons . The internal factors are considered by Beaumont et al. 
to be more able to be influenced by the members of the committee 
and the eleven internal factors are discussed below along with the 
findings of Kochan et al. (1977) and those from the present study. 
9.6 Determinants of Effectiveness 
1 . Size 
The SRSC Guidance Notes suggest that the size of a safety 
committee must depend on the circumstances within which it operates. 
The problem here is that it is desirable to ensure adequate 
representation of all interests, that is, agreed trade union 
representation and in addition representative coverage of various 
work areas or locations. At the same time, to ensure good 
communication, it is important that the committee should not be 
allowed to become too large. 
Beaumont et al. found that the average size of safety committees 
in their sample ranged between six and twelve members and that in 
larger plants there was a system of tiered committees with one 
co-ordinating the activities of the lower level committees. 
A similar two-tiered system was found in the Local Authority 
study which has been described above, and this does seem to be the 
preferred way of providing an optimum balance between size and 
coverage of representation. This is particularly useful where 
geographically the sub-committees are widely spread as in the 
Water Supply Services or the Drainage or Highways Departments - a 
situation not normally existing in a plant however large. At the 
same time, the practice of circulating minutes of committee 
meetings round each of the other committees in the same department 
seems particularly effective as there must often be the same or 
similar problems arising and it seems wasteful in terms of effort 
to duplicate the attempts to deal with these items. 
2. Regularity of meetings 
Beaumont et al. state that for a safety committee to function 
effectively, it must meet frequently. They found that over half 
of their sample had committees which met monthly, 14% met bi-
monthly and 14% every three months. However, they stress that 
regularity is more important than frequency. 
In the Local Authority, safety committees meet three-monthly 
with the exception of the departmental safety committees of the 
Highways and Drainage Departments which nO\..., only meet annually 
because of a lack of items requiring attention at this level. 
The researcher observed dates for meetings being fixed and these 
were always firmly set at the previous meeting with, in her 
experience, no deviation from the previously set time between 
meetings. 
The frequency of meetings may depend on such factors as the 
size of the organisation and the hazards within the workplace. 
It may be that if meetings are held infrequently and as a result 
of this they are very long and the agenda is full of items, there 
is a case for more frequent but less 'enthusiasm-sapping' meetings. 
3. Minutes 
One purpose of keeping these committee meetings to a set time 
period is the problem of maintaining continuity highlighted by 
Kochan et ale One method suggested to ensure this continuity is 
the use of minutes which can indicate the progress of items from 
the agenda of previous meetings and proceedings. Have recommend-
ations been followed up and has suitable action been taken within 
the time period specified? 
The minutes of safety committee meetings in the Local Authority 
playa similar role in providing information to people at all levels 
in the organisation and also as a permanent record of proceedings of 
the committee. This aids attempts to follow the progress of items 
raised and recommendations made at committee meetings. 
Each meeting starts with a discussion of matters arising from 
the minutes of the previous meeting which states whether or not 
each point has been satisfactorily dealt with. In addition, in 
the Water Supply Services, under each item raised at meetings, a 
specific person is named who is to take action on that issue - so 
--. 
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the minutes form a record of who was given the responsibility of 
dealing with an item. There can therefore be no dispute on the 
grounds of misunderstanding as to who has been delegated which 
responsibility. One safety representative commented that "formal 
meetings with minutes are more effective than informal meetings 
wi th management. II 
4. Agenda 
Beaumont et ale suggest that the overall effectiveness of 
a safety committee is related to the nature of the items included 
on the agenda and how the agenda is set. It is important that 
~e agenda should not be too long as this may result in a loss of 
interest of committee members who have to sit through long meetings. 
At the same time it is important that each member of the committee 
should have equal opportunity to contribute items to the agenda. 
In the Local Authority, all safety committee members have the 
right to place items on the agenda and these must be notified to 
the Clerk of the Committee not less than ten days before the date 
of the next committee meeting. 
5. Composition of safety committees 
(a) Management representation 
The SRSC Regulations suggest that there should be 
equal numbers of management and trade union representatives 
on the committee and in addition, Beaumont et al. found 
senior management presence on a safety committee important 
in providing genuine decision-making authority and in 
demonstrating management's commitment to health and 
safety. 
Kochan et al. (1977) also emphasised the importance of 
delegation of sufficient decision-making authority to 
a management representati ve on the cOrTITIi ttee who can 
deal with problems that arose. 
IRS Health and Safety Bulletin (Nov. 1978) states that 
if management is represented by someone in the hierarchy 
who is senior enough to guarantee that the views of the 
committee are not subject to more senior vetting, the 
committee will more easily retain the confidence of 
the workforce as a whole. 
In the study of a Local Authority, when observing safety 
committee meetings, it was clear how important it was 
that there should be present a member of management 
senior enough to have the authority to make decisions, 
deal with problems that arose and to answer enquiries 
with the required knowledge. The importance was also 
noted of having an individual on the committee who was 
either able to allocate financial resources for the 
rectification or elimination of hazardous situations, or 
who was in a position to know the financial resources 
available. 
In the case of the Local Authority, the upper tier 
committees are chaired by either the Director of the 
department himself or his depute and this means that 
time can be saved by making unnecessary the step of 
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communicating to the Director the issues discussed 
and recommendations made at safety committee meetings. 
In the lower tier committees, the chairman may not be 
in this position, so there may be some delay before 
certain types of decisions can be made such as those 
where financial investment is involved. 
(b) The role of the safety officer 
Beaumont et al. state that the safety officer can 
playa major role in determining the success of the 
safety committee through his technical and personal 
skills, his relationship to the committee and its 
members, and his advisory role in the organisation. 
The SRSC Guidance Notes suggest that the safety 
officer should be an ex-officio member of the safety 
committee and Beaumont et ala also make this point. 
This is the case in the Local Authority where safety 
officers attend all the lower tier safety committees 
as well as the upper tier ones and are often asked 
for advice as well as for a report on accident statis-
tics in their department. 
A point was made to the researcher by two of the 
safety officers in the study with regard to their role 
in connection with safety committee. They see their 
role as important but, especially in a department 
where there are several lower tier committees, it is 
also very time-consuming. Travelling some miles from 
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the city is often involved, and this may be one 
reason why meetings are held three-monthly rather 
than month ly . 
(c) Employee representation 
Kochan et al. suggest that representatives should 
be selected on the basis of technical expertise, they 
should be highly motivated and they suggest that 
younger workers may be best to fill this role. 
However, in the present study, safety representatives 
were not selected in this way. 41% were shop 
stewards and as a result of this became safety repre-
sentatives, 20% were apPointed and 18% were elected 
by their trade union. 
Beaumont et al. say that management were 
initially apprehensive about the use of a single trade 
union channel of communication although employee 
representatives emphasised its importance. One 
quotation that illustrates th s management view comes 
from a senior manager in one department of the Local 
Authority who thought that safety committees can be 
"valuable, useful and constructive": 
"If safety representatives are genuine and 
have no axe to grind, all is well, but the 
occasional safety representative is militant, 
out to get at management, and raises petty 
issues. " 
6. Feedback 
Beaumont et al. found that in effective safety committees, 
in general, representation on the committee operated most 
smoothly through established trade union channels. In a number 
of the workplaces they looked at, employee representatives were 
able to have both informal and formal meetings with their members 
to build up a two-way flow of communication. However, the main 
method of telling the workforce about safety committee dealings 
was posting minutes on notice boards which is one-way and rather 
passive communication. 
Kochan et al. also mention the importance of feedback to 
members to encourage the involvement of the rank and file in 
committee actions. Trade union meetings are one possible channel 
of communication however Kochan et al. make the valid point that 
only a small minority of the workforce attend these, so they 
suggest the use of notice boards and perhaps a trade union news-
paper in addition. 
In the Local Authority the same points apply - only a minority 
will attend trade union meetings, so minutes posted on notice boards 
or circulated among and between committees playa vital part in 
keeping the workforce up-to-date with safety committee activities. 
It is suggested that keeping the workforce informed about 
safety committee interactions is one aspect which, along with other 
methods, can be instrumental in changing attitudes to health and 
safety in the workforce and developing positive attitudes partly as 
a result of seeing that; 
1. senior management is involved in safety committees; 
2. recommendations are follow up; 
3. items are attended to with the minimum of delay. 
Feedback to the workforce from the safety committee is important 
but at the same time so is communication to the safety committee 
from the workforce. Kochan et al. state that an effective safety 
committee should receive a high number of suggestions from the 
workforce in order to maintain its function of joint problem-
solving of health and safety issues. They found that the rank and 
file was relatively active in using its safety representatives and 
safety committees to channel complaints and problems. 
Stevenson (1980) suggests that at each safety committee 
meeting there should be a review of its performance record as a 
major item on the agenda. This would concentrate attention on 
any projects where progress is unsatisfactory and emphasise the 
fact that the committee should not just report the existence of 
problems but also have a degree of responsibility for resolving 
them. Although the committee may have to depend on others 
actually to implement solutions, it must continue to exercise an 
influence until these are achieved. This feedback is to some 
extent covered by the agenda item regarding previous minutes 
which was described above. 
Stevenson states that the safety committee depends on a steady 
supply of facts, information and ideas about health and safety and 
maintains that the outcome of its decisions, actions or recommen-
dations must be reported to it as feedback which should stimulate 
it to greater or better efforts. 
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In order to be an effective aid to the organisation, the 
safety committee should be provided with actual experience, be 
recognised as a lagent for change ' by all employees, encouraged 
to tackle problems and be supported in the implementation of its 
solutions by both management and trade unions. 
7. Training 
Beaumont et ale (1982) found considerable variation in the 
extent and nature of health and safety training that members of the 
various safety committees being studied had received. They 
contrasted the length of health and safety training received by 
management (one to two days) with that received by safety 
representatives (ten days). 
The HSE Manufacturing and Service Industries report for 1976 
makes this point in para. 31: 
" ... inspectors feel that~ in most cases~ the trade union 
representatives could become much better informed about 
matters of health and safety than their supervisors and 
middle mana(] em en t. " 
Leopold (1981) describes the rapid expansion of training of 
trade union representatives, but states that courses for management 
tend to be only one or two day affairs and it is senior management 
who are most likely to attend. A similar point was made by 
the researcher in the present study in Chapter Seven with regard 
to the fact that management representatives may be at a disadvantage 
compared with safety representatives in interactions requiring 
know' edge of hea 1 th and sa fety . 
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The two day course for supervisors at the Local Authority 
was attended by the researcher as an observer. A large 
proportion of time was spent on the legal responsibilities of 
the supervisor. Although legal aspects are also included in 
the Tue safety representatives course, other more practical 
skills are also given a good share of the available time. 
Examples of these are: hazard spotting skills, technical skills 
such as sampling the environment, and accident investigation 
skills. Although supervisors may have less training than 
safety representatives, this may be more than compensated for by 
the advantage the supervisors hold because of their authority 
over subordinates. 
The safety policy of each organisation should include a 
stated intention to provide safety training at all levels in the 
organisation, and this point has been emphasised by Kochan et ale 
(1977). They say it is important for management to develop and 
implement a comprehensive management safety training programme 
for supervisors and for individual employees which can indicate 
management's commitment to health and safety. Kochan et al. 
consider that as well as technical information concerning proper 
safety practices being given, workers should be motivated to avoid 
unsafe procedures or careless acts. 
In the Local Authority the number of members of safety 
committees who had received safety training varied, however overall, 
there seemed to be a favourable attitude towards safety training 
for all levels of the workforce, and training was a standing item 
on the agenda of some safety committees. 
Having a trained membership should increase the effectiveness 
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of a safety committee as a fuller appreciation of problems is 
possible and hopefully better solutions may be found. Training 
should also have the effect of instilling safety consciousness 
in trainees and motivating them to put effort into improving the 
work environment. 
8. The importance of commitment 
Another important determinant of safety committee effective-
ness identified by Beaumont et ala is that all members of the 
committee must be committed to the objective of improving health 
and safety in the organisation and must see the committee as 
contributing to this end. Beaumont et ala suggest that without 
this commitment to health and safety, the committee could be used 
by both trade unions and management to pursue ends other than 
health and safety ones. An indication of this commitment is, 
according to Beaumont et ala regularity of attendance at meetings. 
The commitment of senior management is seen as important as it 
sets the climate for others lower down the organisation. 
Kochan et ala in the United States identify the degree of 
commitment of top management to improved health and safety 
conditions as a major variable which determines the effectiveness 
of union-management safety committees. They say that this commit-
ment is needed to set the standard throughout the organisation and 
to activate the desired behaviour by lower level management 
personnel, for example first-line supervisors. Because supervisors 
usually work in close proximity with the workers they supervise, 
they can set a personal example in working safely. 
A committed senior management is important to develop positive 
attitudes to working safely and following procedures in the entire 
workforce. If senior management can be seen to have this 
commitment, trade unions may be encouraged to engage in problem-
solving activity and to avoid having the union to rely on 
negotiating or other types of pressure strategies. 
Management must develop a major organisational commitment 
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to improving health and safety conditions and develop policies 
which implement this commitment. They must develop a written 
set of policies and procedures that outline the organisation's 
approach to safety and reporting and evaluation procedures. 
These policies should be readily available to all employees. 
The policy should include the setting of standards and the 
monitoring and self-regulation of these standards within the 
organisation. 
There must also be some assignment of health and safety 
responsibility to a specialised management representative who 
is delegated sufficient decision-making authority to deal with 
problems that arise. 
Kochan et al. (1977) suggest that a joint union-management 
safety committee is only one component of a broad management 
programme in this area. External pressures on management and 
trade unions may provide the stimulus for formulation of a joint 
safety committee, but the organisational policies of the trade 
unions and the employers are at least as critical ln determining 
the ultimate effectiveness of these joint efforts. However, 
the safety committee is one mechanism for joint monitoring by 
management and employees, through their trade union representatives, 
of safety pe rfo nnance. 
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The safety committee is one forum where the commitment of 
senior management to health and safety can be expressed, both 
in the course of interactions around the table, and in a concrete 
way, in their willingness to spend resources, both in time and 
money, on health and safety issues. 
Time is a valuable resource which can be used in the form of 
managers taking time off to chair safety committees personally, 
and in the form of allowing other employees time off to attend 
meetings or to go on necessary training courses or carry out 
inspections, etc. Examples of financial resources to be spent 
are the provision of protective clothing and equipment which is 
not just adequate or to comply with the law, but is the best for 
the circumstances in question, and also the money needed to make 
any necessary improvements which may have been highlighted by 
safety representatives or their constituents. 
In the present study, it was hypothesised that there may 
be a difference between the perceptions of senior management 
commitment by safety representatives who are members of safety 
committees and those who are not members. This hypothesis 
was generated by the suggestion that safety representatives who 
are members of safety committees, especially those chaired by 
senior managers, might be impressed by their apparent commitment 
to health and safety. Those who are members of safety committees 
also have more first hand experience of management's willingness 
to spend money on maintaining a safe working environment and to 
making improvements. Also the time-scale and system of priorities 
used to attend to issues discussed in the committee may, if 
regarded as favourable by safety representatives, colour their 
perception of the degree of senior management commitment to hecltr, 
ancs2fe't\. 
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Closer personal contact with senior management through safety 
committee membership may make enough of an impression on safety 
representatives to affect those representatives' opinions of the 
degree of commitment of senior management. That is, the repre-
sentatives who are members of safety committees have more information 
on which to base their judgement about management's commitment. 
In the survey both safety representatives who belonged to 
safety committees and those who were not members were asked the 
question in Table 9.2. 
TABLE 9.2 Differences Between the Perceived Degree of Management 
Commitment to Health and Safety of Members/Non-Members 
of Safety Committees 
liTo what extent to you feel that senior management is 
committed to creating and maintaining safe working 
conditions in the department?" 
Degree of management 
commitment to Members of Non-members of 
health and safety Safety Committees Safety Committees 
N ( %) N (%) 
Slightly conmi tted 14 35 4 17 
Strong ly committed 15 38 14 61 
Very strongly corrrnitted 11 28 5 22 
N=40 N=23 
A Chi-squared test showed no statistically significant differ-
ence between the two groups of safety representatives. So, on the 
basis of this result, there does not appear to be any significant 
effect on safety representatives' perception of management commit-
ment associated with their membership of a safety committee. 
Having personal contact with members of senior management through 
safety committees does not appear to affect representatives' 
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perceptions of their commitment. 
The subject of the perceived degree of senior management 
commitment to health and safety was fully discussed in the 
chapter on safety representatives. Results obtained from 
questionnaires in the Local Authority were discussed and 
compared with those of Kochan et a1. in the USA. An examina-
tion was also made of safety representatives' and supervisors' 
responses to many questions and it was found that these were 
remarkably similar. (It is not proposed to repeat here the 
analysis given in Chapter Seven). 
9. The ability to get things done 
The IRS Health and Safety Bulletin (Nov. 1978) states that the 
only worthwhile measure for the success of a safety committee is 
whether it sets things done. There is a link between this capacity 
and the level of seniority of management who belong to the safety 
committee - if they have no authority vested in them, the resulting 
lack of action will result in the failure of the safety committee. 
The article continues by saying that safety committees must 
not have a purely reactive function, only taking action after an 
accident or dangerous occurrence has taken place. This may lead 
to the situation in organisations where the safety committee is 
described as a 'talking shop' which makes no real contribution 
towards the improvement of safety performance. 
The GMWU safety representatives' handbook (1978) also states 
that the safety corrrnittee can be a 'talking shop' where scfet)· 
representatives and management may air safety issues but nothing 
gets done and time is wast~d. 
Lewis (1977), in describing safety committees, maintains: 
'~ecause many committees lacked real responsibility and 
authority~ they ~ere not as successfUl as was hoped; as 
purely consultat~ve bodies they tended to degenerate 
quickly into mere talking shops." 
Beaumont et ale (1982) state that 79% of the respondents in 
their study judged the aims of the committee in terms of what it 
was goi ng to do. Some of their respondents replied that the 
committee should not just react to events but should try to 
foresee developments and initiate action or policies to deal 
wi th them. 
In the present study, the Assistant Divisional Officer of 
NUPE, one of the main trade unions represented in the Local 
Authority, said that safety committees are used as an excuse for 
delay and are talking shops. In his opinion, safety representa-
tives and departmental management should settle everyday matters 
between them, whereas what actually happens is that issues are 
'kicked upstairs' to the safety committee and delay occurs. The 
Di rectors and the safety offi cer can say "we wi 11 have to go back 
to the safety committee about that." 
The other side or viewpoint of this issue about potential 
delay came from the Chief Engineer of one department who had 
favourable attitudes towards safety committees, but said that the 
problem could be that safety representatives expect things to be 
done at once. He said that sometimes safety representatives do 
')--
.-, : 
not raise the point about work which was recommended by the safety 
committee not being done until the next departmental safety 
committee. He said that these complaints about work not being 
done should be followed up before the next three-monthly meeting. 
However it appears that in most cases this does happen - it is 
only occasionally that safety representatives delay until the next 
upper tier meeting. 
The General Manager of one department stated that in his 
experience safety committees are good and safety representatives 
are reporting defects which, on the whole, are being put right 
quicker than they would have been had there been no safety 
representatives. He said that sometimes it has to be explained 
to safety representatives that things cannot always be put right 
at once. 
These problems over the progressing of work to be carried out 
seem to indicate the need to set up an agreed system of priorities 
and a specific time limit associated with each item for attention. 
The Depute Director of another department said that the safety 
committee is a good thing, encouraging co-operation between trade 
unions and management, but it can sometimes become a bit of a 
talking shop as it has no executive authority and so it can only 
recommend actions. To overcome this tendency, sub-groups or 
working parties have been set up to examine specific problems and 
actively to contribute solutions and initiate actions. 
A dynamic committee could have a more creative role, for 
example the initiation of safety rules or the writing of the 
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safety policy. This would be a creative role rather than the 
'policing' role of reviewing and monitoring compliance with a 
safety policy or set of rules which has been developed by 
management. The workforce are more likely to accept and conform 
to rules and practices if their representatives have played some 
part in their development rather than feeling that they have been 
imposed on them from above. If both management and trade unions 
have had an input into setting out safety rules, then neither side's 
values will be threatened and compliance will result in less 
cognitive dissonance than if rules were laid down only on the 
basis of reinforcing management's attitudes and values. This 
point is made in Chapter Ten in the discussion of the work of 
Gouldner (l954). 
In the present study, with regard to the point about getting 
things done, respondents to both the safety representative and 
the supervisor questionnaires were asked to give their reaction 
to a statement concerning this criticism regarding delay levelled 
at safety committees. 
Note: An important point with regard to these two samples when 
making any comparison between them is that in the case of the 
safety representatives, only those who were members of a safety 
committee were asked this question about delay in taking action, 
- 44 ina 11 . In the case of the supervisors where very few were 
members of a safety committee (12 out of 88), the entire sample 
were asked the question. This means that the safety representatives 
can use personal experience on which to base their judgement, 
whereas the supervisors may be responding on a more theoretical 
basis although personal experience within their own departments 
with regard to the time take~ to make improvements will also be 
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important. This personal experience of safety committees, or 
lack of it, may account to some extent for the difference found 
between safety representatives' and supervisors' perceptions. 
It was hypothesised that supervisors may be inclined to defend 
the position of management by disagreeing with the proposition that 
management use safety committees as a way to delay taking action. 
Safety representatives may be less inclined to defend management. 
TABLE 9.3 Reactions to a Statement sug~esting that Management 
use Safety Committees as an xcuse to Delay Taking 
"Action 
"Can you indicate your reaction to the following statenent: 
'Safety committees provide an excuse for management 
to delay action on health and safety issues'." 
Sa fety Representa ti ves Supe rvi so rs 
N (%) N (%) 
Strongly agree 2 5) 3 5) 
Agree 6 16) 21% 1 2) 7% ) ) 
Disagree 21 57) 43 69) 
Strongly disagree 8 22) 79% 15 24) 93% ) ) 
N=37 N=62 
A Chi-squared test showed no statistically significant difference 
between the two groups. It can be seen that a large majority of 
each group, especially in the case of supervisors (93%), disagree 
with the statement that safety committees give management an excuse 
to delay action on health and safety issues. A small nucleus of 
safety representatives (23%) do see safety committees as being used 
by management to delay taking action, however delay as a criticism 
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of safety committees is not strongly supported by either safety 
representati ves or supervi sors. 
When the safety representatives who were members of safety 
committees were asked in an open-ended question for any further 
views on the functioning of the committees. There were fourteen 
replies, six of which concerned delay or lack of action, for 
example: 
"Managemen t say the items are in hand and think this 
means th e 'Work is done." 
"It takes too 'long to carry out recorrorzendations." 
"Safety corronittees are vital but in the case of 
Government-run industry~ action is pathetically 
s'lo'W in being imp'lemented as there are too many 
departments to go through." 
The latter comment describes very well the typical bureaucratic 
organisation of which a local authority is a good example. Two 
other comments concerned lack of money to carry out improvements. 
For example: 
"The safety committee deal 'With some things but 
cost may mean they are overlooked." 
'~t nearly all meetings~ management say that they 
have not got enough money. " 
However, some comments were favourable coocerning action being taker .. 
For example: 
"The safety committee he lps to bring conditions up-
to-date and get management to act on the issues 
concerned. " 
10. Following up recommendations 
An important function of safety committees is that of making 
recommendations to management with regard to necessary changes, 
improvements, maintenance or repairs necessary in the work 
environment. Other areas may involve training and the policies 
and practices of the organisation with regard to health and 
safety. 
Although the safety committee exists in an advisory capacity, 
it will become totally ineffective if the recommendations it makes 
to management are ignored with items not being progressed and 
recommendations never carried out. This would seem to be not 
only a recipe for the creation of apathy at all levels in the 
organisation, but also a waste of the opportunity for the 
co-operation and joint problem-solving envisaged by Robens. 
The time taken to follow up recommendations made by the 
safety committee can also indicate the amount of management 
commitment. Where items continually appear on the agenda of 
meetings and have not been attended to, it would suggest that 
management are not as strongly motivated to get things done as 
they might be. 
The question asked of 86 safety representatives who were 
members of safety committees regarding recommendations made, 
was discussed very briefly in the chapter on safety representatives 
and is considered in more detail below. 
TABLE 9.4 Follow-up of Recommendations made by Safety Committees 
"00 you feel that recommendations and points discussed by 
the safety comni ttee are fo 11 ow up? II 
N (%) 
(a) always? 12 28 
(b) often? 16 36 
(c) fai rly often? 16 36 
(d) never? 
N=44 
Only 28% of the safety representatives felt that points were 
'always' ~ollowed up with 36% stating that they are 'often followed 
Upl. This leaves more than 1 in 3 safety representatives with the 
opinion that points are only followed up 'fairly often I • 
Each safety committee meeting starts off by discussing matters 
arising from the minutes of the previous meeting so that unresolved 
issues cannot slip the net because they are discussed until satis-
factorily dealt with. This procedure of discussing previous 
minutes seems to work well as on average, items arose only once or 
twice before being resolved. 
One way of cross-checking how often points are followed up is 
to exami ne the resul ts of another ques ti on to safety representati ves 
which asked for the last major recommendation made by the safEty 
committee and what action was taken on it. Before looking at the 
first part of the question, the second part, answered by 23 safety 
representatives, can be examined to see if it backs up the results 
already described regarding frequency of follow-up. The question 
asked what action was taken on the last major recommendation made by 
/0' 
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the safety committee and the results were categoriesed into three 
classes. 
TABEL 9.5 Action Taken on Recommendations Made by Safety Committees 
% 
(a) action taken 86 
(b) action pending 5 
(c) no action 9 
N = 23 
This result indicates a very high level of follow-up on issues 
discussed and recommendations made at safety committees. 
There are two reasons why results may indicate a higher follow-
up rate in the question asking for specific recommendations than in 
the question asking in general terms how often recommendations are 
followed up. This could be described as the difference between an 
open-ended question as opposed to a forced-choice question and as a 
specific rather than a general question. 
Being asked to think of an actual incidence, that is the last 
major recommendation made by the safety committee and how it was 
acted upon, is more exact than a general impression of the follow-up 
of items which has to fit into pre-set specific categories, that is 
'always, often, fairly often, never ' . This general as opposed to 
specific format may account for the discrepancy between answers to 
the two questions described abcve, that is, both could be true. 
Another possible reason for this difference is that the more 
general question concerns only 'recommendations and point discussed 
by the safety committee' whereas the other question asked 'for the 
last major recommendation made by the safety committee'. 
It may be that the major recommendations are indeed the ones 
which have a high follow-up rate and the more 'minor' issues are 
the ones which suffer from delay and therefore contribute to the 
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lower percentages of follow-up in the more general question. 
11. Type of issues discussed 
Beaumont et al. (1982) note the importance of the right sort of 
issue being discussed at safety committee meetings if the committee 
is to be effective. They say that the committee should not have 
to deal with every single health and safety issue that arises on 
crucial, long-term policy issues. They found that in the vast 
majority of the plants in their study there was a procedure to 
deal with day-to-day issues except in low accident rate industries 
where so few issues arose that the committee could deal with them. 
One safety representative in the present study backed up this 
point: 
"Safe~b corrmittees car. be bene!':c--:aZ bu-'; should nc: be 
the p~ace tc hctlJe probZems resoZved as the sa,-"ftt; 
representative had adequate procedures to er£ure 
problems are resolved." 
The General Manager of one department said: 
, .,' ~ 1--~' , +-"'" 
'Unfortunately s~a~l ~tgr.8 tena TC ~~ C~8cussec ravne~ 
- l" ~"l ".L'." tliar.. po ~c~es ar-a pnnc~p es 0,- sa.1 e~-, . 
The Director of another department said that: 
"The important issues are not always disc:ussed but the 
aommittees do bring hazards to the notice of managers. " 
Before moving on, it is important to discuss the interpreta-
tion of the word 'major l in the question described above. It 
was deliberate policy not to give examples of what the researcher 
considered to be Imajor l issues, that is, it was thought to be 
important not to impose the researcher's values on the respondents. 
When safety representatives were asked to give an example of 
the last major recommendation made by the safety committee, the 
24 answers were categorised and the results are shown in Table 9.6. 
TABLE 9.6 Last Major Recommendation Made by Safety Committees 
Types of Issues 
Safety issues 
Health issues 
Pro tecti ve c 1 othi ng 
Training issues 
Administration 
issues 
No. 
12 
5 
4 
2 
1 
Examples 
Lifting of manhole 
covers. Fire pre-
cauti ons 
Asbestos on pipes. 
Dust inhalation at 
a quarry 
Types of industrial 
glass tested. Wearing 
of safety gear at all 
times 
Training issues to be 
set up, e.g. use of 
STOP/GO boards 
Head Office is taking 
too long to attend to 
safety matters 
Table 9.6 indicates the range of recommendations considered 
W be Imajor l and it is suggested that as the various respondents 
carry out different types of work under different circumstances 
and within different environments, some things will be more salient 
w them than others. 
To continue on this theme of the individual classifications 
of issues, the safety representatives were asked if the safety 
committee to which they belonged discussed important issues and/or 
trivial points. The responses are shown in Table 9.7. 
TABLE 9.7 Type of Issues Discussed by Safety Committees 
Important issues 
Trivial issues 
Both important 
and trivial issues 
N (%) 
18 
2 
20 
N=40 
45 
5 
50 
From these results it can be seen that a mere 5% of respondents 
considered that the safety committee discusses only trivial points, 
the remainder being nearly equally divided into those who feel that 
both important and trivial issues are discussed and those who feel 
that only important issues are raised. 
An attempt was made to cross-check this by examining the 
minutes of safety committees using the classifications given below 
and compared with those of the researcher. The results of this 
can be seen 1 ater. 
The safety representatives were also asked to give examples 
of important and trivial issues. 
given in Tables 9.8 and 9.9. 
The subsequent issues are 
Before receiving replies to the questionnaires, the researcher 
analysed copies of the minutes of safety committees from the four 
departments concerned. Items which were discussed at safety 
committee meetings were classified under two main headings, 
important and trivial, and the equivalent safety representative 
examples obtained from the questionnaires are shown alongside 
them in Tables 9.8 and 9.9. 
Issues appearing in the sample of safety committee minutes 
were categorised by the researcher using the two major categories 
of 'important issues' and 'trivial issues'. Within each of these 
categories, items were further classified into four 'important' 
categories: training, safety policy, safe working procedures and 
health hazards; and into three 'trivial' categories: protective 
clothing and equipment, housekeeping items and routine safety items. 
This classification is admittedly somewhat arbitrary, however on 
the whole the 'important' issues are those which may be expected 
to be discussed at higher tier meetings. The 'trivial I issues 
are everyday items which might be discussed at lower tier meetings. 
However, it is still useful to use these categories as a comparison 
with those emerging fro~ the issues identified as important anc 
trivial by the safety representatives, to see if there is some 
similarity between the interpretations of 'important' and 'trivial I 
made by the researcher and the safety representatives. 
TABLE 9.8 Important Issues as Described by the Researcher and 
by the Safety Representatives 
Researcher's categories Safety Representatives' 
categories 
Training Training items 
Safety po 1 i cy 
Safe working procedures Procedural items 
Health hazards Health items 
Sa fety items 
TABLE 9.9 Trivial Issues as Described by the Researcher and 
by the Safety Representatives 
Researcher's categories 
Protective clothing & 
equipment 
Housekeeping items 
Routine safety items 
Safety Representatives' 
categories 
Personal protection 
Facilities 
General safety items 
Maintenance 
Note: This is not to imply that, for example, the researcher 
considers the provision and use of protective clothing 
as trivial or unimportant, merely that it is an item 
one would expect to be settled either outwith safety 
committees or at lower tier committees. 
The main difference between the two categorisations is the 
lack of mention by the safety representatives of the safety policy 
as an issue discussed by the committee although there is mention 
of it in the minutes. There is also an additional safety represen-
tative category of 'maintenance'. 
It can be seen that there is a general consensus of opinion 
between the researcher and the respondents as to what constitute 
important issues and trivial items. This consensus is important 
as it indicates that the safety representatives have interpreted 
the question in the way that the researcher anticipated in spite 
of the fact that examples were deliberately not given. By not 
giving examples, but by asking respondents to provide their own, 
some interesting and useful information can be elicited which can 
then be compared to the factual evidence of the committee minutes. 
As the Drainage and Highways Departmental Safety Committees 
meet infrequently, it was decided to look at the ratio of important 
issues to trivial points in the lower tier safety committees in 
these two departments. A comparison was then made with the same 
type of analysis carried out on minutes of the upper tier safety 
committees of the Transport Department and the Water Supply Services. 
Observation also was used to collect data in these safety committees. 
This analysis is based on a sample of safety committee minutes 
collected over a period of from a year to 18 months depending on 
the availability to the researcher of the necessary copies of 
minutes. 1980-81 was the time period concerned. 
Note: The results gained from this analysis were used to cross-
check the data obtained from the questionnaires, and are 
not intended to be an authoritative collection of statistical 
data. Some degree of subjectivity is involved in classifying 
items into categories, and, although it is hoped that the 
minutes analysed were representative of the usual format of 
meetings, this cannot be assured. (See the effect of 
observer bias and the Hawthorne Effect for example). 
The researcher observed at least three safety committee 
meetings in each of the four departments and checked her 
notes made during the meetings with the minutes when they 
were issued. These showed the minutes to be an accurate 
account of the proceedings. 
The original philosophy behind the two-tier system of safety 
committees in the Local Authority was that different types of 
items would be discussed on different tiers as described above. 
From observation at both higher and lower tier committee 
meetings it was found that local issues (roughly corresponding to 
'trivial' items) were discussed at lower tier meetings, and policy 
issues (roughly corresponding to 'important' items) at higher tier 
meetings. 
Therefore it was hypothesised before carrying out the analysis 
that a difference would be found in the ratios of 'important' to 
'trivial' items discussed by upper and lower tier safety committees. 
It was expected that a higher proportion of the items discussed 
would be included in the 'trivial' category in the lower tier 
committees of the Highways and Drainage Departments than in the 
higher tier committees of the Transport and Water Supply Services 
where most of these items should have been satisfactorily dealt 
with in lower level sub-regional committees, so leaving more time 
to deal with issues such as training and safety policies and 
procedures. 
The minutes used for the analysis were carefully read through 
and the items discussed were classified by the researcher into the 
'important' and 'trivial' categories set up by the researcher on 
the basis described above. A ratio of important to trivial items 
was drawn up for each set of minutes and then an overall average 
found for each department as the number of sets of minutes varied 
slightly. This average was then reduced further to show how many 
trivial items were discussed to each important issue. The results 
can be seen in Table 9.10. 
TABLE 9.10 AVERAGE RATIOS - TRIVIAL:IMPORTANT ISSUES IN HIGHER 
AND LOWER TIER SAFETy COMMITTEES 
Department Tier (Hi gher/Lower) Ratio (Trivia1:Important) 
Transport Hi gher 1 .8: 1 
Water Supply Services Hi gher 1 .3: 1 
Highways Lower 7: 1 
Drainage Lower 1 .4: 1 
These results require some discussion. In the two higher 
tier committees the number of trivial points discused at the Water 
Supply Services is overall not much greater than the number of 
important issues. The higher ratio in the Transport Department 
may result from the practice at the upper tier committee of going 
round the table to allow each safety representative in turn to 
comment on the situation in his workplace. This is not the case 
in the Water Supply Services, although if safety representatives 
wish to contribute they can, and indeed do so. The fact that each 
safety representative is given a turn to speak may mean that 
occasionally a point which should have been dealt with at a lower 
committee ;s raised. In these cases the Chairman usually makes 
some comment to this effect. Overall, however, it appeared to 
the observer that on the whole the practice of encouraging safety 
representatives to speak ;n turn was a good one, as the atmosphere 
29C 
at meetings, although closely controlled by the chairman, was 
relaxed and safety representatives were not reluctant to make their 
views heard. 
The Highways Department figure does seem higher than anti-
cipated but it may be inappropriate to compare it directly with 
that of the other lower tier committee in the Drainage Department 
for reasons that are given below. Another point to bear in mind 
here is that over a particular period of time, certain problems 
may be extensively discussed at successive safety committee 
meetings and then, once resolved, may then be omitted for a while 
at least. For example, at the sub-regional safety committee 
meeting observed by the researcher there had been testing of various 
items of protective clothing, particularly gloves, and the results 
of these tests were discussed at length. These are the type of 
items which then increase the balance of the side of 'trivial' 
points. when protective clothing and equipment ;s included. 
However, the higher proportion of 'trivial' items discussed at this 
lower level safety committee does support the hypothesis stated 
above that more trivial items would be discussed at lower tier 
meetings. 
The results from the Drainage Department safety committee are 
interesting (1.4:1) because they reflect some of the unique factors 
with regard to the hazards to be found in this department. Both 
the safety representatives who replied to the relevant question and 
the researcher included health hazards in the list of 'important' 
issues. The Drainage Department has many of these hazards such as 
gases in sewers, the risk of diseases such as typhoid, polio and, 
more rarely, leprospirosis against which certain of their employees 
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must receive regular innoculations and which make washing facilities 
even more important than usual. These health issues are often 
discussed at the sub-regional meetings as the upper tier safety 
committee meets so rarely. Thus, it can be seen that these health 
items, which are unique to this department, have had the effect of 
heavily weighting the ratio in favour of 'important ' issues. In 
this way the lower tier committee in the Drainage Department is in 
effect being operated as the equivalent to a higher tier one 
elsewhere. This may mean that the ratio of 7:1 trivial to 
important issues discussed in meetings in the Highways Department 
is the 'typical I figure for a lower tier committee and so should 
not be directly compared with the 'untypical I Drainage Department. 
The types of issue discussed varies between departments and between 
committees. As Beaumont et al. (1982) state, the accident rate 
(or in the case of the Drainage Department the existence or the 
severity of the potential hazards) have been shown to have an 
effect on the type of issues discussed. Perhaps the Highways 
Department, having fewer hazards, has more time for the lower level 
committees to discuss items such as protective equipment. So the 
hypothesis about a higher proportion of trivial items being 
discussed at lower tier committees has been partially supported. 
The type of issue discussed can indeed affect the effectiveness 
of the safety committee, but hard and fast rules cannot always be 
drawn regarding what should not be discussed. In some cases, what 
have been classified as trivial items should be discussed as the 
safety committee (especially if the upper level committees meet 
infrequently) is an important forum - providing an opportunity for 
safety representatives to air certain issues. Provided that the 
major important issues such as policies and procedures and training 
are also being regularly discussed, and that the proportion of 
trivial to important issues is not too high, then a safety committee 
can be effective if both types of issues are dealt with. 
9.7 The Management/Trade Union Relationship - The Effects of 
Being a Member of a Safety Committee 
The safety representatives in the Local Authority study were 
asked if they had ever been consulted on specific issues and the 
results were discussed in Chapter Seven. 
It was hypothesised that those safety representatives who are 
members of a consultative style safety committee may perceive 
themselves as consulted by management more often than those who do 
not personally come into contact with the more senior levels of 
management because they do not belong to safety committees. The 
safety representatives who answered the question were divided into 
two groups and the results can be seen in Table 9.11. 
TABLE 9.11 Consultation by Management Reported by Safety Representatives 
IIHave you even been consul ted by 
managemen t on: 
(a) re-writing the safety policy? 
(b) devising safe systems of work? 
(c) motivating the workforce?" 
Members of a 
Safety Committee Not members 
Yes No Yes No 
10 29 6 15 
18 21 8 13 
7 32 7 14 
N=39 N=21 
However, when the safety representative respondents were 
divided into two groups in this way and Chi-squared tests carried 
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out to test for differences, there were found to be no statistically 
significant differences between the two groups. Belonging to a 
safety committee did not make it any more likely that these safety 
representatives would report that management had consulted them on 
the issues identified above. 
Observation at safety committee meetings showed that draft 
safety policy documents were circulated to members for comment but 
it was always announced that they would be sent to aLL safety 
representatives - this meant that there would be no different 
treatment accorded to those who did or who did not belong to safety 
committees when management were consulting with safety representatives. 
Safety representatives were asked to read the material that was 
distributed and encouraged to make suggestions for improvements or 
alterations. 
When later checking with safety officers or the safety adviser 
to whom replies were to be sent, the researcher was told that only 
in a few exceptional cases was any feedback given on these documents. 
If safety representatives were not using this opportunity to provide 
input into the writing of the safety policy, management may be 
less inclined to consult them on other issues. This may account 
for the relatively low percentage of safety representatives who 
reported being consulted by management (described in Chapter Seven) 
which are again illustrated in Table 9.12. 
TABLE 9. 12 Consultation b 
e resentat1ves 
"Have you ever been consul ted by Yes (%) No (%) 
management on: 
(a) re-writing of the departmental 
safety policy? 27 73 
(b) devising safe systems of work? 43 57 
(c) how to motivate the workforce?" 23 77 
N=60 
According to the Robens Report and the SRSC Regulations the 
safety committee's main function is a co-operative one with consul-
tation emphasised rather than negotiation, which may take place 
elsewhere. As a result, it is hypothesised that safety represen-
tatives who belong to safety committees are more likely to see 
their relationship with management as consultative. 
In the safety representative questionnaire, respondents were 
asked if they saw their relationship with management as consultative, 
negotiating or a mixture of both. Definitions were given (see 
Chapter Seven for deta i 1 s) . 
TABLE 9. 13 
Relationship with management 
Consultative 
Negotiating 
A mixture of consultative and 
negotiating 
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with Mana ement b 
Members of 
Safety Committees Non-members 
17 11 
3 0 
20 11 
N=40 N=22 
No statistically significant difference was found between the 
two groups so it would seem that being a member of a safety committee 
does not give a safety representative a different perspective from 
one who is not a member of a committee on his relationship with 
management. 
Another method of eliciting the views of safety representatives 
who are members of safety committees and of supervisors with regard 
to the co-operative opportunities of safety committees, was to ask 
for their reactions to a statement which along with the results can 
be seen in Table 9.14. 
TABLE 9.14 Reactions of safe~h Representatives and Supervisors 
to the Statement tat: 
"Safety committees provide a genuine opportunity for management 
and emp 1 oyees to co-opera te over hea 1 th and safety. II 
Safet~ Representatives 
N (%) 
Supervi sors 
N (%) 
Strong ly agree 15 38 34 40 
Agree 24 60 50 59 
Disagree 1 2 1 1 
Strongly disagree 
N=40 N=85 
A Chi-squared test showed there was no statistically significant 
di fference between these two groups wi th regard to the; r react; on to 
the above statement. The results are remarkably similar over 
the two groups, showing a strong agreement that safety committees 
can provide a situation where there is an opportunity for 
co-operation and suggesting that a consultative relationship or 
strategy would be used. Again the point must be made that the 
safety representative1s sample were all members of safety committees 
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whereas few of the supervisors were members. 
In Chapter Seven it was reported that approximately half of 
both the safety representatives and the supervisors saw the 
management/trade union relationship as consultative and half saw 
the relationship as a mixture of consultation and negotiation. 
However those respondents who saw the management/trade union 
relationship as a mixture of consultation and negotiation would 
not necessarily disagree with the statement in Table 9.14 as the 
consultation element of the relationship suggests co-operation. 
One point to be noted here is that the statement about safety 
committees providing a genuine opportunity for co-operation, is a 
general one and does not refer to the specific situation existing 
in their own workplaces. It has to be admitted however that the 
safety committee in their place of work is almost bound to be used 
as a reference point when the respondents are giving a reaction to 
a statement so their perception of the actual situation in their 
organisation will affect their replies. 
The responses of the safety representatives to the statement 
about co-operation were cross-tabulated against the safety 
representatives' responses regarding their perception of the degree 
of management commitment to health and safety. The sample 
consisted of those safety representatives who are safety committee 
members. It was hypothesised that there would be an association 
between safety representatives expressing strong agreement with the 
statement in Table 9.14 and perceiving senior management as being 
very strongly conmitted to health and safety. 
In this case the data were grouped so that those safety 
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representatives who strongLy agreed with the statement were in one 
category and those who had less strong reactions were in the second 
category. The one individual who answered 'disagree' was omitted 
from the analysis. The results on which a Chi-squared test was 
carried out and a test for trend developed by Armitage can be seen 
in Table 9.15. 
over Healt 
Degree of Senior Management 
Commitment to Health and Safety 
Slightly committed 
Strongly committed 
Very strongly committed 
x2 = 17.83 df = 1 
Strong Reaction 
(strongly agree) 
o 
5 
9 
N=14 
p < 0.005 
Less Strong Reaction 
(agree) 
13 
9 
2 
N=24 
There is a highly significant linear trend which explains virtually 
all the variations in the proportions. 
There is a strong relationship between safety representatives 
feeling strongly that safety committees can be used for co-operation 
and perceiving senior management as very stror~lb comnr:tt~c to health 
and safety. The inverse relationship can also be seen where those 
who do not have particularly strong views or feelings about the 
statement about safety committees who see management as less stro~g~~ 
committed or only sZightZy committed to health and safety. The 
safety representatives' perception of how much senior management 
care about health and safety and how much they are willing to do to 
ensure a safe environment may be associated with their perception 
of the potential for co-operation between those who interact on 
safety committees. However, whether or not the potential for 
co-operation is perceived by respondents will depend on many 
variables and it is too simple to suggest a causal relationship 
between the factors isolated above. 
9.8 Consultation, Negotiation and the Safety Committee 
There has already been a discussion of the industrial 
relations background with regard to the subject area of health and 
safety in Chapter Six. Management/trade union relationships in 
health and safety were examined with particular emphasis on whether 
~is relationship was characterised by consensus or conflict. 
Fox's unitary and pluralist perspectives were described and 
put forward as potential frames of reference within which to 
interpret interactions between, for example, safety representatives 
and supervisors. 
Lewis's models of the consensus view and the conflict view of 
the control of work hazards was shown in diagrammatic form and the 
differences described. 
Critics of the consensus view put forward by the Robens 
Committee include Nichols and Armstrong (1973) and Grayson and 
Goddard (1975) and their views were discussed, in particular 
stressing the inevitable conflict between the many competing calls 
on scarce resources such as money. Improvements in safety 
standards is one of many areas which management must consider wher 
resources are all oca ted. 
Further discussion as to the usefulness or otherwise of a 
distinction between consultation and negotiation can be found in 
the chapter on safety representatives (Chapter Seven). It may 
be that a distinction between consultation and negotiation is 
neither useful, accurate nor desirable. This problem - the 
difference between consultation and negotiation - can be 
illustrated by the three passages below. 
The first was written in 1974 before the SRSC Regulations of 
1977 and refers to early safety committees: 
"Safety corronittees with trade union representatives are 
quite corronon. Their roLe is often mereLy advisory3 so 
that they become a speciaL form of joint consuLtation. 
Unions now want these committees to be strengthened 
either by transforming them into negotiating bodies3 or 
bt:" giving workers' sc:fev~' representc.tives statutory 
authority to make inspections and to order safety measures 
to be impLemented." 
(T. Topham The Organised Worker Arrow 1974, p84) 
The Confederation of British Industry (1970) note the tendency 
for consultation of a purely advisory nature to merge into negotiatioc. 
The CBr in this context, define consultation as "an exhance of 
information and views before action is taken by management." Negot-
i ati on is defi ned as i nvo 1 vi ng "ei ther joi nt agreement or exhaus ti on 
of procedure before ac ti or is taken. II 
The Bullock Committee (1977) note that: 
" ..... it has beer. cus tomaY"'v' tc drQ7..J; a o::s tinction be::_'ccy. 
consuLtation on t!2e O:Y:E: h;~c- an c.- negct'Z'cticr. or C'cZlect:'-:)e. 
bargainina or. the oti:er3 but ir. practice the. c3.iS7::'nc7:'-·cy. 
is b LUTTed ar.3. -6: ere haE beer. a gra:iuc 2 ~Y't?r.~-:: ir. reCC'it 
years t(A;.)ards the fUBion of consuZtative and negotiating 
maohinery. " 
(Dept. of Trade, Report a.f the Committee of Inquiry on 
IndustriaZ Democracy, London, HMSO, Cmnd 6706, 1977) 
A strict dichotomY between the concepts of consultation and 
negotiation may therefore be a false one, and we should perhaps be 
inclined to think of them as points on a continuum of decision-
making between parties rather than as two discrete entities. There 
will then be a good deal of shading in the centre of the continuum 
where some overlap is inevitable and a mixed strategy (such as that 
described by Kochan et ale (1977) and in the present study) will be 
used. There may be a theoretical distinction between the two 
concepts, but in the case of practical application, for example in 
discussions between safety representatives and supervisors this 
distinction may no longer exist. 
Three further sources show the difficulty of making the 
distinction between consultation and negotiation. 
The Industrial Relations Code of Practice (1972) regarded 
consultation and negotiation as "closely related but distinct 
processes" although some, for example Daniel and McIntosh (1972), 
are now of the opinion that many of the distinctions are inadequate 
for normal operations. 
The eIR 14th Report (1971) recognised that the distinction 
between joint consultation and negotiation was largely meaningless 
in principle and self-defeating in practice. 
The CSI (1966) have found it impossible to differentiate 
between what they describe as "channels of communication 'l . Joint 
consultation includes elements of communication, consultation 
and negoti a ti on. 
Having discussed the difficulties in defining "consultation" 
and "negotiation", in this chapter it is proposed to relate these 
concepts to the operation of safety committees. 
It is impossible to separate out health and safety in the 
organisation and the industrial relations climate which prevails 
there. The individuals interviewed by Beaumont et ale (1982) felt 
that an effective health and safety committee could best operate 
where the overall industrial relations environment is essentially 
a co-operative one. Most people interviewed in Beaumont's study 
felt that a co-operative, problem-solving health and safety 
committee could contribute towards improving overall relationships 
i n th e p 1 ant. 
Beaumont et al. found that both management and trade union 
representatives felt that safety committees provided an opportunity 
for discussion with management which might otherwise be impossible. 
The contact made between the two groups and information exchanged 
led to an increase in the level of trust and understanding between 
them, which in turn led to improved interpersonal relationships 
which spilled over into other areas and could be used to advantage 
on other issues. They had reported that one fifth of the respon-
dents felt that improved relationships was one objective of their 
safety committee so it appears that in many cases, this objective 
;s attained. 
One criticism of safety committees described in the GMWU 
Safety Representa ti ves Handbook states that there; s a danger tr.at 
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safety committees may deflect safety representatives from 
representing their members on health and safety issues through the 
collective bargaining structures and, if they are purely consult-
ative, then management may use safety committees to try to shift 
responsibility for health and safety matters from management alone 
to management and safety representatives jointly resulting in a 
diffusion of responsibility. 
The findings of Kochan et a1. (1977) in the USA with regard 
to the use of negotiating or problem-solving strategies used by 
trade unions and employees have been described in some detail in 
Chapter Seven. 
Some of the senior managers who were interviewed in the Local 
Authority study expressed views describing safety committees as 
consultative bodies where both management and trade unions can 
co-operate to tackle heal th and safety problems. As Kochan et ale 
suggest, this co-operative viewpoint could be the result of the 
legislation which encourages active co-operation and consultation. 
Although it is the United States legislation they refer to, the 
British situation may be similar. The other determinant described 
above is the degree of senior management commitment to health and 
safety which in this study is considerable, judged by factors 
described earlier and which may discourage negotiating strategies, 
that is negotiation is made unnecessary as safety representatives 
do not need to put much pressure on management to get things done. 
As Kochan et ale note, when senior management are committed to 
health and safety and devise policies .to back up this commitment, 
it is not as necessary for trade unions to act assertively to get 
action. Pressure strategies are not as necessary where there ;s a 
committed management, so it is important for management ~ buffer 
safety committees from the collective bargaining process or they 
could become a forum for polarised viewpoints to be aired which may 
result in a fear on the part of management of union harassment. 
Stevens (1979) points out that the HASAWA and SRSC Regulations 
which followed the Robens Report contain provisions for safety 
representatives to consult, but no provision to negotiate or fall-
back mechanisms to operate where negotiation does not take place. 
Clegg (1979) in discussing employee participation in health 
and safety states: 
"General, conditions~ safety and heal,th are perhaps the 
most obvious issues for co-operation between managers 
and empl,oyees in undertakings of al,l, kinds and seem to 
provide much of the stapl,e business of Joint Consul,tative 
Committees where these exist. A number of firms have 
separate joint safety committees to emphasise the common 
concern in avoiding accidents." 
This statement indicates once again the predominantly unitary 
perspective on health and safety to be found in the Robens Report. 
However the TUC and individual trade unions have redefined 
the role of safety representatives so that bargaining is an integral 
part of their activities. Stevens cites the example of British 
Steel which, in a national agreement, set out a clear trade union 
emphasis on negotiating on health and safety issues at both locel 
and national levels. The trade union movement has supportec 
this redefinition with training, information and advice aimed at 
negotiating rather than consulting with employers. Individual 
trade unions also provide a specialised service of ;nformatior. on 
specific risks which strengthens the safety representative role. 
3r ' l.' .... 
Stevens states that despite differences between trade unions, 
their policies on shop stewards as safety representatives and the 
place of health and safety issues in negotiating and disputes 
procedures emphasise the negotiation above the consultative 
function of safety representatives. 
The GMWU Safety Representatives Handbook advises safety 
representatives that they do not need a safety committee, as 
their negotiating authority stems from being a shop steward or 
a safety representative tied into the shop steward bargaining 
structure. However safety committees are useful for long-term 
consultation on such areas as the study of accidents and 
diseases, statistical trends, safety audits, amendments to the 
safety policy, the contents of health and safety training and 
communication on health and safety matters in the workplace. 
Other trade unions are more positive about safety committees 
although they tend to retain the viewpoint that safety committees 
are necessarily primarily a joint consultative exercise useful for 
monitoring health and safety practice and policies without affect-
ing the negotiating position of safety representatives outside 
the committee. In Table 9.1, one trade union source (GMWU) 
did not give the promotion of co-operation between management and 
employees as a safety committee function although it was mentioned 
by four of the other sources. 
Lewis (1974) suggests that safety committees should, as far 
as possible, be geared to the existing negotiating and consulting 
machinery, for example as a sub-committee of a plant or works 
corrrni t tee and the i r cons ti tu ti ons shou 1 d a 11 O~' di s putes to be 
processed through the normal grievance channels. Lewis also 
states that managers should accelerate the merger of negotiation 
and consultation machinery because they must realise that it is 
more important to get the right decisions taken, accepted and imple-
mented than to exercise their prerogative. The trade union 
movement should insist that safety like any other subject is a fit 
one for negotiation. Collective bargaining not only raises the 
status of safety, but may also constitute a more effective form of 
participation than any of the schemes formally given that name. 
The TGWU Safety Representatives 'Handbook states that the 
more important day-to-day handling of health and safety issues will 
best be done by safety representatives using their functions. 
Safety committees are best used to consider long term issues and 
carrying out work such as monitoring the overall health and safety 
statistics and finance programme that an individual safety repres-
entative would find difficult to do effectively. 
Stevens points out that substantial commitment of the trade 
union movement to the safety representative system and their 
adoption of a negotiating role (not Robens-style co-operation via 
consultation) indicates the movement's determination to make 
local/plant level bargaining on health and safety issues of 
prima ry i mpo rtance. 
It appears that there may be scope for both consultation and 
negotiation on health and safety issues at workplace level through 
joint safety agreements. Issues to be included can be discussed 
and some compromise may be needed before the agreement is drawn up. 
Then issues discussed at the safety committee can be dealt with 
within a framework of procedures which have been negotiated, 
leaving the safety committee free to consult upon problems arising 
in the workclacE. 
Lewis states that legislation can only prescribe a minimum 
standard if it is to apply to most of the establishments it 
covers. Agreements between managements and trade unions can 
help to ensure that statutory requirements are adhered to and 
can provide facilities above the legal minimum. 
Glendon (1977) in an article written before the implementation 
of the SRSC Regulations (1977) states that a jointly negotiable 
safety agreement may be useful in establishing procedures for day-
to day-action on health and safety issues. He suggests that 
the responsibilities and duties of all employees in respect of 
health and safety can be spelled out in the safety agreement, 
which could cover matters not dealt with specifically under the 
Regulations. An example might be whether a safety representative 
may halt dangerous work. 
Glendon and Booth (1982), reviewing worker participation in 
occupational health and safety in Britain state that a number of 
trade unions advocate negotiated safety agreements as the way 
forward to reduce workplace hazards. They describe the types of 
issues to be included in such a safety agreement as: the 
appointment and status of safety representatives, defining their 
constituencies, training in health and safety for safety represen-
tatives and other employees, procedures for carrying out safety 
representative functions, complaints and grievance procedures, 
safety committee composition and sphere of operation, and promotion 
of health and safety in the workplace. 
Stevenson (1980) gives an example of a possible joint agreement 
by listing some of the issues for negotiation: 
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1. Amount and frequency of time off for representatives. 
2. Facilities for representatives to consult with members. 
3. Access to documents and information. 
4. Methods of reporting by representatives to management. 
5. Provision of expert advice and assistance to representatives. 
6. Procedures in cases of failure to agree. 
7. Disciplinary and grievance procedures for health and safety 
matters. 
8. Provision of training for representatives. 
9. Arrangements for inspections, examinations and investigations. 
10. Creation of safety rules. 
At least three major British trade unions, TGWU, ASTMS, GMBAW, 
suggest to their safety representatives that the HASAWA and the 
SRSC Regulations and Code of Practice provide some minimum rights 
which could be improved on by negotiating with management a safety 
agreement or procedures. 
Table 9.16 shows which of the items were most frequently 
identified by these three trade unions and also the two sources 
already discussed above (Glendon and Booth, and Stevenson). The 
table also indicates some differences between trade union and 
non-trade union sources. 
The most frequently identified items concern the appointment 
of safety representatives, their role and functions, and the 
facilities to enable them to carry out these functions. The 
composition of safety committees and their frame of reference 
were also frequently mentioned. Some items were included by 
one or more trade unions but not by the non-union sources, for 
example provision of protective clothing and equipment and the 
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Stevenson 
(1980) 
* S.R. appointment 
S.R. status 
S.R. constituencies 
* Safety training arrangements x 
* Procedures for S.R. functions, e.g. inspections x 
* Time off for S.R.s x 
* Access to S.R.s of documents & information x 
* Complaints/grievances/disciplinary procedures x 
* S.C. composition 
* S.C. sphere of operation 
Promotion of health and safety 
Creation of safety rules x 
Procedures in case of failure to agree x 
* Facilities for S.R. to consult with members x 
Methods of S.R. reporting to management x 
Provision of expert advice & assistance to S.R.s x 
The right to stop work 
Procedures for inspectors' visits 
Provision for health surveys 
Provision for safety equipment & clothing 
TOTALS 10 
* The most frequently identified items (3 or more times) 
S. R. 
S.C. 
Safety representative 
Safety committee 
Glendon 
& Booth 
(1982) 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
x 
9 
No. of times 
TGWU ASTMS G~U mentioned 
x x x 4 
x 2 
x 2 
x x 4 
x x x 5 
x x x 4 
x x x 4 
x x 4 
x x 3 
x x 3 
1 
x 2 
1 
x x 3 
/ x 2 
1 
x x 2 
x 1 
x 1 
x 1 
16 9 6 
NOTE: Not all of the above sources set out specifically to deal with the contents of safety agreements 
, 
right to stop work if circumstances indicate the necessity for 
this. 
Safety issues cannot readily be separated from other 
industrial relations issues and possible areas for negotiation can 
be divided into two categories - substantive issues and procedural 
issues. 
Examples of sUbstantive issues are the introduction of new 
plant, processes, machinery and working methods, and issues of and 
provision of protective clothing and equipment. Examples of 
procedural issues are the company safety agreement, grievance and 
disputes procedures on safety issues and the role and function of 
safety committees. 
In the present study of a Local Authority, when observing 
safety committee meetings, it was clear that issues that were 
outwith the framework of the safety committee were quickly 
rejected by the chairman and the person who raised the point was 
directed elsewhere. 
In the Transport Department, two interesting examples of 
this occurred when the researcher/observer was present at a higher 
tier meeting. On one occasion a safety representative raised 
an item about the inadequacy of the heating in the canteen at one 
of the garages. He was told by the Traffic Manager that this 
was an issue for the Canteen Users Committee and was not relevant 
at the JCC on health and safety. 
On another occaSlon, the lighting in a yard was described by 
a safety representative as inadequate. The Chief Engineer said 
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that this had been examined by management and was considered to 
be perfectly adequate. The Director of the department who has 
the authority in his role of chairman to speak at the time 
(without referral later being necessary) said that in his opinion 
the lighting needed no improvement and therefore the matter must 
now be referred to a negotiating committee. 
Sometime after attending this ~fety committee meeting, I 
questioned the Safety Co-ordinator about the transferring of 
items from the Safety Committee to a negotiating committee, and 
he stated that to his knowledge this had not happened. Items 
such as the one described above concerning the canteen are 
referred to a lower level committee such as the Canteen Users 
Committee. Issues such as whether safety footwear is to be 
provided free are discussed at a negotiating committee. The 
Safety Co-ordinator stated that in this department when safety 
representatives and management do not agree on the settlement of an 
item such as the one concerning lighting in the yard, the safety 
representatives make use of their right to go to the Health and 
Safety Executive who can make a decision as to whether the 
situation requires action. This procedure has been used in the 
department, for example for disagreements over noise levels. It 
appears that the statement of the safety committee chairman on the 
use of a negotiating committee for dealing with issues which remain 
unresolved from the JCC on safety is at variance with the above 
statement of the safety co-ordinator. 
This section has included a discussion on consultation and 
negotiation and how they relate to the part played by safety 
committees in the regulation of health and safety in organisation, 
and this is a good point at which to exa~ine Figure 9.5. This is 
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an adaptation of the Lewis consensus/conflict models illustrated 
in Figures 6.1 and 6.2 and which fits more closely the situation 
that exists where a mixed strategy is used. 
In Figure 9.5 it can be seen that the safety committee is 
provided with reports from safety representatives and also accident 
statistics and trends to provide them with information regarding 
safety performance in the organisation. Both workers and rna nage-
ment through their representatives on the safety committee, are 
affected by the presence of certain external influences such as 
economic constraints, which may be due to the economic recession 
and legislation. 
Economic constraints may set limits on what improvements can 
be carried out in the workplace and management is also constrained 
by what is expected by law. Lewis (1977) makes the point that 
managers are expected only to institute safer working practices 
"as far as is reasonably practicable tl which he describes as lithe 
lawyer ls way of recognising the conflict between cash and safety." 
However, this flexibility may be thought of as a realistic rather 
than an idealistic situation in a real world where employers must 
have some system of priorities as they cannot be expected to 
satisfy simultaneously all the demands of the various groups in 
the organisation. 
External influences set the parameters within which the two 
main strategies of consultation and negotiation operate in an 
attempt to eliminate or reduce certain factors which may contri-
bute to hazards and possibly to incidents or accidents. These 
two strategies - consultation and co-operation (through safety 
corrrnittee and joint consultative committee interaction) anc 
negotiation (through collective bargaining) - provide the two 
main 'routes' shown on the model towards attaining the goal of 
hazard elimination or reduction. The effects of external 
influences on the safety committee and JCCs and on collective 
bargaining bring to the notice of both management and trade 
union representatives the existence of, for example, economic 
constraints whereas in Lewis's Conflict Model seen in Figure 
6.2, economic constraints only influence management. There 
are feedback loops to workers and management and their represen-
tatives in the form of minutes from safety committees and 
negotiating committees. 
The safety representative.s and/or shop stewards concerned 
with these types of committee mayor may not be one and the same 
(this point would have to be tested empirically along with other 
aspects of the mode 1 ) . There are several factors which singly 
or combined contribute to hazards in the workplace and some 
examples are given here which can all be dealt with by means of 
a consultative and co-operative approach both formally through 
committees and informally; or by negotiation through collective 
bargaining which may involve a safety agreement. 
The first factor is lack of resources. This is particuarly 
relevant in the present economic recession and is related in the 
model to the economic constraints which influence both the safety 
committee and the negotiating corrmittee. Negotiation can be 
used to try and resolve the problem of limited resources as it 1S 
not realistic to expect the problem to be completely eliminated. 
It may not be possible to do everything that ought to be done and 
safety representatives and management may have to come to some 
agreement by setting priorities linked to c time scale. Cutbacks 
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may mean that there are fewer men to carry out necessary improve-
ments and maintenance, and may also make it more difficult for 
safety representatives to get the necessary time off to attend 
to their duties. Standards may have to be compromised to some 
extent, and rather than look for improvements, safety represen-
tatives may have to settle for maintenance of present standards. 
Lack of the necessary money may mean that the provision of 
protective clothing and equipment may have to be negotiated and 
the quality, and perhaps the acceptability, of clothing and 
equipment may decline. 
Not only do safety representatives have the problem of 
trying to get as much as possible from management through 
negotiation towards maintaining a safe working environment, as 
trade union representatives they must also be aware that by 
pushing too hard for expensive safety improvements, they could, 
in the long run, put their constituents' jobs in jeopardy - thus 
the bargaining power of safety representatives is weakened. 
At the time of collecting data for this project, the economic 
recession had not yet badly affected the local authorities and 
safety representatives reported little difficulty in getting what 
they asked for. However, as described in Chapter Eleven, the 
local authorities are 'catching up' with the private sector with 
regard to experiencing the effects of a lack of resources. 
One point to keep in mind is that safety representatives must 
be aware that management may use lack of money as an excuse to 
delay taking action over health and safety issues, and this is 
where good, accurate, unbiased information regardinQ the economic 
situation in the organisation is essential to safety represent-
atives so that they can assess for themselves if there is a genuine 
lack of resources available for use on health and safety matters, 
and negotiate on that basis. 
The second factor which may contribute to hazards is lack of 
training which could apply to all levels of the workforce. It 
may be necessary for safety representatives to negotiate to get 
time off to attend safety training courses because manpower short-
ages may make it difficult for safety representatives to go on a 
course when they wish to - a point made by a senior manager in the 
Transport Department. Apart from imparting knowledge and 
skills, good safety training should instil safety awareness and 
positive attitudes to health and safety, so safety representatives 
should negotiate not only for safety training for themselves, but 
also for others. For example, kinetic handling and lifting 
techniques may show good returns by a decrease in back injuries 
and may in addition make trainees more aware of doing things the 
safe way in other aspects of their work. 
Safety representatives and management could come to a 
realistic agreement, for example regarding a safety training plan 
related to a time scale showing who has yet to attend a training 
course and by what date in the future they should have completed 
such a course. This systematic method of planning training, 
agreed to by both parties, should be more efficient than haphazard 
selection of who is to attend a safety training course and when. 
As well as being open to negctiation as described above, 
training should be a standing item fur the safety committee which 
can use a co-operative, problem-sclving approach to ensure a 
well-trained workforce which hopefully should help to reduce 
hazards of the type caused by untrained workers at present being 
discussed in the media with regard to young people on Youth 
Opportunities Scheme placements - now known as the Youth Training 
Scheme. 
Unsafe working conditions which are the legal responsibility 
of management, but the moral responsibility of all groups of the 
workforce, is another example of a factor which may contribute to 
hazards. The working environment may be unsafe because of, 
among many factors, lack of money for maintenance and improvements, 
lack of inspection and monitoring by management and safety repres-
entatives, bad supervision and bad work methods, for example bad 
housekeeping. 
Again a co-operative, problem-solving approach and/or 
negotiation could be used to try to improve working conditions, 
for example setting up a system of priorities over a specified 
time so that there is a steady improvement in safety standards. 
This adaptation of Lewis's two models is a hypothetical model 
which is partly based upon some of the findings from the Local 
Authority study, for example the use of both consultation and 
negotiation in trying to eliminate or reduce hazards, however 
further work could be done in order to empirically test the model. 
Some suggestions as to how this could be done are giver in Chapter 
Twelve. 
9.9 Summary 
The SRSC Regulations and Guidance Notes were reviewed and 
the system of safety committees in the Local Authority was desc-
ribed. The systems in the four departments were illustrated. 
Three of the four departments had a two-tier system, and in 
these communication is two-way between the safety committees on 
both tiers. 
Safety committee functions and duties 
The functions and duties of safety committees were examined 
from six of the available sources. These sources were selected 
on the basis that they are diverse and might provide differing 
interpretations of the SRSC Regulations (1977) which were left 
flexible so that they can be usefully applied to individual work-
places. The similarities and differences between the sources with 
regard to safety committee functions were described. 
Safety committee effectiveness 
Previous research, of which there is very little on safety 
committees, was described under the heading of safety committee 
effectiveness and its determinants, Beaumont et al. in the United 
Kingdom and Kochan et al. in the United States being the main 
contributors to information on safety committee functioning. 
Data from the present study were used to illustrate some of the 
pOints made, in particular the importance of following up 
recommendations, discussing the right sort of issues, and the 
importance of senior management commitment to health and safety. 
fffects of safety committee membership 
It was hypothesised that certain differences would be found 
between safety representatives who belong to safety committees 
and those who are not members. However, in each case no 
statistically significant differences were found. For example, 
interactions between safety representatives and senior management 
at safety committee meetings did not appear to have resulted in 
those safety representatives seeing senior management as more 
committed to health and safety than those safety representatives 
who did not belong to safety committees. Neither were safety 
representatives who are members of safety committees more likely 
to see their relationship with management as consultative than 
were non-members in spite of contact with senior management through 
safety committees. Also the evidence did not support the hypo-
thesis that being a member of a safety committee would affect safety 
representatives' perceptions of whether they are consulted by 
management on certain issues even thou~the two groups are inter-
acting within the framework of a consultative style safety committee. 
The type of issues discussed 
It was suggested that a higher proportion of 'trivial' 
items as opposed to 'important ' items would be discussed on lower 
tier safety committees such as those in the Highways and Drainage 
Departments. The reverse would be true of the issues discussed 
in the Transport Department and the Water Supply Services. This 
was indeed found to be the case with one notable exception - that 
of the Drainage Department, where the lower tier committee 
discusses health problems unique to that department and appears to 
be operating as beth an upper tier and a lower tier committee. 
So the hypothesis concerning a higher proportion of trivial items 
being discussed at lower tier safety committees is partially 
supported. 
Consultation and negotiation 
The strategies used in the relationship between safety 
representatives and management were examined and were found, on 
the whole, to be either consultative or a mixture of consultation 
and negotiation. This finding supports the results of Kochan 
et ale in the United States. The introduction of a mixed 
strategy used by Kochan et ale and in the present study, provided 
more information than the study of Beaumont (1980) which used only 
the two categories of negotiation and consultation. 
Safety agreements are one example of an area where negotiation 
can be used to establish a base from which consultation can be the 
strategy used. Table 9.16 shows that among other items suggested 
by various sources for inclusion in safety agreements are the 
composition of a safety committee and the definition of the sphere 
of operation within which it functions. Once the parameters 
within which the safety committee will operate have been agreed 
upon by trade unions and management, the safety committee can then 
operate mainly in a consultative fashion. Therefore, where safety 
committees are concerned there is a place for both consultation and 
negotiation. 
An adaptation of the Lewis consensus/conflict model was 
illustrated in Figure 9.5 which showed that consultation, co-
operation and negotiation all have a part to play along with the 
safety committees in changing the conditions which g~ve rise to 
hazards which in turn can cause accidents. 
It was hypothesised that there may be a difference in 
reaction by safety representatives and supervisors, because of 
differing perspectives of the two groups, to a statement 
sugges ti ng that, II safety commi ttees provi de a genui ne opportuni ty 
for management and employees to co-operate over heal th and safety. II 
This hypothesis was not supported by the data. There was however 
a strong relationship between safety representatives feeling that 
safety committees can be used for co-operation, and perceiving 
senior management as being committed to health and safety. 
Criticisms of safety committees 
Criticisms of safety committees voiced by some trade unions 
were examined and were found on the whole not to be justified in 
this Local Authority. For example, the safety committees are not 
just talking shops because among the members are senior managers 
with the necessary authority to make decisions and to get things 
done. 
79% of safety representatives and 93% of supervisors disagreed 
with a statement suggesting that "safety committees provide an 
excuse for management to delay taking action on heclth anc safety 
issues. II It appears that in the Local Authority, safety committees 
are not used as an excuse to delay taking action and indeed may 
bring to the notice of management necessary improvements which 
might otherwise be overlooked. 
Nor do the safety committees diminish the rights of safety 
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representatives who, in this Local Authority, still seem to have 
all the rights they are entitled to, and in addition, provide a 
direct line of communication to senior management. 
Safety committees in this Local Authority 
The function and duties of safety committees outlined in the 
sources described in Table 9.1 are followed closely in the case 
of the safety committees in this Local Authority. The committees 
work to objectives and have a frame of reference for their 
activities. Safety performance is considered and monitored with 
accident and disease statistics and trends studied, and an 
attempt is made to discover the causes of accidents. As a 
result of safety committee deliberations, recommendations are 
made to management on health and safety issues. 
The safety committee is g1ven the opportunity to develop 
safety rules and safe systems at work although in some committees 
the opportunity of providing an input, for example into the re-
writing of the safety policy is not always taken up. 
Some of the safety committees carry out safety inspections 
or walkabouts while others do not, and only two of the six sources 
in Table 9.1 mention this as a safety committee function. 
Similarly only twc of the sources mention the monitoring of 
safety training and it was found that in some of the Local Authority 
safety committees this was a standing item on the agenda but was 
usually only briefly referred to. 
The safety committees in the Local Authority do, as a result 
of their joint efforts to maintain a safe and healthy workplace, 
promote co-operation between management and employees which is a 
function mentioned by four out of the six sources. 
To sum up, it can be seen that, in the case of this research 
project, the safety committees that were observed and on which 
the respondents to the questionnaires served, seem to provide a 
good example of effective committees and to follow closely the 
functions and duties outlined in the sources described. 
The safety committee can be considered to be an effective 
agent for self-regulation of safety standards in this Local 
Authority. 
CHAPTER TEN 
THE GOULDNER MODEL OF REPRESENTATIVE 
BUREAUCRACY AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITY 
AS A BUREAUCRACY 
THE GOULDNER MODEL OF REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY 
AND THE LOCAL AUTHORITY AS A BUREAUCRACY 
In the Nineteenth century, the movement of a large part of 
the population into the towns and employment there meant that 
tasks became too large and complicated to be carried out volun-
tarily by leading local personalities such as J.P.s etc. So 
paid officials had to be engaged and their work had to be 
co-ordinated. The type of organisation described by Weber as a 
bureaucracy emerged, this being characterised by systems of rules, 
a code of conduct, a hierarchy of offices each with clearly 
specified functions and a defined field of responsibility, and 
the whole bei ng contro 11 ed from the top. 
I n our modem soci ety, a bureaucracy is defi ned as the type 
of organisation designed to accomplish large scale administrative 
tasks by systematically co-ordinating the work of individuals. 
Local Government is typical of Weber's ideal-type bureaucracy 
in that peopl e do not work independently but are answerable to a 
superior. At the top of this pyramid in Local Government is the 
Council of elected representatives. 
Hill (1972) describes a bureaucracy as slo~' because it pays 
such careful attention to rules and precedents before taking action, 
and rigid because individuals tend to evade decision-taking to 
avoid having responsibility for incorrect or unpopular decisions. 
The hierarchical structure makes it easy to pass matters up to 
their superiors for decisions, and it has been said to be the 
negation of individual autonomy, freedom, spontaneity, creativity, 
dignity and independence valued in other sectors of our society. 
However a bureaucratic organisation may still be the most effic"-
ient way of dealing with large scale administration where stable, 
routine tasks predominate. 
Burns and Stalker (1966) describe two ideal-type models, one 
of which - the mechanistic model - is similar to the bureaucratic 
type. It is characterised by a clear hierarchy of offices 
involving strict specialisation, vertical communication and 
usually one individual at the top of the hierarchy with overall 
respons i bi 1 i ty. The organismic model, on the other hand, has 
no clearly defined hierarchy with roles constantly being redefined. 
Communication is lateral and concerns information and advice rather 
than the giving of orders. Like a bureaucracy, the mechanistic 
type is more appropriate in relatively stable market conditions, 
where the technology is unchanging. In contrast, the organismic 
type is appropriate to an unstable situation in which the organis-
ation is continually experiencing relatively unpredictable new 
tasks and problems. 
The Gouldner Study 
The research in question was a case study carried out by 
Gouldner between 1948 anG 1951 based in a gypsum mine, to look at 
the organisational structure both before and after the arrival of 
a new manager. He then described the resulting 'succession 
crisis
' 
which led to the formation and operation of an industrial 
bureaucracy. 
1?; 
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Gouldner described three distinct tendencies which were 
found to be associated with the process of bureaucracy: the 
'mock bureaucratic' pattern characterised by the failure to 
enforce or obey rules; the 'representative' pattern where rules 
are both enforced by management and obeyed by workers, and the 
'punishment-centred' bureaucracy where management attempts 
regular enforcement but is resisted by the workers. This study 
is particularly relevant to the present research project because 
it examines the handling of safety by management and workforce. 
Gouldner used a theoretical framework based on patterns of 
bureaucracy within which the empirical data he collected by 
various methods were analysed. He carried out non-directive 
interviews in order to obtain a picture of the plant as a social 
system from the perspective of the workers. He asked what 
problems confronted them, what they thought of their work and 
about the people they met. He also used observation in walking 
round the plant talking to the men as they worked. Documents 
such as memoranda, correspondence, company reports and Government 
reports were studied. Gouldner described the original informal 
system of relationships at the gypsum mine including what he calls 
the indulgency pattern which was a lenient attitude towards 
discipline with the rules being applied in a flexible way. This 
indulgency pattern led to a disposition among the workers to 
react favourably to the plant and to trust thei r supervisors. It 
was an important source of job satisfaction, motivating the work-
force, expressing a commitment to a set of beliefs as to how the 
plant should be run, generating loyalties to the plant and to the 
company, and expressing preferences for certain patterns of social 
relationships. 
A successor to the manager of the plant arrived and as a 
result of this there was increased bureaucratisation in the form 
of the revival of formal rules and the establishment of supple-
mentaryones. The atmosphere became impersonal and cold and 
there was a communication gap between the successor and the rest 
of the plant. Communication was mainly downwards and supervision 
became closer. Changes were made in the formal organisation and 
key personne 1 we re moved about. 
Gouldner describes various tensions which led to the prolif-
eration of bureaucratic rules in the organisation and the functions 
of these rules is given in some detail. As mentioned, three types 
of bureaucracy are identified and illustrated with reference to 
the safety organisation in the plant: 
1. Mock bureaucracy is where many of the bureaucratic cues 
were present - inspections, rules, with posters calling 
for their reinforcement, but in the ordinary day-to-day 
conduct of work these were ignored and inoperative. Mock 
bureaucracy was the administrative implementation of the 
indulgency pattern described above. The rules in the 
case of mock bureaucracy are neither enforced by management 
nor obeyed by workers, the actual position does not coin-
cide with the official one. There is usually little 
conflict between management anc workforce and joint 
violation and evasion of rules is buttressed by the 
informal sentiments of the participants. For example, 
the Ino smoking' rule was initiated by the insurance 
company and if it had been put into effect it would have 
created status differentials because office workers would 
still be priviledged to smoke. 
32£ 
2. Punishment-centred bureaucracy concerned the enforcement 
of rules by either management or workers rather than both. 
and evaded by the other group. This type entails 
relatively great tension and conflict which is not helped 
by the closeness of the supervision. Deviants are thought 
to be willfully disobedient and are punished rather than 
educated, that is the rules are enforced with the use of 
punishment or sanctions. For example, through their union 
the workers initiated the bidding system which minimised 
personal favouritism in the distribution of jobs. Super-
visors conformed to the system largely because they feared 
the consequences of deviation. 
3. In a representative bureaucracy, rules are both enforced 
by management and obeyed by workers. Joint support for 
the rules is buttressed by the mutual participation, 
initiation and education of workers and management, for 
example, pressure from both management and workers to 
develop a safety programme. So, it can be seen that 
solidarity between management and workers is derived from 
their mutual acceptance of the safety programme rather than 
from their joint rejection of it. Solidarity developed 
through the interaction that arose in the process of 
securing conformance with, rather than avoidance, of, the 
rules. 
The designation 'representative bureaucracy' is related to 
the fact that this type of organisation is characterised 
by the day-to-day participation of the workers in its 
administration. For example, one of the effects of safety 
meetings described by Gouldner ;s to give workers some 
measure of control over the initiation and administration 
of the rules. 
Gouldner states that the safety operations were more bureau-
cratically organised than any other in the plant. Safety rules 
were more numerous and more complex than any others, some apply-
ing to the whole plant, others only to specific divisions of the 
factory and conformity to these rules were stressed. Paperwork 
was prolific in particular reports, safety manuals, first aid 
records, posters and statistics. 
In the present chapter it ;s proposed to examine how many of 
the characteristics of the representative bureaucracy model are 
demonstrated in the Local Authority under study. This model 
is illustrated in Figure 10.1. 
Figure 10.1 shows the main factors associated with Gouldner's 
description of representative bureaucracy. This model will be 
tested out in this chapter to see how closely the Local Authority 
in this study fits the described pattern. Figure 10.1 shows 
the system of safety rules associated with representative 
bureaucracy. These rules can be seen to be jointly initiated 
by management and workers and they are enforced by management and 
obeyed by workers. The relationship between the values of both 
management and workers and the rules can be seen. Usually 
both workers and management can legitimate the rules in terms of 
their own key values. These are shown separately on the diagram 
and also jointly expressed, for example through the safety 
committee. The effects of both deviance from and conformity to 
the safety rules are shown and these effects are similar for both 
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superiors and subordinates. Deviance is attributed to ignorance 
or carelessness rather than deliberate action or status -
threatening resistence. 
Factors Associated with the Representative Bureaucracy Pattern 
1. Who usually initiates the rules? 
Gouldner found that both groups initiated the rules and 
viewed them as their own with pressure exerted by unions and 
management to initiate and develop the safety programme. 
The rules were enforced by management and obeyed by workers, 
that is there was joint support which was reinforced by mutual 
participation in the initiation of safety rules and further backed 
up by the education if workers and management through for example, 
meetings, discussions and posters which contributed towards a 
general safety consciousness in the organisation. 
In the Local Authority, trade unions and employees have a 
potential input via safety representatives. For example, when 
the departmental safety policy or procedures were being re-
written or modified, draft copies were circulated to all safety 
representatives. But did they ever suggest points or alter 
others? From evidence collected from discussion with safety 
officers, it appears that the majority do not use this opportunity 
to contribute, although some particularly interested individuals do 
comment on these drafts. 
The Manpower Committee of the Local Authority had a standing 
provision made for the raising of health and safety issues, 
however, at the time of writing this had been discontinued as 
no issues were raised by full-time trade union officials who 
attend. This means that no input is being made at this level, 
perhaps because it is at departmental level that input is con-
sidered to be more useful. 
If both groups view the safety rules as their own as the 
model suggests, then they should not be felt by the workforce to 
be imposed. When the safety representatives and supervisors 
were asked if discipline was often used for breaches of health 
and safety practices in the workplace, the results showed that 
this enforcement of the rules by one group on the other occurred 
only occasionally. 
TABLE 10.1 The Use of Discipline Reported by Safety Representatives 
and Supervi sors 
"Are members of the workforce ever disciplined for breaches 
of health and safety practices in the workplace?I' 
Safety Repres en ta ti ves (%) Supervi sors 
Often 8 8 
Sometimes 57 47 
Never 35 45 
N=60 N=86 
(%) 
A common complaint from supervisors was that they do not have 
enough authority to enforce the rules, so it may be senior manage-
ment policy to use positive reinforcement to encourage workers to 
do the right thing, rather than negative reinforcement or punishment 
in the form of formal disciplinary action to discourage workers 
from doing the wrong thing. 
However, when they consider it necessary, management are 
willing to enforce rules and workers are willing to obey the safety 
rules without much resistance. The rules are accepted as necessary 
for all those who are exposed to hazards, because there has been 
some employee input, they are adhered to in good faith. 
With regard to the question of safety rules being imposed on 
the workforce, the fact that safety representatives who are trade 
union representatives, are willing to use their influence on the 
people they represent in order to ensure that they work according 
to 1 ai d down procedures, and tha t they make use of protecti ve 
clothing and equipment, seems to imply that they do not feel that 
these rules are imposed by one lsi del , that ;s management, upon the 
other, that ;s employee~. 
Another pi ece of evi dence from the Loca 1 Authori ty study 
relevant to this matter of imposition of rules, is the results of 
a question to safety representatives which has been discussed 
previously but for convenience is shown again in Table 10.2. 
TABLE 10.2 Consultation by ~''1anagement of Safety Representatives 
"Have you ever been consulted by management on: 
Re-writing the departmental safety policy? 
Devising safe systems of work? 
How to motivate the workforce?1I 
Yes (~) No( %) 
27 
43 
23 
~=6C 
73 
57 
77 
It can be seen that safety representatives report some 
degree of consultation between management and employees 
particularly in the case of devising safe systems of work, where 
nearly half of the safety representative respondents reported 
having been consulted. Therefore as they are employee represen-
tatives, it appears that management cannot be said to be unilater-
ally imposing the rules related to safe systems of work upon their 
employees. 
However, although at first sight the above statement seems 
valid, there are several reasons why consulting the workforce 
about aspects of the rules, and imposing these rules on the 
workforce are not mutually exclusive. It may be that worker 
representatives are consulted by management on devising safe 
systems of work in general, but not about the actual rules 
which emerge. Thus, the rules themselves may not have emerged 
as a re s u 1 t 0 f co n s u 1 ta t ion. 
Another very important point, raised by those who are 
cynical about the concepts of consultation and participation, 
;s that perhaps consulting the workforce over certain issues is 
done by management as a public relations exercise and not in a 
serious way. It may be a gesture of appeasement, to militant 
trade unionists for example, or a cosmetic exercise to impress 
outsiders such as the HSE or other firms or organisations. 
Having consulted safety representatives on devising safe systems 
of work, how much use is made by manage~ent of the information 
they have obtained? If safety representati ves see that thei r 
contribution is not being utilised when rules are ~ad9, t~2n 
this may have the effect of hardening their attitudes towards 
335 
management, and encouraging a feeling of lack of involvement in 
the creati ve aspects of hea 1 th and safety as opposed to the 
purely monitoring aspects of rules and procedures devised 
only bymanagerrentand possibly having to be imposed on the 
workforce. 
When safety representatives who are members of safety 
committees, are given draft copies of new regulations, this may 
mean that they are genuinely being consulted. However, it may 
be that they are being used as Imanagers of discontent ' to 
contain conflict over health and safety by encouraging the 
workforce to believe that their representatives have a genuine 
imput to safety rules when, in some organisations, little use 
is made of safety representatives' viewpoints. 
The above points illustrate the fact that although 43% of 
safety representatives have been consulted by management about 
devising safe systems of work, this does not necessarily imply 
that the resulting safety rules are not being imposed on the 
workforce they represent. 
One aspect of a bureaucracy is that the rules are given by 
expe rts . In the Local Authority, safety officers, who act in 
an advisory capacity, do have considerable input when the safety 
policy is being written, rules set out or safety manuals written. 
Summary 
Who usually initiates the rules? 
In the Local Authority there is the potential for input 
when safety rules are initiated by both management and workers 
via their representatives. However there is in fact only a 
limited input from the workforce whose trade union representa-
tives, on the whole, do not appear to use the available oppor-
tunities to contribute to the formulation of safety rules. The 
rules are enforced to some extent by management though the mini-
mum of coercion or discipline ;s used, encouragement being the 
preferred method of reinforcement. Workers willingly obey the 
safety rules and there is no evidence to suggest that they feel 
that the rules are imposed on them by management. There is some 
evidence of safety representatives being consulted by management 
on some issues, but it is difficult to know how much use management 
make of the information given to them by the representatives. 
2. Whose values legitimate the rules? 
Gouldner found that usually both workers and management can 
legitimate the rules in terms of their own key values. It is 
suggested that if the values of either or both groups could not 
be upheld then there would be evidence of tension and conflict 
over the safety rules which, in the case of the Local Authority, 
is not much in evidence. This will be further discussed in the 
next section. 
There appears to be little resistance on the part of workers 
to the safety programme becuase it is, on the whole, in conformity 
with their expectations and values, some of which are discussed 
here. So even if workers have not initiated the rules they freely 
acquiesce to them, that is, there is no need for imposition by 
~--
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management. The values discussed below consist of some 
identified by Gouldner and some additions from myself. 
Workers I Va 1 ues 
(i) Personal well-being, cleanliness and neatness 
There has been in recent years a change over the whole of 
society as to the expectations of people regarding the quality 
of life. We expect to live and to work in reasonable conditions 
with adequate heating, lighting, washing facilities and in well 
mai ntai ned premi ses . The population has become more health 
conscious, interested in sport, taking exercise, the type of food 
they eat and there has been much more information to the general 
public about certain industrial diseases such as asbestosis. 
These increased expectations with regard to the surroundings we 
live in apply equally to the work environment, where their health 
and safety at work is an important workforce value. 
Brown (1980) states that people not only expect a better 
material standard of living but are also concerned with the quality 
of their working lives and satisfaction they get from their work. 
She describes the way in which bad working conditions can be 
perceived by the workforce to represent the employer's attitudes 
towards their employees: 
" .... . bad working conditions~ if caUSf:C by the thought-
Lessness of the empLoyer rather ~han representing ~. 
unavoidabLe chaLLenge to the skiLL and stanr:na of the 
worker~ are resented not onLy as such but as ciearLy 
denoting the empZ,oyer'g negative attit;ude towards the 
empLoyee and his vaLue." 
Eva and Oswald (1981) suggest that the social contract of the 
mid-1970s, drawn up between the Labour Government and the trace 
unions had an effect on the quality of working life. The trade 
unions agreed to voluntary pay restraint in return for legislation 
favourable to trade unionism. One example of this legislation 
was the HASAWA, which contained the vital provision for the appoint-
ment of trade union safety representatives which the TUe had 
requested, and which would draw attention to workers' conditions of 
work. In fact it was the Employment Protection Act (1975) which 
repealed Section 2(5) of HASAWA which originally provided for 
worker representatives to be elected by the workplace whether they 
were trade union members or not. The appointment of only trade 
union safety representatives gave the trade unions more control 
over health and safety matters, particularly where collective 
bargaining was jnvolved. For a fuller discussion of this issue 
see Chapter Eleven. 
In the Local Authority, when safety representatives were 
asked what particular health and safety issues take up most of 
their time, the second most popular reply concerned conditions of 
work including protective clothing and equipment. For example, 
raising standards of equipment, heating and lighting. 
(ii) Maintenance of income 
An important worker value is that of avoiding any loss of 
earnings due to injury or ill-health. It is therefore ;n the 
interests of the workforce that accidents should not happen. 
When it is brought home to worke~ that not only would they suffer 
physically and psychologically as the result of an injury, but 
also financially, they will feel that their values with regard 
to maintaining their income will legitimate the safety rules. 
It is worth following safe procedures to avoid being incapacitated 
through injury and suffering the resulting drop in income. 
The effects of bonus schemes on safe working is a subject 
often discussed by trade unions, employees and management as 
well as by a few researchers such as Wrench and Lee (1982). It 
could be the case that by adhering to safety rules workers may 
be unable to earn the maximum bonus. On the other hand, one 
reason why workers take short cuts and cut corners is acknowledged 
to be that they are on some sort of payment by results system. 
There is therefore potential conflict here between the wish to 
work safely and the wish to maximise earnings. However, the 
bonus scheme in operation in the Local Authority is claimed by 
work study experts to have been carefully drawn up leaving ample 
time for safe procedures to be carried out. 
The respondents to the two questionnaires were asked about 
the effects of the bonus scheme. 
TABLE 10.3 Safety Re7resentatives ' and SURervisors ' Perceptions of the Ef ects of the Bonus Sc erne 
"Some people feel that a bonus scheme works against safe 
working methods. Do you agree?" 
Safety Representatives (%) Supervisors (%L 
Yes 
No 
49 
51 
N=64 
45 
55 
N=88 
It can be seen from the results that approximately half of 
both the safety representatives and the supervisors, both of whom 
work at the actual work site feel that the bonus scheme does 
conflict with safe working. These are the people who shoulc be 
able to make such a judgement rather than those who devise the 
schemes who are removed from the actual workplace when the 
schemes are put into action. So this is one area where two 
important worker values are potentially, for some individuals at 
least, in conflict. 
(iii) Independence and autonomy 
One other value which, it must be admitted is not particu-
larly salient for some workers but is for others, is that of 
maintaining their independence and autonomy. These values can 
be made to legitimate the safety rules if workers felt that they, 
through their trade union representatives, have had an input in 
devising the rules and procedures and have not had these imposed 
on them - backed up by fierce disciplinary action for any breaches. 
If workers can i denti fy wi th the aims of the organi sati on wi th 
regard to health and safety, they will conform to the standards 
and not feel that their independence and autonomy are in jeopardy. 
Training, education, information and being consulted by management 
can all help to develop positive attitudes to safety which would 
mean that, for example, workers might wear protective clothing 
because they are convinced of its efficacy and not feel that their 
independence is threatened by being forced to wear it against 
thei r will. 
Gouldner states that in his study safety meetings provided 
some feelings of control over one aspect of their work for some 
employees. In the Local Authority, the researcher observed safety 
committees and noted that interactions between management and 
worker representatives were relaxed and safety representatives 
were given every opportunity to put forward points raised by 
wo rke rs . 
If the workforce have confidence in their representatives and 
in the democratic procedures of the safety committee, the value of 
autonomY and control over at least the safety aspects of their 
work could be enhanced rather than violated. 
(i v) Pa rti ci pa ti on 
Through safety committees, workers .an maintain the value of 
participation in the instigation and administration of elements of 
the safety programme. 
Management Values 
(i) Maximising production 
Management must keep up production and may find that this 
conflicts with safety rules. A bonus scheme is one way for 
management to ensure that they maintain a satisfactory production 
level and this may cause employees to take risks as described 
above. 
A senior manager in the Transport Department stated that 
health and safety is only one area of concern to management. 
Their first priority must be to keep an efficient, well-maintained 
fleet of buses on the road. 
Supervisors are often 'the men in the middle' and may come 
under conflicting pressures, that of keeping up production and 
that of ensuring that the workers they supervise adhere to safe 
practi ces . 
In the present study. supervisors were asked about production 
pressure. 
TABLE 10.4 Production Pressures Perceived by Supervisors 
"00 you feel under pressure to keep up production?" 
Often 
Sometimes 
Never 
N 
28 33 
37 44 
19 23 
N=84 
So, 77% of the supervisors felt under at least some pressure from 
the management value of keeping up production. 
One problem which was encountered during the Local Authority 
study was highl ighted when both management and safety representati ves 
mentioned occasional problems with management not letting too many 
employees away on safety training courses at one time because of 
the effect on production of a depleted workforce. On the other 
hand, management should be informed that in the long run time lost 
to investigate accidents, to assist the injured, and due to 
absence from work of those injured, can affect production. 
Sending people to be trained can reduce these accidents thereby 
reducing lost time and maintaining production levels. 
(ii) Maximising profit 
This is linked with the above management value, but in 
addition is related to keeping costs to a minimum. For example, 
the company insurance premiums may be increased where the accident 
rate is high. Management may expect to see a return on any 
investment they make in safety, for example purchasing new 
equipment and they have to be persuaded that long-term effects 
may increase profit because of fewer interruptions due to 
accidents or incidents and because of a long-term improvement in 
morale and therefore in industrial relations climate which may 
lead to increased productivity. 
The profit motive may not be as pressing in a local authority 
as in private industry and from interviews with senior managers it 
appears that even in times of cut-backs in local authorities, 
there is a positive attitude from the top with regard to agreeing 
to the safety budgets requested by the various departments. So 
the profit value does not conflict with the safety rules. 
(iii) Humanitarian values 
From the days of the Human Relations School of Management, 
a paternalistic, humanitarian type of management exists in some 
organisations where management have responsibility for the welfare 
of their employees. This does to some extent exist in local 
government. The UK Government in its role as employer sets an 
example to industry in general, and therefore it generally provides 
a standard of facilities for its employees which exceeds the 
minimum requi red by 1 a~'. 
Beaumont (1981) asks why the Government should adopt a 
model or good employer role and gives two main reasons. The fi rst 
is relative freedom from profit and loss, which means they can take 
a long-term perspective and can test new practices and arrangements. 
Another reason for Government being a good employer is that by 
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following best employment practices, Government can hope to attract 
and retain a high quality labour force and minimise union-manage-
ment difficulties and so ensure relatively efficient provision of 
services. 
Humanitarian values would legitimate the safety rules in an 
organisation because a concern for the welfare of the workforce 
and the provision of a high standard of facilities would surely 
include management ensuring a safe working environment and the 
setting up of safety rules and procedures. 
(iv) Legal responsibility 
The HASAWA has laid upon management the legal responsibility 
for ensuring that the work environment reaches the required 
standards with regard to health and safety. Senior management 
can be prosecuted for an unsafe act which takes place in the 
organisation if the HSE can show that the act occurred because of 
senior management's ultimate negligence. 
Management's legal responsibility certainly legitimates the 
safety rules because as well as defending the workforce from 
danger and ill-health, the rules, if followed, defend management 
from legal repercussions. 
(v) Good management/workforce relationship 
Showing the workforce that management has set out a safety 
programme in order to protect them and to demonstrate their 
interest in their welfare, can lead to good management/workforce 
relationships and raise morale in the organisation. The safety 
programme can increase solidarity and minimise conflict in an 
organisation. 
Summary 
Whose values legitimate the rules? 
Four workers' values were identified and of these, two seemed 
to legitimate the rules: firstly, participation and secondly 
personal well-being cleanliness and neatness. The remaining two 
worker values: firstly, maintenance of income and secondly 
independence and autonomy, may in some cases legitimate the rules. 
However, in some situations these values may be subject to some 
conflict as described above. Therefore, the latter two worker 
values can be said only to legitimate the safety rules in part. 
Five management values were identified, four of which can 
be considered to legitimate the safety rules - legal responsibility, 
profit maximisation (not particularly important in a Local Authority) 
anmanitarian values and a good management/workforce relationship. 
The remaining management value can be said only partially to 
legitimate the safety rules because there are circumstances where 
the value concerned - production maximisation - is in conflict with 
the safety rules. These circumstances are discussed above. 
3. Whose Values are Violated by Enforcement of the Rules? 
Gouldner suggests that under representative bureaucracy neither 
side's values are violated under most conditions. In this section, 
all the values identified above are examined to see if, in the 
opinion of the researcher, they are, or are not, violated by 
enforcement of the rules in the Local Authority. 
Workers I Values 
(i) Personal well-being, cleanliness and neatness 
This value is likely to be upheld rather than violated if 
safety rules are enforced and a large number of supervisors consid-
ered the maintenance of good housekeeping to be their most useful 
contribution to safe working. Examples given were: 
a) "ensuring a clean and tidy workshop" 
b) "keep; ng floors clean and dry and maki ng sure 
the lighting is good" 
Working in an environment which is clean, tidy, and well-
organised may raise the status of those who work there and this 
worker value is not violated by enforcement of rules in the Local 
Authori ty. 
(ii) Maintenance of income 
Maintenance of income may be one worker value under threat 
if closely enforced safety rules and procedures mean that employees 
on payment-by-results systems are slowed down, and they cannot earn 
what they feel they are capable of. There is a conflict between 
being motivated to earn as much as possible, and being motivated 
to work safely and conform to safety rules, and the way in which 
this conflict is resolved will depend on which motive is most 
salient to the individual at any particular time. Being in need 
of money may mean that workers will cut corners and take risks in 
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order to maximise their earnings. For a fuller discussion on 
the effects of the bonus system on safety see Chapter Eight. 
However. if workers remain injury-free by not having accidents, 
they will not lose income by being off work. So in this case 
the enforcement of safety rules and the workforce conforming to 
them can uphold the worker value of maintenance of income. 
(iii) Independence and autonomy 
The main worker value that may be violated by enforcement 
of the rules, is the need for independence and autonomy that 
ex i s ts ins orne wo rke rs . 
For example, these values may be violated in some individuals 
if they are forced to wear~otective clothing when their attitudes 
towards the value of such protection are not favourable. They 
may feel that it is unmanly to wear p"'otective clothing or unneces-
sary if they have done the job without it for the past twenty years. 
By the same argument as that voiced by those against the compulsory 
use of seat belts before the introduction of the recent legislation, 
some individuals feel that their lives are involved and therefore 
it is their decision as to whether to take precautions or risk an 
accident. The need for independence, personal freedom and for 
making decisions about one's life may be stronger than the need to 
conform and obey rul es - another examp 1 e of confl i cti ng moti ves. 
Argyris (1960) points to the dilemma concerning the relation-
ship of individuals and the organisation within which they are 
employed. He proposes that there is a lack of congruency between 
the needs of healthy individuals, for example the need for independence 
and autonomy, and the demands of the fonnal orgardsation~ for example 
conformi ty to rul es and regul a ti ons. 
The degree of conflict experienced by an individual will vary 
according to variables such as personality factors. Where one 
individual values independence hi9hly, another will find no 
discomfort in submerging his own needs and, in doing so, losing 
some degree of control over his working life. Those who do 
experience conflict may develop one or more defence mechanisms 
to assist them into coping with the resulting discomfort. These 
mechanisms may manifest themselves as adaptive reactions to the 
erosion of independence. Workers may exhibit apathy or resistence 
to rules such as safety rules. Defiance is one wayan individual 
can try to retain some autonomy and this may be expressed by 
ignoring or resenting the enforcement of safety rules. On the 
other hand, there may be an element of compliance with rules when 
the supervisor is near, but as soon as he is out of sight the rules 
are ignored again. This indicates a lack of commitment by the 
workforce to the safety goals of the organisation. 
(iv) Participation 
The chapter on safety safety committees indicates that in 
the Local Authority the committees seem to be effective in 
providing a means of expressing the joint values of workers and 
management, and also in providing a forum for interaction between 
the two groups. Participation, indirectly through their 
representatives on safety committees, is possible for the work-
force when health and safety matters are dealt with in the Local 
Author; ty . It is partly up to individuals as to how much 
advantage they take of this opportunity to have their views 
expressed. The enforcement of safety rules should not violate 
the worker value of participation if workers used the available 
channels to provide input when rules are being discussed or drawn 
up. 
Management Values 
(i) Maximising production 
If the safety rules were closely enforced by supervisors, 
the value of production maximisation may be violated. The 
reasons for this are as for those concerning the worker value of 
maintaining income - that if corners are not cut and work carried 
out speedily the amount of work produced in a given time may 
decrease. A comment from one safety representative states 
that: 
If ••• the hahits of both mcmagement and men that the 
quickest way is the best way are hard and slow to 
change. " 
Gou1dner (1954) states that however much safety work was 
justified in terms of its production consequences these two manage-
ment values did not always coincide. Management's stake in 
production was so compelling that they sometimes neglected safety 
when there was a di ve rgen ce of in te res ts . For example when the 
gypsum mine Gou1dner studied was short-staffed, new workers were 
needed immediately and medical examinations were not carried out 
upon the new workers until after they had begun working in the 
mine. 
Roy (1952) found that line foremen were willing to interfere 
with formal rules a~d regu12tions tc ensure that shcpfloor workers 
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reached their piecework targets. However, other groups in 
management didnot participate in such subversive practices. 
However, although safety rules may in some circumstances 
slow down production, a lack of accidents will mean that 
production can continue smoothly without stoppages to administer 
first aid, to investigate what occurred, to interview other 
employees and to get workers who witnessed the accident - and 
who may be suffering from shock, back to work. 
(ii) Maximising profit 
The management value of maximisation of profit or profit 
satisficing may be threatened in the short-term by the implementa-
tion of the safety programme and the enforcement of the rules. 
This can occur as a result of management investing money initially 
to bring conditions in the workplace up to standard. The improve-
ments and equipment on which the money is spent can be regarded as 
a long-term investment in safety which, because of a resulting 
decrease in the number of accidents, may increase profitability 
over the years. However, if management take a short-term perspec-
tive of their expenditure on safety, there may appear to be a 
detrimental effect on their ability to maximise profit for that 
period, because of the increased cost of safety. 
Ashford (1976) makes the point that it has been widely 
noted that the most profitable firms in industry are typically 
also the safest and many firms with clear safety and health 
problems may be economically marginal. Although there are many 
factors associated with these situations described above, the 
point to be made is that profitability and safety are not mutually 
exclusive. The workplace can be made safer and healthier partly 
by means of education and co-operation between management and 
workforce neither of which requires heavy capital expenditure. 
However, in the case of the Local Authority in this study 
there is no evidence to suggest that management take this view 
about investment in safety. The public sector tends to be 
sheltered from the obligation of maximising profit and the four 
safety officers when interviewed said that they had never had 
any problems in getting money for safety equipment, etc. Senior 
managers also said that they got safety budgets granted by the 
Council without opposition. So in this case, the value of profit 
maximisation is not violated in the way it might be in the private 
sector. 
(iii) Humanitarian values 
These values genuinely pursued by management should not be 
violated by enforcement of the safety rules in a structured safety 
programme. 
The Government in its role as good employer has already 
been discussed and, from impressions gained through observations 
at various workplaces and from interviews, it appears that the 
Local Authority provides good facilities and equipment for its 
employees. The wish to treat employees in a humanitarian way 
should legitimate the enforcement of safety rules if management 
appreciate that it is shopfloor workers who are nearest to 
potential hazards, and that one of the main reasons by procedures 
must be followed is to protect these workers at risk from injury 
and suffering. 
(;v) Legal responsibility 
From interviews with senior managers and hearing comments 
made by them at safety committee meetings, the researcher strongly 
believes that they are very much aware of their legal responsibil-
ities towards their employees with regard to health and safety. 
They are aware that they can be prosecuted by the HSE and obviously 
want to make sure that this does not happen. This is one 
management value which cannot be said to be violated by enforcement 
of the safety rules, indeed it may be said to be the main underlying 
motive behind the instigation and implementation of safety rules. 
Abeytunga (1979), in a study of construction site supervisors, 
found that they imposed limitations and boundaries to the expecta-
tions of their safety role in certain ways. One method is to 
limit their safety activities to complying with legal requirements. 
This indicates that although these supervisors were restricting 
their contribution by various means, for example leaving individual 
workers to cope with some hazards, accepting some hazards as 
inevitable, and categorising some activities as outside the 
boundaries of supervisory duties, they were conscious of their 
legal responsibilities and of the need to fulfil them. 
(v) Good management/workforce relations 
If management were very s~gly to enforce the safety rules 
with the frequent use of discipline, the result could be a deter-
ioration of management/employee relations which could have lasting 
results. There is evidence described in Chapter Eight from the 
Local Authority which suggests that discipline is only used as a 
last resort, so enforcement may not violate the value of the 
fostering of good management/workforce relations. The safety 
committee may have the effect of increasing solidarity and 
decreasing conflict by facilitating the free interchange of 
attitudes and opinions and allowing workforce representatives 
to express directly to management any points raised by the work-
force. 
However, there is one aspect of worker/management interaction 
over health and safety which could effect a deterioration in the 
relationship between the two groups. After inspections, or as a 
result of items brought to their attention by those they represent, 
safety representatives go to management or approach them at safety 
committees with items of work to be done or improvements to be 
made. There seem to be differing perspectives from management 
and safety representatives as to what should happen next with 
regard to the time taken for work to be carried out. This point 
was brought out several times in the study done in the Local 
Authori ty: 
"The prob lem with safety representatives is that they 
expect things to be done at once." (Chi ef Engi neer) 
"There is a danger that the regulaticr.s can be taken 
too far and may become unrealistic especially ur.ere 
there are financial limi tations priorit r : es nrust be 
set and everthing cannot be done at once." (Senior manager) 
'~ometimes it has to be explained tha~ things car.r~t 
au.uays be put right at once. " (Senior manager) 
"We have a fairly good reZationshA:p wi-tlr; management 
but some de la:us do occur which may cause frustrat::on 
for the safetb' representative." (Safety representative) 
"Managemen t say the work is in hand and think tr.at 
means its been attended to." (Safety representative) 
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So it can be seen that on the whole good workforce/management 
relations should not be violated by the rules, although certain 
differences of opinion about the speed of progressing of necessary 
work can emerge which can have a detrimental effect on such 
re 1 ati onshi ps . 
If either group's values were being violated by enforcement of 
the rules, one would expect conflict to result. However, in the 
Local Authority there was little evidence of overt conflict. 
Both groups were asked if they had experienced conflict with the 
other (safety representatives/supervisor) over a health and safety 
issue. The results are seen in Table 10.5. 
TABLE 10.5 Exaerience,of conflict reported by safety representatives 
an supervl sors 
IIHave you ever experienced conflict wi th a safety represen-
tative/supervisor over a health and safety issue?" 
Safety representatives 
Supervi sors 
Yes (%) 
23 
5 
No (%) 
77 
95 
N 
66 
86 
Again a majority in each group reported experiencing no 
conflict, which may mean that the values of neither side are being 
violated in the course of the enforcement of the rules, although it 
is an over-simplification to say that a lack of reported conflict 
is enough to indicate that both sides' valuesareupheld. The 
difference between the percentages of the two groups who replied 
that they had experienced conflict has been discussed in the chapter 
on safety representatives. 
When discussing the apparently low level of overt conflict to 
be found in the Local Authority it may be interesting to put 
forward some possible reasons for this situation. The Government 
role as a good employer has been discussed and in addition to this, 
there is the bureaucratic nature of local government where conflict 
is 'institutionalised'. A system of rules and procedures, and 
committees is accepted as part of the operation of a local authority. 
Decision-making is notoriously slow because of the use of precedent, 
the number of tiers in the hierarchy which may make communication 
slow, and the situation where managers may delay making decisions 
before consulting their superiors. Because of their bureaucratic 
organisation, local authorities may be slower than private industry 
to adapt, and employees may have to get used to this - frustrating 
though it may be. It may be a trade-off situation between this 
frustration and the security of employment which until now has 
been afforded to workers in the public sector unlike many of those 
in the private sector. Trade union membership is encouraged in 
local government and joint consultation procedures where prevalent 
earlier than in private industry. 
For a fuller discussion of some of these differences be~Jeen 
the public and private sectors, see Chapter Seven. 
The fact that this Local Authority had not opposed the 
granting of safety budgets and hac been supportive towards s2fety 
representatives attending courses probably reduced the need for 
open confl i ct. Both negotiating and consultative procedures for 
health and safety existed and management's reluctance to use 
disciplinary procedures for breaches of health and safety rules 
meant that the trade unions did not often find it necessary to be 
in open conflict with management over healtr, and safety issues. 
Summary 
Whose values are violated by enforcement of the rules? 
Of the four workers' values identified, personal well-being, 
cleanliness and neatness and also participation are not violated 
by enforcement of the rules. 
Independence and autonomy may be violated in some individuals 
if, for example, they are forced to wear protective clothing when 
they are not convinced of its usefulness. The strict enforcement 
of safety rules may violate the worker value of maintenance of 
income for those on payment by results systems. However, if 
workers are not involved in accidents at work because safety rules 
are enforced, their income is more secure than if they are laid 
off for some time to recover from injuries sustained in accidents. 
Five management values were examined, and it is suggested 
that humanitarian values and legal responsibilities rather than 
being violated by enforcement of the rules, are upheld and justified 
by enforcement of safety rules. Profit maximising or satisficing 
is not in danger in the public sector if safety rules are enforced 
as the profit motive is not relevant in a Local kuthority. However, 
the profit motive has been discussed in a theoretical context in 
this chapter because of its importance in the private sector. The 
management value of maximising production may be violated by strict 
enforcement of safety rules where payment by results systems are 
used and strict adherence to safety rules may slow down workers. 
However, fewer accidents due to following safe work procedures may 
also ensure consistent output and so help to ensure maximum 
production. Good management/workforce relations could be violated 
by enforcement of safety rules if they were backed up by frequent 
disciplinary procedures. However, discipline is rarely used, 
education being preferred as a means to change behaviour. There 
is little evidence in the Local Authority of the overt conflict 
one might expect to find it either sides' values were being 
viol ated. 
4. What are the standard explanations of deviations from the rules? 
Gouldner said that in a Representative Bureaucracy, deviance 
is attributed to ignorance or well-intentioned carelessness. This 
is described as the 'utilitarian' conception of deviance. 
Accidents are not caused by deliberate actions, but are 
uni ntenti ona 1 . Breaking of the safety rules may be because of a 
concern for production (see the effect of the bonus system) or may 
be due to ignorance, for example back injuries due to the lack of 
information regarding kinetic lifting techniques. 
Gouldner found that in his study, safety work was unlque 
because management believed that adherence to the safety 
programme could be secured by way of 'education' rather than via 
discipline and punishment. There was an emphasis on reports; 
accident records were viewed as educational or fact finding. 
The Local Authority run safety training courses for supervisors 
and for senior managers and training the workforce is emphasised as 
being an important and continuous part of supervisors' responsibil-
; ti es . The safety officers carry out trainirg in their 
department, for example specialist courses such as sewer-walking in 
the Drainage Department and courses on kinetic lifting and handling 
in the Water Supply Services. 
Bad supervision is another possible reason for deviations from 
the rules and in the Local Authority safety training for supervisors 
is seen as important with compulsory training for all supervisors 
at a course un by the Local Authority itself. Supervi sors are 
in turn expected to train the workers they supervise in correct 
procedures and in the use of protective clothing and equipment. 
The Robens Report emphasised the effect of apathy, lack of 
interest and lack of motivation upon safe working. Both safety 
representatives and supervisors in the Local Authority were asked 
if they got the support of the workforce. The 22% of safety 
representatives and 33% of supervisors who answered that they 
did not get the support of the workforce were asked to give 
reasons why they felt they did not get support. The main reasons 
given were lack of interest and not caring about safety so there 
is apparently some apathy in evidence among the workforce in the 
Loca 1 Author; ty. 
However, questions asked in the present study about the use 
of discipline which were discussed before, do show that management 
are reluctant to use this method to ensure conformity to the 
safety rules. The complaints of supervisors about lack of 
authority to enforce the rules reinforce this lack of the use of 
punishment by management found by Gouldner. 
summary 
What are the standard explanations of deviation from the rules? 
In the Local Authority, emphasis is placed on safety training 
at all levels and management are reluctant to use discipline to 
ensure conformity to the safety rules and, according to several 
supervisors, have not invested them with sufficient authority to 
enforce the rules. 
The use of ignorance or lack of sufficient training to 
explain deviation from the rules is similar to Gouldner's 
description of Representative Bureaucracy. 
5. What effects do the rules have on the status of the participants? 
Gouldner says that deviation from the rules impairs the status 
of superiors and subordinates, while conformance ordinarily permits 
both groups a measure of status improvement. He cites the example 
of the safety programme increasing the prestige of workers I jobs 
by improving the cleanl~ness of the plant, that is good housekeeping) 
as well as enabling workers to initiate action through safety 
meetings. The programme also facilitated management's ability 
to realise its production obligations and legitimately provided it 
with extended control over the workforce. 
In the Local Authority, conformance to the safety rules can 
improve status in various ways: 
1. Safety meetings can enhance workers I status by allowing them 
to initiate action by providing an input to the safety 
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policy and procedures of the organisation. 
2. A safe, clean work environment through good housekeeping 
can increase the prestige of workers' jobs by them being 
employed by an efficient, well-run organisation with a 
good accident record and a good reputation. 
3. Safety representatives may feel increased status/power 
from their role as monitors of safety standards. 
4. Belonging to a work group which observes the safety rules 
and is free from accidents may increase the status of 
workers. 
5. An authoritarian management may feel that their status is 
increased by the conformance of workers to the safety rules, 
that is, it gives them another legitimate way of controlling 
the workforce. Supervisors particularly may experience 
this effect. 
6. A paternalistic management may see their 'caring' role as 
enhanced by the conformance of the workforce to safety rules. 
7. Increased productivity due to increased morale resulting 
from fewer accidents can enhance the status of management on 
the one hand because they can fulfil their production 
obligations, and of workers on the other, who can increase 
their earnings. 
Deviance from the safety rules can impair the status of 
management because their safety programme is seen to be failing 
which could be due to apathy, resistence from the workforce or lack 
of education. It can also impair the status of the workforce 
--~ 
I 
through the fact that they work in an organisation with a bad 
reputation for accidents and where morale is low and workers 
feel that management do not care about them. 
One exception which should be noted here, is that in some 
cases where workers have negative attitudes to health and safety, 
their status may be reduced if they have to conform to safety 
rules, for example wearing protective clothing, because of a loss 
of individual freedom. 
Summary 
What effects do the rules have on the status of the participants? 
From data collected from employees at all levels of the 
Local Authority, it appears that all groups wish to see conformance 
to the safety rules and that this can only be beneficial to all 
parties. Of the seven ways of improving status described above, 
most are characteristic of representative bureaucracy with the 
exception of number five, which concerns authoritarian management 
and its increased control over the workforce. This is more 
indicative of a Punishment-centred Bureaucracy. 
SUMMARY 
Some of the areas which have been discussed in relation to 
Gouldner's study and how it relates to the present study are: 
1. Workers' attitudes towards safety and the degree of support 
they give to safety representatives and supervisors. 
According to Gouldner, they are concerned about injury, 
death and loss of income. In this study, on the whole 
there is considerable worker support, for both supervisors 
and safety representatives over health and safety matters, 
however, there is evidence of some apathy as described by 
Robens. 
2. The use of education as opposed to punishment by management. 
There was generally found to be a lack of the use of 
disciplinary procedures for health and safety, senior 
management stating that they see this only as a last resort. 
3. The role of the supervisors was discussed and their complaint 
that they lack the authority to enforce the rules was 
discussed. 
4. The interdependence of safety and production and the effects 
of the bonus scheme on safe working were discussec, and the 
views on this subject of safety representatives, supervisors 
and senior management were compared. 
5. The reported effects on productivity of a safe working 
environment were described. 
6. The opinion of senior management with regard to health and 
safety was ascertained from interviews and seemed positive 
as shown in various ways already described when discussing 
the degree of senior management commitment to health and 
safety. 
7. Safety meetings can be used to provide an opportunity for 
input via workers' representatives to the safety programme 
and also to help provide a forum for discussion of safety 
issues between trade unions and management. Safety meetings 
can act as a safety valve by facilitating the expression by 
representatives of the workforce of issues which, if not 
openly discussed with management, may in the long-term have 
a detrimental effect on industrial relations in the 
organisation. 
Having looked at some of the characteristics seen as central to 
representative bureaucracy by Gouldner, an attempt was made to 
test out this model with regard to the Local Authority in the 
present study. It was found that with a few exceptions the 
Gouldner model is a close fit. A diagram can now be drawn to 
illustrate this Imperfect Representative Bureaucracy Model to 
show in which areas the original model and the imperfect model 
differ. 
It can be seen that the ma1n differences are: 
1. There is only a limited input by the workforce when safety 
rules are being initiated. 
2. The rules are to some extent enforced by management. However 
discipline is not much used to back up this enforcement. 
Complaints about a lack of authority to enforce the rules 
were reported from supervisors. 
minimum of enforcement of the rules. 
There is therefore a 
3. Some management values and some worker values r7ia~ be 
violated by enforcement of the safety rules. These ; ncl ude 
the management values of maximising production and the 
development of good ~anagement/workforce relations. The 
workforce values which may be violated are maintenance of 
income and indepencence anc autonomy. 
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36f 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF-REGULATION 
11.1 Introducti on 
In this chapter self-regulation refers to self-regulation 
of health and safety at work. There are other examples of se1f-
regulation in industry and, where relevant, these will be specific-
ally menti oned. 
In Chapter Three, self-regulation was defined and described 
in terms of the Report of the Robens Committee (1972) and the 
present chapter starts by examining the background to this Report. 
Employment legislation which exemplifies self-regulation 
in industry will be discussed in relation to the move from volun-
tarism which has occurred over the last ten to fifteen years. 
The increase in industrial democracy and worker participation as 
a means of or as one aspect of self-regulation in recent years is 
examined and applications of worker participation in health and 
safety at work are described. Finally, an assessment will be 
made of the effects of the present economic recession on the 
effectiveness of self-regulation and tentative predictions made 
as to the future of self-regulation. 
11.2 The background to and the development of self-regulation 
The Committee on Safety and Health at Work which was chaired 
by Lord Robens was appointed in May 1970 by Barbara Castle, then 
Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity in the Labour 
Government, as a Committee of Inquiry with the following terms of 
reference: 
• 
'To review the provision made for the safety and health of 
persons in the course of their employment (other than 
transp~rt workers while directly engaged on transport 
operat~ons and who are covered by other provisions) and to 
consider whether any changes are needed in: 
1. the scope or nature of the major relevant enactments~ 
or, 
2. the nature and extent of voluntary action concerned 
with these matters, and 
to consider whether any further steps are required to 
safeguard members of the public from hazards~ other 
than general environmental pollution~ arising in 
connection with activities in industrial and commercial 
premises and construction sites~ and to make recommen-
dations. ' 
The Robens Report was submitted in June 1972 to Maurice 
MacMillan, the Secretary of State for Employment in the Conservative 
Government. 
In the early stages of the Inquiry a memorandum which posed a 
number of questions was issued by the Committee reviewing the field 
of inquiry. Some of these questions came under the heading of 
'voluntary effort and self-help' which is particularly relevant 
to this research. Examples of some of the questions then asked 
are: 'What contributions to the prevention of accidents and ill-
health at work are or can be made by non-statutory bodies, profes-
sional organisations, insurance companies, trade unions and 
employers? ' 'How can such contributions be made more effective?' 
'Is the form of consultation on the establishment of standards 
sati sfactory? ' 'What scope is there for collective arrangements 
and agreements between employers and workers?' 'How far could 
this replace legislation?' 
It is suggested that although these questions are a useful 
guide for those giving evidence, they may affect the emphasiS of 
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the statements given. 
Copies of the memorandum were sent to the CBI, the TUC, 
government departments and to a wide range of other organisations 
along with a formal invitation to submit evidence. A general 
invitation was also issued through the press. Written submissions 
were received from 183 organisations and individuals and 38 parties 
also gave oral evidence. Individual and group visits were made 
in Britain and abroad and informal discussions carried out with 
various officials including some from the inspectorates concerned 
with safety and health at work. The Committee also commissioned 
a number of background papers to enable them to form some view of 
research approaches to the subject of health and safety at work. 
One of the headings provided as a guidance to those giving evidence 
to the Robens Committee was 'voluntary effort and self-help' and 
one of the questions posed was how far this could replace legis-
lation. Some of the submissions to Robens providing information 
on this topic are discussed below with a view to examining how 
simil~r or different are their reactions to the value of self-
help in health and safety. Most of those submitting evidence 
stated that legislation cannot be replaced by voluntary agreements 
but that a statutory framework can incorporate collective agree-
ments between trade unions and employers. This would'secure the 
provision of good facilities and working conditions above the 
minima prescribed' (Department of Trade and Industry, Evidence to 
the Robens Committee 1972). 
Several submissions, such as those of the Association of 
Municipal Corporations and the Association of Public Health 
Inspectors suggested that trade unions should actively participate 
by means of safety representatives or joint safety committees so 
36~ 
that 'trade unions could encourage employees to adhere to safety 
procedures without the need to resort to financial incentives.' 
The British Chemical Industry Safety Council of the Chemical 
Industries Association considered that workers should have the 
opportunity to have their say on safety matters possibly through a 
formal joint safety committee with representatives from management 
and each section/plant of a works, and safety as a regular item on 
the agenda of existing JCCs. They made the point that these safety 
committees should be given a meaningful programme of work to 
undertake as what was needed was more effective safety committees 
not merely an increase in their number. This point was also 
, 
brought out in the evidence from RoSPA, who considered that safety 
committees as voluntary bodies using joint consultation and 
participation should be encouraged and supported. They were not 
in favour of legislation to make joint safety committees compulsory 
as this would increase the number but would not necessarily guaran-
tee their quality or effectiveness. 
The Forestry Commission saw scope for collective agreeffients 
between trade unions and employers through safety committees 
especially in the field of the provision and use of protective 
clothing and the adoption of safe and efficient working methods. 
Employers and trade unions would have a collective responsibility 
for ensuring that agreements were followed by the employees 
concerned. 
The Department of Employment saw the development of collective 
agreements on standards of health and safety at work as limited 
but most useful in relation to joint consultation and self-
inspection at plant level. However, agreements must be underpinned 
with a statutory framework of specific health and safety 
precautions: 'The main incentive to good performance must be 
based on systematic self-inspection and the enforcement of the law'. 
The CBI stated that legislation can only provide the 
base upon which voluntary activities must be built and that in 
the sphere of positive co-operation between management and trade 
unions the initiative must come from management. 
According to the British Safety Council, a background of 
legislation is necessary, but the greatest contribution comes 
from voluntary effort or self-help as seen in the National Coal 
Board and other nationalised industries. They state that 'the 
initiation and operation of safety procedures must be jointly with 
the trade unions who have as great an interest in their members' 
safety and welfare as an employer has in his employees.' 
In direct contrast to this is the evidence from the Institute 
of Professional Civil Servants who stated that in the past too 
much reliance had been placed on self-help which can never be 
wholly effective. The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food expressed the view that it was difficult to see how safety 
could be maintained without the ultimate sanction of legislation. 
On the whole, these various sources agreed upon the 
necessity for a statutory framework within which there was 
considerable scope for voluntary effort and self-help to 
1mprove upon the minimum standards - mostly through safety commit-
tees and safety agreements. It can be seen that a mainly 
positive attitude towards the potential value of self-help from 
a wide range of parties laid the foundations for the recommendations 
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of the Robens Report for a more co-operative approach and an 
increase in self-regulation instead of enforcement of health 
and safety standards from outside agencies. At this point it 
is useful to look at what is meant by self-regulation of health 
and safety at work. 
In general terms, each individual, group, organisation or 
industry is required to measure discrepancies in its performance 
against some set criteria and to feed back the resulting assess-
ment to its policy and decision-making function in order to 
modify the way the system operates in the future - that is, to 
monitor its effectiveness. 
The HSE (1980) state that self-regulation is not the self-
enforcement of standards imposed from outside the organisation 
(the situation existing in the United States) but involves 'the 
purposeful creation and maintenance of standards of health and 
safety and the according of priorities commensurate with the risks 
generated by the activities of the organisation ' . The discre-
tionary element in self-regulation must be exercised within a 
framework of legislation, and health and safety objectives must 
be set as high as is reasonably practicable and should be seen 
by management as having equal importance with the other primary 
objectives of the organisation. 
The Robens Report expressed the Vlew that the primary 
responsibility for doing something about the existing levels of 
occupational accidents and diseases lay with those who create 
the risks and those who work with them. Because individuals who 
work in each area of an organisation have a unique knowledge of 
the processes carri ed out there, imp 1 i ci tin the Robens vi ewpoi nt 
3i2 
is a need for consultationand co-operation with employees at all 
levels in order to establish safety arrangements and safe systems 
of work. 
This consultative approach was made explicit in the Robens 
Report: 
"There is no legitimate scope for 'ba:rgaining' on 
safety and health issues, but much scope for 
constructive discussion, joint inspection, and 
participation in working out solutions.' (p2l) 
According to Barrett (1977) even the TUC were initially 
content with the advocated consultative relationship as were the 
CBI and the Department of Employment. 
The underlying philosophy of the Robens Committee is the 
unitary perspective (Fox 1974). This assumes that there will be 
no dissention as to how to achieve a safer and healthier workplace 
because both management and workforce have much to gain and nothing 
to lose. The unitary perspective on health and safety has been 
criticised by, among others, Ashford (1976) and Lewis (1977) as 
being too simple, naive, and idealistic rather than realistic. 
These criticisms were discussed in Chapter Six. 
With regard to case law and accident prevention, the 
Committee's study of the evidence indicated that the interests 
of safety are not always served by the results of the application, 
interpretation and development of legal rules through the process 
of judicial precedent. Where fault has to be proved by the 
claimant in a civil case, it has to be considered if liability is 
abso 1 ute or not abso 1 ute. The provisions of the statute may 
qualify the duties in question by the use of such phrases as 'as 
far as is reasonably practicable'. Even where the duty is 
absolute, concepts such as foreseeability may be used to soften 
the impact as in the fencing provisions of Section 14(1) of the 
Factories Act 1961. 
The Committee recommended that new legislation should be 
more enabling in character than the existing Acts so as to 
provide a more flexible instrument for dealing with the problems 
of rapid technological change. The main findings of the Robens 
Report which laid the foundations for the subsequent legislation 
on health and safety were described in Chapter Two, but the main 
points made in relation to self-regulation are reviewed below. 
The Report stated that the traditional systems of enforcement 
had placed too much emphasis on state regulation and too little 
on personal responsibility and voluntary, self-generating effort. 
Employees must be able to participate in the working and monitoring 
of arrangements for safety and health in their workplaces because 
safety should not be a management prerogative where systems were 
set up and monitored without reference to the workforce. 
" ... if the new inspection approaches ... are to work~ 
increasing reliance will have to be placed on the 
contribution that workpeople themselves can make 
towards safety monitoring." (p19) 
Worker involvement would mean communication between management 
and workers and a co-operative, consultative approach to solving 
problems. This would be put into operation through constructive 
discussion, inspection and participation. The resulting legislation 
(HASAWA) does in most aspects reflect the recommendations of the 
Robens Report, however, the SRSC Regulations which came into 
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operation four years later acknowledge a pluralistic framework 
in existence in this country and the possible use of a bargaining 
approach to health and safety issues. 
11.3 Employment legislation and the move from voluntarism 
It is important now to describe the underlying concept of 
voluntarism in industrial relations which was prevalent until the 
1960s. 
Jackson (1977) makes the point that if a ' vo1untary' system 
of industrial relations means that the State plays no part at all 
in industrial relations, then the British system has never been 
truly 'voluntary'. The State has played a restricted role and 
has tried to keep industrial relations and trade unions away from 
the courts. This can not be described as a situation where there 
is no State intervention at all. 
Voluntarism is described by White (1978) as a form of 
'industrial self-government ' where the State's role is limited 
to underpinning the collective agencies and to buttressing freedom 
in industry. According to White, under voluntarism employers 
are free to enter into collective bargaining and to recognise or 
not to recognise trade unions as legitimate representors of 
employees. Employees are free to form trade unions and are free 
to join them or not. They are also free to enter into collective 
bargaining arrangements. 
The results of collective bargaining in the form of 
negotiated terms and conditions must be adhered to by employers 
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on moral grounds and they must accord any agreed rights to employees 
who in turn must be morally bound by the conditions laid down. 
However, collective bargaining was not traditionally based 
upon legislation; collective agreements were not legally binding, 
and there was no system of compulsory arbitration. One exception 
existed when for two to three years as a result of the Industrial 
Relations Act (1971) the parties to an agreement had to state that 
it was not legally binding if that was their wish. 
Voluntarism has been commented upon in relation to industrial 
relations systems in other countries: 
"There is perhaps no major country in the world in 
which the law has played a less significant role 
in the shaping of industrial re lations than in 
Britain and in which today the law and the legal 
profession has less to do wi th labour re lations. " 
(Kahn Freund, 1953) 
"When British industrial relations are compared 
with those of the other democracies they stand 
out because they aPe so little regulated by law." 
(Phelps Brown, 1959) 
According to Farnham and Pimlott (1979) there are certain 
implications of the voluntary principle in industrial relations: 
1) a preference for free collective bargaining as a 
method of fixing pay and working conditions; 
2) the belief that a non-legal system of industrial 
relations should allow only those matters beyond 
the competence of trade unions to be determined 
by 1 aw; 
3) the desire for the complete autonomy of the 
bargaining partners in industry. 
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These objectives appear to be at variance with the prolifer-
ation of industrial relations legislation in recent years and 
the succession of incomes policies restricting collective bargain-
ing since 1964. This trend is described by Lewis (1976): 
"It wouz,d seem that the one induhitahz,y fundamental 
and irreversibz,e trend is the ever-increasing extent 
of the z,egaz, resoz,ution of the British system of 
industrial, rez,ations." 
To return to the point that there had been some state inter-
vention before the 1960s, Government intervention was mainly in 
the field of wage regulation, for example through the wages coun-
cils and in legislation such as the Terms and Conditions of 
Employment Act (1959). 
Kahn-Freund (1968) draws a distinction between legislation 
des i gned to support the co 11 ecti ve bargai ni ng process - au xi 11 i ary 
legislation - and legislation designed directly to regulate terms 
and conditions of service. Therefore not all legislation restricts 
collective bargaining. This point is also made by Wedderburn 
(1971) who states that a statutory floor of rights and legislation 
supplementary to industrial relations on for example, safety and 
training, do not 'conflict ' with State non-intervention in 
collective bargaining. They supplement and support the voluntary 
system. 
State intervention has often been with the support of both 
trade unions and employers and has served to improve working 
conditions. This point is also made by Farnham and Pimlott (1979) 
who suggest that the voluntarist tradition of collective laissez-
faire implies that legislation favouring the trade unions ;s 
acceptable to them, while that which is unfavourable to their 
interests is rejected. This rejection by trade unions of legal 
intervention has been applied inconsistently, for example they 
may oppose unwanted legislation on collective bargaining and on 
the legal status of trade unions, while welcoming law useful to 
union purposes. Some examples are the improvement of workplace 
safety, equal pay for women and a state redundancy payments scheme. 
Lewis (1974) comments upon the apparent sudden transformation 
of the attitudes of the trade unions regarding the extension of 
statutory provision which occurred during the evolution of the 
Social Contract. Even as late as the 1960s the trade unions 
were not enthusiastic about such an extension. Lewis suggests 
that perhaps the trade union movement underestimated the degree 
of legal intervention in the new laws, and has accidentally 
jeopardised the abstentionist tradition in a sudden eagerness to 
win statutory victories. 
The 1960s were described by Lewis (1976) as a 'watershed 
decade' in the role of the State in industrial relations in 
Britain. This resulted in a new series of statutory protections 
for the individual worker and witnessed a renewed attack on the 
right to strike. Two examples of State intervention through 
legislation concern the termination of employment (Contract of 
Employment Act 1963) and industrial training through the Industrial 
Training Act (1964). 
Another example of increased State intervention mentioned 
above relates to strikes and disputes. The Donovan Report (1968) 
suggested that there were too many unofficial strikes and this led 
to Government intervention in bargaining and disputes on the assump-
tion that a reduction in the extent of strike action would lead 
to improved economi c perfonnance. 
Many politicians justified greater State intervention in 
industrial relations in the late 1960s and early 1970s on the 
basis that it would lead to economic benefits, for example inter-
vention through a series of incomes policies to try to reduce the 
rate of inflation. However, according to Jackson (1977), there 
was also a political appeal which was based on evidence (from 
opinion polls for example) to show that trade unions were "too 
powerful II and "were a threat to i ndi vi dua 1 freedom". Therefore, 
moves to curb trade union power promised to pay electoral dividends, 
especially if they could be given some kind of explicit economic 
justification. It was argued that this imbalance of power had 
resulted from the State having refrained from intervention in 
industrial relations for so long and that the only way to redress 
the balance was the introduction of a new interventionist framework 
of law. 
The above is an interesting point illustrating an underlying 
concern regarding the balance of power reflected in some of the 
employment legislation of the time. This point will be dealt with 
more fully 1 a ter. 
The Industrial Relations Act (1971) introduced by the 
Conservative Government was drafted on the assumption that work-
groups and trade unions had too much power. Its main emphasis 
was upon restructuring trade union activities and making both paid 
and lay trade union officials responsible in law for the actions 
of union members. 
In 1974 a Labour Government was returned to power which had 
already drawn up a 'Social Contract' with the TUC whereby workers 
would moderate their claims for higher money wages if their 
'social wage' was improved. The very high level of inflation 
was cited as one of the underlying issues contributing to this 
alleged need for moderation. However, it is important to note 
that high wage claims are only one suggested 'cause' of inflation. 
Legislation in 1974 and 1975 was based on the converse assump-
tion to that of 1971, that is that trade unions did not have enough 
power. 
Current emphasis is on the role of the law in extending the 
scope of joint decision-making in industry and in improving the 
status and rights of the individual employee. 
The balance of the legal framework between 1974 and 1976 when 
he is writing is described by Anderman (1976): 
" ..• • the new legaZ rights are given to employees cmd 
trade unions whilst the legal restrictions and 
liabilities are applied to employees cmd employing 
organisations. " 
One concession to the trade unions was the repeal of the 
Industrial Relations Act (1971) which was replaced by the Trade 
Union and Labour Relations Act (1974) (TULRA) which basically 
reaffirmed the tradition of legal abstentionism in the area of 
strike law and collective bargaining. The Industrial Relations 
Act (1971) had stated that, as in the USA structure, collective 
agreements were presumed to be legally binding unless otherwise 
stated - a situation which was resisted by the British trade union 
movement. TULRA changed the position introduced by the Industri21 
Relations Act by stating that such agreements were not considered 
to be legally binding unless specific provisions stated that 
this was the case. This legislation reverted to the encourage-
ment of the development of traditionally British voluntary 
collective bargaining. TULRA also reversed the closed-shop 
provisions of the Industrial Relations Act in making the c1osed-
shop legal again. 
In 1972, the Robens Committee proposed that employers should 
have a general duty to consult in the way that existed in legis-
lation prescribing the functions and duties of the nationalised 
corporations, for example the Coal Industry Nationa1isation Act 
(1946), the Electricity Act (1947), the Gas Act (1948) and the 
Iron and Steel Acts (1949 and 1967). The resulting legislation 
(HASAWA, 1974) did put this provison into operation. 
Barrett (1977) states that the HASAWA (1974) departed 
radically from earlier legislation in the extent to which it made 
provision for employee involvement. For example, the general 
duty of the employer included the dissemination of such informa-
tion as was necessary to ensure the health and safety at work of 
all his employees. The Inspectorate had to provide factual 
information to employees' representatives about the premises 
where they worked and any action to be taken concerning the work-
place. 
The most important departure of the new Act from the 
philosophy of previous occupational health and safety laws was, 
according to Barrett, the inclusion of the provisions concerning 
the appointment of safety representatives and the establishment 
of safety committees to keep under review the measures take~ to 
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ensure the health and safety at work of employees. 
The Employment Protection Act (EPA) (1975) introduced some 
important measures affecting the relationships of employers and 
trade unions. Firstly, a procedure was designed to help trade 
unions obtain recognition from employers who were reluctant to 
enter into collective bargaining arrangements. Secondly, 
employers were obliged to disclose information to representatives 
of recognised trade unions if this was requested, for example 
information might be needed to facilitate collective bargaining. 
An employer was expected to observe terms and conditions of 
employment. settled through collective bargaining, which were 
equally favourable as those to be found in comparable employment 
in the same trade or industry. 
Employers were required to consult with trade union repre-
sentatives at the earliest opportunity when redundancies were 
proposed. They had to give the same notice to trade unions that 
they had to give to the Department of Employment regarding the 
reasons for the proposed redundancies, the numbers whom it was 
proposed to dismiss, and how these individuals would be selected 
and the proposed method of dismissal. According to White (1983) 
managerial autonomy was heavily circumscribed and there was 
potential for negotiations to occur over redundancy proposals. 
This enforced consultation period can be used in different ways 
by employers and trade unions as described by White. Employers 
may treat it as an opportunity to discuss the best ways of imple-
menting redundancies and may see consultation as nothing more 
than a means of explaining to workers the basis for the discussion. 
On the other hand, trade unions may use the consultation period 
as a means of trying forcibly to prevent any redundancies. 
Hickson and Mallory (1981) state that empirical findings 
show that trade unions exercise no influence over major decision-
making although they might influence the implementation of the 
effects of such decision-making, for example on redundancies. 
The Advisory, Concilliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) 
was set up and given a statutory basis under the EPA (1975). It 
was designed to assist in the smooth working of industrial 
relations through the extension of the traditional mechanisms of 
collective bargaining. It is an independent body playing a 
neutral role and it was not intended to interfere with existing 
procedures for negotiation and for the resolution of disputes. 
For example, it is not called in to enforce or to advocate the 
successive incomes policies by Governments in power. 
Another important aspect of EPA (1975) is that it repealed 
Section 2(5) of HASAWA which had allowed the election of safety 
representatives from the workforce. This change confined the 
role of safety representative to those appointed by recognised 
trade unions. This repeal was in accordance with the objectives 
of EPA by encouraging collective bargaining by recognised trade 
unions. 
Barrett (1977) considers that EPA advanced the concept of 
worker involvement in management far beyond the cautious provisions 
relating to consultation which are contained in HASAWA. She 
makes the very important point that the provisions of HASAWA 
concerning worker involvement were not devised with the objective 
of improving industrial relations, they were devised with the 
objective of overcoming the apathy in which unsafe working 
conditions tend to flourish. It may be that this apathy is 
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greatest in non-unionised establishments where employees have no 
right to consult, through their representatives, with management. 
Barrett considers that it would be most unfortunate if the philos-
ophy of satisfactory industri'al relations were allowed to conflict 
with the philosophy of safety at the workplace. 
However, although the main objective of HASAWA was an improve-
ment in safety standards, its effect upon the larger context of 
industrial relations must be considerable. The two philosophies 
of satisfactory industrial relations and safety in the workplace 
should be complementary and should reinforce each other rather 
than produce confl i ct. 
The State has played a positive part in extending collective 
bargaining not only through legislation but also by recognising 
the right of its own employees to belong to trade unions and by 
negotiating collectively with them. 
White (1978) asks if voluntarism is in decline in Britain 
and comes to the conclusion that much of the legislation since 
1974 may be said to have reinforced voluntarism for example, through 
the increase in collective bargaining advocated in EPA. In 
White's opinion, voluntarism has continued in Britain because 
there has been a broad consensus between employers and employed 
about their fitness to handle their relations more satisfactorily 
than could the State or the law courts. In addition economic 
conditions in Britain have generally favoured the continuation 
of voluntarism. He sums up the situation by stating that 
" ... freedom from legislation is quite compatible with freedom 
secured through legislation." 
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However, Hawkins (1978) considers that managers will have to 
reconcile themselves to the fact that their freedom to manage 
will be circumscribed not simply by the countervailing powers of 
trade unions and workgroups but by an increasingly complex body 
of legal rules. 
It should be noted that it ;s not the function of this 
section to describe and discuss the HASAWA and other legislation 
fully, but rather to fit these Acts into a chronological framework 
and to highlight only those aspects of the law that are relevant 
to the discussion of voluntarism and increased worker participation. 
It can be seen that the increase ;n employment legislation since 
the early 1970s has not restricted the potential contribution of 
the workforce, but on the contrary has encouraged collective 
bargaining and extended the range of topics which can be handled 
by means of negotiation between employer and employees. 
Legislation has served to increase worker involvement by 
requiring management to provide necessary information to worker 
representatives and to consult with them in certain circumstances 
for example with regard to redundancies and health and safety in 
the workplace. 
11.4 The increase 
as a means 0 
ation and industrial democrac 
Control of organisations can be of three types which may 
merge into a continuum: unilateral regulation by employer, uni-
lateral regulation by employees and joint regulation or collective 
bargaining. It is the last of these types which is to be discussed 
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here. The bargaining relationship between key negotiators is a 
power relationship which produces agreements which are pro tern 
not permanent and are mostly unwritten agreements or conventions. 
In parts of Europe and in Japan, bargaining is often between 
employers' associations and trade unions making industry-wide 
agreements. In the USA employers' associations are not as 
important and in Britain there has been a move over the last 
twenty years towards the USA model of single employer bargaining 
- for example the Government in its role of employer. The 
Government had encouraged trade unionism among its employees but 
in the 1960s was faced with inflation and the emergence of public 
sector militancy (Roberts, Loveridge & Gennard - 'Reluctant 
militants', 1972). Although reluctant to get involved with 
industrial relations legislation, the Government had to try to 
stop strikes in the public sector. To this end, the Donovan 
Commission was set up and their report was published in 1968. 
In the view of the Donovan Commission (1968): 
"Properl.y conducted col.l.ective bargaining is the most 
effective means of giving workers the right to represent-
ation in decisions affecting their working l.ives, a 
right which is or shoul.d 1x:: the prerogative of every worker 
in a democratic society." 
Collective bargaining conducted 'properly' should include all 
those issues of substance which workers and their organisations 
regard as important and should be regulated by formal, written 
procedures. 
In 1975 the Government appointed the Bullock Committee to 
look at the question of worker participation and industrial 
democracy in Britain. The Report of the Committee (1977) 
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stated that social changes over the last decade had resulted in a 
desire among employees to control the working environment and to 
have a say in decisions which affect their working lives. They 
were less prepared to accept unquestioningly unilateral decisions 
made by management. Traditional management prerogatives had 
therefore come under attack and the modern manager had had to 
develop a style of participative management which had recognised 
the necessity and the benefits of involving employees in decision-
making rather than imposing decisions upon them without consultation. 
Similarly, Lewis (1976) outlines four reasons for the increase 
in worker participation in the workplace over recent years which 
are based on empirical data. Firstly, for moral reasons, workers 
have a right to participate in decisions which affect them in their 
place of work, that is participation is part of an extension of 
democratic rights to the place. Secondly, participation can be 
seen as an exercise in power-sharing, a pragmatic recognition by 
employers of the collective power of employees in the workplace. 
Thirdly trade union activity is seen as having been responsible 
for 'pushing' managers into adopting some form of participation. 
Lastly, major political forces in Britain have advocated partici-
pation making it unwise for managers not to introduce participation 
in their organisations. 
The Bullock Report stated that in 1977 there was already a 
great deal of participation through the trade unions particularly 
at local level in collective bargaining and at national level through 
discussions between the TUC and the Government and in such tripartite 
institutions as the National Economic Development Council. 
Hawkins (1978) considers that since collective bargaining is 
essentially an integrative process, the wider its scope becomes 
the more pressure there will be on trade union negotiators to 
accept wider responsibility for the conduct of the enterprise. 
Hawkins suggests that as this sense of responsibility grows there 
will be pressure for more participation at board level. This 
extension of participation should be allowed to evolve out of the 
growing pressures of technological and organisational change, aided 
by an appropriate legal framework, and should be consistent with 
the traditions of British industrial relations. 
Both HASAWA (1974) and EPA (1975) gave legislative backing 
to specific extensions of collective bargaining. The provisions 
of HASAWA providing for safety representatives and safety committees 
have inevitably brought a whole range of issues associated with 
health and safety into the sphere of joint regulation. EPA 
provides for the extension of joint regulation into areas that 
were previously managerial prerogatives and contains important 
provisions on the disclosure of information and advance consultation 
on redundancy. (Throughout this chapter the above act is referred 
to as the EPA (1975) however it should be noted that this was 
followed by the Employment Protection Consolidation Act (1978)). 
By employee participation is meant the active involvement of 
, 
employees in decision-making in the corporate affairs of industrial 
and commercial organisations. This may include any method by 
which subordinate employees exert countervailing pressure against 
managerial control at work. 
Cuthbert and Whitaker (1977) suggest that there is a growing 
gap between the managerial conception of employee participation 
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and that of the trade unions. The overall trade union objectives 
of greater industrial democracy, giving the workforce greater 
control over their work situation, to some extent run counter to 
the expectations of management with regard to employee participation 
as a technique for increasing understanding, involvement and 
commitment and possibly improving efficiency and profitability. 
The gap revolves around the focal point of power. 
Farnham and Pimlott (1979) describe two approaches to 
participation which are not necessarily incompatible. The first, 
employee participation, is essentially task-based, concerned 
mainly with lower-level executive decision-making and basically 
integrative in its purposes. According to Farnham and Pimlott 
one of the aims of worker participation is to minimise the impact 
of power changes within the industrial infrastructure by concen-
trating on task-centred means of worker involvement. This could 
be described as a negative viewpoint where the aim of worker 
participation is to reduce devisiveness and tensions b~tween 
management and employees rather than to make a direct comparison 
to the overall effectiveness of the organisation. 
On the other hand, a more positive approach would acknowledge 
the potential contribution to increased efficiency in the creation 
of wealth by enhancing the employee's sense of involvement in 
helping to shape decisions. 
Interest groups which advocate employee participation are the 
British Institute of Management and to a lesser extent the Confed-
eration of British Industry. The methods used in task-based 
employee participation involve the use of more participative manage-
ment styles, more job autonomy and more consultation and communication 
with subordinate employees. 
The second approach described by Farnham and Pimlott is 
indirect or power-based participation. Participation is viewed 
as representative in nature, distributive in its purposes, and 
the process by which trade union representatives become increas-
ingly involved in 'legislative ' or policy-level decision-making 
in their organisations. The main methods used are more collective 
bargaining and more representative machinery in industry. The 
main aim of this type of participation is to institutionalise the 
power shift towards the trade unions in recent years and to 
increase union power-sharing with management at all levels of 
organisational decision-making. 
Farnham and Pimlott state that ultimately in Britain worker 
participation can only be extended through enabling legislation, 
and indeed it may be that legislation, some of which appears to 
be about worker protecti on, can be vi ewed as the foundati ons upon 
or the framework within which a programme for increased worker 
participation may be set. Examples of this type of legislation 
are: 
1) The Code of Practice on disciplinary practice and procedures 
in employment which states that: '~Management should aim to 
secure the involvement of employees and all levels of managemer.t 
when formulating new or revising existing ru les and procedures . .. "; 
2) the SRSC Regulations which followed the HASAWA provide a frame-
work within which employees and trade unions can agree on 
arrangements which suit their particular undertakings; 
3) a Code of Practice on disclosure of information to trade unions 
for collective bargaining suggests that management should 
formulate a policy on disclosure which is as open as possible 
in meeting trade union requirements for collective bargaining 
purposes, unless there are genuine considered reasons for 
refusal. 
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As a 'self-contained' concept, joint consultation generally 
has failed because many managements have not been prepared 
genuinely to share some measure of power and control. There has 
been little support for joint consultation from the TUC who state 
that increased participation must come from the extension of 
existing collective bargaining and joint regulation, and by the 
introduction of parity representation of the trade unionised 
workforce at board level. 
An exception to this lack of support for consultation was 
the area of health and safety in the early days described above 
by Barrett (1977). Indedd health and safety is often seen as a 
'no conflict' area even by trade unions. For example, Beaumont 
(1980) found that 73% of his sample of safety representatives 
described their basic function as one of consultation with manage-
ment, and of these individuals, 74% regarded union-management aims 
in the health and safety area to be essentially the same. 
The Bullock Committee (1977) considered that the purely 
consultative system, where decision-making is a management function, 
was becoming less common. Consultation was developing to the 
point where the workforce have a de facto power of veto over 
certain management actions. As a result the Committee doubted 
the usefulness of the term 'consultative'. 
Problems regarding the use of the terms 'consultation' and 
'negotiation' were discussed in Chapter Nine, but as the terms 
are central to this chapter some repetition is unavoidable. 
Joint consultation and bargaining can be seen as complementary 
concepts as described by Daniel and McIntosh (1972). 
"The distinction between bargaining and consultation 
is largely meaningless in practice. The only 
managerial prerogative is to initiate discussion." 
Howells (1974) considers that there are four ways in which 
some form of joint machinery can be set up to represent the 
workers' viewpoint in the solution of workplace problems, 
including safety. These are: 
1. Communication - a two-way flow of information. 
2. Consultation - an exchange of views used to settle 
non-contentious safety problems. 
3. Negotiation - to bargain about matters in dispute, 
for example, contentious safety points. 
4. Participation - the right to challenge, delay or veto 
management decisions on safety grounds. 
The distinction between consultation and negotiation is obsolete, 
with consultation being part of a spectrum of worker involvement 
ranging from bare communication to full participation. 
The CBI (1970) also note the tendency for consultation to 
merge into negotiation and state that action taken by either party 
is likely to be determined by: the strength of the parties, their 
relationship and their appraisal of the situation rather than by a 
nice distinction between consultation and negotiation. 
This section has shown that social change over recent years 
has altered the expectations of the workforce towards their work. 
They expect to playa greater part in decision-making which affects 
the conditions under which they work. Legislation has increased 
worker participation, particularly by encouragement of the extensior. 
of collective bargaining but there is still a place for joint 
consultation - indeed it may be spurious to try to separate these 
two concepts. They may simply represent points on a continuum 
along which most interactions occur within the central 'grey' area. 
Worker participation in its various forms is one means of 
implementing self-regulation in organisations. The next section 
will deal specifically with worker participation in health and 
safety. 
11.5 The application of worker participation in health and safety 
The development of trade union involvement in health and safety 
The previous section described in general terms the increase 
in worker participation in industry and in this section participation 
in health and safety will be considered. 
The historical perspective of the development of trade 
union involvement in health and safety is described by Grayson and 
Goddard (1975). During the 1950s and 1960s there was a growing 
realisation among trade unions that new industrial processes were 
becoming more hazardous for workers. This led to a new safety 
awareness which is reflected in motions and debates at TUe 
conferences over the past twenty years. 
An important factor in sharpening trade union responses in 
the field of safety was the strengthening of the role of local 
bargaining, and the shop steward in many industries taking on the 
role of the key lay officer - that is in health and safety terms. 
There was also a large increase in public sector manpower accom-
panied by a corresponding growth in membership of white collar 
unions such as NALGO and ASTMS (Eaton & Gill 1981). As many 
areas of the public sector were not covered by safety legislation, 
the relevant trade unions, for example, in the public sector NUPE, 
campaigned for legislation to cover their members. This is 
particularly relevant to local authorities. 
The effects of higher expectations regarding the quality of 
working life and a growing interest in matters related to health 
among the population in general were described in earlier chapters. 
All of these points mentioned above have been involved in the 
growing trade union involvement in health and safety over the past 
two decades. 
The usefulness of legislation in tackling health and safety problems 
Hale (1983) describes early legislation related to safety as 
generally being phrased in terms of the standards to be achieved 
by a company, with much of the current legislation still being 
concerned with standards. However, recently there has been an 
increase in the discretion left to the individual health and 
safety inspector by the law he administers. Standards are now 
expressed in more general terms or qualified by such expressions 
as 'acceptable', 'adequate', 'suitable', 'so far as is reasonably 
practicable', adding an element of flexibility. 
This is in contrast to the health and safety legislation in 
the United States which is based on standards enforcement. 
Mendeloff (1979) considers this approach to be rigid and unwork-
able. He states that in the United States, because the standards 
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are so detailed, violations are commonplace and local unions can 
use the threat of inspection to give them bargaining leverage 
with management in the safety area or in some other area. 
The usefulness of legislation is doubted by Abell (1979) as, 
in his opinion, few health and safety problems can be resolved 
legalistically because there are many gaps in the provisions of 
specific regulations, and also because the Inspectorates do not 
have sufficient members to establish standards in each workplace. 
He calls this a 'regulative gap' in the control of health and 
safety at work. 
Abell seems to be inferring a standards enforcement role for 
the HSE Inspectorate who see enforcement of legally set minimum 
standards as only one strand of their work, the other being 
advisory. 
HSE Inspectorate manpower 
The point raised above by Abell regarding shortage of manpower 
in the HSE Inspectorate has important implications for the partici-
pation of the workforce in health and safety which are described 
below. 
The annual report of the Chief Inspector of Factories for 1979 
which was published in 1981 states that because of Government 
economies in public spending the Inspectorate must face a 6% cut 
in expenditure over 1982-83. The Chief Inspector makes the point 
that in the face of declining resources, if the Inspectorate are 
to concentrate on the more potentially hazardous premises and 
processes, and undertake positive and preventive strategies, 
there will not be time or resources to inspect the smallest and 
least hazardous premises except on a reactive basis. 
The HSE Inspectorate's activities have been reinforced when 
financial cutbacks have caused manpower shortages, by increased 
joint responsibility of both 'sides' of industry for self-
inspection and self-regulation. In particular, this lack of 
inspectors means that safety representatives can play an important 
role in monitoring and inspecting with a view to preventing 
accidents, rather than investigating after they have taken place. 
Contribution of the workforce 
Lewis (1974) comments on the view that apathy with regard to 
safety is considered to be due to the feeling that safety is not 
really the responsibility of the workforce. This is contrary 
to the experience of worker involvement in some companies, which 
shows that workers can 'sell' safety where management has failed 
to do so. Safety representatives and joint committees can set an 
atmosphere of awareness and can continuously monitor the workforce 
- functions which could never be performed by the Health and Safety 
Executive. 
The HSE (1980) is in agreement, stating that if properly informed 
and invited to participate in the setting of standards and maintaining 
those already agreed, workers can make a specific contribution to 
their own immediate place of work which is available from no other 
source. 
In outlining five arguments in favour of worker participation 
in health and safety, Gevers (1983) emphasises the important 
contribution to be made by the workforce. The five points are: 
Firstly, workers can contribute to the prevention of industrial 
accidents by looking for potential dangers and imminent dangers 
and notifying management of these. Secondly, workers in co-
operating in the promotion of safety become more safety conscious 
and more motivated to work safely. Thi rdly, workers' ideas, 
knowledge and experience can provide a useful contribution to the 
definition and solution of health and safety problems. Fourthly, 
Gevers considers that the desired co-operation between employer and 
employees, which is essential to improve working conditions, 
can only be effective if the relationship is based on equal partner-
ship. The final point Gevers makes is that employees whose 
'physical integrity' may be at stake have a right to be associated 
with decisions affecting them. The importance of the part played 
by workers themselves is summed up: 
'Prevention of accidents and occupational disease 
and the promotion of worker's 'well-being' cannot 
be achieved if the workers' own expe~:ence and 
evaluation of the working environment as a whole 
are not taken into account." 
Trade union power 
The move in the balance of power towards the trade unions 
up to 1979 and increased worker participation including the use of 
joint self-regulation of health and safety at interrelated. The 
SRSC Regulations in particular are seen by many sources as an 
important step towards statutory provisions for increased worker 
involvement through their representatives. 
Castle (1978) states that rather than relying on the 
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negotiating skills of staff and management, Parliament set out 
basic statutory rights in the SRSe Regulations and in doing so 
placed the initiative firmly in the hands of the trade unions. 
He considers that the powers invested in the safety representatives 
in an attempt towards policing the HASAWA are greater than any 
powers afoot for industrial democracy, for example access to docu-
ments and accident reports. 
The passage of the SRSe Regulations in seen by Abell (1979) 
as a further stage in the formal development of trade union involve-
ment in the control of health and safety at work. This is because 
of the amendments to the HASAWA at the behest of the TUe which 
confine the legal rights and privileges of safety representatives 
to those appointed by recognised independent trade unions. 
Beaumont (1983) also sees the SRse provisions of the HASAWA 
as possibly having important implications for extending industrial 
democracy because in the past there had been unilateral management 
decision-making in health and safety at work, and the framework 
of law had taken a highly 'paternalistic' attitude towards the 
issue of employee and trade union involvement. 
The SRse Regulations are also viewed by Stuttard (1979), 
among others, as the spearhead of the new health and safety 
legislation and an important extension of industrial democracy. 
This view maintains that the Regulations provide the basis for a 
practical form of worker participation which is not simply an 
extension of collective bargaining or conventional consultation, 
but a recognisable right to share in workplace affairs. 
According to Glendon and Booth (1982) the SRSC Regulations 
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were radical because they gave a statutory basis to trade union 
lay officials which runs counter to the voluntaristic tradition 
of British industrial relations, and also to the recommendations 
of the Robens Report which laid the basis for the HASAWA. They 
a lso made the poi nt that " ... the statutory requi rements introduced 
by the SRSC Regulations were designed to encourage self-regulation. 1I 
Who is responsible for health and safety? 
There appears to have been a change over recent years with 
regard to the responsibility for safety. In this case rather 
than a legal responsibility which is laid out in the legislation, 
it is the overall, moral responsibility that is being considered. 
The tradi ti ona 1 vi ew of regul ati on is descri bed by Abell 
(1979) as the employer being responsible for health and safety, 
a situation which employers have accepted and indeed they have 
tried to maintain a prerogative in health and safety matters. 
The trade unions have also played their part in seeking to ensure 
that the employer accepts responsibility by paying adequate 
compensation and introducing preventive measures. 
Lewis (1974) considers that the great emphasis placed on 
alleged common interests and managerial prerogatives has been a 
serious impediment to establishing a safer working environment. 
The distinction between consultation and negotiation which was 
theoretically based on the ultimate location of authority 
(consultation leaves the final decision to management) is now 
obsolete. Management must realise that getting the right 
decision taken, accepted and implemented is far more important 
than prerogative and so the merger of consultation and negotiation 
machinery should be accelercted. 
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Lewis continues that while the initiative must come from 
management. it is the unions' function to job management (see 
Chapter Seven regarding the safety representative role of 
management pressuriser). His view is that not only is effective 
worker participation essential to raising the status of safety, 
but that collective bargaining is the only realistic way of achiev-
i ng thi send. 
However. health and safety has sometimes been considered to 
be a subject which is suitable for a joint problem-solving approach 
by trade unions and management - for consultation rather than 
negotiation. Beaumont (1983) describes the necessary prerequisites 
for successful joint problem-solving as mutual trust, friendliness 
and respect between trade union and management representatives 
within a supportive industrial relations climate. 
The responsibility for dealing with health and safety problems 
has changed over recent years from being purely a management 
responsibility to being a joint one. This may take the form of 
management taking the initiative having been prompted by the 
trade unions, or a joint problem-solving approach, or of course a 
mixture of the two. 
What type of participation? 
There are several factors which will affect the type of 
participation ;n an organisation, and the strategies employed 
to put it into action. 
The type of worker participation in health and safety at 
industry level differs between the public cnd private sectors, 
reflecting the extent of joint consultation and barg2ining in eac~. 
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The public sector has a higher percentage of employees belonging 
to trade unions, with joint trade union/management machinery of 
various types for discussing occupational health and safety 
issues. In the private sector, there is a general absence of 
formal machinery for joint discussion on health and safety beyond 
individual plant or company level. 
The question of the use of consultation or negotiation between 
management and trade unions has been discussed in previous chapters. 
However, a range of views on this question related specifically 
to health and safety is given below to demonstrate that there is 
by no means consensus regarding the 'best' strategy to be employed. 
Safety committees provide an opportunity for consultation, 
and before 1977, they fell within the voluntaristic tradition of 
British industrial relations which was being eroded by increased 
legislation. 
'~espite some trade union antipathy towards safety 
committees, a large proportion of those participating 
in their operation see them as useful parts of the 
consultative process in indust~." (Incomes Data 
Services 1979) 
A survey carried out in the private sector by Cressey et ale 
(1981) indicated that a large number of managers considered consul-
tation to be the most appropriate mechanism for dealing with health 
and safety issues, but nearly one quarter of employee respondents 
regarded it as a negotiable issue. However, there was a large 
measure of agreement between management and employee respondents 
that a high degree of workforce involvement in health and safety 
existed. 
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However, negotiation is seen by many as the most effective 
strategy in management/trade union interactions. Eva and Oswald 
(198l) state that it is important·that health and safety at work 
is seen by trade unions as one part of the overall objectives when 
negotiating with the employer and should be part of the existing 
negotiating structure. In the same vein, Ruheman (198l) states 
that, "Health and safety is increasingly an issue for negotiation 
through the normal industrial relations machinery and less for 
j 0 i n t con s u 1 ta t ion. II 
When examining the strategy of negotiation we may ask what 
causes the development of a negotiating relationship. The develop-
ment of bargaining awareness is described by Brown (1973): 
" ..• empZ-oyees can gain bargaining (1];)areness on an issue 
from a n7A11Wer of causes. It may be that management 
has manifestZ-y faiZ-ed to protect their interests - for 
instance~ by permitting -working conditions tc becor"'~ 
unbea1Y1h le. " 
Abell (1979) relates this situation to health and safety 
problems, one example being the discovery by employees of the with-
holding of information about hazardous materials. Lack of trust 
between employers and employees could lead to the emergence of 
bargaining awareness. 
When discussing the strategies used in self-regulation 
differences may occur between national level and plant level. 
AShford (1976) sees self-regulation at plant level as hinging 
upon voluntary management-labour interaction and states that 
although the general duty on the employer to consult with 
employees has persuasive force, it lacks specification. On 
the national level, the policy of self-policing ;s manifested in 
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a greater reliance on consultation rather than legal coercion 
in enforcement and in the setting and use of standards. Voluntary 
standards and Codes of Practice setting out minimum standards will 
provide flexibility. 
Similarly Glendon and Booth (1982) suggest that there is 
scope for both consultation and negotiation on health and safety 
issues. Relationships at national level and where there is 
legislation governing consultative arrangements are likely to be 
characterised by broad consensus on such issues. However, at work-
place level, the different interests of the parties over health 
and safety issues may result in bargaining relationships. 
This section has discussed the application of worker partici-
pation in health and safety. The place of legislation in dealing 
with problems was discussed and also the shortage of HSE Inspec-
torate manpower which is one of the reasons why the safety repres-
entative role of inspector/monitor is particularly important in 
self-regulation in the organisation. The question of whose moral 
responsibility safety is was discussed along with the strategies 
used in self-regulation. The ideal situation exists when there 
is joint responsibility for setting and maintaining safety standards 
in the workplace and there seems to be support for the use of both 
consultation and negotiation by management and trade unions. 
Self-regulation and the duty to consult 
The HSE (1980) describes self-regulation as part of "a changing 
philosophy away from enforcement of safety legislation, towards 
incorporation of the relevant aspects of legislation into the rules 
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and practi ces tha t an orga ni sa ti on deri ves for its own use. II It 
is the safety policy which is being written about here. and although 
safety policies are not studied in thei r own right in the present 
study, the standards and the arrangements for monitoring them are 
the central factors for self-regulation in an organisation. 
Self-regulation may be better described in the health and 
safety context as joint self-regulation because the term could 
equally well mean unilateral self-regulation by management, or 
indeed trade unions, of issues concerning either or both of them. 
The underlying philosophy of self-regulation in health and 
safety stems from the Robens Report, that is it can be used as a 
means of dispelling what Robens described as the apathy of the 
workforce towards safety which they perceived as purely a management 
rspons i bil i ty. The co-operation, participation and involvement 
of the workforce would hopefully lead to changed attitudes with 
responsibility for maintaining a safe working environment being to 
some extent "shared" (morally if not legally) between management 
and workforce. Apathy was not only attributed to the workforce, 
and it may be that worker involvement would also have the effect 
of motivating an apathetic management to get things done. 
However, as we live in a pluralistic society with various 
interest groups having to co-exist, it would not, in my opinion, be 
practicable to expect self-regulation to function without some form 
of legislative framework within which it can operate. 
The legislation puts a duty on employers to consult with 
trade union safety representatives and to disclose relevant 
infonnati on. There is no duty upon the trade union side to consult 
or to co-operate with management. There are several reasons why 
management must consult with employee representatives and provide 
them with information. 
The first point is that having looked at the political per-
spective of the emergence of recent health and safety legislation 
and the increase in worker participation, it can be seen that these 
aspects were a concession to the trade unions from the Government -
part of the improvement of working life given in exchange for wage 
restraint as part of the Social Contract. 
Secondly, it is employers who are in receipt of information 
needed by employees and who have more power and influence, and one 
may ask if, without the 'encouragement' of legislation. they would 
voluntarily share information with safety representatives. The 
old attitude of 'information means power' may still obtain with 
some employers who are unwilling to share their power and influence. 
Therefore when looking at the emergence of self-regulation it is 
necessary to be aware of the wider social and political trends in 
Britain. Social change is a slow and sometimes painful process 
which may require a catalyst to facilitate it. Legislation which 
regulates the relationship between management and workforce can 
act as a catalyst in this way. Recent law relating to health and 
safety can be said to be less punitive, less concerned with enforce-
ment and more concerned with changing attitudes, for example to 
shared responsibility for health and safety. Legislation can 
'modify' voluntarism not replace it by helping to encourage true 
joint self-regulation which then can be left to individual employers 
and employees to operationalise in ways which are acceptable to 
both parties, that is consultation, negotiation or most commonly a 
mixture of the two strategies. 
Although health and safety legislation can be seen as part 
of the trend of increasing worker participation and industrial 
democracy, it can also be seen in its own right as a step in the 
advancement of employee participation. 
In the light of the historical perspective outlined in the 
previous sections of this chapter, it is suggested by this 
researcher that the development of the concept of self-regulation 
within a legal framework can be described as evolutionary rather 
than revolutionary. 
11.6 Self-regulation in an economic recession and the outlook 
for the future 
Over the past few years in Britain, the economic recession 
has undoubtedly had an effect upon most aspects of industrial 
relations and trade union/management relations including health 
and safety at work. Negotiation between management and trade 
unions at plant level could lead to formal safety agreements as 
described in Chapter Nine. However Brown (1983) makes the 
point that employers did not generally take advantage of the oppor-
tunity provided by the Industrial Relations Act (1971) to make 
collective agreements legally enforceable. He suggests that in 
the current economic climate, managements are able to force 
through changes in informal work practices with little or no 
opposition. Therefore, IIformal agreements would appear to make 
even 1 ess sense. II 
Glendon and Booth (1982) point out that in recent years there 
has been an increase in worker participation in health and safety, 
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and advances in technical and research knowledge of workplace 
hazards. However. it is still the case that economic and business 
criteria may act as constraints with regard to the degree of 
participation in health and safety that workers have been able to 
obtai n. 
According to Ruhemann (198l), the trade unions are exercising 
restraint with regard to complaining about safety in a worsening 
economic climate as it is possible that their members may lose 
their jobs regardless of the strength of workplace union organisation. 
It is known that restrictions on Government spending have resulted 
in a reduction in HSE manpower levels, so an interview was arranged 
in May 1983 with Stephen Grant, Scottish Director of HSE, to obtain 
his views on the effects of the recession. He stated that the 
validity of self-regulation is questionable. In 1974-1979 health 
and safety was booming and was favourably considered by all political 
parties. However since 1979 there has been, in Mr Grant's view, 
a more 'realistic' viewpoint and the health and safety boom is 
over. The recession has placed economic pressures and constraints 
on both management and the workforce. The ability of workers to 
press for safety measures has been blunted as for many of them the 
first priority is to have a job, leaving high wages and a safe 
place of work as secondary considerations. People do not want to 
risk losing their jobs by reporting problems to the HSE. The 
Inspectorate is also operating with reduced numbers and this inevit-
ably means fewer enforcement visits and an adjustment of inspection 
p ri 0 ri tie s . 
In an article in 1983 Stephen Grant stated that, 
"many managements ir. the public o:r local aut~OY~~Y sec~c~ 
have not yet faced the deva8 tating se If-exar.,,nat'Z-cr. (11.':- t;: 
:reOQY'c- tc accour;:-cJ:-:~l:t", fcy' safet1-) 
~ '" . . "" 
cury·cr:t wo:rld Y't?Ct8S:·C~~." 
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He feels that local authorities are shielded from economic pressure 
and problems of job security and indeed with regard to health and 
safety are in the situation of the private sector several years 
ago before the recession. 
There are obviously considerable effects upon self-regulation 
in health and safety of the present economic recession. Resources 
are scarce both in terms of money to spend on improving conditions 
at work and also for Inspectorate manpower. It may be that not 
only it it impossible to improve standards, but even to maintain 
present standards. It would be regretable if, after years of 
progress, the situation with regard to safety in industry were to 
deteriorate. 
Quality of working life may become a low priority issue in a 
workforce where maintaining a job is beyond the hopes or aspirations 
of a proportion of its members. If workers' expectations of work 
are reduced in this way, the trade unions will not have the whole-
hearted support of their members and therefore bargaining over 
safety will decline. In this way, joint self-regulation may then 
become the exception with managerial prerogative in health and 
safety decision-making and problem-solving re-emerging as the norm. 
The onus would be put on to management to self-regulate. This 
would not only be a backward step with regard to standards of 
safety in industry, but also an unfortunate interruption in the 
progress of worker participation and industrial democracy in Britain. 
It is also possible, although there is a lack of empirical evidence, 
that management are using the decrease in trade union bargaining 
power to increase their control over the workforce. The effects 
of the economic recession upon management/trade union relationships 
is more complex and subtle than may at first appear. However, 
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these effects are still speculative until research has been under-
taken to examine the situation. 
In order to gather information about the place of self-
regulation in the future, the researcher decided to write to Lord 
Robens asking for an interview. However, no reply was received, 
which was unfortunate because it would have been particularly 
interesting to hear directly from Lord Robens if his conception 
of self-regulation is consistent with the type of joint setting 
and maintaining of standards to be found in industry today. 
Self-regulation as seen by the Robens Committee exemplified 
a consultative approach based on a unitary perspective of industrial 
relations. whereas self-regulation in practice, at least in the 
Local Authority in this study, involved both consultation and neg-
otiation and was based on a pluralistic perspective. I n many ways, 
the pluralistic approach may enhance self-regulation because 
competing interests are a good spur for progress - management are 
kept 'on thei r toes' and trade unions maintain an interest as do 
the workers they represent. 
The previous section indicated that joint self-regulation may 
have lost much of its impact and effectiveness because of the 
present economi c recess ion. For thi s reason it may ot be 
possib to fortell what the future holds in health and safety, 
in the same way as it is difficult to forecast when, if ever, the 
economic situation may start to improve. If a recovery does 
Occur, the trade unions may be able to regain at least some of 
their bargaining power and the employers will not be able to use 
economic hardship as a reason to cut back on areas such as safety. 
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11.7 Summary 
An attempt has been made in this chapter to examine the 
philosophy behind the concept of self-regulation not in isolation, 
but within the context of British industrial relations. The 
Robens Committee and the selected evidence received by it were 
discussed in some detail because the resulting Robens Report 
provides one of the two underlying elements of the philosophy of 
self-regulation. This was the perceived need to overcome 'apathy' 
regarding health and safety and the encourage workforce involvement 
through consultation with management. 
In order to examine the historical development of self-
regulation within a legislative framework, a section described 
employment legislation and the move away from voluntarism in 
British industrial relations in recent years. This showed the 
HASAWA and the SRSC Regulations as part of a range of employment 
laws which effected a change with regard to the relationship 
between the Labour Party which later became the Government of the 
day and the trade unions. An important factor with regard to 
this relationship was the Social Contract between the two parties 
which led to important contributions from each party. 
The next section involved the second underlying element of 
the philosophy of self-regulation or joint self-regulation - that 
is the link between the steady increase in worker participation 
and industrial democracy in British industry in recent years and 
self-regulation. The essence of joint self-regulation is partic-
ipation by the workforce through their representatives, and increas-
ing participation in many areas was described. The use of 
collective bargaining over a wider range of issues leads to the 
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second view of self-regulation as a natural development along with 
increased worker participation, where the parties involved use 
both consultative and negotiating strategies, which has wider 
implications for industrial relations in Britain than does the 
Robens perception of self-regulation. 
The application of worker participation in health and safety 
was described, including the use of consultation and negotiation 
over health and safety issues. 
The effects of the present economic recession on the working 
of joint self-regulation were described. There are indications 
that the reduction in bargaining power of the trade unions has, to 
some extent, reduced the effectiveness of joint regulation of 
health and safety. 
~to the place of self-regulation in the future, it is very 
difficult to try to anticipate when, if ever, some improvement in 
the present economic recession may take place, and because of the 
interrelationship between the economy, current legislation, the 
level of unemployment, and the bargaining power of the trade unions 
it is equally difficult to predict the place of self-regulation of 
health and safety in the future. 
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OVERVIEW 
12.1 Summary 
This research has focussed upon certain aspects of se1f-
regulation in health and safety in an organisation in the public 
sector - a Scottish Local Authority. Three agents of self-
regulation were described in detail - safety representatives, safety 
committees and supervisors. It was not possible in this project 
because of constraints on time to look at the part played in self-
regulation of health and safety by among others, middle and senior 
management, and safety officers. 
Various methods were used to collect data in order to examine 
the part played by each of these agents in an attempt to eliminate 
or reduce the hazards which can lead to accidents in the workplace. 
The research was based in the public sector because this is 
an area which has long been neglected by researchers in organizational 
aspects of health and safety in the workplace. Local authorities 
were not fully covered by legislation until the HASAWA (1974), and 
therefore it was interesting to see the impact that the Act has 
had in these areas. However, it should be noted that the effects 
of the HASAWA on local authorities cannot be systematically 
measured here as there is no base for comparison due to a lack of 
data regarding the situation prior to 1974. 
There are also other characteristics of local authorities 
which make them interesting to study, for example the fact that 
they are bureaucratic organisations with complex systems of rules 
and regulations which encourage the institutionalisation of 
conflict. Management actively encourage trade union membership, 
and there is a well-developed system of joint consultative 
committees. 
The public sector is sheltered from competition and the profit 
motive is not the major constraint upon spending that it is in the 
private sector. Indeed it is only recently that Government cut-
backs have begun to affect the finances in local authorities and 
forced them to set up a system of priorities to deal with work to 
be done. 
The philosophy of self-regulation was discussed in detail in 
Chapter Eleven and although there are several possible routes 
towards the reduction or elimination of hazards, for example consul-
tation and co-operation, and negotiation through collective bargain-
ing or a mixture of these, all of them require close contact 
between safety representatives and management, particularly super-
visors. For this reason, a considerable proportion of this thesis 
is given over to the examination and discussion of the strategies 
used by the parties concerned. 
A behavioural approach has been taken in the study of self-
regulation in the Local Authority, for example, there is emphasis 
on such concepts as the perceptions and attitudes of supervisors, 
safety representatives and some senior managers towards certain 
issues. In addition, the strategies used by trade union 
representatives and management were discussed and the roles 
played, in health and safety terms, by safety representatives and 
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supervisors (as perceived by themselves) were described. 
Some of the values of workers and management, were studied 
and were discussed in Chapter Ten. Potential conflicts in 
motivation were also examined. These may occur when workers, 
and indeed supervisors, may have to make the choice between 
working safely and cutting corners in order to maximise earnings 
when on a bonus system of payment. 
The HSE publication 1I~'1anufacturing and Services Industries 
1980" states that: 
"The SRSC Regulations (1977) toge"ther witt: the Code of 
Practice and HSE Guidanc,e Notes were written to ensure 
that the safety representative and the scfety co~~ttee 
were genuinely part of the process of organising the 
safe ty of the workp lace from wi thir.. " 
In the present project the SRSC Regulations were used in 
both Chapters Seven and Nine for comparisor purposes. The ro 1 e 
and functions of safety representatives and safety committees in 
the health and safety organisation of the Local Authority were 
examined and compared vJith those envisaged in the SRSC Regulations 
and other sources described in Chapters Seven and Nine. There 
was found to be a considerable coincidence between the roles and 
functions conceived on a theoretical level in the SRSC Regulations 
and the roles and functions of safety representatives as described 
by themselves in the actual situation existing in the Local Authority. 
Sa fety representa ti ves were not asked di rectly about hovi they 
perceived their role, as this may have led to answers which were 
based on the roles discussed in the SRSC Regulations. Instead 
the safety representatives were asked what aspects of their work 
they saw as being most important, and which health and safety issues 
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took up most of their time. Their responses, as well as giving 
interesting detailed information, could then be classified into 
safety representative roles as perceived by themselves. This 
then, in my opinion, provided a better basis for comparison with 
the officially stated roles in the SRSC Regulations. 
Data were collected using several methods and from various 
sources in order to examine the effectiveness of safety committees 
in the Local Authority and the part they played in self-regulation 
of health and safety in the workplace. The types of issues 
discussed at the different tiers of committees were examined as 
were actions taken on recommendations made by safety committees. 
The above issues were among the criteria used to assess the 
effectiveness of safety committees and it was concluded that in 
the Local Authority, safety committees are a useful forum for the 
exchange of views of trade union safety representatives and 
management representatives. They provide a route to accident 
prevention via consultation and co-operation in this organisation. 
When examining the part played by safety representatives and 
supervisors in the self-regulation of health and safety ;n the 
Local Authority, the relationship between the two parties is 
particularly important. The responses to questions on various 
subjects were very similar and the suggestion was made that 
present day supervisors, because of the marginal nature of their 
role which was described in Chapter Eight, may no longer fully 
identify with management goals and ideologies. Modern, unionised 
supervisors may have attitudes, perceptions and values closer to 
those of the workforce and their representatives. For example, 
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they may collude with workers to help them to maximise their 
earnings at the expense of safe working methods. 
There was little reported conflict over health and safety 
issues between trade union representatives and supervisors. 
However, of those respondents who did report conflict, a larger 
proportion were safety representatives than were supervisors. 
This may be due to supervisors being unwilling to admit to 
conflict or that they may simply not perceive health and safety 
to bea conflict area. Safety representatives may feel that 
they need to 'fight' to improve health and safety conditions and 
so report more conflict. 
When askec about their perceptions of their relationship, 
in terms of the use of negotiating and consultative strategies, 
it appeared the: little use was being made by either safety 
representatives or supervisors of a purely negotiating strategy. 
Approximately hc:f of those in both groups saw their relationship 
as a consultativ: one and the other half saw the relationship as 
a mixture of corsultation and negotiation. (On ly 5% of both 
samples reportee using a purely negotiating strategy). 
The adaptati~n of the Lewis consensus and conflict models of 
health and safet}' which was illustrated in Figure 9.5 shows the 
use of both consJltation and negotiation in accident prevention 
in the Local Au~:ority and possible ways of empirically testing 
this model are c~scussed later in this chapter. 
The behavic~ral aspects of trade union/management interaction 
over health and safety matters in the form of the strategies used 
have been fount in the study to be related to two other variables, 
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both of which are perceptions reported by safety representative 
respondents. 
The first of these variables is the safety representatives' 
perception of the degree of commitment of senior management to 
creating and maintaining safe working conditions in the department. 
There was an association between safety representatives seeing 
management as strongly committed and the use of a purely non-
negotiating strategy. This may be because safety representatives 
feel that they do not need to use pressure in order to make 
management take notice of and take action on health and safety 
issues that are raised. 
The second variable is the safety represenatives' perception 
of whether they receive support from management when health and 
safety issues are raised. It was found that there was an 
association between safety representatives feeling that they got 
management support, and perceiving management as strongly committed 
to health and safety. The safety representatives' perceptions of 
whether or not they get the support of management, and the degree 
of commitment of management to health and safety, may affect the 
strategy used when interacting with management. No causal 
relationship can be shown, only an association. Therefore, it 
could be that the use of a co-operative, consultative, non-
threatening approach to safety representatives by management, for 
example on safety committees, may convince safety representatives 
of management's commitment to health and safety. Safety represen-
tatives may also be aware that instead of having to negotiate in 
order to get things done they receive the support of management 
without resorting to confrontation. 
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With regard to the perceptions of safety representatives 
and supervisors of their health and safety roles, there was some 
similarity in this study between the responses of the two groups. 
The three most mentioned aspects of their work considered as 
important by safety representatives concerned general health, 
safety and welfare and inspecting and monitoring, and educating 
others. 68% of the safety representative responses fell into 
at least one of these three categories. 
Supervisors were asked what they considered to be the most 
useful contribution to safe working that could be made by super-
visory staff, and 63% of their responses concerned inspecting 
and monitoring and educating others. 
As inspecting and monitoring are essential aspects of 
self-regulation, it is encouraging that a large number of trade 
union representatives and management in this study identify these 
procedures as important components of their health and safety roles. 
One major complaint from supervisors was the lack of authority 
vested in them by the Local Authority in spite of their legal 
responsibility for health and safety in their workplace. This 
meant that they coul d not effectively enforce safety rules, for 
example with regard to workers wearing protective clothing, and 
this resulted in feelings ofwustration. The lack of authority 
felt by supervisors is well documented in the literature with 
regard to areas other than health and safety and the findings of 
this study reinforce previous findings. 
One point that emerged from this project is the reported 
lack of contact between safety representatives and the HSE 
Inspectorate. However, over the last five years, because of 
financial cutbacks affecting the HSE, there are fewer inspectors 
available to make inspections and organisations may not receive 
a visit from an inspector for a considerable time. As a result 
there may be fewer opportunities for safety representatives to 
accompany inspectors or to receive copies of reports they may make 
to management. 
Chapter Eleven described some of the effects of the present 
economic recession upon the part played by safety representatives, 
safety committees and supervisors in self-regulation in health 
and safety. Shortage of money for improvements and job insecurity 
have served to weaken the influence upon management of all three 
'agents' of self-regulation, although these effects are only 
recently beginning to percolate to the public sector, the private 
sector having been subject to these constraints for some time. 
12.2 Conclusions 
In the process of attempting to assess the effectiveness 
of self-regulation and the operation of some of its 'agents', it is 
too simplistic to look at the organisation being studied as though 
it existed in a vacuum. One of the main benefits of a case study 
approach is that there is an opportunity to make a detailed exam-
ination of one organisation, which should provide information 
regarding the context both internal and external in which that 
organisation functions. 
Dunlop (1958) stated that an industrial relations system 
could be considered as a sub-system of society. He then showed 
how interactions between elements of the environmental context 
affected the working of the various sub-systems. 
It is proposed to take a similar approach adapted to the 
smaller unit of one organisation in trying to clarify the main 
conclusions in this study. The context within which an 
organisation functions is complex and it impinges in important 
ways upon its functioning. The effectiveness of the operational-
isation of self-regulation in the Local Authority studied is 
affected by several factors, some internal and some external to 
the organisation. Each of these types of factors may interact 
with one another and they are dynamic over time. For example, 
between the time of collecting the data on this project and writing 
up the results, the economic recession has had effects which may 
have led to different results in some aspects of the study if the 
data had been collected now. 
Figure 12.1 shows some of the internal and external factors 
which are interrelated and interacting and all may be hypothesised 
to affect the effectiveness of joint self-regulation of health and 
safety in the Local Authority. 
Gouldner (1954) described the importance of the organisational 
structure on the operationalisation of safety rules. The Local 
Authority was considered to closely fit Gouldner's model of 
Representative Bureaucracy. The Local Authority may also 
exhibit other forms of bureaucratic functioning, but it was 
elected to study the Representative Bureaucracy pattern as it was 
hypothesised that this would provide a closer fit than either Mock 
Bureaucracy or Punishment-Centred Bureaucracy. 
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Violation of the safety rules is seen by management in a 
Representative Bureaucracy as unintentional and due to carelessness 
or lack of training, and joint support of these rules is buttressed 
by mutual participation in initiation of the rules and by the 
education of workers and management. Day-to-day participation 
of the workers, for example through safety meetings, gives workers 
some control over the initiation and administration of the rules. 
Solidarity develops between management and workers through 
their mutual acceptance of the safety programme rather than their 
joint rejection of it. 
The organisational structure of the Local Authority being 
typical of a bureaucracy, was considered to be one reason for a 
lack of reported conflict over health and safety. One of the many 
characteristics of a bureaucracy which were discussed in Chapter 
Ten is a proliferation of rules and procedures. In a bureaucracy, 
impersonal rules are substituted for personal contact in cases of 
conflict between superiors and the subordinates they are trying to 
control. Sticking to the rules and going through channels may be 
used as delaying tactics to avoid confronting conflict. In 
bureaucracies there exists a well-developed committee system, for 
example joint consultative committees, which meant that the setting 
up of safety committees was not as much of an innovation as it may 
have been in the private sector. Lack of overt conflict and a 
joint consultative approach together with highly structured bargain-
ing procedures all serve to increase the effectiveness of joint self-
regulation. 
The industrial relations climate is, as mentioned above, 
reasonably free from overt conflict with few industrial disputes in 
evidence. Unionisation is encouraged in the Local Authority and 
the main strategies used by management and safety representatives 
appear to be either consultation or a mixture of consultation and 
negotiation. There is little evidence of the need for safety 
representatives to use a purely negotiating strategy. 
This may be the result of the third internal factor to be 
examined - the degree of senior management commitment to health 
and safety. On the whole, both safety representatives and super-
~isors see management in the Local Authority to be considerably 
committed to health and safety. Senior management chair safety 
committees and recommendations put to senior management are 
usually followed through. A committed senior management can set 
an example to those lower down the hierarchy in the organisation. 
When management are seen to have positive attitudes to health and 
safety, safety representatives do not need to play the role of 
management pressuriser as often as they otherwise would. It can 
be seen therefore that senior management commitment facilitates 
joint self-regulation of health and safety in an organisation. 
At the time of collecting data for the present study, 
budgetary constraints were not considered to have a strong effect 
upon the effectiveness of self-regulation although the point that 
there was not enough money to attend to everything at once was made 
by management. This implied the need for a system of priorities 
which I did not hear seriously challenged by safety representatives 
when the point was raised at safety committee meetings. However, 
over the last two years there have been reductions in the rate 
support grant to local authorities as part of the cutback in 
public spending by the Government. At the time of writing, Irate-
capping' is being discussed by Parliament which would further 
reduce the autonomy of local government. The departments which 
were studied in the Local Authority, all received the requested 
safety budget each year without too much pressure being necessary. 
However, it is suggested that at the present time this situation 
may have changed. Budgetary constraints may have a detrimental 
effect on joint self-regulation as safety representatives become 
discouraged when points they raise with management are no longer 
acted upon and they can see that the necessary funds are no longer 
forthcoming. Once safety representatives become disillusioned or 
apathetic, joint self-regulation may be replaced by unilateral 
self-regulation with the onus falling upon management alone. 
The four internal factor which has an effect on joint self-
regulation is the system of payment which is used in the organisa-
tion. In the Local Authority there is a bonus scheme in operation 
for a large proportion of its employees. Approximately half of 
both the safety representative respondents and the supervisor respon-
dents felt that a bonus scheme works against safe working. They 
gave examples where employees take short cuts and rush in order to 
save time so that they can earn maximum bonus. 
There is empirical evidence to support the association between 
piecework and industrial accidents (Wrench 1972; Wrench and Lee 
1982). This situation may mean that some safety representatives 
are not playing a full part in joint self-regulation of health and 
safety. They may be under pressure from co-workers not to report 
to management infringements of safety rules which occur as a result 
of attempts to maximise earnings. Indeed the safety representa-
tive himself may experience considerable conflict when he has 
financial commitments to meet which necessitate him taking home a 
certa ins UIr of money each week. 
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If there is a payment-by-results system in an organisation it 
is possible that safety representatives may be adversely affecting 
the effectiveness of joint self-regulation of health and safety 
if they succumb to pressure from workmates to 'turn a blind eye' 
to unsafe practices. 
With regard to the external factors which affect joint self-
regulation of health and safety, only a few of the main factors a~ 
mentioned here. The legal framework within which an organisation 
operates will affect the ways in which joint self-regulation of 
health and safety is put into action. For example, the HASAWA 
(1974) and the SRSC Regulations which followed, introduced the 
innovative new role of safety representative. One of the effects 
of the EPA (1975) amendment which stated that safety representatives 
must be trade union-appointed was the encouragement of collective 
bargaining over health and safety. The Regulations applying to 
safety committees encouraged consultation and co-operation between 
trade unions and employers, so it is not surprising that there is 
evidence in the Local Authority of a 'two-pronged attack' on the 
elimination of reduction of hazards in the workplace - that is by 
means of consultation or negotiation or a combination of both. 
These strategies, which exemplify both the unitary and pluralist 
perspectives of industrial relations, all have a part to play in 
self-regulation and between them should increase its effectiveness, 
rather than the use of only one approach to solving the problems of 
accident and disease reduction. 
The balance of power between trade unions and employers, which 
is another external factor, will both affect and be affected by the 
legislation which is passed by Government. Public opinion has a 
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part to play through the media, for example if fears are expressed 
that the trade unions are too powerful, the Government of the day 
may see electoral advantage in curbing that power. Indeed the 
media have an influence upon the Government in their own right. 
During periods of high employment, the trade unions have more 
power than when unemployment is high. When the Government needed 
trade union support to try to curb inflation, the Social Contract 
resulted in legislation, favourable to the trade unions. This 
legislation, together with increasing influence of trade unions 
resulted in increased worker participation and was instrumental in 
helping to make joint self-regulation in health and safety more 
effective. However, in the last two years, unemployment has risen 
as the economic recession has produced changes in the industrial 
base in Britain. Although at the present time, local authorities 
have not been affected by redundancies, the trade unions have 
undoubtedly lost some bargaining power and the balance of power 
is tipping back towards management. Loss of trade union power has 
had the effect of reducing power-based worker participation and 
therefore is likely to reduce the effectiveness of joint self-
regulation of health and safety. The present economic recession 
and high levels of unemployment have meant not only that there is 
less money available for maintenance and replacement of plant and 
machinery, but also an understandable pre-occupation with job 
security among the workforce. Workers and their representatives 
are reluctant to raise health and safety issues if they fear 
being labelled as 'trouble-makers ' and having their jobs put at risk. 
Safety representatives may be opting out of joint self-regulation 
and leaving the entire responsibility for setting and monitoring 
of health and safety standards to management. 
The internal factors, some of which are described above, 
which all interact with each other, have a direct effect on self-
regulation in the Local Authority. However, the external 
factors, which interact with these internal factors, also have an 
important if more 1.ndi rect effect upon how successful joint sel f-
regulation of health and safety is in this Local Authority. 
12.3 Recommendations for further research 
This project has indicated at various points that there are 
important differences between the public and private sectors of 
British industry and it is not proposed to describe these again 
here. However, it would be useful for a comparison to be made 
of the effectiveness of self-regulation in organisations from a 
variety of industries in both sectors. The effects of the present 
economic recession on safety standards could be described and it 1S 
hypothesised that there may be significant differences, with the 
private sector being more adversely affected by lack of resources 
than the public sector because of the influence of the profit motive 
on the former. Other factors which may affect safety standards 
reflect the different industries, the strength of the trade unions 
involved, and the prevailing traditions in the individual organisa-
tions. It would be very difficult to match organisations from 
both sectors to control for the influence of factors on health and 
safety. In addition to the factors mentioned above, size and 
location of the organisations could be matched. 
The fieldwork for the present study was inititated within two 
years of the introduction of the SRSC Regulations and a further 
study after ten years or so could show whether the initial 
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enthusiasm and impetus will be maintained. Will safety represen-
tatives still be attending either introductory safety training 
courses or refresher courses? Will they be carrying out inspections 
and monitoring standards in their workplace and feel that they can 
report hazards which will then be dealt with by management? Will 
safety committees still be meeting regularly and making recommenda-
tions for improvements whi ch are then implemented? Wi 11 senior mana-
gers be attending meetings and demonstrating their commitment to 
health and safety? 
It is now a decade since the introduction of the HASAWA and it 
is possible that in the next decade safety representatives, having 
made some impact by instigating improvements, may find it difficult 
to maintain the momentum and may 'sit back' not make efforts for 
further improvements or even ensure the maintenance of present 
standards. There is evidence that the trade unions are consoli-
dating present health and safety standards. They are continuing 
to "deve10p training, infonnation and propaganda activities even 
if they are not expanding their health and safety departments. 1I 
(HSIB March 1983, page 2) 
Management may eel that health and safety improvements made 
in the late 1970s were made on a 'once and for all basis' and that 
they do not expect to have to continue with an ongoing se1f-
examination of the standards prevailing in their organisation. 
The hypothesised model described in Chapter Nine which was 
adapted from the Lewis consensus and conflict models, was partly 
based on the findings from this project but is partly speculative. 
Further work would be required to test it empirically to see if 
both consultation and negotiation are used as routes in an attempt 
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to reduce the hazards that lead to accidents. 
A model is essentially a series of hypotheses about behaviour 
within a system and some attempt should be made to test and vali-
date the model. However, if the only acceptable systems models 
were those which others could not succeed in falsifying, then 
modelling may become a little used technique. This is because 
the subject matter of modelling is so complex, and the extent of 
the knowledge base about human activity systems is less than fully 
adequate. Therefore the systems model is unlikely to withstand 
attempts to falsify it. 
Although a model that has not been validated has limited use-
fulness with regard to drawing general conclusions, it can still 
provide an interesting and instructive view of one case. I would 
submit that in this project, which is entirely based in one 
organisation, the model shown in Figure 9.5 is an attempt to 
illustrate some of the empirical findings from this particular study. 
The model has not been generated to make predictions about how a 
system will behave under different circumstances but to communicate 
ideas about the sys tern du ri ng one pe ri od inti me and to provi de 
insights into how the different elements of the system interact. 
There are three approaches to the problem of validation of 
models which are described below and any rigorous attempt to 
validate a systems model should include elements of all three. 
With the Rationalist Approach, a model is seen as a system of 
logical deductions from a series of premises whose 'truth ' is 
unquestionnable. The basic underlying assumptions must be 
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identified. Some of the main assumptions are based on the two 
models by Lewis (1977). For example, that trade unions - through 
their representatives, and management are both attempting to 
reduce hazards. Also that the safety committee is given safety 
representative reports and information on accident statistics and 
trends. We must ask if the assumptions that factors such as lack 
of resources, lack of training and unsafe working conditions 
contribute to hazards is true. The model assumes that external 
factors such as economic constraints and legislation affect both 
the safety committee and JCCs, that is the consultative machinery 
of the organisation, and also the process of negotiation. The 
model also assumes that negotiation, consultation and a mixture of 
the two are used to tackle the same problem, that is, the reduction 
of hazards. 
In order to test this model, all of the above underlying 
assumptions would have to be identified in order to then go on to 
test them. 
In the second approach to validation, the Empiricist Approach, 
there is a refusal to accept any assumptions however basic unless 
they can be independently verified and supported by empirical 
evidence. A priori assumptions underlying the model must be 
looked at and an attempt made to verify empirically one or more of 
its basic assumptions. 
Empirical data already exist which show the existence of safety 
committees and JCCs which discuss safety matters. There is also 
evidence of the use of both consultative and negotiating strategies 
and a mixture of both by management and trade union representatives. 
Further investigations could be made however, for example to find 
out whether external influences affect both negotiation and 
consultative machine~ and if so, to what extent each is influenced. 
Do the factors, some of which have already been identified, 
actually contribute to hazards and if they do, can negotiation and 
consultation or a mixture of the two strategies help to eliminate 
or reduce these hazards? Which strategy is seen by the parties 
to be most effective? It may also be interesting to find out 
whether the same individuals (shop stewards and safety representa-
tives) are involved with both negotiation and consultative 
machinery in the workplace, or if different individuals are involved 
in each case. 
The Predictive Approach to validation is concerned with the 
ability of the model to predict the behaviour of the dependent 
variables, for example, reduction of hazards, included in the 
model. Goodness of fit between the predictions of the model and 
the actual situation should be as close as possible. This type 
of approach is more relevant to the type of quantitive model 
produced by economists. However, it may be possible to compare 
the speculative relationships within the model with the 'real-life' 
situation existing in the actual organisation. 
This project has shown that at the time of collecting data, 
safety representatives and safety committees appeared to be 
reasonably effective agents of self-regulation in this Scottish 
Local Authority. Supervisors were well trained but felt a lack 
of authority to enforce the rules, and were aware of the conflict 
they sometimes experienced between insisting on safe working and 
facilitating the maximum earnings of those workers on bonus system 
payments. 
This is one of the few detailed studies of self-regulation of 
health and safety in an organisation in the public sector and has, 
hopefully, highlighted some of the important differences between 
this sector, and the private sector where most previous research 
work has been done. 
It would be interesting to see similar work done in other 
areas of the public sector in the future, with a view to comparing 
the findings with those from this study where the research was 
conducted over a very interesting period in economiclsocial and 
political tenns. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 
THE LOCAL AUTHORITY STUDIED 
. The Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 was designed to 
brlng the conduct of local affairs into line with present day 
needs. 
In order to make Scottish local government effective a 
major reorganisation took place in 1975. This process i~ 
often referred to as 'Regiona1isation' because the old 
authorities were abolished and 'the Region' became the new 
main local authority. 
The functions of four cities, 21 large burghs, 176 small 
burghs, 22 counties and 196 districts were handed over in May 
1975 to new councils elected to administer Scotland as nine 
Regions and 53 Districts with special provision for Orkney, 
Shetland the Western Isles. There is now a two-tier system 
of local government in Scotland. 
1. Regional Authorities are responsible for large scale 
services such as Education, Social Work, Fire Brigade, 
Water Supplies, Public Transport, Registration of Births, 
Marriages and Deaths, Valuation for Rating, Electoral 
Registration, Drainage and Roads. 
2. District Authorities are responsible for those services 
more efficiently administered at a more local level such 
as - Housing, Parks, Environmental Health, Public Libraries, 
Museums and Art Galleries, Licensing and Burial Grounds. 
This reorganisation was on an enormous scale and was a 
formidable task, the results of which have not been without 
criticism. However, we are now well into the second four-
year period of this method of organisation and some of the 
initial confusion felt by the public has been overcome and 
some of the problems of the division of tasks and responsib-
ilities between Regions and Districts have been clarified 
and discussed. 
This project is based on a Scottish Regional Authority 
and this Appendix provides some information about the Region 
concerned and about the responsibilities of the various 
departments of the Local Authority. The four departments; 
in which the implementation of the Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1974 will be looked at in detail, will be more fully 
described later. 
The Region concerned covers a ~opulat~on ?f 754,009 and 
it occupies an area of 677 square m,les wh,ch ,~clu?es lndust-
rial areas and also rich farming country. A C1ty 1S also 
part of the geographical area served by the Regional Council. 
The Regional Council is comprised of 49 elected members -
the councillors, whose leader is known as the Convenor, beins 
nomin2ted by the e1ected members. 
Councillors, as the elected representatives of the people 
decide on policy. Officers, the paid employees of the local ' 
authority, carry into effect the councillors' policy decisions 
However, in practice, senior officers are closely involved in . 
giving advice on matters of policy. 
Councillors are citizens drawn from the community who are 
paid al1~ances for their.counci1 work but no regular salary. 
The councl110rs are organlsed on a party basis, and the Council 
itself is.the supreme decision-making body of the Authority. 
The Councl1 normally meets every three weeks. Its purpose is 
to discuss.and formu1ate.po1icy and ~t also permits public 
debate of lssues concernlng the serVlces which the Council 
provides to the community. 
Elections to the Regional Council first took place in 1974 
and are to be held every four years thereafter. The Council 
is assisted in its work by a system of committees. 
THE COMMITIEES 
Policy and Resources Committee - This committee is made up 
of 15 councillors and its membership reflects the current 
po 1 i ti ca 1 power of the rul i ng party wi thi n the Counci 1 . It 
normally meets once every three weeks. Its main functions are: 
1. To advise the Council on policy objectives and 
priorities and the allocation and control of financial, 
manpower and land resources. 
2. To review the effectiveness of the Council's policies 
and the standards and level of service provided, the 
organisation and management processes of the Council, 
the committee and departmental structures and the 
distribution of functions and responsibilities. 
3. To co-ordinate the activities of the other committees. 
4. To consider new policies or changes in policy 
formulated by other committees and the effect of 
such matters on the policy plan or resources of the 
Council, and when required, to advise the Council 
on the necessity for major changes in policy. 
Resource Committees 
There are three Resource Committees: 
1. Finance 2. Manpower 3. Planning and Development. 
The Finance Committee is made up of 11 councillors while the 
Manpower and Planning and Development Committees have l~ 
councillors. The Resource Committees are each responslble for 
preparing plans and budgets for the management of the r:sourc: 
for which they are each responsible. The Finance CO~1ttee 1S 
responsible for finance management, The Manpower.Comm1ttee for 
the management of the labour force, and the Plann1n~ and D:velop-
ment Committee for the management of land use and 1ndustr1al 
development. 
Service Committees 
There are six service committees, each responsible for a 
major type of service which the Council provides to the community 
- Education, Social Work, Leisure Services. Water and Drainage, 
Transportation, General Purposes. The Service Committees study 
the needs of the community in respect of each particular service 
look at possible ways of meeting these needs, and make their ' 
recommendations to the Council. They have delegated power to 
make decisions concerning their particular service in many 
instances. Once a particular policy has been agreed by the 
Council, the appropriate service committee prepares detailed 
plans for carrying it out, and ensures that these are carried 
out effectively. 
THE MANAGEMENT OF THE REGIONAL COUNCIL 
The Regional Council employs over 35,000 people and it is 
managed on a departmental basis under the leadership of the Chief 
Executive who is the head of the administration and management of 
the services provided to the community. He is responsible for 
the effective implementation of the Council's policies and 
programmes. In doing so, he must also make sure that the human, 
physical and financial resources available to the Council are used 
to maximum effect to meet the political will of the elected Council. 
The Chi ef Executi ve reports to the Counci 1 through the Pol i cy 
and Resources Committee, advises the Council on matters of policy 
and makes recommendations for improvements in the administration 
and management of the Council's services. The Executive Office 
gives advice and assistance to the Chief Executive in carrying out 
a wide range of duties and keeps him fully informed of important 
matters as they arise. The Executive Office comprises the Chief 
Executive and Directors of Administration, Finance and Policy 
Planning. 
Each major council service or group of related services is 
administered by a department, each headed by a Chief Officer known 
as the Director who has a Depute. The Region's management team 
consists of the Directors of all the Council departments and is 
headed by the Chief Executive. It is the central point at 
official level where the Council's services are co-ordinated and 
controlled and is an example of corporate management. The 
management team examines plans put forward by the various ~ervice 
Directors for the running of their department so that posslble 
alternatives can be examined and any adjustments or improvements 
made before they are carried out. 
There are two basic types of departments within the Regional 
Counci 1: 
1 . Service departments which a~e each respons~ble for 
providing a particular serv~ce to the publlC, such as 
Public Transport and Educatlon. 
2. Central Support Services which are. each responS't·ble 
for providing services t? the Se~v,ce Departmen s, 
such as Finance and PubllC Relatlons. 
The Regional Council had a budget i~ :x~e~s of £250 milli~n. 
in 1979 to provide for its major r~spons'bll't,es such as ~rovld'ng 
education, social wor~ water suppl,es and a transport serVlce. 
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE REGIONAL DEPARTMENTS 
Administration Department is based at the Regional Council 
Headquarters and it provides a wide range of services to 
coun~illors ~nd offi~ials. .It looks after ~embersl library 
and lnformatlon serVlces, whlle several enqulry offices run by 
the department provide information to the public on regional 
services. Keeping minutes of committees and noting their 
decisions are functions of the committee division, while a 
printing section supplies agendas and minutes to keep both 
councillors and officials informed. 
A legal division deals with the conveyancing involved in 
the purchase and sale of land and properties, the legal formal-
ities in Council contracts and it also represents the Council 
in the Sheriff Court and at Tribunals. The legal division has 
a part to play in promoting local orders and by-laws. 
A personnel section carries out a wide range of tasks 
relating to Council employees and is divided into four sections. 
The staff administration section deals with salaries, wages and 
conditions of service and provides a link between the department 
and various committees. The Manpower Planning section provides 
manpower statistics and comments on their implications, develops 
systems and planning procedures, assists in review of salary 
grading, manning levels and organisational structures. The 
Industrial Relations Section is charged with establishing sound 
industrial relations procedures, developing effective consultative 
machinery, assisting in labour relations and all aspects of 
industrial relations legislation. The Training and Staff 
Development Section is responsible for the development of 
effective training and staff development programmes both centrally 
and within the departments of the Council. 
The Registrar, via a chain of Registry Offices, is respon-
sible for the registration of births, deaths and marriages and for 
compiling statistics for transmission to Central Government. 
The Department of Administration has overall control of 
several specialists - the Public Relations Officer, the Medical 
Adviser and the Public Analyst. 
Architectural Services is a department responsible for the 
quality and control of the Council IS buildings ~nd maintenanc: 
programme. The Region owns over 3,000 ~ropert1es, BOO of.whlCh 
are major buildings requiring regular ma1ntena~ce and repa1r: . 
The repair budget for Regional establishments 1S about £6~ m:ll:on 
and there is an annual building programme in excess of £20 m1ll1on. 
Assessor and Electoral Registration Officer 
The two main responsibilities undertaken by this departmen~ 
are preparation of the valuation roll, showing owners and occup1ers 
of every property, including land in the Region, and the annual 
preparation of the Register of Electors. 
The Children's Panel 
The operation of the Children's hearings which took over the 
work of the old style juvenile courts is a Regional function and 
is headed by the Reporter. Children who are either alleged to 
have committed offences or who are in need of protection are 
referred to the Reporter who will arrange for a hearing by three 
members of the Panel. This section works closely with the 
Department of Education and Social Work. 
Consumer Protection 
.This d~partment monitors commercial activity for quantity, 
qua11ty, prlce and safety backed by 22 Acts of Parliament 
commencing with the original Weights and Measures Act of 1879. 
Consumer protection provides a comprehensive advice service from 
an Advice Centre and there is a mobile caravan that tours main 
shopping centres throughout the Region. 
The Education Department is the largest department of the 
Regional Council with a revenue budget of more than £133 million 
in 1979 and over 20,000 people of whom 10,500 are teachers. The 
department is responsible for 48 secondary schools, 245 primary 
schools, 44 nurseries and 28 special schools for the handicapped. 
These accommodate a total of 140,000 children. Six colleges of 
Further Education are run by the Department and these provide for 
about 6,000 full-time and 11,000 day release students on a wide 
variety of courses. A new concept in education is the school and 
community complex and the Region has three such facilities. The 
department also runs 75 committee centres as well as six outdoor 
education centres outwith the Region geographically. 
Estate Surveyor provides a service to the Regional Council 
regarding the purchase, lease, development, disposal and approp-
riation of land and property belonging to the Council. 
The Finance De~artment is responsible for the provision of 
general and spec;allst services to all departments as well as to 
councillors. It is responsible for the Regional Council budget 
which exceeded £250 million in 1979. The Department deals with 
the payment of all creditors and contractors as well as employees' 
wages and salaries and pensions. Revenue finance, capital 
finance and rates collection are handled by this Department which 
houses a computer which services not only the needs of the 
Regional Council but also those of other authorities, 
Leisure Services 
Along with the District Councils, thi~ Departme~t is closely 
involved in promoting all forms of recreatlon a~d lelsure 
activities for residents and tourists. For thlS purpose,the 
Department is divided into three divisions: culture and lnter-
national tourism; recreation; nature resources. 
The Department of Physical Planning 
Strategic planning is now a major Regional function and the 
Department of Physical Planning is responsible for the production 
of a framework of proposals for land use, the development and 
improvement of the environment, and for the management of traffic. 
The first structure plan, an obligation of the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act of 1973, concentrates on the pattern of settlement, 
location of industry and employment, mobility of the population 
and transport and on the use of the countryside. 
Polic~ Planning is a central service that co-ordinates the 
forward thl nki ng of all departments on aspects of Counci 1 work and 
advises on priorities. Co-ordination of transport policies and 
control of urban deprivation programmes are among the other 
functions of this department. 
The Social Work De~artment is the second larqest Department 
in the Region and in 19 9 its expenditure was £36 million and it 
employs 8,000 people. It is a very complex department and 
provides a service of social welfare advice, financial support, 
domiciliary care and residential care. Assistance includes 
marriage guidance, daycare for children and support of play groups, 
holidays for children and supervision of children in trouble. 
The Department also runs a sheltered workshop for blind and 
severely disabled people and a hostel for recovering alcoholics. 
A social work team is based at the prison in the area. 
Joint Functions 
The Fire and Police services are administered jointly between 
the local authorities concerned through joint boards. 
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THE FOUR DEPARTMENTS IN THE STUDY 
The four departments which were studied in this project are 
described below in some detail. 
The Water Supply Services and the Drainage Department are 
administered by the Water and Drainage Committee, and the High-
ways and Transport departments are administered by the Transport-
ati on Commi ttee. 
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS 
The Highways Department employs around 1,500 people and 
covers a large geographical area. The Department is divided 
into six sections, namely Highway Maintenance Project, Transport-
ation and Highway Planning, Traffic Management, Administration 
and Lighting. 
Highway Maintenance 
All roads in the region, including motorways and trunk roads 
which extend to 2,000 miles are maintained by this section. 
Work is carried out by both direct labour and under contract. 
As well as the building of new roads, schemes for improvements to 
existing roads are also prepared. The staff are based in four 
sub-regional offices with co-ordination carried out by a small 
group from Headquarters. 
Within this group there is also an independently organised 
section under the Works Controller who is responsible for all 
direct labour working on roads. Planning and control are the 
responsibility of the Works Controller. 
Projects 
In this section there is a rolling programme of a variety 
of highway schemes which includes planning, design and supervision. 
The programme derives from the Transport Policies and Programme 
which is prepared annually to the Transportation Planning Section 
in accordance with the requirements of the Scottish Development 
Department on trunk roads. 
Transportation and Highway Planning 
This section is involved with the preparation of reports 
for the Council to formulate transportation policy, and to . 
translate this policy into practice. As well as th: preparatlon 
of the Transport Policies and Programme document, t~1S also . . 
involves the organisation of surveys and the ana~y~ls of.statlstlcs 
employing computer techniques. There is.also l~alson wlth 
Physical Planning in the preparation of hlghway lnput to the 
Development Plan, the Structure Plan and local plans. 
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Traffic Management 
This section is involved with the preparation of traffic 
signal schemes, some of which are now fully computerised 
parking control schemes, but priority schemes, environme~tal 
traffic management schemes and various types of Traffic Control 
Orders in co-operation with the Police and Legal Departments . 
. . Also ~ealt with are all traffic signs, carriageway markings, 
sltlng of lslands and bus stops and road safety in general. 
Pedestrianisation schemes are also being prepared. 
Administration 
This section carries out the usual administration functions 
for the department and it is here that the Director, Senior 
Managers and Safety Officer are based. 
Lighting Department 
It is fairly unusual for a Highways Department to incorporate 
lighting as one of its responsibilities. Half of the workforce 
are employed on the contracting work done to maintain Regional 
property, for example, re-wiring a school. The other half of 
the workforce are responsible for the maintenance of street 
lighting and the flood lighting of public buildings. 
There are depots in each of the sub-regions covered by the 
Department and there are large workshops at the depot within the 
city. Here a variety of work takes place, for example maintenance 
of plant belonging to the Department such as diggers and rollers. 
There is a paint area where road signs are given a luminous 
surface and park furniture is repaired and painted. In the 
blacksmith's shop, barriers for pavements are made along with road 
signs of all sizes - very large ones being needed for the stretch 
of motorway included in the geographical area concerned. In the joiner's shop, cabins and toilets used by mobile squads of workers 
are repaired as they are often damaged by vandals. Also at this 
depot there can be seen large stockpiles of grit and salt ready to 
load on to gritters which operate in icy weather. A 24-hour 
radio service is based here which receives weather reports and 
can quickly get gritters on to the road if bad weather is forecast. 
There is a large store area containing protective clothing such as 
fluorescent jackets, boots and overalls as well as several 
different types of tools. An outside area stores large quantities 
of items such as pavement slabs. 
An old depot has been turned into a training s~hool and a 
training officer and two instructors have been appolnted. A class 
of sixteen school leavers attend a training course lasting for two 
years which covers excavation, spreading of materials, road. 
building, kerb laying, fencing and also the safety elements ~n t~ese jobs. The trainees also go on a day release course to obtaln Clty 
and Guilds certificates. 
The Department has two workin~ q~arries from which they obtain 
stone for construction and road bUlldlng. 
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DEPARTMENT OF DRAINAGE 
This Department is divided into four sub-regions and it 
carries out a variety of functions which are described below 
and which give employment to approximately 450 people. 
There are 33 sewage works of varying sizes throughout the 
area and there is a recently opened sewage disposal scheme which 
cost £35 million pounds to construct. The works have been 
built on a site reclaimed from the foreshore and sewage disposal 
is carried out by dumping at sea from a specially constructed 
ship. The function of this works is to collect, separate, 
treat and dispose of the sewage of the area. There is also a 
Trade Effluent section which regularly carries out checks to 
ensure that industry is not discharging any harmful substances 
into the drains. 
Other functions of the Department are coastal protection, 
prevention of flooding which entails the repair of sea walls, 
and the watching of rivers and streams. The Department is 
responsible in its area for the control of oil pollution. 
Small harbours along the coast are also kept in good order and 
not allowed to silt up. There is a management and operations 
group which is divided into five sections - including administration. 
The Department has similar hazards to others described in 
thfs study, such as excavations and lifting and handling. 
However, there are other dangers which do not exist in other 
departments such as the danger of coming into contact with 
untreated sewage which can cause diseases such as typhoid. 
There is a full programme of immunisation available for workers 
at risk, and rodent control has lessened the risk of leptospirosis 
from walking in sewers. Entry into confined spaces is probably 
the most hazardous procedure in the Department as there can be a 
build up of sewer gases which could rapidly overcome a man. 
For this reason full training is given into the use of breathing 
apparatus and resuscitation methods. The equipment also has to 
be inspected, serviced and maintained. Rescue techniques are 
also taught and practiced. The fact that these particular 
hazards are potentially so dangerous makes workers very aware of 
them and means that they occur rarely. 
In common with the Water Supply Services, the Drainage 
Department subscribes to the Nation~l Water Council a~d uses some 
of its training facilities. The Dlrector of the Dralnage 
Department has recently been appointed Chairman of th: Scott~sh 
Association of Directors of the Water and Sewage SerVlces WhlCh 
has a safety group with safety.o!ficers of. the relevant depart-
ments in Scottish local authorltles among ltS members. 
Because of the potential health haza~ds associated.with 
working with sewage and in sewers, ~here.ls more emphasls on 
medical requirements for employees ln th:s Department where good 
selection and training are particularly lmportant. 
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WATER SUPPLY SERVICES 
For 300 years there has been a department supplying drinking 
water to the area. Over the years the population of the area 
has i~creased and the area of countryside used for water suppliers 
has W1 dened. 
In 1967, there were a large number of water authorities in 
Scotland, some of which were very small. In order to rationalise 
this situation, water boards with considerable financial and 
technical resources were formed. The Local Government (Scotland) 
Act 1973 dissolved the water boards from May 1975 and the supply 
of water became the responsibility of the new Regional Authority. 
This is the reverse of the situation in England where there are 
large water boards. The supply of water in Scotland now came 
under the corporate management system of local authorities with 
its attendant rules and regulations and generally bureaucratic 
structure. 
The Water Supply Services pay an annual fee to the National 
Water Council which has some representatives in Scotland. In 
return the Department receive assistance with problems and 
publications. The National Water Council have a training centre 
at Kilwinning in Ayrshire to which employees of the Water Supply 
Services go to attend various courses. It is understandable in 
view of the history of water services described above that there 
is some feeling of identification with the National Water Council 
where relevant training can be undertaken and common problems 
discussed with members of other local authorities. 
Nearly 440 people are employed in the Water Supply Services 
Department to operate and maintain the existing works and 
distribution system, and to design and provide new works. The 
Department is grouped into a Headquarter's section and three 
operational sub-regions. 
The Regi on IS wa te r comes from 22 i mpoundi ng res ervoi rs, 19 
stream i nta kes and mo re tha n 260 s pri ngs . It is augmented by 
nine million gallons a day from the Water Board of another region 
of Scotland. Apart from the spring supplies which are of very 
good quality and only require to be chlorinated, all the water 
passes through one or other of the 14 treatment works operated by 
Water Supply Services. 
The vast majority of the 754,000 people who live in the 
region have water supplies on tap. Daily consumption in the 
region amounts to 57 million gallons (which in weight is more 
than a quarter of a million tons). This is equal to 75.5 gallons 
for every person every day of the year. About a third o! this 
water goes to commerce and industry: . After t~e water 1~ 
collected from springs and rivers, 1t 1S stored ln reserV01rs . 
and treated at filter stations and other works to ensure that 1t 
is wholesome and then it is finally delivered through hundreds of 
miles of piping to homes and business premises. 
The council has embarked on a multi-million pound.scheme 
which involves the building of a new reservoir to provlde an 
additional 22~ million gallons of water a day. 
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The water used by domestic consumers is paid for by means 
of the domestic and public water rate levied on the rateable 
value of the property. Commercial and industrial consumers 
have meters fixed to their supply pipes and are charged for the 
amount of water they use. 
There are several specialist sections of the Water Supply 
Services which are described below: 
Scientific 
To ensure that water delivered at consumers' taps is wholesome 
as required by law, the Department has a scientific section which 
continually samples and monitors the quality of the water before, 
during and after treatment. The staff also give advice on the 
operation of treatment plant and other aspects of the water supply 
- relating for example to chemistry, zoology and biology. 
Civil Engineering 
This section is responsible for the design of certain new 
works and for co-ordinating work carried out for the Department 
by consulting engineers. It investigates future water requirements 
and supervises the construction of filter stations, covered concrete 
service reservoirs and pipelines. 
Electrical/Mechanical Engineering 
Besides repairing and maintaining vehicles and mobile plant 
at their workshop, this section maintains electrical and mechanical 
plant at such places as reservoirs and filter stations. 
Plumbing Inspectors 
These are the experts who ensure that new plumbing installed 
in houses, factories and other buildings conforms to the 'By-laws 
for Preventing Waste, Contamination, etc. of Water'. They give 
advice where necessary to plumbers, architects and builders 
engaged in new plumbing work. 
Waste Detectors 
Many of the mains and service pipes for which the Department 
is responsible are old and regular checking is necessary to . 
ensure that there is no excessive wasting through leaks. ThlS 
is done through a waste inspection section specialising in the 
locating of leaks in underground mains, service pipes and the 
premises of consumers. 
Repairs to Mains and Services 
Repair squads based in the sub-regions ensure.t~a~ leaks and 
bursts in mains and services which are the responslblllty of the 
Department are repaired quickly. Generally, the ~epar~ent's 
responsibility ends at the boundary of the street ln WhlCh the 
main is laid. 
New Main Laying 
This section lays some of the new mains required for housing 
development and to reinforce the existing system. 
Administration/Finance 
Although some administrative and finance functions are 
centralised at the Regional Council Headquarters, Water Supply 
Services has an administrative/finance section responsible for 
the primary preparation of salaries and wates, operating 
incentive bonus schemes, costing, accounts and personnel functions. 
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC TRANSPORT 
The Transport Department is a large one with over 2,500 
employees whose main responsibility is to provide an efficient 
public transport system using a modern and well-maintained fleet 
of 600 buses and 1,000 ancillary vehicles. 
As the region is popular with tourists particularly during 
the summer months, the Transport Department is also responsible 
for the provision of a comprehensive tour bus service covering 
city tours and now being extended further into the surrounding 
areas. 
In order to ensure the smooth running of this public service, 
this large Department is divided into four functional units and 
into several geographical units. The four functional units are: 
The Planning Section 
Much planning is needed to co-ordinate public transport in 
the area. The regional buses, part of the Scottish bus group and 
also private transport firms all have a part to play in maintain-
ing an efficient system covering not only the city but also the 
outlying country areas which fall within the Regional Council's 
boundaries. 
One recent innovation within the city from the Planning 
Section has been the introduction of bus lanes which may not be 
entered by cars and which have made it easier for buses to keep 
to their timetables, especially during the morning and evening 
rush hours. 
The Commercial Section 
This includes such departments as Finance, Accounts, Revenue 
and Expenditure and Personnel which includes Welfare and Staff 
Development. 
Traffic Operations 
This Section is responsible for bus operations and.ensurin~ 
that buses run efficiently and to a timetable. There 1S a rad10 
control centre and all bus drivers keep in touch by radio as do 
inspectors in their vehicles. 
The Engineering Section 
There must be sufficient buses on the road to me:t the 
demands of a Region where over the years the bus serV1ces are 
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being used by increasing numbers of people. This may be due 
to the policy of 'freezing' bus fares for several years so 
making the use of public transport an attractive alternative 
for people travelling about the Region. 
The Engineering Department carry out repairs to buses 
(sometimes caused by vandals) and also carry out regular 
servicing to minimise the chance of breakdown of buses and 
disruption of timetables. 
The Transport Department is divided into eight main 
locations. The Head Office accommodates most of the 
administrative staff and the Director and General Manager are 
based here. 
In the main workshops several processes take place and 
there is a variety of machines. This workshop was classified 
as a factory before the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act and 
so could be inspected by the Factory Inspectorate. Some of 
the processes which take place in these workshops are: metal 
casting, forging, engine turning, wood-working, upholstering, a 
paint shop where buses are painted, a bus repair shop where 
buses are repaired after accidents or are made ready for 
re-certification. The radio control centre is also housed here 
and there is an administration block where the Chief Engineer is 
based. There are also three other workshops for servicing and 
repairing ancillary vehicles and three garages for routine 
maintenance and garaging of buses. New workshop premises have 
recently been purchased which will, among other things, house a 
Government bus testing station. 
? ! 
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I am at present engaged on a three year research project to examine how the 
Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) is being implemented in a Scottish 
Local Authority. In order to do this I am looking at four departments 
of Lothian Regional Council. 
I am particularly interested in the self regulatory aspects of health and 
safety and the important part that the safety representative plays in 
this area. I have drawn up a questionnaire which will be sent to all safety 
representatives in the four departments being studied. 
Before this can be done it is necessary to ensure that the questions asked 
are the right ones, that they make sense to practicing safety representatives 
and that they are clearly worded. 
To do this I am conducting a limited pilot study and it would be greatly 
appreciated if you could assist in this by completing the attached questionnaire 
Many of the questions require only a tick or a "yes" or "no" answer and the 
entire questionnaire will not take too much time to complete. 
It is not necessary for your name to appear on the questionnaire so you can 
be assured that any information will be strictly confidential. 
Thank you very much for your help. 
Ani ta Levinson. 
-
- . 
SAFETY REPRESENTATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE 
Please tick the boxes provided where appropriate. 
1. Which department do you work in? 
2. For how long have you worked in this department? 
3. To which trade union do you belong? 
4. Please give your age: 
20 or under 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
over 60 
5. For how long have you been a safety representative? 
6. Haw did you become a safety representative? 
(a) elected 
(b) appointed by a trade union 
(c) both (a) and (b) 
Were you: 
(d) if another method, please describe: 
-----------------------
7. Are you a shop steward as well as a safety representative? 
Yes 0 No Ii 
If "No", go to Ques tion 10. 
B. If "Yes", do you find that the two roles ever conflict? 
Yes Ii No o 
9. If you have experienced this conflict, can you give an example? 
/10. . . . 
. ? 
- . -
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10. Have you ever experienced conflict with a supervisor related to Health 
and Safety matters? 
Yes o No o 
11. If "Yes", can you give details about the last occasion this occurred? 
12. Are you a member of a safety conuni t tee? 
Yes o No II 
If "No", go to Question 22. 
13. If "Yes", are you a member of: 
(a) a sub-regional committee? 
(b) a departmental committee of J.C.C. on safety? 
(c) both of these? 
14. Do you feel that recommendations and points discussed by the safety 
committee(s) are followed up: 
(a) always 
(b) often 
(c) fairly often 
(d) never 
. , 
"---
15. What was the last major recommendation made by the safety committee, and 
what action was taken on it? 
16. Do the safety COlTlllittee to which you belong make inspections of the 
workplace? 
Yes o No o 
/17. . . . 
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17. If "Yes'; how frequently are inspections made? 
18. If "NO", why do you think they do not inspect? 
19. Do the safety committee(s) you are a member of discuss: 
(a) important issues n 
(give an example) : 
and/or (b) trivial pOints o 
(give an example) : 
20. Can you indicate your reaction to the following statements by ticking the 
relevan t boxes: 
(a) "Safety committees provide a genuine opportunity for management and 
employees to co-operate over Health and Safety". 
strongly agree 
agree 
disagree 
strongly disagree 
(b) "Safety corruni ttees provide an excuse for management to delay action 
on Heal th and Safety issues". 
strong ly agree 
agree 
disagree 
strongly disagree 
/21. . . . 
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21. Can you give any other views you wish to express about the functioning 
of safety committees? 
22. Have you been on a training course for safety representatives? 
Yes CI No D 
If "No", go to Question 25. 
23. If "Yes", please state which courses (s) you have attended: 
24. \,lhich aspects of the above course (s) have you found most useful in your 
or 
workplace? (please tick which ones) 
(a) hazard spotting skills 
(b) legal knowledge 
(c) accident investigation skills 
(d) negotiating skills 
(e) committee procedures 
(f) technical skills (e.g. sampling or monitoring the 
workplace environment) 
(g) please describe any other skills/knowledge that have 
proved useful: 
(h) none of the above has proved useful in my workplace 
25. Do you personally make safety inspections? 
Yes D No o 
If "No", go to Question 27. 
o 
/::'6. . . . 
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26. If "Yes", 
(a) How often do you inspect? 
(b) Who accompanies you? 
(c) Do you use a checklist? 
Yes I I No o 
27. If you do not make safety inspections, can you give reasons for this? 
28. Do you investigate accidents and dangerous occurrences which occur in 
the workplace? 
Yes o No D 
If "No", go to Question 31. 
29. If "Yes", can you give an example of a recent investigation you have ma.j~_? 
30. To whom do you send the report of your investigation? 
31. Has a Health and Safety Executive inspector ever visited your department? 
Yes [J No o Don't kno ...... o 
If "No" or "Don't know", go to Question 33. 
/ 32. . . . 
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32. If "Yes", 
(a) have you ever accompanied an inspector on an inspection? 
yes U no 0 
(b) has an inspector come to speak to you during his/her visi t? 
yes 0 no U 
(c) have you received a copy of an inspector's report after a visit? 
yes o no o 
(d) have you received a copy of any Improvement or Prohibition Notices 
served on your department? 
yes o no D don't know if any have been served 
33. Have you ever reported to the Health and Safety Executive something 
which is unsafe? 
yes o no I~ 
34. If "Yes", can you please give details: 
o 
35. What aspects of a safety representative's work do you see as being most 
important? 
36. What particular Health and Safety issues take up most of your time? 
/37. . . . 
3.7 
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37. When :11 th and Safety issues are raised do you feel you get the 
support of: 
Yes No 
(a) the people you represent? 
(b) management? 
(c) your trade union? 
(d) others (e.g. a local hazard group)? 
38. If the answer to any part of Question 37 is "No", could you give some 
further information. 
39. Have you ever been consulted by management on: 
40. 
Yes No 
(a) re-writing of the departmental safety policy? 
, 
(b) devising safe systems of work? 
I I ! (c) how to motivate the workforce? 
(d) some other subject to do with Health and Safety? (please describe) : 
On the last occasion you were approached by management on a Heal :.rJ 
Safety issue, what did the issue involve? 
41. What was the outcome? 
I ~'""\ '"1 L. • • • 
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42. Have you ever experienced any problems about: 
( a) getting time off to perform safety representative duties? 
yes I~ no I I 
If "Yes", please give details: 
(b) getting information on Health and Safety? 
yes o no o 
If "Yes", please give details: 
(c) getting on a training course? 
yes o no o 
If "Yes", please give details: 
(d) getting protective clothing or equipment for employees? 
yes no [] 
If "Yes", please give details: 
(e) any other aspects of safety representative functions? 
yes o no D 
I f "Yes", please give details: 
43. Is there a Bonus Scheme in operation in your workplace? 
yes o no o 
If "No", go to Question 45. 
44. If "Yes", what type of scheme is it? 
/ 
A -~ ~. . . . 
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45. "Some people feel that the bonus system works against f sa e working methods". 
Do you agree with this statement? 
Yes o No o 
46 If "Yes" I in what way do you f1' nd th b . e onus system contributes to unsafe 
practices or working conditions? 
47. Is the procedure for raising and pursuing Health and Safety issues at work 
the same as for the existing grievance procedure? 
Yes u No o 
If "No" I go to Question 49. 
48. If "Yes", how often is this procedure used for Health and Safety issues? 
(please tick one box) 
(a) often 
(b) occasi'onally 
(c) never 
49. If "No", how does the procedure differ? 
50. Are members of the workforce ever disciplined for breaches of Health and 
Safety practices in the workplace? (e.g. not wearing protective clothing) 
(a) often 
(b) sometimes 
(c) never 
51. Do you see your relationship with management mainly as: 
CONSULTATION is used where the basic aims of 
(a) consultative? trade unions and manaqement are held to be 
essentially similar. 
(b) negotiative? NEGOTIATION is uS0d where there is held to be 
(c) a mixture of both? a funuJmental di vergence of interests between 
the two parties. 
/52. . . . 
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52. Can you please add any further comments you may have on being a safety 
representative or on Health and Safety at work in general: 
Thank you very much for taking the trouble to complete this questionnaire. 
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Research Project on Health and Safety 
I am at present engaged on a three-year research project to examine how 
Ule Health and Safety at Work Act (1974) is being implemented in a Scottish 
~ocal Authority. In order to do this I am looking in detail at four departmen t.s 
~f Lothian Regional Council of which your department is one. 
It is important to try to get the views of people who supervise others as 
=.'ley play such an important part in maintaining a safe workplace. I have drawn 
lp a questionnaire which will be sent to all those who work in a supervisory 
:apacity in the four depar":men ts . A copy is enclosed wi th t.'"lis letter and I 
should be most grateful if yeu 'N'ould complete ':..'"le questonnaire and :"!I!t'...L.-:1 .::..-: 
:~ me in t..'1e ~nclosed st.am.pec, 3.cdres.sed envelope .. 
Many of the questions require only a tick or a "Yes" or "No" answer and 
to,e entire questionnaire will not take too muc..~ -:..i:ne to complete. 
Each ques~ionnaire is numbered so that I wilL. know which have been comp:eted. 
1owever, information from the questionnaires will be kept strictly confidential 
lnd individuals' identi ties 'N'ill be known only oy myself. 
I have been given full co-operation from people at all levels in ~~e four 
iepar'"J:lents and also from the trade unions, and I hope that t.'1e report whic.'1 
lill be produced will be of benefi t to all in providing in!or.nation on how Beal th 
lnd Safety is implemented in a Local Au~~ority. I therefore hope that you will 
)e able to assist in this project by completing and returning your questionnaire. 
tf you should wish to see a short summary of the results of this questionnaire, 
t should be pleased to send one to you when the work is .. completed. 
Thank you very much for your help. 
Anita Levinson 
SUPERVISORS' HEALTH AND SAFETY QUESTIONNAIRE 
-
Please tick the boxes provided where appropriate. 
1. In which Department do you work? 
2. Are you: 
( a) a chargehand 
(b) a foreman 
(c) a supervisor 
(d) a superintendent 
(e) if some other grading, please state 
3. For how long have you held this job in the department? 
4. Please give your age.: 
20 and under 
21-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-60 
61 and over 
S. Do you make safety inspections? 
Yes 
If "No", go to Ques tion 7. 
6. If "Yes" , 
o No 
(a) How often do you make safety inspections? 
(b) Who accompanies you? 
o 
/ (c) • • • 
(c) Do you use a checklist when making safety inspections 
always? 
sometimes? 
never? 
7. If you do not make safety inspections, can you give reasons for this? 
8. Do you investigate accidents and dangerous occurrences in the workplace? 
Yes [J No o 
If "No", go to Question 11. 
2 
9. If "Yes", can you give an example of a recent investigation you have made? 
10. To whom do you send the report of your investigation? 
11. Has a Heal th and Safety Executive inspector ever visi ted your department? 
Yes o No o Don't know D 
12. Have you ever reported to the Heal th and Safety Executive something which 
was unsafe? 
Yes o No o 
/:. 3. . . . 
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J. If "Yes", can you give details. 
,4. What particular Health and Safety responsibilities take up most of your time? 
.5. What do you consider to be the most useful contribution to safe working that 
can be made by supervisory staff?· 
l6. Have you ever experienced conflict wi th a safety representative over a Health 
and Safety issue? 
Yes o No D 
17. If "Yes", can you gi ve details of the last occasion when this occurred? 
18. Is there a bonus scheme in operation in your workplace? 
Yes o No o 
19. "Some people feel that a bonus scheme works against safe working methods." 
Do you ag ree? 
Yes o No o 
/20. . . . 
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If "Yes", in what way does the bonus system ib 20. contr ute to unsafe practices 
or working conditions in your workplace? 
21. Is the procedure for raising and pursuing Health and Safety issues at work 
the same as for existing grievance procedure? 
Yes o No D Don't know II 
-
If "NO", go to Question 23. 
22. If "Yes", how often is the procedure used for Health and Safety issues? 
(a) often 
(b) occasionally 
(c) never 
23. If "No", how does the procedure differ? 
24. Are members of the workforce ever disciplined for breaches of Health and 
Safety practices in the workplace? (e.g. not wearing protective clothing) 
(a) often 
(b) sometimes 
(c) never 
25. To what extent do you feel that senior management is committed to creating 
and maintaining safe working conditions in the department? 
(a) not committed 
(b) slightly committed 
(c) strongly committed 
26. Have you been on a training course involving Health and Safety? 
Yes o No o 
I f liN 0", go to Ques tion 29. 
- . -
I .... , -
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27. If "Yes", please state which course (s) you have attended. 
28. Which aspects of the above course(s) have you found most useful in your work 
as a supervisor etc? 
29. Are you a member of a safety committee? 
Yes o No o 
30. Can you indicate your reaction to the following statements by ticking the 
relevant boxes: 
Strongly Agree Disagree Strongly I 
agree disagree I 
(a) "Safety committees provide a 
genuine opportunity for manage-
I ment and employees to co-operate over Health and Safety" I 
(b) "Safety commi ttees provide an I 
excuse for management to delay I 
I action on Health and Safety I 
issues" ! 
31. Do you train workers in the Health and Safety aspects of their work? 
(a) Yes, all workers 
(b) Some of them 
(c) No, none of them 
32. If you ticked (a) or (b) in Question 31, can you give details of the tr~r.':':1g 
that you give? 
/33. . . . 
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33. Have you been consul ted when training programmes on Health and Safety were 
be ing dr awn up? 
Yes o No o 
34. Do you feel under pressure to keep up \\production" 
(a) often? 
, 
(b) sometimes? 
(c) never? 
35. When trying to maintain a safe workplace do you feel that you get the 
support of: 
(a) safety representatives? 
(b) the workers you supervise? 
(c) senior management? 
(d) the safety officer? 
Yes No 
please tick either 
"Yes" or "No" for 
each of (a) to (d) 
36. If the ans~er to any part of Question 35 is "No", can you give further 
information? 
37. Do you see your relationship with the trade unions on Health and Safety 
issues as: 
(a) consultative? 
(b) negotia ting? 
(0) a mixture of both 
CONSUL'l'ATION is used where the basic aims of 
trade unions and ma."1agemen": are held to be 
essentially similar. 
NEGOTIATION is used where there is he:d to be 
a fundamental divergence of interes~s betwee~ 
the two parties. 
>8. Can you please add any further comments you may have on YO'.1Y res:Jons~Li::"i'.:.':'e5 
/ as • . . . 
--
as a supervisor with regard to Health and Safety in the workplace: 
Thank you very much for 
Please return to: taking the trouble to complete this questionnaire. Mrs. Anita Levinson, 
Napier College of Commerce and Technology, 
Redwood House, 
16, Spylaw Road, 
Edinburgh 10. 
in the enclosed reply paid envelope. 
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